[Global NK Commentary] The 3-Stage Denuclearization Theory and the END Initiative: Issues and Limitations of the South Korean Government's Denuclearization Approach

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Introduction[1]

This article examines the impact of conceptual ambiguity in the denuclearization phasing theory and the 'END (Exchange–Normalization–Denuclearization) Initiative,' raised in the context of South Korea-U.S. North Korea policy in the second half of 2025, on policy consistency and deterrence credibility. Despite eight months having passed since the Trump administration's inauguration and four months since the Lee Jae-myung administration's inauguration, the absence of official North Korea and denuclearization strategy documents from both countries means that policy is being replaced by fragmented messages from summit remarks, interviews, and domestic and international speeches. Concurrently, North Korea, at the December 2023 plenary meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea, shifted its relations with South Korea to 'relations between two hostile states' and has repeatedly confirmed its stance, negating the very premise of dialogue through statements from the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024, Kim Yo-jong's remarks in 2025, and Kim Jong-un's speeches. Amidst these structural changes, a re-examination is needed to determine whether declarative phase distinctions, such as 'interim–reduction–dismantlement,' can drive actual deterrence and negotiation dynamics.

This paper addresses three core questions. First, it assesses the implications of the terminological and conceptual differences between the 'freeze–reduction–dismantlement' and 'interim–disarmament–complete denuclearization' approaches presented by the South Korean government for policy choices and mutual verification systems. Second, it examines how the U.S.'s multi-layered missile defense and institutionalization of extended deterrence (NCG), along with the strengthening of homeland defense symbolized by Executive Order 14186 ('The Iron Dome for America,' also known as 'Golden Dome'), asymmetrically interact with South Korea's security dilemma, particularly the direct threat posed by short- and medium-range nuclear capabilities like the KN-23. Finally, it investigates the risk that an approach linking 'interim measures' to compensation, in a situation where signs of operationalization of tactical systems tested by North Korea on the Ukrainian battlefield are confirmed, could lead to the solidification of de facto nuclear-state status and a verification vacuum.

To this end, the analysis utilizes statements by the South Korean president, speeches at the UN General Assembly, interviews, and materials from the Presidential Office. It also references U.S. executive orders, public defense-related materials, and Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports. Official documents and primary reports from North Korea, including those from the Supreme People's Assembly, the Workers' Party, and the Korean Central News Agency, were compared and analyzed.

Threat Environment and Policy Context

The current situation appears to be characterized by the presentation of uncoordinated individual statements and fragmented principles, rather than a clear set of principles from the South Korean government and a coordinated strategy between South Korea and the U.S. Firstly, the South Korean government's perception of North Korea's nuclear threat seems to be focused on the threat to the U.S. homeland rather than the threat to South Korea. On September 25 (local time), President Lee Jae-myung, in his remarks at the New York Stock Exchange, introduced the summit with President Trump held on August 25.[2] President Lee stated that he emphasized three points. First, that North Korea has nearly completed the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a nuclear weapon capable of striking the U.S. homeland. This implies a message that the U.S. must start dialogue with North Korea immediately to avoid its homeland being threatened. Second, he presented the possibility that North Korea is continuously producing about 15 to 20 nuclear bombs annually and exporting them. This also serves as a warning that if North Korea is not stopped, there is a risk of nuclear proliferation to terrorist groups, which the U.S. considers extremely sensitive. Third, he argued that stopping North Korea's ICBM and nuclear production capabilities would therefore yield 'significant security benefits.' The implication is that only Trump has the capability and will to stop North Korea, and thus negotiations should commence quickly. Notably absent from this emphasis was the existential threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons to South Korea, which is a grave concern for the security of the Korean Peninsula. Only the threat to the U.S. homeland, the capabilities for which are still uncertain, was highlighted. While President Lee's emphasis can be understood as an attempt to persuade Trump to engage in U.S.-North Korea dialogue, it is insufficient, as the U.S. still has leeway even if North Korea's capability to strike the U.S. is in the final development stage.

