[EAIㆍKAIS] 북 웨비나 시리즈 - A Region of Regimes, T.J. Pempel

YouTube 링크 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5v2BvhBJCWs

동아시아연구원의 후원으로 개최된 한국국제정치학회 <북 웨비나 시리즈 – A Region of Regimes, T.J. Pempel>가 7월 12일 공개되었습니다. 정치학 및 관련 사회과학 분야의 주요 신간을 소개하고 집중 토론하는 장을 마련하고자 기획된 본 웨비나 시리즈는 국내외 주요 저서에 대한 관심을 높이고, 다양한 질문과 의견을 나누는 기회를 제공합니다. 이번에 진행된 북 웨비나에서는 T.J. Pempel 저자의 “A Region of Regimes”를 소개하였습니다. 토론에는 송지연(서울대), 이왕휘(아주대), 정주연(고려대) 교수가 참여하였으며, 손열(연세대) 교수의 사회로 진행되었습니다.

본 웨비나에서 저자는 아시아 국가들의 정치경제발전 모델을 분류 및 분석하고, 이러한 정책의 추구 방향이 지역 안보와 경제에 끼치는 영향에 대해 설명했습니다. 이어서 패널들과 함께 레짐의 변화를 이끌어낼 수 있는 변수와 시진핑 리더십 아래 중국의 미래 등에 대한 심도깊은 토론이 이루어졌습니다.

프로그램

북 웨비나 영상보기

담당자

서정혜, 동아시아연구원(EAI) 연구원

영상 스크립트

hello uh welcome to kai's book webinar uh i am yao zong professor of beyonce university uh and today's moderator uh on behalf of uh kais i'd like to thank all of you to you know come to join us today we are featuring uh professor t.j pampel and his book the region of regimes and we also invite uh three uh excellent uh you know scholars uh from the kais uh for discussion um professor tj pempel received uh his phd from columbia university he's currently a professor at a political science at the university

of california berkeley he taught at cornell university for many years and university of colorado university of wisconsin and university of washington before joining university of california berkeley he is the author of uh over uh 120 scholarly articles and author and editor of uh 24 books so um it's a really uh great uh to uh you know introduce his works and uh today's uh book uh uh this book uh has been already translated into korean uh a region of regimes it's uh i think uh sort of uh summing up of his uh previous

works uh and it will be uh you know remembered as his um i don't know uh one of the masterpieces that uh he has produced uh for many many years um i mean he will uh produce much much more um you know after this book uh but we are really happy to discuss this book today with that introduction um pj it's your turn you uh you have about 15 to 20 minutes to introduce your book and then we turn to our panelists thank you very much joel uh it's a great pleasure to be here i want to thank the participants the discussions for

taking the time and trouble to read the book and i look forward to getting their comments and reactions i do want to thank both eai and kais for co-hosting this seminar i've had a very positive relationship with both of them uh a long time relationship with eai probably going back about 10 years or more but i also had close ties with kais including being a participant and a panelist in their december of 2019 conference so i have great respect for both of those organizations and i think they play a

very important role academically um i thought i would start with just a very brief word about my motivation in doing this book uh and it really in my view comes out of three very different threads as uh professor sun was talking about it in many ways it's it's uh growing out of my previous academic work but uh the first thing of course that i think is central to this book is my effort to grapple with the so-called asian economic miracle we saw huge growth in gross domestic product exports asia's share of

the world economy has gone rather dramatically we all know that east asia has been the most dynamic region for growth over the last three decades if not longer and i've joined many others in trying to understand that and puzzle it out the second big thread that runs through this book is what would be called comparative political economy my effort to link my thinking about issues of the specific countries that are involved to the broader theoretical debates that are going on within comparative politics

that have been going on for decades about how we should categorize different political economies whether we're talking about just as big anderson's three worlds of welfare capitalism or we're talking about uh hall and saskas you know coordinated market economies liberal market economies or whether we're talking about you know schmitter's state-led corporatism were uh societal at corporatism etc so i joined that that group and this book is one effort to try to grapple with some of the comparative political economic ways to

think about east asia and then finally as professor was talking about it i'm trying to grapple with the whole question of asian regional relations both the economic but also in the book a little bit of the security relationships so those are the sort of three motivating engines behind what i what i'm doing in the book and the book uh very boldly or very ridiculously tries to tackle the political economies of 10 different countries over a period of about 40 years so it's obviously going to run into the

difficulties and criticisms that i think are often confronting such an effort at trying to theorize about such a broad range which is uh it looks very good when until you get to the country that i know the most and uh you've clearly gotten the country wrong on the details that are the most critical so with that boldness i forge ahead the starting point for me was regional economic growth and i think if you look for a thread that runs through the book it's my effort to try to explain this and i what i think i try to do in the

book or what i hope the book does is present at least three important challenges to our understanding of what was behind that economic growth the first of these is the very straightforward point that the countries that have been successful in east asia economically by no means followed a single path this was not a situation of the flying geese model is often portrayed in japan of one country being out in the front and then other countries catching up and following roughly in the same pattern and

doing the same sorts of things i'm making an argument that uh that things are quite different from one national economy to the other but at the same time i'm not suggesting that this is a random collection of individual countries stories as i'll try to explain in a few minutes i see these economic growth patterns the political economies of these national uh national political economies growing in ways that are separable into several different types of ideal types of regimes the second big thing that i'm trying to

do is to make it clear that despite the so-called east asian miracle as the overarching label there are very important outliers of countries that do not participate in the miracle and not only do not participate in it but actively and openly reject it and these are countries that i think need to be part of the regional story and then finally and importantly and i i think this goes back to some of the things i wrote earlier in in my career but that i still think are very important i think in trying to understand the

