[Fake News and Democracy Series] III. Responding to Disinformation: International Regulatory Trends and South Korea's Response Measures

1. Introduction

The term "fake news" is no longer used in the international community due to the increasing instances of powerful figures attacking their critics by accusing them of spreading "fake news." Instead, the term "disinformation" is used. The dictionary definition of disinformation is "false information that is deliberately and often secretly spread" (Merriam-Webster Dictionary). It is distinguished from false information due to exaggeration or simple mistakes. Hate speech and mockery are typically considered within the scope of freedom of expression and not classified as disinformation. Disinformation is distinguished from simple misinformation because there is an "intent" to distort or fabricate information through fake photos or videos, or baseless claims. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defines disinformation as false information deliberately created to harm individuals, social groups, organizations, or any country (UNESCO 2018). The European Union defines disinformation as "false or misleading content that is deliberately created or spread to deceive, with the intention of causing harm or to obtain economic or political gain, which may cause public harm" (European Commission). Both definitions distinguish it from simple misinformation by including the terms "intent" and "harm." However, since intent is difficult to ascertain, the two terms, disinformation and misinformation, are often used interchangeably. "Fake news" is only a subset of disinformation, as it is limited to "news." Nevertheless, in Korea, the term "fake news" is still widely used in legislative efforts and public discourse, so both terms will be used here depending on the context.

In authoritarian countries, disinformation is primarily used to undermine the legitimacy of political opposition or as a tool for "politics of exclusion" against ethnic or religious minorities. In this context, terms like "online freedom" or "internet freedom" are mainly used to protect democracy from digital authoritarianism. Freedom House reports that online freedom has been declining for the past 13 years, with authoritarian governments moving beyond simply blocking specific social media apps or internet services to using Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) to spread disinformation or strengthen censorship. It notes that 47 authoritarian governments are using AI to fabricate sentences, sounds, and images to manipulate public opinion or mislead, and 21 countries mandate or encourage the integration of machine learning into digital platforms to suppress political opposition or minority voices (Funk, Shahbaz, and Vesteinsson 2023).

Disinformation is also widespread in democratic countries. In these cases, the government is not the primary source; rather, politically polarized societies are the main source. Individual YouTubers or social media users, fully utilizing the freedom of expression valued in democratic societies, create or disseminate disinformation for ideological or financial gain. This form of disinformation thrives in politically polarized societies. Even information that should be scientific, such as climate change or pandemics, is interpreted differently based on political ideology. Social media users, driven by their own beliefs, contribute to the spread of disinformation by selectively consuming or sharing information that confirms their biases. A distinct psychological state involves spreading disinformation not out of genuine belief, but out of a motive to support one's own political party in a structurally polarized two-party system, even when aware that the information is false or exaggerated (Peterson and Iyengar 2021). Regardless of the precise psychological state, disinformation tends to spread synergistically when public opinion and networks are polarized (Törnberg 2018). In other words, the echo chamber effect is not limited to homogenous small networks but extends to networks of the same political leaning that have weak connections with these networks.

Research on disinformation seeks causal factors at both individual and societal structural levels. Studies show that individuals with high political interest or frequent social media use are more likely to spread disinformation, beyond their attitudes on specific issues (Morosoli et al. 2022). Research focusing on societal influences, rather than individual ones, highlights structural factors that undermine democratic resilience due to the presence of extreme ideologies. For example, societies that rely more on social media or alternative media than traditional media, or societies with populist parties, tend to facilitate the spread of disinformation (Humprecht et al. 2023).

Meanwhile, foreign interference for opinion manipulation occurs more frequently in democratic societies. Unlike authoritarian countries, these societies are open to information flows and do not block information from abroad. However, the revelation of Russian interference in the 2020 US presidential election led the United States to approach the influx of foreign disinformation as a national security issue. Disinformation is also used in information warfare targeting people worldwide, as seen in the case of the war in Ukraine. Consequently, open societies in the West are attempting to counter information dissemination from authoritarian powers like Russia and China as part of their security policies.