The current Trump administration is fully engaged in responding to China's nuclear buildup and aggressive nuclear strategy. Immediately after taking office, on January 27, President Trump signed Executive Order 14186, 'The Iron Dome for America,' later renamed by Trump as 'Golden Dome.'[3] The order outlines three policy directions: (1) deployment and maintenance of next-generation missile defense systems, (2) deterrence and defense against all foreign homeland aerial attacks, and (3) ensuring secure second-strike capabilities. To this end, the U.S. is strengthening its defenses against ballistic, hypersonic, and advanced cruise missiles, as well as next-generation aerial attacks. Specifically, it is accelerating the deployment of a space sensor layer for tracking hypersonic and ballistic missiles and developing and deploying space-based interceptors capable of interception during the boost phase. Furthermore, it is enhancing terminal-phase intercept capabilities to defend against high-value foreign targets (such as cities and civilian infrastructure) and expanding capabilities to neutralize missile attacks during the pre-launch and boost phases. Although there is debate about its feasibility, it is a fact that the U.S. is building a 'multi-layered defense network' to intercept missiles at various stages, including space, ground, and early launch. If this is the case, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S.'s advanced defense capabilities, aimed at China, provide sufficient response capabilities against North Korean ICBMs, the completion of which is still uncertain. Indeed, on September 24, the nominee for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of South Korea testified at his confirmation hearing that 'it appears that the re-entry capability of North Korean ICBM warheads has not been verified.'[4]

Unlike the U.S., which can be considered virtually secure due to its superior defense capabilities and formidable offensive power, South Korea is severely exposed to North Korean threats. In May 2019, while inter-Korean negotiations were actively underway and the South Korean Moon Jae-in administration was promoting the Korean Peninsula Peace Process, North Korea test-fired for the first time a missile equipped with a low-yield nuclear warhead, the KN-23, with a range of 690 km capable of striking all of South Korea. Subsequent development has continued, and according to a May 2025 U.S. Congressional Research Service report, North Korea has sufficiently tested this missile on the Russia-Ukraine battlefield and confirmed its operational deployment capability to attack South Korea.[5]

Therefore, during his meeting with Trump, the South Korean president should have emphasized the existential threat posed by North Korean nuclear weapons to South Korea, rather than the threat to the U.S. homeland, and reaffirmed the U.S.'s extended deterrence commitment. He should have requested that the institutionalization of extended deterrence through the 'Nuclear Consultative Group' (NCG), initiated by the previous Biden administration, proceed as originally planned, and specifically sought security assurances for the Korean Peninsula. The Biden administration had frequently stated, through presidential remarks and official government documents, a commitment that any North Korean nuclear use would result in the end of the regime.

Denuclearization Phasing Theory and North Korea's Position

The 3-stage denuclearization approach presented by the South Korean government also requires more detailed explanation of its principles. The terminology used has changed several times. Initially, it was freeze, reduction, and dismantlement, but[6] in President Lee's interview with TIME magazine, it became stop, disarmament, and complete denuclearization, and[7] the expression used in his UN speech on September 23 (local time) was stop, reduction, and dismantlement.[8] According to Presidential Office National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac, it was initially referred to as 'freeze,' but was later adopted because 'stop is a more accurate expression.'