domestic political economies of these places it's critical that we also weave in the international forces that were part of the domestic shaping of these political economies in particular we need to look at the pivotal force uh pivotal power of economic forces uh to get the to the heart of this i try to make an argument about what i call regimes it's a concept that i build around three key elements uh the first of these are political institutions essentially state institutions national bureaucracies secondly socioeconomic

forces what are the key socio-economic forces and what resources do they have within these different national economies and how do they align with each other what are the social coalitions socioeconomic coalitions that are formed and then finally um what are the most important international forces that are operating on the domestic political economy and these can be positive and supportive as they have been for some countries but they can also be very negative and uh focused on trying to upend or resist

the economic development patterns that are being pursued by these individual countries so those are the uh the three key elements that i see as part of the regime concept then in addition to that i want to just point out that the book is divided into two parts part one really tries to identify three distinct patterns of regime in east asia and these in many ways are ideal typical and i'll talk about them in a minute but the second part of the book tries to be a bit more dynamic and to look at changes in regime in a

regime that take place over time to look at the situation in china which i see as a hybrid of the three types of regimes that i look at in the in the part one and then finally in the final and concluding chapter to reverse the causal arrow and look at the ways in which the different combinations of regimes have led to different regional orders in east asia some very important differences from one period to the next uh i want not to not to spend too much time on things but but let me say a few things about part

one and the three ideal types of regimes that i suggest are advancing different paradigms of political economy so i take the three key elements of the regime and pair them with corresponding economic policies the first category of regime is what i'm calling developmental regimes many of you will see this is congruent with the developmental state although i see it as more complex than that i play this out with regard to japan korea and taiwan japan south korea and taiwan and essentially i argue that all three

benefited from what might be thought of as strong cohesive state institutions with skilled and relatively meritocratic bureaucratic agencies they had cohesive pro-growth socio-economic coalitions that were committed to rapid growth and they were capable of marginalizing political oppositions that were pursuing alternative patterns of growth and then finally and most importantly they enjoyed the unstinting support powerfully economically uh in terms of market access by the united states and the bond that

held this regime together was of course the anti-communism of the cold war all three elements of the regime were bound together by their anti-communist agenda and the economic policy that these regimes pursued was what i call embedded mercantilism i've used the term before but basically this involves keeping the domestic economy relatively free from highly competitive manufacturing products and foreign direct investment but supporting domestic large businesses that can move into the export markets

uh globally and doing so with a pr particularly high regard for job training moving people up the educational spectrum moving up the technological spectrum and with a high degree of socioeconomic uh equality with economic benefits most importantly going to domestic actors and this is a contrast to the second category which i'm calling irsa's developmental regimes where i see the primary economic benefits going to foreign holders of capital or multinational corporations so a word or two about the airsoft's

airsoft regimes or assad's developmental regimes the cases i use in malaysia indonesia thailand all of these are much more fragmented politically lots of regional bastions of power they are socioeconomically more diverse much greater economic and ethnic tensions uh across different regions there are much stronger oppositions to the dominance of the national government patronage is widespread in the national bureaucracies typically less talented and less cohesive than the developmental regimes they look like the developmental regimes

in terms of high growth they look like the developmental regimes in terms of their reliance on exports but they're very different in so far as the outside support that they receive comes primarily from the multinational corporations and as a consequence of this their economic policies are they become integral parts in the supply chain of the multinational corporations so that in many respects the predominant economic benefits redound to the multinational corporation not so much to the hosting institutions

the jobs for which are reduced to essentially packaging and assembly with very little emphasis on improving the job skills of the workforce the end result of which is that all three of these countries are at risk of falling into what i call the middle income trap and finally i have a third category of regimes which i'm calling rapacious regimes these are prototypically north korea myanmar or burma if you prefer but myanmar and the philippines particularly during the regime of philippine mark ferdinand marcos here we have uh

very narrow powerful control of uh state power state institutions very often reliant heavily on military force and coercion of citizenry limited bureaucratic skills except in very targeted areas like military skills and loyalty to the narrow group of political power holders is critical to advancement within the bureaucracy so it's loyalty takes precedence over technical competence there are basically no socio-economic divisions that are capable of challenging state institutions although in places

like myanmar there are certainly outlying pockets of powerful ethnic and social division that are challenging the central power within the burmese core but basically there are a few of these socioeconomic divisions within the dprk but all of them all of these three rapacious regimes really put in place policies that reflect their sanctions from abroad their absence of strong powerful economic supporters except in cases where the outside force such as china influencing myanmar or north korea are extracting resources from that

regime and keeping in power a narrow political elite so the policy that these are typically pursuing uh involve extraction of benefits for the political elite and for very slow to no growth a little focus on industrialization uh heavy reliance on raw materials and agricultural exports etc and the outside regimes supporting them are basically interested in foreign direct investment and exploitation uh more than anything else now part two i'll try to be brief on this um the first chapter in part two looks at

what happens when regimes and many successes when when the developmental regimes in particular achieve high levels of success and when the cold war ends and their external support begins to erode the united states as we know was far less supportive of japan korea and taiwan once the cold war ended than they were when they saw them as viable allies valuable allies in the fight against communism as a consequence they all faced much greater pressure from the united states to liberalize their economies

and the support for the regimes in power the support for the political institutions and for the socio-economic coalitions that have been there before began to erode and additionally because of the great economic success that took place many of the social social and economic forces that were once powerful began to lose their power to new socioeconomic groups that rose in power organized labor it might be it might be more entrepreneurs it might be small and medium-sized businesses uh it also led to of course

