[EAIㆍKAIS] 北部网络研讨会系列 - 政权区域，T.J. Pempel

分类: 多媒体
发布日期: 2021年7月12日

YouTube 链接 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5v2BvhBJCWs

由东亚研究所赞助的韩国国际政治学会“北部网络研讨会系列 – 政权区域，T.J. Pempel”于7月12日发布。该网络研讨会系列旨在为介绍政治学及相关社会科学领域的重要新书并进行深入讨论提供平台，旨在提高对国内外主要著作的兴趣，并提供分享各种问题和意见的机会。本次北部网络研讨会介绍了T.J. Pempel的著作《政权区域》。首尔大学的宋智妍教授、亚洲大学的李王辉教授和高丽大学的郑周燕教授参与了讨论，延世大学的孙烈教授担任主持人。

在本次网络研讨会中，作者对亚洲国家的政治经济发展模式进行了分类和分析，并解释了这些政策的追求方向对地区安全和经济的影响。随后，与会专家就引发政权变革的变量以及习近平领导下的中国未来等问题进行了深入讨论。

日程

观看北部网络研讨会视频

联系人

徐正惠，东亚研究所（EAI）研究员

视频文字稿

大家好，欢迎来到KAIS的书籍网络研讨会，我是延世大学的姚宗教授，也是今天的主持人。我谨代表KAIS感谢大家今天莅临。今天我们荣幸地邀请到T.J. Pempel教授，介绍他的著作《政权区域》，并邀请了三位优秀的KAIS学者进行讨论。T.J. Pempel教授获得了哥伦比亚大学的博士学位，现任加州大学伯克利分校政治学教授。此前，他在康奈尔大学、科罗拉多大学、威斯康星大学和华盛顿大学任教多年，之后加入加州大学伯克利分校。他撰写了超过120篇学术文章，并担任24本书的作者或编辑。因此，介绍他的作品，尤其是今天介绍的这本书，意义重大。这本书已被翻译成韩文，书名为《政权区域》。我认为这本书是他过往研究的总结，并将成为他多年来创作的杰作之一。当然，他未来还会创作更多优秀作品。我们非常高兴今天能与大家一起讨论这本书。介绍完毕，PJ，现在轮到你了，你有大约15到20分钟的时间介绍你的书，然后我们将转向讨论嘉宾。非常感谢。