However, agreements previously concluded with North Korea, such as the 1994 Agreed Framework, used the term 'freeze.' In the context of denuclearization, the concept used is 'freeze,' not 'stop.' 'Freeze' is a formal procedure that specifies the object and verifies compliance, whereas 'stop' is an ambiguous concept. It is unclear whether it means merely halting production, suspending facility operations, or simply stating that nuclear and missile development will not proceed. This conceptual difference is clearly demonstrated by the frequent use of the phrase 'freeze and verify' in denuclearization documents and analytical papers. For example, a report by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) explains that 'freeze' includes halting 'all nuclear material production activities,' thereby minimizing the possibility of diversion or concealment and increasing traceability.[9] Unlike a mere declarative halt, 'freeze' encompasses measures to stop the production, processing, and reprocessing of nuclear materials, and securing verifiability while that state is maintained. However, President Lee stated in his TIME magazine interview that compensation could be provided to North Korea if it 'stops.'[10] Without a specific definition of 'stop,' it can be interpreted as emphasizing compensation, which ultimately means the lifting of sanctions against North Korea. If such a situation arises, North Korea would effectively become a nuclear-weapon state early in the denuclearization negotiations, and based on past experience, progress would be virtually impossible thereafter. Negotiations with North Korea have always broken down due to North Korea's failure to properly comply with verification.

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Kim Jong-un, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, clearly stated his position in his speech at the Supreme People's Assembly, dedicating about 40 minutes to 'the current state and compatibility of relations with the U.S. and South Korea, and the principled stance to be maintained in external activities.'[11] He clearly expressed his rejection of the South Korean government's 3-stage denuclearization theory, calling it a 'copycat version of the homework assignments of his predecessors who dreamed of our disarmament,' referring to the 'so-called 'stop-reduction-denuclearization' 3-stage denuclearization theory' by the current administration.

The policy initiative proposed by the current administration also requires explanation. The END initiative, an acronym for Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization, appears to have a priority and sequence, despite Mr. Wi Sung-lac's denial. It is common sense that normalization of relations can only occur after exchanges. Denuclearization is positioned thereafter. Furthermore, Mr. Wi is reported to have explained the END initiative as a 'principle emphasized in the U.S.-North Korea Singapore Joint Statement of 2018,' which would imply a priority order. The Singapore agreement's core contents are (1) establishment of new U.S.-North Korea relations, (2) a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and (3) denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Following the agreement, then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo visited North Korea to demand denuclearization, and on July 7, the North Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement criticizing that the Singapore agreement had an order, and that 'only the demand for 강도적인 (forceful/robbery-like) denuclearization was brought up,' which was contrary to the spirit of the talks.[12] Regardless of South Korea's denial, North Korea insists on an order. If South Korea desires improved relations with North Korea, denuclearization must either be de-emphasized or omitted entirely for North Korea to even consider engagement. In this scenario, the significantly reduced emphasis on denuclearization could further jeopardize South Korea's security.

Policy Recommendations and Conclusion

A more realistic assessment is that North Korea is highly unlikely to engage with South Korea for the foreseeable future. Kim Jong-un's speech at the Supreme People's Assembly and Kim Yo-jong's statements confirm this. North Korea already solidified its stance of declaring relations with South Korea as 'relations between two hostile states' at the 8th session of the 9th plenary meeting of the WPK in December 2023.[13] No matter how much the North Korean system is a supreme leader-led system, a change in national strategy requires formal procedures. However, North Korea emphasizes that it has no intention of changing its course. Kim Jong-un stated, 'We will have no occasion to sit down with South Korea, nor will we do anything with them,' and 'We make it clear that we will not deal with them in any way.' Furthermore, he asserted towards the South Korean government, 'The reality shows that regardless of whether they claim to be 'democratic' or wear the guise of 'conservative,' South Korea's inherent ambition to collapse our system and regime has never changed and can never change, and the enemy is the enemy.' The same exact wording was used in a speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024,[14] and Kim Yo-jong also issued a similar statement.[15] Regardless of the nature of the South Korean government, the message is 'we will not associate with you.'