Disinformation tends to proliferate particularly during election periods. The New York Times reports that this year is an unprecedented political year, with elections in 83 countries, involving half of the world's population. Concerned about this, Meta, YouTube, X, and others have reportedly been strengthening their teams and protective measures against the spread of election-related disinformation since last year. Concerned about the harmful effects of disinformation in elections, UNESCO conducted a survey in September 2023 of 8,000 voters in 16 countries with elections this year (South Korea was not included). The survey found that in developed countries, 55% rely on TV and 37% on social media for information, while in less developed countries with lower Human Development Index (HDI) scores, these figures are 37% and 68% respectively, indicating a higher reliance on social media. However, the proportion of respondents who believe disinformation will have a negative impact was high in most surveyed countries, regardless of their development level. Notably, 85% of respondents expressed concern about the impact of disinformation on the elections this year (UNESCO 2023). South Koreans also appear to view the problem of disinformation seriously. According to an East Asia Institute (EAI) survey in January 2024, 81.4% of South Koreans agreed on the seriousness of fake news, and 60% believed they were likely to be deceived by fake news.

According to the aforementioned UNESCO report, citizens in 16 countries responded that governments (89%) and social media platform companies (91%) should strongly address disinformation and hate speech during election periods. However, regulating disinformation is not easy. It is difficult to identify the individuals who create or spread such information and the social media users who disseminate it. Consequently, strengthening the responsibility of social media platform companies, which play a crucial role in spreading disinformation, is the most frequently proposed solution. Alternatively, many efforts are focused on citizen education in media literacy to enable internet users to discern disinformation themselves. Furthermore, there is considerable debate about the cautious approach to regulation, as an overly regulatory approach could harm the beneficial sharing of information and democratic solidarity brought about by digital communication methods. Opinions advocating for strengthening empirical research on the legitimacy of disinformation containment, the effectiveness of disinformation regulations, and the need for research from a broader information ecosystem perspective fall into this category (Wanless and Shapiro 2022; Green et al. 2023).

It has become important to strike a balance between the need to respond to disinformation and the potential harms of excessive regulation. To consider desirable regulatory directions for South Korea, we will first examine recent international regulatory trends.

2. International Regulatory Movements

A 2020 report by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the UNESCO Broadband Commission analyzed the digital disinformation lifecycle as Instigators, Agents, Messages, Intermediaries, and Targets/Interpreters (IAMIT) and categorized 11 responses into the following four areas: 1) Responses to identify disinformation (monitoring and fact-checking, investigation); 2) Responses to producers and disseminators (legislative/policy responses, domestic/international counter-disinformation campaigns, electoral-specific responses); 3) Responses to production and dissemination mechanisms (curatorial responses, technical algorithm responses, de-monetization responses); 4) Responses to the target audience of disinformation campaigns (ethical/normative responses, educational responses, empowerment and credibility labelling responses) (Broadband Commission 2020).

While the above categorization focuses on actors, Jeong Se-hoon categorizes responses by method, comparing legal regulation, self-regulation, fact-checking, and literacy education, along with their scope, actors, and pros and cons (Jeong Se-hoon 2017).

<Table 1> Comparison of Disinformation Response Measures

Among these response categories, the United States and Europe have begun to more seriously pursue legal and policy responses targeting the producers of disinformation and its dissemination mechanisms. This is due to a shared understanding of the problems posed by digital disinformation, such as exacerbating political polarization, hindering pandemic response, and increasing election interference and security threats from foreign influence, particularly from Russia. However, there is a difference: Europe is focusing on legislative and policy measures that balance freedom of expression with the regulation of disinformation, while the United States is concentrating on establishing mechanisms within the executive branch for early detection and response to foreign disinformation.

2.1 European Union's Response

The European Union enacted the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Market Act (DMA) in October 2022. The former aims to protect fundamental rights and freedom of expression online, while the latter seeks to foster digital innovation, growth, and competitiveness in the EU's single market. By February 2024, member states are required to designate a Digital Services Coordinator to facilitate policy coordination among member states (European Commission).

The EU's DSA was enacted with the aim of preventing the spread of illegal and harmful activities and misinformation online. The Act seeks to ensure user safety, protect fundamental rights, and create a fair and open platform environment. The DSA regulates online intermediaries and platforms, including online marketplaces, social networks, content-sharing platforms, and app stores. It adopts an approach that redefines the roles of users, platforms, and government authorities, with citizens at its core (European Commission). The European Commission explains the Act's objectives for each stakeholder group. For citizens, it aims to better protect fundamental rights, provide greater control and choice, and particularly enhance the protection of children online by reducing exposure to illegal content. For digital service providers, it aims to provide legal clarity and uniform rules applicable across the EU, making it easier for startups and SMEs in Europe to scale up. For businesses using digital services, it aims to facilitate market access across the EU through platforms and create a level playing field against providers of illegal content. For society as a whole, it aims to enable democratic oversight and monitoring of systemic platforms and reduce systemic risks such as manipulation and misinformation.