非常荣幸能来到这里。我要感谢与会讨论嘉宾们抽出宝贵时间阅读本书，并期待他们的评论和反馈。我还要感谢EAI和KAIS共同主办本次研讨会。我与EAI有着非常积极的长期合作关系，可能可以追溯到十多年前，我也与KAIS有着密切的联系，包括参加了他们2019年12月的会议并担任过讨论嘉宾。因此，我对这两个组织都非常尊敬，我认为它们在学术界发挥着非常重要的作用。我想先简单谈谈我写这本书的动机。我认为这主要源于三个非常不同的线索。正如孙教授刚才提到的，在很多方面，这本书源于我之前的学术工作。首先，我认为这本书的核心是我努力应对所谓的“亚洲经济奇迹”。我们看到了巨大的国内生产总值和出口增长，亚洲在全球经济中的份额急剧增加。众所周知，东亚是过去三十年甚至更长时间里最具活力的增长区域。我与其他许多人一样，一直在努力理解和探究这一点。贯穿本书的第二条主线是比较政治经济学。我努力将我对特定国家问题的思考与比较政治学中正在进行的更广泛的理论辩论联系起来。几十年来，我们一直在讨论如何对不同的政治经济体进行分类，无论是像安德森那样讨论福利资本主义的三种世界，还是讨论霍尔和萨斯卡关于协调市场经济和自由市场经济的观点，或者讨论施密特关于国家主导的社团主义或社会社团主义的观点等等。因此，我加入了这个群体，这本书就是我努力尝试从比较政治经济学的角度来思考东亚问题的一种尝试。最后，正如孙教授提到的，我试图解决亚洲区域关系的问题，包括经济关系，以及书中略微涉及的安全关系。这些就是我在这本书中所做的三项主要驱动力。这本书大胆地或荒谬地试图处理10个不同国家在约40年时间里的政治经济问题。因此，它显然会遇到试图对如此广泛的范围进行理论化的努力通常面临的困难和批评，即当你深入研究你最了解的国家时，你可能会发现细节上存在错误。因此，我带着这种大胆精神继续前进。对我来说，起点是区域经济增长。我认为，如果你要寻找贯穿本书的一条主线，那就是我努力解释这一点。我认为我在书中尝试做的是，或者我希望这本书能做的是，至少对我们理解经济增长背后的原因提出了三个重要的挑战。第一个挑战是这样一个非常直接的观点，即东亚经济成功的国家绝不是遵循单一的道路。情况并非像日本经常描绘的“雁群模式”那样，一个国家走在前列，其他国家追赶并大致遵循相同的模式，做着同样的事情。我正在论证，不同国家经济体的情况差异很大。但同时，我并不是说这是一个由个体国家故事组成的随机集合。正如我将在几分钟内解释的那样，我认为这些经济增长模式，这些国家的政治经济体，正在以几种不同类型的理想类型政权的形式发展。我试图做的第二件大事是明确，尽管有“东亚奇迹”这个总括性的标签，但存在着重要的国家作为例外，它们没有参与这个奇迹，不仅没有参与，而且积极公开地拒绝它。我认为这些国家需要成为区域故事的一部分。最后，也是重要的一点，我认为这可以追溯到我职业生涯早期的一些写作，但我仍然认为它们非常重要，我认为在理解这些地方的国内政治经济时，至关重要的是要将塑造这些政治经济的国际力量也融入其中。特别是，我们需要关注经济力量的关键作用。为了抓住问题的核心，我试图提出一个关于我称之为“政权”的论点。这是一个围绕三个关键要素构建的概念：首先是政治制度，主要是国家制度和国家官僚机构；其次是社会经济力量，关键的社会经济力量是什么？它们在这些不同的国家经济体中拥有什么资源？它们如何相互协调？形成的社会联盟、社会经济联盟是什么？最后，最重要的国际力量是什么？它们可以是积极和支持性的，就像它们对某些国家那样，但它们也可能非常消极，并试图颠覆或抵制这些国家正在追求的经济发展模式。因此，这三个关键要素是我认为构成“政权”概念的一部分。此外，我想指出的是，本书分为两部分。第一部分试图识别东亚地区三种不同的政权模式，这些模式在很多方面都是理想化的，我稍后会谈到它们。但第二部分试图更具动态性，并考察政权随时间的变化，考察中国的情况，我认为中国是我在第一部分研究的三种政权类型的混合体。最后，在最后一章，我试图反转因果关系，考察不同政权的组合如何导致东亚地区不同的秩序。从一个时期到另一个时期，存在着一些非常重要的差异。我不想花太多时间在上面，但让我简单谈谈第一部分以及我提出的三种理想类型的政权，它们代表了不同的政治经济范式。因此，我将政权的三个关键要素与相应的经济政策相结合。第一类政权是我称之为“发展型政权”。许多人会认为这与“发展型国家”一致，尽管我认为它比这更复杂。我以日本、韩国和台湾为例进行了阐述。我基本上认为，这三个国家都受益于可能被认为是强大的、有凝聚力的国家制度，拥有熟练且相对精英制的官僚机构；它们拥有有凝聚力的、有利于增长的社会经济联盟，致力于快速增长；它们能够边缘化追求替代性增长模式的政治反对派；最后，也是最重要的，它们得到了美国坚定不移的经济支持，包括市场准入。将这种政权结合在一起的纽带当然是冷战的反共主义。这三种政权要素都因其反共议程而联系在一起。这些政权追求的经济政策是我称之为“嵌入式重商主义”。我以前用过这个词，但基本上它包括让国内经济相对自由地免受高度竞争的制成品和外国直接投资的影响，但支持国内大型企业进入全球出口市场，并特别注重职业培训，提升人们的教育水平和技术水平，并实现高度的社会经济平等，最重要的是，经济利益流向国内行为者。这与我称之为“依附型发展型政权”的第二类政权形成对比，在第二类政权中，我看到主要的经济利益流向外国资本持有者或跨国公司。因此，关于依附型政权或依附型发展型政权，我使用的案例是马来西亚、印度尼西亚、泰国。这些国家在政治上更加分散，拥有许多地区权力中心；它们在社会经济上更加多样化，不同地区之间存在更大的经济和民族紧张关系；存在更强的反对国家政府主导的力量；国家官僚机构通常不如发展型政权有才干和有凝聚力。它们在高速增长方面与发展型政权相似，在依赖出口方面也与发展型政权相似，但它们在外部支持主要来自跨国公司方面存在很大差异。因此，作为结果，它们的经济政策成为跨国公司供应链的组成部分，因此在许多方面，主要的经济利益都归于跨国公司，而不是东道国机构。这些工作岗位基本上被简化为包装和组装，几乎不注重提高劳动力的技能水平。其最终结果是，这三个国家都有陷入我所谓的“中等收入陷阱”的风险。最后，我还有第三类政权，我称之为“掠夺型政权”。这些国家原型是朝鲜、缅甸（或称缅甸），以及菲律宾，尤其是在费迪南德·马科斯政权时期。在这里，我们看到国家权力、国家机构受到非常狭窄、强大的控制，非常依赖军事力量和对公民的强制；官僚机构的技能有限，除非在军事技能等非常具体的领域；对狭窄政治权力持有者群体的忠诚对于在官僚机构中晋升至关重要。因此，忠诚比技术能力更重要。基本上，没有能够挑战国家机构的社会经济分歧，尽管在缅甸等地方，确实存在强大的民族和社会分歧的外部势力，挑战着缅甸核心地区的中央权力，但在朝鲜，基本上很少有这样的社会经济分歧。但所有这三个掠夺型政权都实施了反映其外部制裁的政策，缺乏强大有力的经济支持者，除非外部力量（如影响缅甸或朝鲜的中国）正在从该政权榨取资源并维持狭窄的政治精英掌权。因此，这些政权通常追求的政策涉及为政治精英榨取利益，增长非常缓慢甚至停滞，很少关注工业化，严重依赖原材料和农产品出口等。支持它们的外部政权基本上对外国直接投资和剥削更感兴趣，而不是其他任何事情。现在，第二部分，我将简要介绍一下。第二部分的第一章探讨了当政权，尤其是许多成功的政权，在发展型政权取得巨大成功，并且冷战结束，外部支持开始减弱时会发生什么。美国在我们知道的冷战结束后，对日本、韩国和台湾的支持远不如它们被视为对抗共产主义的有效盟友时那么支持。因此，它们都面临着美国更大的压力，要求它们开放经济。掌权政权的支持，政治制度的支持以及之前的社会经济联盟的支持开始减弱。此外，由于经济取得了巨大成功，许多曾经强大的社会和经济力量开始失去力量，新的社会经济群体崛起，例如工会，可能是更多的企业家，可能是中小企业。这也导致了韩国和台湾的民主化。其最终结果是，所有这些政权都开始看到巨大的变化，不是崩溃，而是政权性质的巨大变化。台湾和韩国都经历了进步政权和保守政权之间的交替。日本看到了其长期执政的自由民主党及其反对派的上台。但我想在这一章中指出的最后一件有趣的事情是，日本的政权适应新经济力量的速度最慢，这意味着日本的经济增长是这三个政权中最慢的。韩国和台湾都更快地调整了它们的政权，但对这三个国家来说，都很难实施长期以来推动这三个议程的一贯的嵌入式重商主义。转向下一章，重点关注中国。我认为中国本质上是其他三种政权类型的混合体。它具有发展型政权的特点，因为它拥有强大的国家和称职、连贯的官僚机构，当然是在中国共产党的控制下运作，但在这一点上，它与发展型政权非常相似。它们也致力于快速的经济增长，快速提升技术水平，但它们与发展型政权非常不同，更像依附型政权，因为它们非常依赖外国直接投资，允许外国竞争，并且也像依附型政权一样，更加依赖国有企业，以此作为试图在政治上控制经济的一种方式。最后，它们在某种程度上像掠夺型政权，因为共产党，特别是共产党精英，能够为自己及其家人以及与他们亲近的人提取异常高的利益。但与掠夺型政权不同的是，中国取得的财富中有很大一部分已经 spread 到全国各地。当然，我们知道有大量个人进入了中产阶级。最后，最后一章试图探讨这个问题：这对区域秩序意味着什么？这些部分如何结合在一起塑造区域后果？在这里，我提出，如果你到现在还没有弄清楚，对我来说，数字“三”似乎是万能的，我几乎思考的所有事情都与“三”有关。但我认为，在战后时期，存在着三种不同的秩序。第一种是众所周知的冷战秩序，亚洲沿着共产主义与民主的界限分裂，经济和安全利益几乎100%重叠。日本、韩国和台湾等经济体没有与任何共产主义国家进行贸易，存在着非常明确的分歧，这些分歧导致并将安全视为首要目标，并且认为经济与各国 Thus, the economic players, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in particular, did not trade with any of the communist countries, and there were very clear divisions that led and that promoted security as the primary goal and that saw economics in accord with security calculations by the various countries. 随着冷战的结束，苏联的解体，以及中国转向更自由化的经济政策的决定，我们看到了向我所谓的“和平与繁荣”时期的转变，这个时期最早可以追溯到1980年左右，但随着苏联的衰落和天安门事件的发生而加速，我们看到了大约30多年的时期，一直到我所说的2008年全球金融危机，在此期间，大多数掠夺型政权几乎没有能力颠覆地区安全问题，制造地区安全紧张局势，或颠覆经济发展的集体项目。中国致力于区域化经济发展，并且在安全事务上非常不强势。但我们现在正处于我所认为的第三个时期的开端或可能的胚胎阶段，即安全紧张局势加剧，民族主义兴起，许多国家回归自身，变得更加怀疑地区联系，无论是日本与韩国的关系，还是缅甸与东盟的关系，还是台湾的问题转向自身并尽力减少与大陆的经济联系，因为担心被吞并。但我们现在看到的是，我们提出了阿伦·弗里德伯格多年前提出的问题，即亚洲现在是否准备好进行竞争？我认为在某些方面是的，或者亚洲是的，但我认为“和平与繁荣”时代的遗迹，旧秩序是许多国家、许多政权仍然渴望的。因此，我试图在书中最后提出一个简单的论点，即亚洲各地的政治领导人现在拥有决定未来的能动性。那些将我们拉向负面方向、加剧紧张局势和安全紧张局势的结构，并非没有这些政治领导人和商界领袖尽力推动并维持对经济增长与和平与繁荣的集体承诺的能力，并试图边缘化对该安全秩序的挑战者，并以长期有利的方式将它们融合起来。因此，我讲得有点长了，我道歉，但是，你们现在没有理由不买这本书了，因为我几乎把里面的所有内容都告诉你们了。我期待你们的反馈和评论，非常感谢你们的耐心。

作品，并且它将被铭记为他……我不知道……他多年来创作的杰作之一。我意思是，他在这本书之后还会创作出更多作品，但我们今天很高兴能和他一起讨论这本书。有了这个介绍，PJ，该你了，你有大约15到20分钟的时间介绍你的书，然后我们请各位评论员发言。非常感谢乔尔，很高兴来到这里。我要感谢各位与会者、各位评论员