However, North Korea hints that it might establish relations as individual states if South Korea takes the following measures. First, it demands the cessation of all types of joint military exercises. Since the inauguration of the Trump administration, North Korea has criticized and pointed out all exercises involving South Korea and the U.S. The speeches and statements by Kim Jong-un and Kim Yo-jong are also understood as a message demanding the permanent cessation of joint military exercises, calling them 'war frenzies.'[16]

Second, it demands that South Korea amend its constitution to remove provisions hostile to North Korea. Kim Jong-un's speech recalls the era of President Syngman Rhee and criticizes that 'by embedding the phrase 'The territory of the Republic of Korea shall be the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands' in the first Constitution of the Republic of Korea, fabricated and promulgated in July 1948, the inherent nature most hostile to our state was codified.'[17] Although North Korea states it will include similar provisions in its constitution, the status of the South Korean constitution is incomparably higher than that of the North Korean constitution, which also includes the Party charter and the leader's directives above it. Therefore, it can be interpreted as a demand for South Korea to ultimately accept North Korea's 'theory of two hostile states' by amending its constitution. For reference, North Korea's constitution is subordinate to the Party charter, which is subordinate to the leader's directives.

Finally, it demands the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea and the dissolution of the alliance. Kim Jong-un stated, 'We absolutely do not need unification,' and defined South Korea as 'a country that has entrusted its politics and defense to foreign powers.'[18] This is a message that if South Korea desires a deep relationship with North Korea, including discussions on unification, it must break ties with the U.S. North Korea knows that it is impossible for South Korea to accept all three conditions, and therefore, it can be interpreted as an attempt to completely exclude South Korea under this pretext.

What the South Korean government should do now is, first and foremost, to officially finalize and explain its principles accurately. As it has only been in office for less than four months, it may take more time to formalize its core policies. In that case, rather than revealing principles and concepts piecemeal, it should promptly formulate an integrated policy on North Korea, unification, and denuclearization, explain it to the public, and announce it internationally to prevent confusion.

Above all, cooperation with the United States is crucial. Although the Trump administration has been in office for eight months, it has not yet announced its official North Korea policy. Despite the existential threat posed by the North Korean nuclear issue to South Korea, the U.S. is the primary actor in denuclearization negotiations. Therefore, South Korea must promptly consult closely with the U.S. to align its North Korea and denuclearization policies. If the U.S. disagrees with the 3-stage approach advocated by South Korea, South Korea's credibility will diminish. Since North Korea completely excludes South Korea, it is necessary to reflect South Korea's position through the U.S. and create space for improving inter-Korean relations. This makes the South Korea-U.S. relationship even more important.

Specifically, the terminology of the 3-stage denuclearization theory, which has been used inconsistently, needs to be redefined from the perspective of verifiability, binding force, and linkage to compensation to minimize errors in policy translation. The asymmetry in threat perception between 'deterrence focused on the U.S. homeland' and 'threats facing South Korea' must be revealed, and practical guidelines for extended deterrence that bridge this gap, such as clarifying redlines, maintaining visible combined forces posture, and establishing rapid consultation procedures in times of crisis, should be further developed. Even with North Korea's entrenched non-cooperative stance towards South Korea, negotiations should be presented as a means and deterrence as the goal, with 'freeze and verify' as the initial standard, thereby enhancing the consistency of the South Korea-U.S. cooperation framework and messages to North Korea.

In conclusion, this paper has shown that while the South Korean government's '3-stage denuclearization theory' and 'END initiative' possess a declarative structure, they require structural improvements in conceptual clarity (compared to 'freeze and verify' versus 'stop'), focus of threat perception (U.S. homeland-centric versus threats facing South Korea), and implementation mechanisms (institutionalization and visualization of extended deterrence). As North Korea defines inter-Korean relations as 'relations between two hostile states' and undermines the premise of negotiations, tactical system operationalization signs on the Ukrainian battlefield and short- and medium-range threats like the KN-23 directly impact South Korean security. Therefore, South Korea must standardize its policy vocabulary to 'freeze & verify' and further institutionalize operational guidelines for extended deterrence between South Korea and the U.S., including the documentation of redlines, constant visualization of combined forces, and rapid consultation procedures during crises. Messages to North Korea should be based on the principle that negotiations are a means and deterrence is the goal, with the phased design reconfigured, and compensation should be allowed only restrictively, linked to verification and anti-backsliding mechanisms. Only when conceptual consistency and alliance effectiveness are combined can the rhetoric of 'END' be transformed into a strategy that actually reduces risk. ■

[1] Настоящая статья является расширенной и углубленной версией статьи автора «За пределами евхаристии слов, реальность северокорейского ядерного оружия и безопасности Южной Кореи» (The Hankyoreh, «Perspective», 20 сентября 2025 г.).