The DSA applies different levels of regulation based on the role, size, and influence of entities within the online ecosystem, categorizing them into four types. First are "Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs)" and "Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs)," defined as platforms or search engines with at least 10% of the EU's population of 450 million, meaning over 45 million average monthly users in Europe. Second are "Online Platforms," such as online marketplaces, app stores, collaborative economy platforms, and social media platforms that connect sellers and consumers. Third are "Hosting Services," which provide cloud and web hosting services. Fourth are "Intermediary Services," which provide network infrastructure for internet access and domain name registration.

The core of the regulation targets VLOPs and VLOSEs. The European Commission required online platform companies to submit their user numbers by February 17, 2023 (these companies must report their user numbers every six months). Based on this, 17 entities were designated as VLOPs and VLOSEs in April. If their average monthly user numbers fall below the threshold of 45 million for one year, these companies will be removed from the designation. The national authorities in the countries where these companies have their main offices will act as coordinators starting February 17, 2024. For example, for AliExpress, an online platform used by an average of 104 million Europeans per month, the Dutch government will act as the coordinator because it is operated by Alibaba Netherlands. For Google Search and YouTube, used by an average of 364 million and 417 million Europeans per month, respectively, the Irish government will act as the coordinator because they are operated by Google Ireland Ltd. (European Commission).

Companies designated as VLOPs and VLOSEs must comply with the following within four months. First, they must provide contact points to authorities and users, report illegal activities, provide user-friendly interfaces, and be transparent about advertising, recommendation systems, or content moderation decisions. Second, designated companies must identify, analyze, and assess systemic risks associated with their services, considering their societal impact. Particular attention must be paid to risks related to illegal content; fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and media freedom, pluralism, non-discrimination, consumer protection, and children's rights; public safety and electoral processes; gender-based violence, public health, protection of minors, and mental and physical well-being. Third, once risks are identified and reported to the European Commission for supervision, these companies must take measures to mitigate these risks. Specifically, this involves redesigning services or altering functionalities or recommendation methods. These companies can internally strengthen their platforms by investing more resources to better identify systemic risks. Fourth, VLOPs and VLOSEs must establish internal control functions to effectively identify and mitigate risks; conduct independent audits at least once a year; share their data with the European Commission and authorities to enable supervision and assessment of DSA compliance; allow researchers access to platform data to detect, identify, and understand systemic risks; provide recommendation systems that do not rely on user profiling as an alternative; and disclose accumulated advertising. Failure to comply with these obligations may result in fines of up to 6% of their global annual revenue starting February 17, 2024.

It is important to note that the DSA only targets illegal content and does not regulate harmful content such as online harassment, bullying, or non-illegal hate speech. This is to avoid disputes over what constitutes harmful content and to avoid restricting free online speech. For content that is harmful but not illegal, the DSA adopts an indirect approach by strengthening the transparency and accountability of platform companies to filter content. Calabrese notes that the ongoing debate in the UK Parliament over the Online Safety Bill, which could potentially infringe on freedom of expression, demonstrates the difficulty of enacting strict legislation. As feared, authoritarian countries like Hungary are enacting laws that could impose up to five years of imprisonment for spreading disinformation, aiming to silence voices critical of the government. This raises concerns that strengthening regulations towards criminal penalties could actually undermine democracy. The enactment of the DSA is expected to be effective in enhancing the accountability of large platform companies through cooperation among EU member states. Furthermore, EU member states are addressing disinformation through their domestic laws. France and Germany have had regulations on election-related disinformation and hate speech in place for years, and other European countries such as Austria, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Spain are also introducing regulations to combat disinformation.