抽出宝贵时间阅读本书，我期待他们的评论和反馈。我要感谢EAI和Kais共同主办本次研讨会。我与这两个机构都有着非常积极的合作关系，与EAI的合作可以追溯到大约10年前，甚至更早，但我与Kais也有着密切的联系，包括在2019年12月的会议上作为参与者和评论员。因此，我对这两个组织都非常尊重，我认为它们发挥着

重要的学术作用。我想先简单谈谈我写这本书的动机。在我看来，这确实源于三个截然不同的线索。正如孙教授所说，在很多方面，它都源于我以前的学术工作。但首先，我认为对这本书至关重要的是我努力应对所谓的“亚洲经济奇迹”。我们看到了国内生产总值和出口的巨大增长，亚洲在全球经济中的份额

急剧上升。我们都知道，过去三十年，如果不是更长的话，东亚一直是增长最快的地区。我加入了许多人的行列，试图理解和解释这一点。贯穿本书的第二条重要线索是所谓的“比较政治经济学”。我努力将我对相关国家问题的思考与比较政治学中正在进行的更广泛的理论辩论联系起来。

几十年来，关于我们应该如何对不同的政治经济体进行分类，一直在进行着争论，无论是谈论阿萨·奥尔森的“福利资本主义三世界”，还是谈论霍尔和萨斯卡的“协调市场经济”或“自由市场经济”，或者是谈论施密特的“国家主导的社团主义”或“社会社团主义”等等。因此，我加入了这个群体，本书就是努力尝试从比较政治经济学的角度来

思考东亚问题。最后，正如教授所说，我正在努力解决亚洲区域关系的问题，包括经济关系，书中也略微涉及安全关系。所以，这些是我写这本书的三个主要驱动力。这本书非常大胆，或者说非常荒谬地试图在约40年的时间里，处理10个不同国家的政治经济问题。因此，它显然会遇到

在试图对如此广泛的范围进行理论化时，通常会面临的困难和批评。也就是说，当我研究我最了解的国家时，它看起来会很好，但你显然在最关键的细节上出了错。因此，我带着这种大胆精神继续前进。对我来说，起点是区域经济增长。我认为，如果你要寻找贯穿本书的一条线索，那就是我试图解释这一点。在书中，我试图做的是，或者我希望这本书做的是，至少提出三个重要的挑战，以加深我们对经济增长背后原因的理解。第一个挑战非常直接，那就是东亚在经济上取得成功的国家，绝非遵循了单一的道路。情况并非像日本经常描绘的那样，存在“雁群模式”，即一个国家走在前列，其他国家赶上来，大致遵循相同的模式，

并做同样的事情。我提出的论点是，各国的实际情况大相径庭。但同时，我并不是说这是一系列随机的个体国家故事。正如我将在几分钟内解释的那样，我认为这些经济增长模式，这些国家政治经济体的政治经济体，可以分为几种不同的理想类型政权。第二个重要的事情是，我想

明确，尽管有“东亚奇迹”这个总括性标签，但有非常重要的例外国家，它们没有参与到这个奇迹中，不仅没有参与，而且还积极公开地拒绝它。我认为这些国家也需要成为区域故事的一部分。最后，也是最重要的，我认为这可以追溯到我职业生涯早期的一些写作，但我仍然认为这非常重要。我认为，在试图理解

这些地方的国内政治经济时，关键在于我们也要融入那些塑造这些国内政治经济的国际力量。特别是，我们需要关注经济力量的关键作用。为了抓住问题的核心，我试图提出一个关于我称之为“政权”的论点。这是一个我围绕三个关键要素构建的概念。第一个要素是政治制度，主要是国家制度和国家官僚机构；第二是社会经济

力量，即关键的社会经济力量是什么？它们在不同国家经济体中拥有哪些资源？它们如何相互协调？形成的社会联盟、社会经济联盟是什么？最后，最重要的是影响国内政治经济的国际力量是什么？这些力量可能是有益和支持性的，就像它们对某些国家一样，但也可能非常负面，并试图颠覆或抵制

这些国家所追求的经济发展模式。所以，这些是我认为构成“政权”概念的三个关键要素。此外，我想指出的是，本书分为两部分。第一部分试图识别东亚的三种不同政权模式，这些模式在很多方面都是理想化的，我稍后会谈到。第二部分则试图更具动态性，考察政权的

随时间推移而发生的变化，考察中国的情况，我认为中国是我在第一部分中研究的三种政权类型的混合体。最后，在最后一章，我将反转因果关系，考察不同政权组合如何导致东亚不同的区域秩序，以及从一个时期到另一个时期的一些非常重要的差异。我想不花太多时间，但让我谈谈第一部分

以及我提出的三种理想类型的政权，它们代表了不同的政治经济范式。因此，我选取了政权的三个关键要素，并将其与相应的经济政策相结合。第一类政权是我称之为“发展型政权”。许多人会认为这与“发展型国家”一致，尽管我认为它比这更复杂。我以日本、韩国和台湾为例。日本、韩国和台湾。我基本上认为，这三个国家都受益于可能被认为是强大的、凝聚力的国家制度，拥有熟练且相对精英化的官僚机构；它们拥有凝聚力的、支持增长的社会经济联盟，致力于快速增长，并有能力边缘化那些追求其他增长模式的政治反对派；最后，也是最重要的，它们得到了美国坚定不移的经济支持，在市场准入方面给予了强大支持，而维系

这个政权的纽带当然是冷战的反共主义。政权的所有三个要素都因其反共议程而联系在一起。这些政权所奉行的经济政策是我称之为“嵌入式重商主义”。我以前用过这个词，但基本上它包括使国内经济在很大程度上免受高竞争性制造业产品和外国直接投资的影响，但支持那些能够进入全球出口市场的国内大型企业。

在全球范围内开展业务，并特别重视职业培训，提升人们的教育水平，提升技术水平，并实现高度的社会经济平等，最重要的是，经济利益流向国内行为者。这与我称之为“伊萨斯发展型政权”的第二类形成了对比，在后者中，我认为主要的经济利益流向了外国资本持有者或跨国公司。因此，简单谈谈伊萨斯（IRSA）

政权。

马来西亚、印度尼西亚、泰国。这些国家在政治上更加分散，拥有许多地区权力中心；它们在社会经济上更加多样化，不同地区之间存在更大的经济和民族紧张关系；存在更强的反对国家政府主导的力量；国家官僚机构通常不如发展型政权有才干和有凝聚力。它们在高速增长方面与发展型政权相似，在依赖出口方面也与发展型政权相似，但它们在外部支持主要来自跨国公司方面存在很大差异。因此，作为结果，它们的经济政策成为跨国公司供应链的组成部分，因此在许多方面，主要的经济利益都归于跨国公司，而不是东道国机构。这些工作岗位基本上被简化为包装和组装，几乎不注重提高劳动力的技能水平。其最终结果是，这三个国家都有陷入我所谓的“中等收入陷阱”的风险。

因此，作为结果，它们的经济政策成为跨国公司供应链的组成部分，因此在许多方面，主要的经济利益都归于跨国公司，而不是东道国机构。这些工作岗位基本上被简化为包装和组装，几乎不注重提高劳动力的技能水平。其最终结果是，这三个国家都有陷入我所谓的“中等收入陷阱”的风险。