[2] Правительство Республики Корея, «Пресс-релиз: Президент Ли подчеркнул усилия по устранению «геополитических рисков» во время визита на Нью-Йоркскую фондовую биржу», 25 сентября 2025 г.

[3] Указ Президента № 14186 «Железный купол для Америки», Federal Register 90 FR 8767 (3 февраля 2025 г.), подписан 27 января 2025 г.

[4] Запрос на утверждение кандидатуры председателя Объединенного комитета начальников штабов (Чин Ён Сын), Национальное собрание (материалы, представленные Комитету по обороне).

[5] Congressional Research Service, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs," 23 мая 2025 г., https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF10472/IF10472.39.pdf

[6] Администрация Президента Республики Корея, «Интервью Президента Ли Чжэ Мёна газете Yomiuri Shimbun», 19 августа 2025 г.

[7] Time Magazine, "President Lee Jae-Myung's Plan to Reboot South Korea," 17 сентября 2025 г., https://time.com/7317953/south-korea-president-lee-jae-myung-cover/

[8] Korea Times, "S. Korean President Lee Jae Myung's UN General Assembly Address," 23 сентября 2025 г., https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20250924/full-text-s-korean-president-lee-jae-myungs-un-general-assembly-address.

[9] Pavel Podvig, "Freeze and Verify: Ending Fissile Material Production on the Korean Peninsula," United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Geneva, Switzerland, 2020, p. 9, https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/FreezeandVerify.pdf.

[10] Оригинальный текст на английском языке гласит: «В качестве нашей краткосрочной цели мы должны остановить их ядерные и ракетные программы. И мы могли бы компенсировать им некоторые из этих мер, а затем преследовать разоружение и затем полную денуклеаризацию».

[11] «Проведение 13-го заседания 14-го созыва Верховного народного собрания Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики», «Труд», 22 сентября 2025 г.

[12] Заявление представителя Министерства иностранных дел КНДР после переговоров на высоком уровне между КНДР и США, Центральное телеграфное агентство Кореи (ЦТАК), 7 июля 2018 г.

[13] Центральное телеграфное агентство Кореи (ЦТАК), «Отчет о 9-м пленуме 8-го созыва Трудовой партии Кореи», 30 декабря 2023 г.

[14] Центральное телеграфное агентство Кореи (ЦТАК), «Отчет о 10-м заседании 14-го созыва Верховного народного собрания», 16 января 2024 г.

[15] Заявление Ким Ё Чжон, заместителя заведующего отделом ЦК Трудовой партии Кореи, «Корейско-американские отношения полностью вышли за временные рамки понятия «соотечественники»», Центральное телеграфное агентство Кореи (ЦТАК), 28 июля 2025 г.

[16] «Проведение 13-го заседания 14-го созыва Верховного народного собрания Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики», «Труд», 22 сентября 2025 г.

[17] «Проведение 13-го заседания 14-го созыва Верховного народного собрания Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики», «Труд», 22 сентября 2025 г.

[18] «Проведение 13-го заседания 14-го созыва Верховного народного собрания Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики», «Труд», 22 сентября 2025 г.

■ Пак Вон Гон_Директор Центра северокорейских исследований EAI; профессор кафедры северокорейских исследований Университета Ихва.

■ Ответственный за выпуск и редактирование: Ли Сан Джун_Исследователь EAI

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