MASI 2010 Annual Meeting Transcript: Closing Session

Date: July 9, 2010, 09:30~10:30

Venue: Orchid Room, Westin Chosun Seoul

Chaesung Chun

Now we will start the second day, fourth session, which is a wrap-up and conclusion. We have three speakers, including myself. We will start now and try to finish by 11:30. Then we will have lunch at twelve with General Sharp of the USFK. This is a wrap-up session, but I do not think the three speakers will be able to wrap up all the wonderful discussions we had yesterday. So, I suppose the speakers will offer some thoughts on the two subjects we dealt with yesterday. The three speakers are representatives of core institutions of the ASI. First, let me introduce Professor Qingguo Jia, although you know him very well. Professor Qingguo Jia is a professor and associate dean of the Schools of International Studies at Peking University. He has taught at the University of Vermont, Brown University, University of California San Diego, the University of Sydney, Australia, as well as Peking University. He is also a member of the standing committee and the foreign affairs committee of the national committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and a member of the standing committee of the Central Committee of the China Democratic League. Please welcome Professor Jia.

Qingguo Jia

Thank you very much. It is a great honor to have this opportunity to address this distinguished group of people. I am speaking on behalf of the Center of International Strategic Studies at Peking University. My boss is not here, so I am free. During the past day and a half, I have been sitting in the sessions and have learned a great deal by listening to the presentations, briefings, and also the discussions. We have talked about various issues concerning the global and regional order after the international economic crisis, and also the East Asian community. Member institutions have given briefings on what they have done in the past year. I am very impressed with the quality of the presentations and discussions. I am also happy to learn how much has been accomplished by various institutions in materializing their perspective MASI programs. Indeed, we have much to celebrate. Congratulations.

In the remainder of my time, I would like to share with you some of my thoughts regarding the subject matter discussed in this conference, and how we might proceed. One of the common themes of the conference, it appears, is how the rise of China has affected the international and regional order, and the prospects for creating an East Asian community, especially against the backdrop of the global financial crisis. We all agree that the rise of China has affected the regional order and the global order to some extent. What we find difficult to agree on is how and to what extent it has affected the orders at the regional and global levels. Some say the impact is positive; the Chinese government now belongs to this group, and many other people inside and outside China share this view. Some say it is negative, and China does not lack critics at home and abroad. And some say the impact is great. Thus, some argue that it is time for G-2. We spent a lot of time discussing G-2. I am still puzzled by the concept. It appears to me that most of the major countries do not mention G-2. Some people say that China has been shy by not mentioning G-2, or that China has been calculating by not accepting G-2. But the reality is, China does not believe in G-2 for various reasons. And, of course, some people say that the impact is not that great; it is too early to talk about G-2, or even to talk about a substantial role commensurate with the size and actual power of China. So the impact has not been that significant.

I believe a more fruitful approach to exploring this issue is to identify a few criteria for us to measure the impact of the rise of China on the regional and global order. The first criterion we may use is the nature of the order. When we talk about international order, we must mean one aspect of it: the nature of international order. We are talking about stability, prosperity, progressiveness, and justice. These are the elements associated with the nature of international order. If we want to evaluate the impact of the rise of China on the international order or regional order, these are the themes we should examine: how the rise of China has affected the nature of the order. The second criterion we may use to measure the impact is the mechanism of decision-making. Let me put it this way: the way decisions are made. Here we can discuss the level of participation; whether decisions are made by one country in a dictatorial manner, or in a consultative manner, or in a democratic manner. This might be part of the international order we need to examine. The third aspect of the criteria is the type of cooperation, whether it is bilateral, or mainly bilateral, or multilateral, or mainly multilateral. I think this is another aspect of international order we need to examine. The fourth aspect is the depth of cooperation. Here we are talking about the degree of institutionalization. Do we have a secretariat for these multilateral efforts? Do we have a constitution? Are decisions binding? These are things we may need to examine. The fifth aspect we may consider when talking about international order is leadership: who is taking the leadership, or the quality of the leadership. The sixth aspect is the direction of development: whether it is moving in a positive direction or a negative direction. And, of course, probably another aspect to consider is the variation between the regional and global levels, how the impact may differ at different levels.

With these criteria, if we use these criteria, we may find the following. I do not know if it requires further exploration. First, the rise of China has not caused significant damage to regional stability, prosperity, progressiveness, and justice. On the contrary, it has enhanced some of these virtues. For example, China’s handling of its border issues over the past decades. China has concluded quite a number of border treaties and agreements with its neighbors. Of course, we have border disputes, but most of China’s land border problems, and even some of its maritime border problems, are being addressed. China used to have border problems with most of the countries along its borders.

Now it does not have many. By signing treaties and agreements, China has demonstrated that it is not a territorially expansionist power. China’s policy in the Six-Party Talks has, in a way, demonstrated China’s preference for stability in the region. China’s ASEAN FTA is a way China has found to promote economic prosperity. And China’s economic relationships with most of its partners, major states, have been very fruitful. China seems—of course, we have trade disputes, the RMB issue—but most of China’s trading partners do not have significant problems with trade or economic relations themselves; they just want to improve them. And China is also increasing efforts to deal with issues such as environmental pollution, climate change, infectious diseases, transnational crime, and more recently, increasing protection of labor rights. So all these actions have shown that China has made efforts to enhance regional cooperation, regional stability, and regional prosperity over the years. Even China’s position on the Cheonan incident—you know, South Korea and the world probably look to China for taking a position because somehow they believe that China’s decision in this matter may be useful. So, on the first criterion, China has made some contributions.

Secondly, when it comes to international decision-making, the rise of China has led to greater consultation and consensus-building in regional affairs. One of the things that China has repeatedly argued, perhaps to the frustration of some who want to get things done quickly, is let us talk, have dialogues, negotiate. The Six-Party Talks—China has been more patient than some of the great powers, perhaps to their frustration to some extent. And China’s participation in the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), China’s support of ASEAN’s approach to regional matters in favor of consensus-building, and also the China-Japan-South Korea summit, again, is more like a venue to get to know each other and then to establish trust and understanding rather than to address specific problems immediately. China believes in dialogues, confidence-building, and ultimately getting things done on that basis. So China favors greater consultation and consensus as a mechanism for decision-making... (Continued)

Speaker

Mely Caballero-Anthony

Chaesung Chun

Qingguo Jia

Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. The East Asia Institute, an Asia Security Initiative core institution, acknowledges the MacArthur Foundation for its generous grant and continued support. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government.