最后，我还有第三类政权，我称之为“掠夺型政权”。这些国家原型是朝鲜、缅甸（或称缅甸），以及菲律宾，尤其是在费迪南德·马科斯政权时期。在这里，我们看到国家权力、国家机构受到非常狭窄、强大的控制，非常依赖军事力量和对公民的强制；官僚机构的技能有限，除非在军事技能等非常具体的领域；对狭窄政治权力持有者群体的忠诚对于在官僚机构中晋升至关重要。因此，忠诚比技术能力更重要。基本上，没有能够挑战国家机构的社会经济分歧，尽管在缅甸等地方，确实存在强大的民族和社会分歧的外部势力，挑战着缅甸核心地区的中央权力，但在朝鲜，基本上很少有这样的社会经济分歧。但所有这三个掠夺型政权都实施了反映其外部制裁的政策，缺乏强大有力的经济支持者，除非外部力量（如影响缅甸或朝鲜的中国）正在从该政权榨取资源并维持狭窄的政治精英掌权。

因此，忠诚比技术能力更重要。基本上，没有能够挑战国家机构的社会经济分歧，尽管在缅甸等地方，确实存在强大的民族和社会分歧的外部势力，挑战着缅甸核心地区的中央权力，但在朝鲜，基本上很少有这样的社会经济分歧。但所有这三个掠夺型政权都实施了反映其外部制裁的政策，缺乏强大有力的经济支持者，除非外部力量（如影响缅甸或朝鲜的中国）正在从该政权榨取资源并维持狭窄的政治精英掌权。

因此，这些政权通常追求的政策涉及为政治精英榨取利益，增长非常缓慢甚至停滞，很少关注工业化，严重依赖原材料和农产品出口等。支持它们的外部政权基本上对外国直接投资和剥削更感兴趣，而不是其他任何事情。现在，第二部分，我将简要介绍一下。

第二部分的第一章探讨了当政权，尤其是许多成功的政权，在发展型政权取得巨大成功，并且冷战结束，外部支持开始减弱时会发生什么。美国在我们知道的冷战结束后，对日本、韩国和台湾的支持远不如它们被视为对抗共产主义的有效盟友时那么支持。因此，它们都面临着美国更大的压力，要求它们开放经济。掌权政权的支持，政治制度的支持以及之前的社会经济联盟的支持开始减弱。

此外，由于经济取得了巨大成功，许多曾经强大的社会和经济力量开始失去力量，新的社会经济群体崛起，例如工会，可能是更多的企业家，可能是中小企业。这也导致了韩国和台湾的民主化。其最终结果是，所有这些政权都开始看到巨大的变化，不是崩溃，而是政权性质的巨大变化。

台湾和韩国都经历了进步政权和保守政权之间的交替。日本看到了其长期执政的自由民主党及其反对派的上台。但我想在这一章中指出的最后一件有趣的事情是，日本的政权适应新经济力量的速度最慢，这意味着日本的经济增长是这三个政权中最慢的。韩国和台湾都更快地调整了它们的政权，但对这三个国家来说，都很难实施长期以来推动这三个议程的一贯的嵌入式重商主义。

转向下一章，重点关注中国。我认为中国本质上是其他三种政权类型的混合体。它具有发展型政权的特点，因为它拥有强大的国家和称职、连贯的官僚机构，当然是在中国共产党的控制下运作，但在这一点上，它与发展型政权非常相似。它们也致力于快速的经济增长，快速提升技术水平，但它们与发展型政权非常不同，更像依附型政权，因为它们非常依赖外国直接投资，允许外国竞争，并且也像依附型政权一样，更加依赖国有企业，以此作为试图在政治上控制经济的一种方式。

它们也致力于快速的经济增长，快速提升技术水平，但它们与发展型政权非常不同，更像依附型政权，因为它们非常依赖外国直接投资，允许外国竞争，并且也像依附型政权一样，更加依赖国有企业，以此作为试图在政治上控制经济的一种方式。

最后，它们在某种程度上像掠夺型政权，因为共产党，特别是共产党精英，能够为自己及其家人以及与他们亲近的人提取异常高的利益。但与掠夺型政权不同的是，中国取得的财富中有很大一部分已经 spread 到全国各地。当然，我们知道有大量个人进入了中产阶级。

最后，最后一章试图探讨这个问题：这对区域秩序意味着什么？这些部分如何结合在一起塑造区域后果？在这里，我提出，如果你到现在还没有弄清楚，对我来说，数字“三”似乎是万能的，我几乎思考的所有事情都与“三”有关。但我认为，在战后时期，存在着三种不同的秩序。第一种是众所周知的冷战秩序，亚洲沿着共产主义与民主的界限分裂，经济和安全利益几乎100%重叠。

日本、韩国和台湾等经济体没有与任何共产主义国家进行贸易，存在着非常明确的分歧，这些分歧导致并将安全视为首要目标，并且认为经济与各国 Thus, the economic players, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in particular, did not trade with any of the communist countries, and there were very clear divisions that led and that promoted security as the primary goal and that saw economics in accord with security calculations by the various countries. 随着冷战的结束，苏联的解体，以及中国转向更自由化的经济政策的决定，我们看到了向我所谓的“和平与繁荣”时期的转变，这个时期最早可以追溯到1980年左右，但随着苏联的衰落和天安门事件的发生而加速，我们看到了大约30多年的时期，一直到我所说的2008年全球金融危机，在此期间，大多数掠夺型政权几乎没有能力颠覆地区安全问题，制造地区安全紧张局势，或颠覆经济发展的集体项目。

中国致力于区域化经济发展，并且在安全事务上非常不强势。但我们现在正处于我所认为的第三个时期的开端或可能的胚胎阶段，即安全紧张局势加剧，民族主义兴起，许多国家回归自身，变得更加怀疑地区联系，无论是日本与韩国的关系，还是缅甸与东盟的关系，还是台湾的问题转向自身并尽力减少与大陆的经济联系，因为担心被吞并。

但我们现在看到的是，我们提出了阿伦·弗里德伯格多年前提出的问题，即亚洲现在是否准备好进行竞争？我认为在某些方面是的，或者亚洲是的，但我认为“和平与繁荣”时代的遗迹，旧秩序是许多国家、许多政权仍然渴望的。因此，我试图在书中最后提出一个简单的论点，即亚洲各地的政治领导人现在拥有决定未来的能动性。

那些将我们拉向负面方向、加剧紧张局势和安全紧张局势的结构，并非没有这些政治领导人和商界领袖尽力推动并维持对经济增长与和平与繁荣的集体承诺的能力，并试图边缘化对该安全秩序的挑战者，并以长期有利的方式将它们融合起来。

因此，我讲得有点长了，我道歉，但是，你们现在没有理由不买这本书了，因为我几乎把里面的所有内容都告诉你们了。我期待你们的反馈和评论，非常感谢你们的耐心。

谢谢，谢谢TJ介绍你的精彩著作。我知道不可能总结你关于十个不同国家过去几十年的经验的五章内容。现在，我将直接转向我们今天的三位杰出讨论嘉宾。首先，让我这样安排：我们有三位优秀的比较学家和一位日本学者，他翻译了你的书。我也会给你机会发言。因此，每次讨论将花费大约八分钟，讨论你的书，提出问题。如果提出问题，TJ你将回应这些问题或评论，然后我们将转向讨论第二位、第三位和第四位讨论嘉宾。如果时间允许，我们将进行进一步讨论，或者就这些问题与你进行后续交流。

