[Global NK Interview] North Korea's Nuclear Strategy Shift and ROK-U.S. Security Cooperation

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TKRpE4eWp24

Victor Cha, Professor at Georgetown University, explains that North Korea has completed all preparations for a 7th nuclear test at Punggye-ri and only a political decision remains. He anticipates that if a nuclear test is conducted, while UN-level sanctions may be difficult, sanctions at the ROK-U.S.-Japan level will be strengthened, and additional U.S. military assets will be deployed to the region. Furthermore, he analyzes that the Ukraine war has made it even more difficult for North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons for its own security, and that North Korea's recent assertion of a first-use nuclear doctrine stems from calculations to strengthen deterrence against the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, Professor Cha warns that North Korea must also recognize the possibility that, as demonstrated by Russia's shelling of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant during the war, nuclear facilities could lead to a severe national crisis in the event of war. He also suggests that South Korea acquiring its own nuclear weapons in response to North Korea's changing nuclear strategy is still not a good option, and that strengthening extended deterrence through reassurance measures that bolster the U.S.'s political commitment to defending allies remains effective.

I. Timing of the 7th Nuclear Test of Pyongyang and Directions of ROK-U.S. Response

• Numerous reports have confirmed that only a “political decision” is left before Pyongyang goes ahead with the 7th nuclear weapons test. Dr. Cha highlights that “our satellite imagery shows that North Korea completed all the work they need to do with tunnel three.”

• In case North Korea decides to conduct nuclear testing, the United States will highly likely respond with more sanctions. He anticipates that “sanctions may not be UN sanctions, but additional sanctioning by countries like Japan, perhaps South Korea, and the United States will take place.”

• Regarding sanctions lifting, he predicts that “there would be assistance to North Korea if they simply made the commitment to coming back to talks”, which is just the same process that the United States has gone through previously.

II. Possibility of Pyongyang’s Using Nuclear Weapons in the Event of Crisis

• As Ukraine gave up nuclear arms and got betrayed, Dr. Cha mentions that “North Korea might have some lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine” that it seems North Korea will not abandon the nuclear weapons.

• Since Russia has reportedly resumed shelling near the nuclear power plant in Ukraine, Dr. Cha stresses “how North Korea thinks about their position of nuclear weapons will evolve right now. They see it entirely as a good thing in terms of their self-defense ... but there are real liabilities to having a nuclear complex that is vulnerable to strike as theirs is” as the vulnerability of nuclear plants to intentional or inadvertent attacks is of concern in the area of nuclear safety and security. Though nuclear facilities are required to produce nuclear weapons, North Korea will conceive these might be the real liabilities during the warfare.

III. U.S Extended Deterrence and ROK-U.S. Alliance

• North Korea’s current missile testing campaign and development of the weapons seem unstoppable. Dr. Cha claims that “this raises questions in South Korea about the credibility of the United States extended deterrence.”

• In terms of the possibility of North Korea’s denuclearization in the near future, he asserts that “denuclearization is not anything that will happen in the near term.”

• Dr. Cha indicates that extended deterrence really needs to be done on the military capabilities, and political reassurance side. He states that “political signaling and reassurance is more important” and affirms that “though it is a classic security dilemma for South Korea, I don’t think South Korea acquiring their own nuclear weapons is the answer right now.”

V. Biography

■ Victor Cha_ Victor Cha is a professor of government and holds the D.S. Song-KF Chair in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service (SFS) at Georgetown University. In July 2019, he was appointed vice dean for faculty and graduate affairs in SFS. He left the White House in 2007 after serving since 2004 as director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC). At the White House, he was responsible primarily for Japan, the Korean peninsula, Australia/New Zealand, and Pacific Island nation affairs. Dr. Cha was also the deputy head of delegation for the United States at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing and received two outstanding service commendations during his tenure at the NSC. He is the author of five books, including the award-winning Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford University Press, 1999) (winner of the 2000 Ohira Book Prize) and The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (Harper Collins Ecco, 2012), which was selected by Foreign Affairs as a “Best Book on the Asia-Pacific for 2012.” His newest book is Powerplay: Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia (Princeton University Press, 2016). He is also writing a new book on Korean unification. He has published articles on international relations and East Asia in journals, including Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, International Security, Political Science Quarterly, Survival, International Studies Quarterly, International Journal of the History of Sport, and Asian Survey.

■ Typeset by Junghoo Park, Research Associate

For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 205) | jhpark@eai.or.kr

Video Transcript

north korea would not deny a first use doctrine that they could threaten the use of nuclear weapons not just as a retaliatory strike but as a first strike i think that that is certainly something that's very concerning a very concerning lesson how their thinking about their possession of nuclear weapons will evolve over time right now they see it entirely as a good thing in terms of their self-defense and in terms of possibly a denial strategy denying other countries like the united states the ability to assist south korea

but but there is there are real liabilities to having a nuclear complex and a nuclear weapons program that is as vulnerable to strike as there's there's is that you know could possibly become a more important part of their calculations and thinking