democratization in korea and taiwan the end result of which was that all of these regimes began to see big changes not the collapse but big changes in the nature of their regimes taiwan and south korea both of course moved to a flip-flopping between progressive and conservative regimes japan saw its long-standing liberal democratic party and its rule with opposition coming to power and uh but the the final interesting thing that i want to point out in that chapter to me is that the that the fact that japan's regime was

the slowest to accommodate new economic forces has meant that japan has had the slowest economic growth of the three of these regimes korea and taiwan both move much more quickly to adjust their regimes but it's been hard for all any of the three to put in place the kind of consistent embedded mercantilism that long drove those three agendas turning to the next chapter which focuses on china i see china as essentially a hybrid of the has elements of all three of the other regimes it look it's like the developmental

regimes in that it has a strong state with competent coherent bureaucrats of course responding to controls by the chinese communist party but in that respect it's it's very similar they're also committed to rapid economic growth rapid move up to technological gradient but they're very much different from the developmental regimes and more like the assad's regimes insofar as they rely very heavily on foreign direct investment allowed in foreign competition uh and also like the hair assad's regimes much

more reliant on state-owned enterprises as a way to try to keep some control politically of the economy and finally they're somewhat like the rapacious regimes insofar as the communist party particularly in the communist party elite has been able to extract exceptionally high benefits for themselves and their families and those uh that are close to them but different from the rapacious regimes in that a lot of the wealth that china has achieved has been spread across the country as a whole and of

course we know that huge numbers of uh individuals have moved into the middle class finally the last chapter tries to take up the question of so what does this all mean for the regional order how do these pieces hang together in the context of shaping the regional consequences and here i suggest and if you haven't figured it out by now the magic number for me seems to be three on almost everything i think about but um i see three different orders having been in play over the post-war period the first of these is the very familiar

cold war order in which asia was divided along communist versus democratic lines where economic and security interests overlapped almost 100 percent uh the economic players the japan korea taiwan in particular did not trade with any of the communist countries and uh there were very clear divisions that led and that that promoted security as the primary goal and that saw economics in accord with uh security calculations by the various countries with the end of the cold war though and with the collapse of the soviet union

and with the decisions to move toward more liberalized economic policies by china what we saw was a movement toward what i would call peace and prosperity a period that began sort of in the it began as early as the 1980 or so but certainly accelerated with the decline demayos of the soviet union and we saw a period of you know 30 30 plus years up until i would say the 2008 financial crisis global financial crisis in which for the most part the rapacious regimes had very little capacity to upend the security problems

security tensions to create security tensions across the region to upend the collective project of economic development china was committed to the regionalization of that economic development and very unassertive when it came to security matters but we're now in what i would see as a beginnings or the possible embryonic stage of a third period which is one in which security tensions have risen there's been a rise in nationalism an awful lot of countries have turned back on themselves or back into themselves

become much more skeptical about their regional ties whether this is japan korea relations whether it's myanmar asean relations whether it's taiwan's problems turning into itself and and doing its best to reduce its economic ties to the mainland because of its fears that it will be absorbed but what we're seeing now of course is the uh we're raising the question i guess that aaron freebird raised a number of years ago which is is asia now right for rivalry and i think in some respects they are or asia is but i think the

vestiges of the era of peace and prosperity that older order is one to which many of the countries many of the regimes still aspire and so i try to close the book with making the simple argument that political leaders across asia now have the power of agency to decide what the future is that the structures of the structures that pull in negative directions toward greater tensions and increase security tensions are not without the capacity of these political leaders and leaders in the business community to do their best to

push back and to retain the collective commitment to economic growth and peace and to prosperity and to try to marginalize uh the challengers to that security order and to weave them in ways that could be beneficial in the long run so i went on a little bit longer than i should have i apologize but uh uh you know how you now have no reason to go out and buy the book because i just told you virtually everything in there so i look forward to your reactions and comments and thank you very much for your patience

thank you uh thank you tj for uh uh for introducing um your great book uh it's uh i know it's impossible to uh you know uh some summarize uh you know all five chapters uh of you know ten different countries uh you know experience uh of the past few decades uh uh now uh let let me just you know directly uh turn to our um you know great panelists today uh the first uh so uh let me let me do it this way for this question um we have three uh you know excellent comparativists uh here uh and also uh japan scholar uh who translated your

book uh awesome he uh i'll give you uh also a chance to uh discuss um so uh each uh description discussion uh will take about you know eight minutes uh to talk about his book uh giving you know questions and if questions are uh posed and uh after then uh tj will uh you you will react to uh those questions or comments and then move to uh uh discussing our second discussion and third and fourth uh and then if time remains then we will you know uh do further discussions i mean follow up these questions with you

uh so uh we uh let me let's uh start with uh professor song jian uh of uh seoul national university uh she um she does uh she is a comparativist and she does japan and korea and also she specializes in uh labor politics and trade um so uh professor song why don't you go first okay uh thank you so much for inviting me to participate in our book webinar on professor tj pampa's new book on the regime of uh region of regimes so as professor just mentioned earlier i also all read and learned a lot from

pampa's work during my graduate school era and other stuff even right now so it's very honor for me to have a chance to keep some comments or some points about your new book so uh today uh i'm going to briefly uh summarize a few uh important contribution from this book in the field at the same time i will raise basically three uh discussion points or questions based on the book so uh first of all professor pam paul's tj pemple's new book actually provide a very comprehensive but the new young approach to dramatic