那么，让我们先从首尔国立大学的宋智妍教授开始。她是一位比较学家，研究日本和韩国，并专门研究劳工政治和贸易。宋教授，您先请。非常感谢邀请我参加关于T.J. Pempel教授新书《政权区域》的网络研讨会。正如Pempel教授刚才提到的，我在研究生时期以及现在都阅读并从Pempel教授的作品中学到了很多。能有机会对您的新书发表一些评论或看法，我感到非常荣幸。今天，我将简要总结这本书在该领域的一些重要贡献，同时提出三个基于本书的讨论点或问题。首先，Pempel教授的新书为理解东亚地区戏剧性的经济进步以及发展不足或经济失败提供了一个非常全面但新颖的视角。主要关注三个关键要素：政治（即国家制度）、社会经济力量、外部力量以及经济政策范式。这将为东北亚和东南亚的10个国家提供全面的分析。一个非常重要的贡献是，尽管他涵盖了10个不同的国家，但他试图提供国家之间的一些相似之处，以及政权内部和区域之间的新的差异。因此，它为亚洲研究和比较经济学领域做出了宝贵的贡献。根据他的书，他实际上提供了三个不同的国家集群。他在演讲中提到了，我将跳过这部分。但我认为一个非常有趣和重要的贡献是，他试图提供一个非常独特的亚洲经济发展类型学。尽管许多亚洲学者要么专注于一个国家，要么专注于世界，要么专注于国际关系，但TJ试图提供对该地区的全面分析，并具有非常具有竞争力的视角，这是巨大的贡献。它还有助于我们理解他几十年研究和奉献精神所体现的问题和竞争背景的重要性。因此，尽管我从书中获益良多，并获得了许多深刻的见解，但我也想提出三个讨论问题。首先，我想提出一些关于三个关键组成部分（政治、社会经济、国际力量）之间一般因果机制的问题。正如Pempel教授提到的，有三个关键要素，它们也基于亲和力，虽然它们不是真正决定性的，但它们是相互关联的，并且一起演变。但对我来说，似乎在引言章节中，他试图提供一些机制变化和影响。同时，根据他的分析，特别是对于我们的第一类国家——发展型政权，似乎关键的限制应该是外部力量。那么我的问题是，在政治、社会经济、外部这三个关键要素中，对于每个政权或每个案例或跨国案例，起点是什么？

根据他的书，他实际上提供了三个不同的国家集群。他提到了，我将跳过这部分。但我认为一个非常有趣和重要的贡献是，他试图提供一个非常独特的亚洲经济发展类型学。尽管许多亚洲学者要么专注于一个国家，要么专注于世界，要么专注于国际关系，但TJ试图提供对该地区的全面分析，并具有非常具有竞争力的视角，这是巨大的贡献。它还有助于我们理解他几十年研究和奉献精神所体现的问题和竞争背景的重要性。

在这种情况下，特别是对于第一类发展型政权，对我来说，我们必须更认真地考虑外部力量。虽然对于第二类国家也有重要的例子，但我提出一个问题：外部力量在这些区域案例中的重要性是否不同？对于第一类发展型政权，存在更多的安全关切、区域结构限制，因为冷战和美国的区域支持。但第二类主要是经济层面，因此安全因素可能不如第一类重要。主要是跨国公司的支持和投资。在这种情况下，即使外部力量很重要，但外部力量在多大程度上是关键的，这是我想听您稍后回应的一个问题。同时，正如我之前提到的，所有这三个要素都很重要，但同时外部力量也非常重要。

因此，他试图提供一个非常全面的、新的视角来分析东亚的经济进步和经济失败。他关注三个主要关键要素：政治（国家制度）、社会经济力量和外部力量，以及经济政策范式。这将为东北亚和东南亚的10个国家提供全面的分析。一个非常重要的贡献是，尽管他涵盖了10个不同的国家，但他试图提供国家之间的一些相似之处，以及政权内部和区域之间的新的差异。因此，它为亚洲研究和比较经济学领域做出了宝贵的贡献。

因此，尽管我从书中获益良多，并获得了许多深刻的见解，但我也想提出三个讨论问题。首先，我想提出一些关于三个关键组成部分（政治、社会经济、国际力量）之间一般因果机制的问题。正如Pempel教授提到的，有三个关键要素，它们也基于亲和力，虽然它们不是真正决定性的，但它们是相互关联的，并且一起演变。但对我来说，似乎在引言章节中，他试图提供一些机制变化和影响。

同时，根据他的分析，特别是对于我们的第一类国家——发展型政权，似乎关键的限制应该是外部力量。那么我的问题是，在政治、社会经济、外部这三个关键要素中，对于每个政权或每个案例或跨国案例，起点是什么？

因此，对于第一类发展型政权，外部力量是至关重要的。对于第二类国家，外部力量也很重要，但其性质不同。对于第三类国家，外部力量可能不那么重要，因为它们是内部驱动的。然而，外部力量在维持这些政权方面起着至关重要的作用。因此，我的问题是，外部力量在多大程度上是决定性的？

因此，外部力量在多大程度上是决定性的？我的第二个问题是关于政权内部的社会经济力量。在第一类发展型政权中，他提到了强大的、有凝聚力的社会经济联盟，致力于快速增长。然而，在韩国和台湾，我们看到了工会和中小企业等新社会经济力量的崛起，它们挑战了现有的联盟。那么，这些联盟是如何形成的？它们是如何演变的？它们是如何与国家制度互动的？

for development region especially early stage of the institutional setting or economic development so later in the conclusion mentioned about domestic factors may influence over the international order of regionalism so which is going to reverse fidelity but the same time in these cases only developmental regimes today just make more contribution to variations region or all other two breast cases astral regime or rapacious region they also having some contribution to the regional order or regionalism in

east asia so in a sense to what extent each cluster of countries make contribution to constructing or reconfiguration of the regional order in asia so that's my first part so and uh the other one is um uh having said i also a bit uh raised kind of mechanical changes in regimes or in regions or algorithms so according to our professor pampa's explanation so uh especially uh chapter four the uh project temple is trying to elaborate development regions under reconstruction through incremental erosion so it's

reduced external support from the mostly us and fragmented social economics and increased fbi or fragmentation of mercantilism however if we just take into account these three key elements as based on elect affinity so usually we consider they are linked to one another which means it might also accelerate institutional changes more high speed as opposed to incremental changes so what if there are some changes in one domain do they just trigger more a faster speed of change in other domain so i'm just wondering

this incremental uh change incremental erosion how is it different from radical change in either in regions or is there any possibility moving from one type of regime to the other so uh in addition to that um let this issue so it seems maybe these three classes quite more the resilient or much strong to just register changes although they might have some room for change within regime over time over the past four or five decades but still there are key characteristics still remain as it has so it seems to me it's

rather all this institutional development to explain economic development the political institutions economic institutions or external forces it seems to me a vacant path-dependent trajectory development so in that context these countries is in country response to these new stimulus or forces for change rather constrained within a certain scope so how do you think this kind of the uh country responds to change are they maintaining their domain of regime type or is any possibility for moving from one

over the other or moving into kind of fourth type of the clusters so that's kind of my second point uh my last point is uh you just mentioned about the how users come up with these conceptual definitions how these countries are carried into three clusters but still it seems to me this can especially first two types of regime which is developmental regime and astro uh ursa development regimes they are quite similar with typology four asian tigers and late asian tigers which means northeast asia and also southeast asia

so as opposed to um although there are some difficult explanation different emphasis as you mentioned you are trying to reject single path of developments which is rejecting some flying kiss models some other issue in literature but at the same time it seems to me these three components are very important at the same time can we take into account different timing and sequencing of development matters more in explaining these different types of the development so this in this context the east asian

development is very uncommon as you mentioned it is very easy to find in other different settings so it seems to me this all this combination of political social economic external elements can a certain type of religion possible so if that's the case right now we don't have the same institutional or structural constraint like we had in the past for example cold war or a new type of the u.s kind of market access so if so so are we going to see kind of similar path of development in other geography settings so east asia has a