2.2 United States' Response

In the United States, the focus appears to be more on establishing mechanisms within the executive branch to counter disinformation rather than enacting comprehensive legislation. Following Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election, laws and systems began to be reformed to improve monitoring and oversight. In 2017, the US Congress unanimously passed the "Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act," establishing the Global Engagement Center (GEC) within the Department of State. In the fall of 2017, the FBI established the "Foreign Influence Task Force," and in 2018, the Department of Homeland Security created the "Countering Foreign Influence and Interference Taskforce" and its associated bureau (Foreign Influence and Interference Bureau). A "Disinformation Board" was reportedly added in 2022. The Department of Defense also established the "Influence and Perception Management Office." As similar organizations were established across various departments in a rapid succession, calls for inter-agency coordination and a unified strategy grew louder. Consequently, in September 2022, the "Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC)" was established within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the highest intelligence agency overseeing US intelligence agencies. The FMIC addresses not only disinformation targeting US elections but also disinformation targeting domestic public opinion. It supports the GEC within the Department of State, which counters disinformation from countries like Russia and Iran, at the intelligence agency level (Klippenstein 2023/5/5).[1]

The activities of the US Department of State's GEC focus on Russian disinformation (U.S. Department of State). For example, a GEC special report on Kremlin disinformation in Brazil indicates that the Kremlin uses overt and covert networks to manipulate information and spread anti-democratic, authoritarian ideologies. For instance, the New Resistance movement in Brazil, part of the Syncretic Disinformation Network (SDN),[2]along with Fort Russ News (FRN) and the Center for Syncretic Studies (CSS), appear to be homegrown organizations within Brazil but are reportedly nurtured by Russian propaganda agents. These organizations are said to spread the neo-Nazi ideology of Russian philosopher Aleksandr Dugin, aiming to unite far-right and far-left factions to destabilize democracy and recruit fighters to support Russia's invasion of Ukraine (U.S. Department of State 2023). The New York Times states that the GEC strives to prevent Kremlin disinformation from spreading into society, as it is much more difficult to counter once a false narrative has taken hold (Myers 2023/10/16).

The US response described above indicates a focus on foreign actors, particularly the Russian government and its connected networks worldwide. This approach prioritizes national security over domestic public opinion, leading to the establishment of operational units in relevant departments to collect, monitor, and control information originating from specific countries. Given the growing awareness in South Korea of disinformation originating from abroad and its geopolitical situation with North Korea, it is necessary to examine the US-style response system from a national security perspective.

3. South Korea's Response to Disinformation

3.1 Recent Response Movements

Various legal restrictions are imposed on acts of spreading false information, such as fake news. Representative non-criminal regulations include those under the Act on Press Arbitration and Remedies, Etc. (APARE) and civil damages. Criminal penalties include charges for defamation and spreading false information under the Public Official Election Act. Due to the difficulty of responding with these scattered legal sanctions, there were attempts to enact two laws related to fake news in 2018, which will be discussed later. Recently, as the harm of fake news targeting the president, prominent politicians, and public officials has become severe, movements have begun to regulate false statements that were not previously punishable under existing criminal provisions.

Online media and internet news from traditional newspapers have been subject to the APARE. With the appointment of Lee Dong-kwan as the Chairperson of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC), the KCC announced its legislative initiative to implement an "one-strike-out" policy for media outlets that spread false information. The KCC plans to expand the scope of telecommunications deliberation to officially include the deliberation of false information from online newspapers for the first time and proceed with related legal revisions. In early September 2023, the KCC launched a dedicated task force to eradicate fake news and announced the "Fake News Eradication Promotion Plan" on September 18. The core of this initiative is the establishment of a public-private consultative body for fake news response, in collaboration with the Korea Communications Standards Commission (KCSC) and domestic and international portal/platform operators (Naver, Kakao, Google, Meta), to create a fast-track system based on self-regulation between the KCSC and these operators. The procedure for the fast-track system for rapid deliberation of fake news is as follows: First, the KCSC will operate a dedicated "Fake News Reporting" banner on its website (starting Sept. 21) to receive reports of fake news incidents. The KCSC will then determine whether to conduct rapid deliberation on the reported cases (designated as a rapid deliberation agenda if approved by the Chairperson or one-third of the standing members) and, if necessary,

request cooperation from operators in writing for self-regulation. Upon receiving the request, the operator will review the content and either display a notice stating "The KCSC is conducting rapid deliberation on this fake news" or take measures such as deletion or blocking.