economic advances as well as under development or economic failure in east asia so primary focus on three major key elements are politics which is in state institutions and social economic forces external forces applause and economic pulse paradigms so this will provide very comprehensive and analysis on 10 countries in northeast and southeast asia so a very important contribution is although he covers 10 different countries but he tried to provide some similarities among countries and also kind of new

york's differences even within regimes and across regions so we should make a valuable uh contribution to the field of asian studies and also comparative economy so based on his book he actually provided three uh distinct clusters countries so he mentioned during his kind of parts so i will skip this part but one of a very interesting and important contribution i think he tried to provide some typology of asian economic development which is very unique so although on many asian scholars we are focusing either

one country or world two or the international relations in general but tj has trying to offer a comprehensive analysis of the regions and also with very competitive perspectives which is a huge contribution and also it helps us to understand the importance of the questions and competitive context they reflect he's actually decade-long research and devotion to the field so uh although i just learned a lot from the book and uh got many inside of the book but i also would like to raise kind three kind of some discussion questions

point for today uh so first of all i would like there's some issue about some general kind of causal mechanism among three key components political social economic international forces so as first temples mentioned that there are three key elements but they are also based on elect affinity although they are not really deterministic and test affinity but they are more or less just going together evolving together in a sense but uh but it seems to me the uh this kind of there are three candidates in his

introduction chapter he's trying to offer some mechanism changes and influences over among these kind of issues and plus an economic pulse paradigm at the same time based on his analysis especially for the our first global country developmental regimes it seems the key constraint here is starting point should be the external forces so my question is among these three key elements of institutions politics socio-economic external what can be the starting point of either each regimes or with each cases or cross-country cases

so in this context um especially for the case of the our first development regimes uh for me we have to take into account more external forces seriously although for the second case about the uh second groups there are also important examples but i raise the question the importance excellent forces are dissimilar across these region cases for the age of the first group developmental regimes there are more security concerns conservation regional structural constraints by uh the cold war and plus and u.s support for the region but the

second is primary more economic dimensions so security council may not be as important as the first group so primary multinational cooperation support that investment so in that context even if the external forces are important but to what extension forces are critical that's kind of some question i wanted to hear from your uh a response later and at the same time um as i mentioned earlier uh there are all these three elements are important but the same time the external forces are very important

for development region especially early stage of the institutional setting or economic development so later in the conclusion mentioned about domestic factors may influence over the international order of regionalism so which is going to reverse fidelity but the same time in these cases only developmental regimes today just make more contribution to variations region or all other two breast cases astral regime or rapacious region they also having some contribution to the regional order or regionalism in

east asia so in a sense to what extent each cluster of countries make contribution to constructing or reconfiguration of the regional order in asia so that's my first part so and uh the other one is um uh having said i also a bit uh raised kind of mechanical changes in regimes or in regions or algorithms so according to our professor pampa's explanation so uh especially uh chapter four the uh project temple is trying to elaborate development regions under reconstruction through incremental erosion so it's

reduced external support from the mostly us and fragmented social economics and increased fbi or fragmentation of mercantilism however if we just take into account these three key elements as based on elect affinity so usually we consider they are linked to one another which means it might also accelerate institutional changes more high speed as opposed to incremental changes so what if there are some changes in one domain do they just trigger more a faster speed of change in other domain so i'm just wondering

this incremental uh change incremental erosion how is it different from radical change in either in regions or is there any possibility moving from one type of regime to the other so uh in addition to that um let this issue so it seems maybe these three classes quite more the resilient or much strong to just register changes although they might have some room for change within regime over time over the past four or five decades but still there are key characteristics still remain as it has so it seems to me it's

rather all this institutional development to explain economic development the political institutions economic institutions or external forces it seems to me a vacant path-dependent trajectory development so in that context these countries is in country response to these new stimulus or forces for change rather constrained within a certain scope so how do you think this kind of the uh country responds to change are they maintaining their domain of regime type or is any possibility for moving from one

over the other or moving into kind of fourth type of the clusters so that's kind of my second point uh my last point is uh you just mentioned about the how users come up with these conceptual definitions how these countries are carried into three clusters but still it seems to me this can especially first two types of regime which is developmental regime and astro uh ursa development regimes they are quite similar with typology four asian tigers and late asian tigers which means northeast asia and also southeast asia

so as opposed to um although there are some difficult explanation different emphasis as you mentioned you are trying to reject single path of developments which is rejecting some flying kiss models some other issue in literature but at the same time it seems to me these three components are very important at the same time can we take into account different timing and sequencing of development matters more in explaining these different types of the development so this in this context the east asian

development is very uncommon as you mentioned it is very easy to find in other different settings so it seems to me this all this combination of political social economic external elements can a certain type of religion possible so if that's the case right now we don't have the same institutional or structural constraint like we had in the past for example cold war or a new type of the u.s kind of market access so if so so are we going to see kind of similar path of development in other geography settings so east asia has a

really unique model so take into account all historical contexts and also structural constraints so some unintended consequences so that's kind of the explanation you are trying to analyze or if all other countries other geographical settings they happen to they come up with similar constraints are we going to see similar path of this east asian development which means can we make this framework as more generalizable perspective in complete context so in these settings i'm just uh trying to also emphasizing so you

mentioned the region as uh according to your uh description so they said the interaction of three elements components people to contribute uh economy but at the same time people mentioned earlier so the first especially they can be easily replaced by developed states so of course divine states put emphasis on city bureaucracy or state institutions so which is different from your primary focus of three institutions or elements but nevertheless they can be also replaced by term of states so how states can be