really unique model so take into account all historical contexts and also structural constraints so some unintended consequences so that's kind of the explanation you are trying to analyze or if all other countries other geographical settings they happen to they come up with similar constraints are we going to see similar path of this east asian development which means can we make this framework as more generalizable perspective in complete context so in these settings i'm just uh trying to also emphasizing so you

mentioned the region as uh according to your uh description so they said the interaction of three elements components people to contribute uh economy but at the same time people mentioned earlier so the first especially they can be easily replaced by developed states so of course divine states put emphasis on city bureaucracy or state institutions so which is different from your primary focus of three institutions or elements but nevertheless they can be also replaced by term of states so how states can be

quite different from regimes conceptually so these are some of my uh points i wanted to raise based on your book so once again i really enjoyed reading the book and learned a lot and also i would like to thank the korean association for the international studies for giving me this valuable opportunity so thank you so much for your listening thank you thank you so much uh professor uh song uh three very specific questions to uh to you uh tj uh do you want to respond yes uh of course i wish i had you know an hour

to sort of go off and think about these because they raised some very important questions but uh let me do my best after writing down the notes and uh trying to respond to what i think were the the core of your your concerns um i'm fully aware that my use of the term elective affinities skirts the whole question of causality and which is the primary mover which comes first and you know was the chicken before the egg or vice versa uh and i do that very deliberately because what i'm concerned about

is the way in which all three of those pieces resonate with each other and are critical to the eventual development of the economic policies that that emerge at the same time i think it's it's really you raise a very important point which the book does not really deal with which is this question of timing and how historical time may if we look at it from a different through a different lens the lens that you're suggesting uh we might very well get to a situation in which we conclude for example that

early in in time the developmental regimes are the primary movers of economic development and that they are in the position that they're in largely because of the cold war and once that cold war has dissipated the energy behind the replication of something like a developmental regime is simply no longer as powerful and i try to make the point in the book which i think you raised toward the very end i do think that that developmental regime is a particular regime that is historically unique or certainly historically limited

i don't think it would be very hard for me to imagine a situation in which one saw a replication of the experiences of japan korea and taiwan in a way that for example we could see the development of state corporatism and many different kinds of regimes around the world we could see coordinated market economies coming up and starting from scratch et cetera et cetera so in that sense there is a certain limitation to the typology that that i'm trying to offer to the typological uh transferability of this uh and i

confess that you know as as is often the case uh the generals are always fighting the last war and in some cases i'm fighting the war of believing that this notion of the developmental state is something that could be applied to other countries and i think the unique experience of japan korean taiwan has to be underscored as historically unique as i think you try to do with your comments about the cold war and in in that context i think you raised the important point that the developmental regimes the airsoft's

developmental regimes may simply be looking discreet because they begin at very different historical times in which the external conditions made possible different patterns of domestic politics i think you're right in that regard at the same time i think it's really critical and i hope i underscore the point that for example those airsides developmental regimes were very different in many of their socioeconomic traits from the developmental regimes for example they have some natural resources they

have strong agriculture whereas the developmental regimes all went through land reform uh they don't have therefore the same political impetus to move in the direction of large-scale industrialization they're simply anchors pulling them back to prioritize or privilege reliance on raw materials governments in power can say well you know we don't have to industrialize because we can always send out some more palm oil or we can send out uh you know more rubber or whatever it happens to be so in that regard i think there is

something fundamentally different about these regimes and i think the ethnic divisions compared to the ethnic homogeneity of the developmental regimes is important to underscore so i think you're right the timing is critical at the same time i think these regimes start from very different places uh in terms of their socioeconomics and what the coalition coalitional capabilities are and i think the vulnerability to multinational penetration or the decision to jump onto the multinational experience of the

multinational opportunities does create a very different set of incentives for these regimes than was the case for the the earlier regimes none of them are held together by the same kind of regime bonding glue that the cold war provided for the developmental regimes so these are much more fragmented i think um and just to see if i if i've got everything reading my own handwriting is never never a good experience i guess i guess i would simply stop at that at that point i there may be other points that you raise that i need

to think more seriously about certainly it's clear that you read and thought about this in some very powerful ways and you've raised some questions that i clearly need to think about some of them i i was thinking about and consciously either chose to ignore or uh or just decided that i couldn't deal with them at that time oh i'm sorry there was the question about how do these regimes pile up in ways that that shaped the the uh regional order and uh and i i guess the one thing or the two things i would

add in this regard i think the cold war is clearly driving the early regional order and it's the it's the developmental regimes versus the communist regimes that are that are the pivotal drivers of that bipolarity and uh and the economic security divisions are critical to that in that regard uh whereas with the order of peace and prosperity i would say that essentially it's the the developmental regimes the airsets developmental regimes and china in its early phase that are critical engines to that peace

and prosperity vietnam could be added singapore could be added but they all basically are led by politicians by business people who essentially are saying don't talk to me about anything but economic growth you know let me make my citizens richer and i will stay in power and let's all go out and make money uh that has changed oh and the the rapacious regimes were not in a position to challenge that order in any fundamental way i think that's all changed since the global financial crisis chinese leaders have become much more assertive

on a security side much more assertive in terms of economic competition north korea has developed its nuclear weapons in roughly the same time period and has the capacity to be a major irritant myanmar has you know managed to reimpose ethnic cleansing as a part of the asean agenda or part of the asean challenge so i think in those regards um uh this notion of the the regime feeding the the mix of regimes feeding back to the changing regional order uh is something i was trying to deal with so let me stop at that note i do

want to hear from the other uh our other two discussions and i don't want to monopolize the discussion myself right uh thank you um and uh i think uh i feel uh time pressure uh um so uh next is uh professor uh lee wong ki uh from uh aju university uh professor lee um specializes in in financial politics um you know he uh did an excellent analysis of asian financial crisis and you know east asian responses um and he also does uh technology and he has regional focus on on china and uh you know korea so uh

perfectly uh you you have uh about five to six minutes uh um sorry we are uh we are uh running out of time so uh please thank you very much professor sun uh yes uh i read the uh book uh three times and uh this is a fascinating and terrific books on uh east asia actually my post impression is wow it's too ambitious actually i thought only professor scala pino could this uh this kind of comparison but professor pj pamper proves me wrong and this is a very uh good uh uh overview of developer development stats in east asia yes it's

a very ambitious task but it's analysis is very uh systematic and sophisticated actually uh i think the one major contribution of this book is a rediscover economic policy paradigm which has been long forgotten in the heydays of neo-liberalism uh the second uh major contribution is to explain diversity within capitalism in east asia actually this will include outliers such as dprk north korea and myanmar and final contribution i think is that analyze china in the middle of east asia actually yes china existed

geographically in east asia but uh i don't think that china is east asia in terms of institution uh let me elaborate uh on my points actually professor uh pj pamper provides uh uh resin's uh type and their key components states uh social economics and external forces and finally economic policy paradigms as i mentioned yeah i think economic polish paradigm is one of the key contribution to cpe and ipa scholarships actually uh this uh uh analytical framework uh remind me reminds me of robert cox's three factors

of uh ipe social forces uh forms of states and world order but uh i i think pj pampa's paradise is much uh more systematic and more sophisticated and uh uh my first impression is that this is book on uh developmental stage but as you know uh this book is not a swanson for developmental states actually develop developmental states was very successful in east asia and nowadays a return of the states become buzzwords in post-pandemic era and when it comes to diversity within capitalism in east asia

professor pj pampel provides five models of east asian capitalism uh as you know well yeah japan korea and taiwan was very successful other countries was not so uh successful actually yes dbr km myanmar was a liar and uh in a sense is a total failure and china yeah now nowadays yes china everyone talks about china actually uh professor pj pampel suggested china adapted the east asia model nonetheless china is not a developmental stage actually china is socialist market economy with chinese characteristic

characteristics recently uh if the economy so uh gildan uh lahuman uh wrote about a very short article on chinese economy actually the title uh is that china has broken the asian model anyway based uh upon my uh analysis and impression i will raise a three questions for professor pamper my first question is about installation in the middle of kovite 19 crisis easter asia has weathered the kobe 9 crisis very well and many people point out that government play a push alone in managing the crisis uh some scholars i mean such as uh

francis fukura said uh is the asian model of governance more efficient than any other models and uh i'm wondering if uh the east racial model of governance can explain the relative success of east asian countries uh so far and the next question is about the return of the states uh as this book shows uh the status has never gone away in east asia but uh just uh after the asian financial crisis of the 1997 a new liberal reform uh forced the states shrink its role especially in economic policy making but

the states still hold commanding heights do you believe that the states can be more efficient in managing economy than market in the future and my final question is about the future of china as you mentioned the uh china is kind of a hybrid model but many uh people especially chinese scholars are worried about the return to state capitalism uh especially uh in the uh xi jinping administration do you think that uh china will add able uh to overcome the middle income trade without institutional and political

reforms this is my final question let me stop here thank you very much thank you thank you professor lee uh once again three uh very concrete questions to you uh tj uh i'll try to be i'll try to be very quick i know we i know we've got some time pressures so uh let me try to be somewhat sympathetic and and i don't want to underplay the uh the importance of professor lee's questions but with regard to covet 19 i think clearly uh the combination of of strong states effective states efficient states

uh worked very well in this regard i would add to that the fact that as i understand it and this is hardly my area of knowledge but that virtually all of the countries in east asia that did respond very effectively to the copenhagen crisis had very strong in place experience institutions that were based on prior experiences with prior pandemics that led that led their health facilities to be able to introduce measures very quickly in terms of testing contact tracing and the like so clearly i think what we saw in place was a

you know combination of very effective governments and also governments that were very sensitive to the necessity for technocratic solutions to what became political problems in other countries in many respects as i understand it the health officials were in a position to say we're shutting down we're wearing masks we're doing testing et cetera et cetera and you know it's that level of government efficiency that i think played a very big role um and i certainly think that you know within western europe and certainly in

particular in in my country with the united states the entire response to coped was driven by politicians with their own agendas so i think that's a very clearly different situation uh the return of the state uh i guess you know i think i think we make a mistake if we bifurcate markets and states uh i think that you know the the capacity of the state to the capacity of the state to shape markets has remained very strong in most places certainly the united states the uk and a few other places promote a neoliberal economic model but

that has not been the case in you know large swaths of of western europe and certainly governments uh you know that that have embraced the neoliberal market and thrown open the gates to market forces have not done particularly well and i think we're seeing a pullback by many countries in terms of recognizing that a they have to deal with new global forces but at the same time dealing with them does not necessarily lead to or should not necessarily mean the erosion of the state and i think even in the united states

following the global financial crisis it's been very hard for even the most dedicated pure economists to sell the virtues of unregulated banks and uh unregulated markets so i think the state is very definitely alive and well but it's dealing with very different situations than it did before and finally on the future of china we should go offline and talk for three hours because predicting future china is uh is a very big opportunity for people who want to write articles about it my own sense is that

that right now xi jinping is in a very powerful position as the leader of china but that the socio-economic forces beneath him have the capacity to push back strongly against him i mean i think he's overreaching with regard to xinjiang i think he's overreaching with regard to hong kong and i think what he's triggered is a greater reaction on the part of many governments and even many corporations to what they now see or recognize as a a country that is not necessarily going to rush out and embrace

the kinds of wto neoliberal open market reforms that were predicted in the 1990s and early 2000s and that this is this is a leader with a very strong security agenda and unless or until the governments of the region and the governments of western europe combine and push back the only recourse is to rely on domestic forces and i'm not sure that domestic forces are going to be in a position effectively to challenge him but uh this is something that we could come back to in a year and uh and find that

we're completely wrong in our expectations of what happened because china's in a very volatile situation so let me stop on that and thank you again for your comments and close reading of the book all right thank you um let's uh let's turn to uh uh china scholar uh here uh professor chong ju young who who does uh china and also uh comparative uh economic uh systems uh among others uh so uh professor thank you um i really enjoyed reading this book and this is an extremely ambitious attempt to explain the divergent path of economic

development in 10 east asian cases and not simply that this book of categorized them into three regimes in other words three specific configurations of political socioeconomic and international forces which share elective affinities and thus generate clusters so the cube on the book cover i have noticed uh kind of desymbolizes um this clustering of different forces and forming three different regime types and you don't stop there you also attempt to explain the transformation of these regimes so anyone who have done a

cross-national comparable analysis would admire the width and depth of this book and i truly enjoyed reading this book i think the narratives about each case and regime is quite persuasive and from this book it is clear how three types of regimes are different from each other in terms of the different configurations of forces but i'm still a little bit confused regarding the general logic behind this regime typology and the causal relationship between particular region configurations and different

economic outcomes so i will elaborate that point by raising two sets of questions first set of question is about the divergence between regimes and the second set is about the conversion of regimes so first regarding the divergence between regimes i'm not entirely clear what makes such divergent path between different region types a good example will be the case of north korea and south korea right they share many socio-economic and structural characteristics but they walk totally different paths north korea of

representative rapacious regime south korea a representative developmental regime and explaining this diversion path uh two koreans have walked you say that in the rapacious regime well-trenched elites forged regime that served their interests and formed predatory pets to protect their power and interest while elites in developmental regimes formed protection packs against existential threats by actions that advance national economic improvement so here you seem to um not explicitly but you seem to emphasize

the role of elites uh key political actors uh in their incentives uh and the problem i'm having is the source of these incentives and the mechanism of such incentives uh you seem to emphasize while defining these three different types of regimes institutional and structural variables but you also emphasize highlight the role of the k actors and their incentives to promote or hinder national industrialization so what is the relationship between the institutional and structural variables you seem to emphasize

while defining regimes and the key actors incentives so what will be the key variables that shape the ellipse incentives that mechanism seems a little bit murky that's my first question regarding the divergence between regimes and the second set of question is about the conversion of regimes well the puzzle i had was about the elective affinities that the different political socio-economic and international forces have between these three different types of regimes because you emphasize that these different forces three different

forces share elective affinities so they tend to stick together right and they form three different types of regimes then it is unclear how and when they make change especially from one regime type to another right if they stick together what breaks off that stickiness and cluster and generate changes so a good example would be korea of course uh in case of korea you could compare east korea with pakistan east korea but the case of china is more impressive right the difference between maoists china

and dungeons or reformist china and well if mao is china is kind of close to rapacious regime the reform is china it will be a hybrid or quite close to a developmental regime then how could china break the old regime equilibrium based on the elective affinities and converted or transformed into a different region right so when is the breakout from the path dependency possible that will be the first question i raised from this second set of questions and a question related to that first question is about how could china

be successful if somehow china could successfully break off from the path dependency of the past so you mentioned in your book that china could steer a course away from the dependent in law and development of the airsoft's development regime and obviously and it may be more importantly china could steer away from a rapacious regime right considering china's institutional and socio-economic characteristics there is a higher chance that china could become a rapacious regime than a developmental regime

but it seems that china despite all the problems and high level of corruption it's not really a typical rapacious regime and you explain that the chinese party state did not restrict economic gains to the ruling view but dispersed benefits to the chinese citizenry and this kind of put china apart from um being a rapacious regime so reading all this i i could not help but wonder why what is the key difference that made china escape the trap of becoming a rapacious uh regime or uh an airs developmental regime um so these two