quite different from regimes conceptually so these are some of my uh points i wanted to raise based on your book so once again i really enjoyed reading the book and learned a lot and also i would like to thank the korean association for the international studies for giving me this valuable opportunity so thank you so much for your listening thank you thank you so much uh professor uh song uh three very specific questions to uh to you uh tj uh do you want to respond yes uh of course i wish i had you know an hour

to sort of go off and think about these because they raised some very important questions but uh let me do my best after writing down the notes and uh trying to respond to what i think were the the core of your your concerns um i'm fully aware that my use of the term elective affinities skirts the whole question of causality and which is the primary mover which comes first and you know was the chicken before the egg or vice versa uh and i do that very deliberately because what i'm concerned about

is the way in which all three of those pieces resonate with each other and are critical to the eventual development of the economic policies that that emerge at the same time i think it's it's really you raise a very important point which the book does not really deal with which is this question of timing and how historical time may if we look at it from a different through a different lens the lens that you're suggesting uh we might very well get to a situation in which we conclude for example that

early in in time the developmental regimes are the primary movers of economic development and that they are in the position that they're in largely because of the cold war and once that cold war has dissipated the energy behind the replication of something like a developmental regime is simply no longer as powerful and i try to make the point in the book which i think you raised toward the very end i do think that that developmental regime is a particular regime that is historically unique or certainly historically limited

i don't think it would be very hard for me to imagine a situation in which one saw a replication of the experiences of japan korea and taiwan in a way that for example we could see the development of state corporatism and many different kinds of regimes around the world we could see coordinated market economies coming up and starting from scratch et cetera et cetera so in that sense there is a certain limitation to the typology that that i'm trying to offer to the typological uh transferability of this uh and i

confess that you know as as is often the case uh the generals are always fighting the last war and in some cases i'm fighting the war of believing that this notion of the developmental state is something that could be applied to other countries and i think the unique experience of japan korean taiwan has to be underscored as historically unique as i think you try to do with your comments about the cold war and in in that context i think you raised the important point that the developmental regimes the airsoft's

developmental regimes may simply be looking discreet because they begin at very different historical times in which the external conditions made possible different patterns of domestic politics i think you're right in that regard at the same time i think it's really critical and i hope i underscore the point that for example those airsides developmental regimes were very different in many of their socioeconomic traits from the developmental regimes for example they have some natural resources they

have strong agriculture whereas the developmental regimes all went through land reform uh they don't have therefore the same political impetus to move in the direction of large-scale industrialization they're simply anchors pulling them back to prioritize or privilege reliance on raw materials governments in power can say well you know we don't have to industrialize because we can always send out some more palm oil or we can send out uh you know more rubber or whatever it happens to be so in that regard i think there is

something fundamentally different about these regimes and i think the ethnic divisions compared to the ethnic homogeneity of the developmental regimes is important to underscore so i think you're right the timing is critical at the same time i think these regimes start from very different places uh in terms of their socioeconomics and what the coalition coalitional capabilities are and i think the vulnerability to multinational penetration or the decision to jump onto the multinational experience of the

multinational opportunities does create a very different set of incentives for these regimes than was the case for the the earlier regimes none of them are held together by the same kind of regime bonding glue that the cold war provided for the developmental regimes so these are much more fragmented i think um and just to see if i if i've got everything reading my own handwriting is never never a good experience i guess i guess i would simply stop at that at that point i there may be other points that you raise that i need

to think more seriously about certainly it's clear that you read and thought about this in some very powerful ways and you've raised some questions that i clearly need to think about some of them i i was thinking about and consciously either chose to ignore or uh or just decided that i couldn't deal with them at that time oh i'm sorry there was the question about how do these regimes pile up in ways that that shaped the the uh regional order and uh and i i guess the one thing or the two things i would

add in this regard i think the cold war is clearly driving the early regional order and it's the it's the developmental regimes versus the communist regimes that are that are the pivotal drivers of that bipolarity and uh and the economic security divisions are critical to that in that regard uh whereas with the order of peace and prosperity i would say that essentially it's the the developmental regimes the airsets developmental regimes and china in its early phase that are critical engines to that peace

and prosperity vietnam could be added singapore could be added but they all basically are led by politicians by business people who essentially are saying don't talk to me about anything but economic growth you know let me make my citizens richer and i will stay in power and let's all go out and make money uh that has changed oh and the the rapacious regimes were not in a position to challenge that order in any fundamental way i think that's all changed since the global financial crisis chinese leaders have become much more assertive

on a security side much more assertive in terms of economic competition north korea has developed its nuclear weapons in roughly the same time period and has the capacity to be a major irritant myanmar has you know managed to reimpose ethnic cleansing as a part of the asean agenda or part of the asean challenge so i think in those regards um uh this notion of the the regime feeding the the mix of regimes feeding back to the changing regional order uh is something i was trying to deal with so let me stop at that note i do

want to hear from the other uh our other two discussions and i don't want to monopolize the discussion myself right uh thank you um and uh i think uh i feel uh time pressure uh um so uh next is uh professor uh lee wong ki uh from uh aju university uh professor lee um specializes in in financial politics um you know he uh did an excellent analysis of asian financial crisis and you know east asian responses um and he also does uh technology and he has regional focus on on china and uh you know korea so uh

perfectly uh you you have uh about five to six minutes uh um sorry we are uh we are uh running out of time so uh please thank you very much professor sun uh yes uh i read the uh book uh three times and uh this is a fascinating and terrific books on uh east asia actually my post impression is wow it's too ambitious actually i thought only professor scala pino could this uh this kind of comparison but professor pj pamper proves me wrong and this is a very uh good uh uh overview of developer development stats in east asia yes it's

a very ambitious task but it's analysis is very uh systematic and sophisticated actually uh i think the one major contribution of this book is a rediscover economic policy paradigm which has been long forgotten in the heydays of neo-liberalism uh the second uh major contribution is to explain diversity within capitalism in east asia actually this will include outliers such as dprk north korea and myanmar and final contribution i think is that analyze china in the middle of east asia actually yes china existed

geographically in east asia but uh i don't think that china is east asia in terms of institution uh let me elaborate uh on my points actually professor uh pj pamper provides uh uh resin's uh type and their key components states uh social economics and external forces and finally economic policy paradigms as i mentioned yeah i think economic polish paradigm is one of the key contribution to cpe and ipa scholarships actually uh this uh uh analytical framework uh remind me reminds me of robert cox's three factors

of uh ipe social forces uh forms of states and world order but uh i i think pj pampa's paradise is much uh more systematic and more sophisticated and uh uh my first impression is that this is book on uh developmental stage but as you know uh this book is not a swanson for developmental states actually develop developmental states was very successful in east asia and nowadays a return of the states become buzzwords in post-pandemic era and when it comes to diversity within capitalism in east asia

professor pj pampel provides five models of east asian capitalism uh as you know well yeah japan korea and taiwan was very successful other countries was not so uh successful actually yes dbr km myanmar was a liar and uh in a sense is a total failure and china yeah now nowadays yes china everyone talks about china actually uh professor pj pampel suggested china adapted the east asia model nonetheless china is not a developmental stage actually china is socialist market economy with chinese characteristic

characteristics recently uh if the economy so uh gildan uh lahuman uh wrote about a very short article on chinese economy actually the title uh is that china has broken the asian model anyway based uh upon my uh analysis and impression i will raise a three questions for professor pamper my first question is about installation in the middle of kovite 19 crisis easter asia has weathered the kobe 9 crisis very well and many people point out that government play a push alone in managing the crisis uh some scholars i mean such as uh

francis fukura said uh is the asian model of governance more efficient than any other models and uh i'm wondering if uh the east racial model of governance can explain the relative success of east asian countries uh so far and the next question is about the return of the states uh as this book shows uh the status has never gone away in east asia but uh just uh after the asian financial crisis of the 1997 a new liberal reform uh forced the states shrink its role especially in economic policy making but

the states still hold commanding heights do you believe that the states can be more efficient in managing economy than market in the future and my final question is about the future of china as you mentioned the uh china is kind of a hybrid model but many uh people especially chinese scholars are worried about the return to state capitalism uh especially uh in the uh xi jinping administration do you think that uh china will add able uh to overcome the middle income trade without institutional and political

reforms this is my final question let me stop here thank you very much thank you thank you professor lee uh once again three uh very concrete questions to you uh tj uh i'll try to be i'll try to be very quick i know we i know we've got some time pressures so uh let me try to be somewhat sympathetic and and i don't want to underplay the uh the importance of professor lee's questions but with regard to covet 19 i think clearly uh the combination of of strong states effective states efficient states

uh worked very well in this regard i would add to that the fact that as i understand it and this is hardly my area of knowledge but that virtually all of the countries in east asia that did respond very effectively to the copenhagen crisis had very strong in place experience institutions that were based on prior experiences with prior pandemics that led that led their health facilities to be able to introduce measures very quickly in terms of testing contact tracing and the like so clearly i think what we saw in place was a

you know combination of very effective governments and also governments that were very sensitive to the necessity for technocratic solutions to what became political problems in other countries in many respects as i understand it the health officials were in a position to say we're shutting down we're wearing masks we're doing testing et cetera et cetera and you know it's that level of government efficiency that i think played a very big role um and i certainly think that you know within western europe and certainly in

particular in in my country with the united states the entire response to coped was driven by politicians with their own agendas so i think that's a very clearly different situation uh the return of the state uh i guess you know i think i think we make a mistake if we bifurcate markets and states uh i think that you know the the capacity of the state to the capacity of the state to shape markets has remained very strong in most places certainly the united states the uk and a few other places promote a neoliberal economic model but

that has not been the case in you know large swaths of of western europe and certainly governments uh you know that that have embraced the neoliberal market and thrown open the gates to market forces have not done particularly well and i think we're seeing a pullback by many countries in terms of recognizing that a they have to deal with new global forces but at the same time dealing with them does not necessarily lead to or should not necessarily mean the erosion of the state and i think even in the united states

following the global financial crisis it's been very hard for even the most dedicated pure economists to sell the virtues of unregulated banks and uh unregulated markets so i think the state is very definitely alive and well but it's dealing with very different situations than it did before and finally on the future of china we should go offline and talk for three hours because predicting future china is uh is a very big opportunity for people who want to write articles about it my own sense is that

that right now xi jinping is in a very powerful position as the leader of china but that the socio-economic forces beneath him have the capacity to push back strongly against him i mean i think he's overreaching with regard to xinjiang i think he's overreaching with regard to hong kong and i think what he's triggered is a greater reaction on the part of many governments and even many corporations to what they now see or recognize as a a country that is not necessarily going to rush out and embrace

the kinds of wto neoliberal open market reforms that were predicted in the 1990s and early 2000s and that this is this is a leader with a very strong security agenda and unless or until the governments of the region and the governments of western europe combine and push back the only recourse is to rely on domestic forces and i'm not sure that domestic forces are going to be in a position effectively to challenge him but uh this is something that we could come back to in a year and uh and find that