questions would uh be part of the second set of questions regarding the conversion of regimes so all you know i was fascinated by all the details you have shown regarding all different 10 cases and the typology it's very interesting but in the end closing this book i just i was not sure if i found the answer to the ultimate question of what really makes a successful sustainable economic growth while uh failing to do so in certain cases so i'll be interested in hearing your uh answers to these questions thank you

uh thank you uh professor before uh turning to uh tj let uh because of you know time constraints uh let me ask if uh dr o uh you you translated this book so i'm sure that you have lots of questions and carries as well uh to the author uh do you do you have a comment or question to tj this comment and thank you for giving this opportunity professor pam pal and professor jonas gerstone i'm singing yo i'm uh i was a principal researcher of east asia institute and now uh working as a research professor of

institution for japanese studies at seoul national university and i translated this book in korean with professor sanjo kim and sunton national university i really enjoyed the entire process for the translation i learned a lot from this book and today's seminar uh there are many there are many outstanding features of this book and i think the biggest attraction and strength of this food is that it is well systematically organized by categorizing the east asia region where the four academical uh annually analytical frameworks

are state institutions social and economic forces maximal forces and economic policy paradigm and i expect that this book will be the most reliable guide to east asian studies by giving a broader perspective on east asia and naming and categorizing east asia is quite complicated and categorizing taiwan as a country can be a problem for china as it poses one china policy also dprk or north korea is not an official country of korea but it exists and is quite different from south korea therefore i think regimes not countries

can be a good alternative to label these places in east asia this is the biggest advantage and system assist significance of this book recognizing east asia according to the type of regimes overall i hope this book will serve as an opportunity to look at this matter from a broader perspective and think about how to categorize over or evaluate east asia i hope this food will be loved by many researchers and students who are living in this region and new delhi will be a good opportunity for many korean readers

who have limited perspective only in northeast asia to broaden their horizons thank you thank you uh well actually it's a promotion remarks don't stop her don't stop her okay he did yeah i i do want to thank uh professor oh both for the translation and for the kind comments that she's made about the book um i think any author loves to hear that kind of thing and it's nice to have it on the back of the book but the reality is that uh usually there are far more flaws in the book than uh then you've probably uh been willing to

uh to underscore and you probably saw many of these as you were translating but thank you very much for not mentioning too much let me pick up professor jung's points because i think a couple of things are very critical in this regard i think you you know i think the central thread that runs through the points that you're making hinge very much on that whole question of where do the incentives come from what creates those incentives why do i mean in terms of your question about divergence between say the rok and

the ddprk you're certainly right that they both start from very similar places in terms of cultures socioeconomics etc in many respects north korea started out with much greater advantages than the south in terms of having more built-in industry um than did the south um the south had the population that had problems with agriculture and so forth i would simply say that this in many ways takes us back to the early point that professor jones raised about the importance of the cold war and the structuring features that the cold war

我带来的，我的意思是，在很多方面，我认为关键的分歧始于美国选择韩国作为其在冷战中的朋友、盟友和支持者，而中国/俄罗斯或中国苏联则与朝鲜民主主义人民共和国结盟，反之亦然，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国与他们结盟，韩国与美国结盟，因此，在冷战早期，这使得这两个政权走上了截然不同的道路，并为它们各自创造了非常不同的发展轨迹。

或者说，创造了将它们推向截然不同方向的轨迹，北方竭力维持国家计划和国有企业以及严格的政治控制，南方在朝鲜战争刚结束的艰难时期之后，幸运或不幸地迎来了朴正熙，他从日本那里吸取了教训，与美国结盟，但也非常相信国家机构在塑造经济政策发展方面的力量。

经济政策的发展，因此两者开始朝着非常不同的方向发展，我认为，在很多方面，我从你关于路径依赖的观点中得出的是，在许多情况下，一旦你走上其中一条道路，就会有内在的激励机制让你继续走下去，那些走在最前面的人有能力保持领先地位，并防止自己滑下悬崖，如果道路变得危险的话。

而那些不太幸运的人则有可能被推下去，所以，在某些方面，这就是你提出的关于发展道路的问题，但我认为你也提出了一个重要的问题，即是什么力量、什么引擎导致了史蒂夫·克拉斯纳等人所说的“间歇性均衡”的发展路径的中断？是什么导致了这种中断，又是什么导致了那些似乎

走在一条稳定轨迹上的政权走向一个非常不同的方向？你提出了中国的问题，在某些方面，这个问题的答案相对容易，我的意思是，在某些方面，中国共产党一旦它摆脱了对斯大林的依赖，一旦它与美国打开了关系，一旦美国尼克松开始提供军事武器并提供增加的经济机会，就使得像邓

小平这样的人能够获得权力、影响力等等成为可能，但我的意思是，正如我在书中试图强调的那样，这不仅仅是美国，我的意思是，邓小平在审视其他经济成功案例时非常聪明，这回到了早些时候提出的关于时机的问题，中国在很多方面受益匪浅，邓小平及其后的中国受益于早期发展型政权的经验，使得像邓小平这样的人能够审视日本，看看他们当时做得对的地方。

他们是如何做到这一点，引进我们后来处理的来自东欧的经济学家，处理那些摆脱国家计划、国家主导的计划和国有企业的举措，并从中学习，所以，在很多方面，我的故事确实在某些方面开始偏重于关键个人，关键的、由关键个人领导的转折点，但我认为，如果你回到韩国的案例，也有这些强大的结构性

变化发生，我在关于拆除发展主义的章节中试图提出的是，经济的成功创造了一个韩国的中产阶级，这个中产阶级不像以前那样强大，这个中产阶级开始要求比以前更多的政治自由，要求军方领导人开放，允许总统自由选举等等，这在很大程度上不是因为集体激励，而是因为结构性变化，我认为这些变化非常重要，我知道我们时间非常紧张，所以我想就此打住。我只想最后说，我非常感谢你们所有人对这本书的评论，特别是你们说的那些好话，但我认为你们提出的挑战也非常重要，没有什么比一位学者受到认真对待的作品更能让他高兴了，很明显，你们三位

你们四位都非常认真地对待它，并进行了深入的思考，这让我不得不重新思考，如果我再版这本书，我应该做些什么改变，我应该解决哪些在第一版中没有真正有效处理的问题，但非常感谢，现在我把发言权交还给孙教授。谢谢，谢谢潘佩尔教授。嗯，嗯，看起来，这里是

一位学生带着他的博士论文，然后是三位委员会成员提问，实际上，因为这是一项大型研究，一项十国分析，他们提出了很多问题，随着我们继续进行，他们越来越被问题的回答所说服，我认为这是一次非常有益的意见交流，特别是我们的讨论让我们能够回到

手稿，在讨论之后阅读一些片段，所以，再次非常感谢。这是一本不同寻常的书，不同寻常之处在于，是的，我们确实有关于十国比较的编辑文集，但没有一位作者能够掌握这十个案例并将其写成一本书，而且只有PJ能做到，在地球上，所以我们非常感谢你的努力，以及

灵感，我将以感谢PJ再次加入我们，以及感谢我们今天的杰出讨论者，各位小组成员，以及最重要的，感谢加入我们的KAI成员来结束今天的活动。非常感谢。

嗯，我们伟大的讨论者，我们今天的小组成员，以及最重要的，KAI的成员们，谢谢大家。

*本文为使用 AI 从韩语原文翻译而来，部分译文或语感可能存在偏差。

← 返回 · ← 首页 · ← 返回列表