we're completely wrong in our expectations of what happened because china's in a very volatile situation so let me stop on that and thank you again for your comments and close reading of the book all right thank you um let's uh let's turn to uh uh china scholar uh here uh professor chong ju young who who does uh china and also uh comparative uh economic uh systems uh among others um so uh professor thank you um i really enjoyed reading this book and this is an extremely ambitious attempt to explain the divergent path of economic

development in 10 east asian cases and not simply that this book of categorized them into three regimes in other words three specific configurations of political socioeconomic and international forces which share elective affinities and thus generate clusters so the cube on the book cover i have noticed uh kind of desymbolizes um this clustering of different forces and forming three different regime types and you don't stop there you also attempt to explain the transformation of these regimes so anyone who have done a

cross-national comparable analysis would admire the width and depth of this book and i truly enjoyed reading this book i think the narratives about each case and regime is quite persuasive and from this book it is clear how three types of regimes are different from each other in terms of the different configurations of forces but i'm still a little bit confused regarding the general logic behind this regime typology and the causal relationship between particular region configurations and different

economic outcomes so i will elaborate that point by raising two sets of questions first set of question is about the divergence between regimes and the second set is about the conversion of regimes so first regarding the divergence between regimes i'm not entirely clear what makes such divergent path between different region types a good example will be the case of north korea and south korea right they share many socio-economic and structural characteristics but they walk totally different paths north korea of

representative rapacious regime south korea a representative developmental regime and explaining this diversion path uh two koreans have walked you say that in the rapacious regime well-trenched elites forged regime that served their interests and formed predatory pets to protect their power and interest while elites in developmental regimes formed protection packs against existential threats by actions that advance national economic improvement so here you seem to um not explicitly but you seem to emphasize

the role of elites uh key political actors uh in their incentives uh and the problem i'm having is the source of these incentives and the mechanism of such incentives um you seem to emphasize while defining these three different types of regimes institutional and structural variables but you also emphasize highlight the role of the k actors and their incentives to promote or hinder national industrialization so what is the relationship between the institutional and structural variables you seem to emphasize

while defining regimes and the key actors incentives so what will be the key variables that shape the ellipse incentives that mechanism seems a little bit murky that's my first question regarding the divergence between regimes and the second set of question is about the conversion of regimes well the puzzle i had was about the elective affinities that the different political socio-economic and international forces have between these three different types of regimes because you emphasize that these different forces three different

forces share elective affinities so they tend to stick together right and they form three different types of regimes then it is unclear how and when they make change especially from one regime type to another right if they stick together what breaks off that stickiness and cluster and generate changes so a good example would be korea of course uh in case of korea you could compare east korea with pakistan east korea but the case of china is more impressive right the difference between maoists china

and dungeons or reformist china and well if mao is china is kind of close to rapacious regime the reform is china it will be a hybrid or quite close to a developmental regime then how could china break the old regime equilibrium based on the elective affinities and converted or transformed into a different region right so when is the breakout from the path dependency possible that will be the first question i raised from this second set of questions and a question related to that first question is about how could china

be successful if somehow china could successfully break off from the path dependency of the past so you mentioned in your book that china could steer a course away from the dependent in law and development of the airsoft's development regime and obviously and it may be more importantly china could steer away from a rapacious regime right considering china's institutional and socio-economic characteristics there is a higher chance that china could become a rapacious regime than a developmental regime

but it seems that china despite all the problems and high level of corruption it's not really a typical rapacious regime and you explain that the chinese party state did not restrict economic gains to the ruling view but dispersed benefits to the chinese citizenry and this kind of put china apart from um being a rapacious regime so reading all this i i could not help but wonder why what is the key difference that made china escape the trap of becoming a rapacious uh regime or uh an airs developmental regime um so these two

questions would uh be part of the second set of questions regarding the conversion of regimes so all you know i was fascinated by all the details you have shown regarding all different 10 cases and the typology it's very interesting but in the end closing this book i just i was not sure if i found the answer to the ultimate question of what really makes a successful sustainable economic growth while uh failing to do so in certain cases so i'll be interested in hearing your uh answers to these questions thank you

uh thank you uh professor before uh turning to uh tj let uh because of you know time constraints uh let me ask if uh dr o uh you you you translated this book so i'm sure that you have lots of questions and carries as well uh to the author uh do you do you have a comment or question to tj this comment and thank you for giving this opportunity professor pam pal and professor jonas gerstone i'm singing yo i'm uh i was a principal researcher of east asia institute and now uh working as a research professor of

institution for japanese studies at seoul national university and i translated this book in korean with professor sanjo kim and sunton national university i really enjoyed the entire process for the translation i learned a lot from this book and today's seminar uh there are many there are many outstanding features of this book and i think the biggest attraction and strength of this food is that it is well systematically organized by categorizing the east asia region where the four academical uh annually analytical frameworks

are state institutions social and economic forces maximal forces and economic policy paradigm and i expect that this book will be the most reliable guide to east asian studies by giving a broader perspective on east asia and naming and categorizing east asia is quite complicated and categorizing taiwan as a country can be a problem for china as it poses one china policy also dprk or north korea is not an official country of korea but it exists and is quite different from south korea therefore i think regimes not countries

can be a good alternative to label these places in east asia this is the biggest advantage and system assist significance of this book recognizing east asia according to the type of regimes overall i hope this book will serve as an opportunity to look at this matter from a broader perspective and think about how to categorize over or evaluate east asia i hope this food will be loved by many researchers and students who are living in this region and new delhi will be a good opportunity for many korean readers

who have limited perspective only in northeast asia to broaden their horizons thank you thank you uh well actually it's a promotion remarks don't stop her don't stop her okay he did yeah i i do want to thank uh professor oh both for the translation and for the kind comments that she's made about the book um i think any author loves to hear that kind of thing and it's nice to have it on the back of the book but the reality is that uh usually there are far more flaws in the book than uh then you've probably uh been willing to

uh to underscore and you probably saw many of these as you were translating but thank you very much for not mentioning too much let me pick up professor jung's points because i think a couple of things are very critical in this regard i think you you know i think the central thread that runs through the points that you're making hinge very much on that whole question of where do the incentives come from what creates those incentives why do i mean in terms of your question about divergence between say the rok and

the ddprk you're certainly right that they both start from very similar places in terms of cultures socioeconomics etc in many respects north korea started out with much greater advantages than the south in terms of having more built-in industry um than did the south um the south had the population that had problems with agriculture and so forth i would simply say that this in many ways takes us back to the early point that professor jones raised about the importance of the cold war and the structuring features that the cold war

brought in i mean in many respects i think that the pivotal divergence begins with the fact that the united states picked rok as its uh as its friend ally supporter in the cold war and china slash russia or china soviet union sided with the dprk or vice versa the dprk sided with them the rok sided with the united states and as a consequence of that uh certainly in this early cold war period uh it put those two regimes on very different tracks and created paths that were very different for both of them

or created paths that uh that propelled them in in substantially different directions the north doing its best to hang on to state planning and state-owned enterprises and uh rigid political control the south after a rough period um with uh in the in the immediate aftermath of the korean war um was either fortunate or unfortunate to get pak chung he who you know took his lessons from japan uh sided with the united states but but also believe very strongly in the power of state institutions to shape the

development of of economic policy and so the two began to move in in very different directions and i think you know in many respects what i what i took from your point about path to dependence was that in many cases once you get on one of these paths uh there are built-in incentives to stay on the same path that that those who are you know walking at the front of the pack uh have every capacity to stay at the front of the pack and and to keep from sliding off the side of the cliff if the path is is getting close to treacherous

areas whereas those who are uh not as privileged uh have the chance to be pushed off so you know in some respects that's the that's a piece of what you're raising with regard to the paths of development but i think you also raise the important question of what is the what is the power of the force the engine that creates the break in the path of what steve krasner and others have called the punctuated equilibrium you know what's the what what causes that puncture and what causes uh regimes that seem

to be on one steady trajectory to move in a very different direction you raise the question of china in some respects the answer to that one is relatively easy i mean in some respects uh the chinese communist party uh once it uh you know um once it had uh opened up to once it had moved away from uh reliance on stalin had opened up relations with the united states once the united states with nixon had begun to provide military arms and and provide increased economic opportunities made it possible for somebody like xiao

ping to move into power influence etc but i mean as i try to stress in the book it was not just the united states but i mean deng was very smart in looking at the other economic success stories which goes back to that point that was raised earlier about timing china had in many respects the benefit china under deng and subsequently had the benefit of earlier experiences by those developmental regimes where it was very possible for someone like deng to look to japan and say what were they doing right

you know how did they manage this to bring in economists from uh eastern europe that we're dealing with later dealing with the moves away from state-owned planning state state-led planning and state-owned enterprises and to begin learning from that so you know in many ways you know my story does then tend in some respects to begin privileging key individuals you know key uh turning points that are led by uh by key individuals but i think you know if you if you go back to the south korean case there are also these powerful structural

changes that take place what i tried to suggest in the chapter about dismantling developmentalism uh the very fact that you know there were there was economic success that created a middle class in south korea that had not been quite as strong as before middle class that was beginning to demand greater political freedoms than have been uh in place before demands that um the the military leaders uh open things up to a free election of the president et cetera et cetera and this this was much less a matter of it was a matter of

collective incentives structural changes that i think was was were very important and i know we're we're really tight on time so i think i better stop on that note i do just want to close with uh saying how much i appreciate the comments from all of you on the book uh particularly the nice things that you said but i think also the uh the challenges that you raise uh nothing nothing is more pleasing to an academic than to have his or her work taken seriously and and it's clear that all three of you uh

all four of you rather have taken it very seriously and thought about it in deep ways that i think send me back to thinking a bit more about what do i do uh with you know if i if i get a second printing of this what what do i begin to change and what are i begin to address uh that i haven't really dealt with effectively in this uh in this first printing but thank you very much let me turn it back to professor sun thank you uh thank you professor pampel uh well uh it uh it looks like uh here's um

here's a student with a big uh this dissertation uh and then uh three uh committee members asking questions with uh i mean actually uh because it's a two uh uh i mean it's a big one uh you know 10 country analysis uh they you know come up with a full of questions and then as we move on you know they are increasingly right persuaded by the you know questions and answers and uh i think it's really a useful uh exchange of opinions and particularly our discussion kind of allowed us to go back to the

manuscript and read uh some of the pieces uh after the discussion so uh thank you so much uh once again this is an unusual book unusual uh in a sense that yes we do have uh edited volumes of uh you know ten country com comparison but not one single author mastering uh those ten cases and then putting into a book and this is only pj can do um on earth so uh we are very much uh appreciate uh your effort and um with uh administration and inspiration let me uh conclude uh by thanking tj uh for uh joining us once again and also

uh you know our uh great uh discussions our panelists today and most of all uh kai's members for joining us thank you very much