Despite these regulatory movements, KCSC employees have opposed the operation of the center, primarily citing concerns about infringing on press freedom and potential double regulation. Opposition parties and critical media outlets have also criticized the initiative for violating press freedom. Ultimately, acknowledging the criticism that the classification of rapid and general deliberation caused processing delays, the KCSC terminated the center at the end of last year and decided to distribute the workload across the entire commission under the principle of conducting constant rapid deliberation for all complaints (Kang Han-deul 2023/12/21). The response described above is fundamentally based on self-regulation, and there are no new legislative regulatory movements at this time.

3.2 Legislative Efforts on Fake News during the 20th National Assembly

It is reported that 43 bills related to disinformation were discussed during the 20th National Assembly (May 2016 - May 2020). Among them, three were new legislative proposals: the "Act on the Establishment and Operation of a Fake News Response Committee," the "Act on the Prevention of Fake News Distribution," and the "Act on the Promotion of Media Education." The rest were amendments to existing laws. Only amendments to the "Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment of Sexual Crimes, Etc." and the "Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc." related to "deepfakes" were passed (Kim Yeo-ra 2020). However, two major bills, one proposed by the ruling party and the other by the opposition, targeting fake news in its entirety, expired due to the end of the National Assembly's term.

Although they expired with the end of the parliamentary term, it is worth examining the two legislative proposals led by the ruling and opposition parties. On April 5, 2018, Park Gwang-on and 29 other lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Party of Korea proposed the "Act on the Prevention of Fake Information Distribution." Shortly thereafter, on May 9, Kang Hyo-sang and 15 other lawmakers from the opposition Liberty Korea Party proposed the "Act on the Establishment and Operation of a Fake News Response Committee."

The "Act on the Prevention of Fake Information Distribution" prohibits internet users from distributing fake information and imposes an obligation on website operators to prevent the distribution of fake information. This bill defines fake news as: 1) information that media organizations have acknowledged as false through correction reports, etc., pursuant to Article 2, Paragraph 12 of the APARE; 2) information determined to be false by the Korea Press Arbitration Commission pursuant to Article 7 of the APARE; 3) information determined to be false by a court ruling; or 4) information requested for deletion by the National Election Commission as false information, disparagement of region or gender, or insult. In essence, information classified as fake news is disinformation already deemed illegal under existing laws.

The primary public institution for this bill is the KCC, which is stipulated to announce the content of fake information and establish a basic plan for its distribution prevention. Internet users are prohibited from distributing information that infringes on the rights of others, including fake information. If damage is caused to others due to the distribution of fake information, the user is liable for damages. Those who produce information that infringes on the rights of others, such as fake information, are subject to imprisonment for up to five years or a fine of up to 50 million won. Meanwhile, website operators are obligated to prevent the distribution of fake information on their websites and establish procedures for handling user requests for deletion of fake information. Failure to take measures to prevent the distribution of fake information would result in a fine. If a user objects to the website operator's handling of a fake information deletion request, the KCC will make a determination. Website operators are also required to submit a report on the prevention of "fake information" distribution on their websites to the KCC. This bill is a regulatory law with penalties, imposing imprisonment or fines on individuals who distribute illegal fake news and imposing fines on website operators who fail to prevent the distribution of fake information. It applies broadly to both large platform companies and small and medium-sized websites by referring only to "website operators."

In contrast, the "Act on the Establishment and Operation of a Fake News Response Committee" states in Article 1 that its purpose is to protect honor, rights, or other legal interests infringed upon by fake news by establishing and operating a "Fake News Response Committee" and defining the basic matters related thereto. This Act defines "fake news" as "false or distorted information produced in newspapers, online newspapers, broadcast media, or information and communication networks for political or economic gain, which is information that is recognized as false by a media report pursuant to Article 2, Paragraph 15 of the APARE, or content that misleads as a media report," thus limiting the scope of fake news more narrowly than the bill proposed by the Democratic Party.

The core of this bill is the establishment of a "Fake News Response Committee" under the Prime Minister's Office to comprehensively and systematically promote policies for preventing the distribution of fake news. The Committee would consist of approximately 30 members, including one chairperson. The members would include government officials such as the Minister of Science and ICT, the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism, the Chairperson of the KCC, and the Chairperson of the Korea Press Arbitration Commission, as well as individuals recommended by 12 private organizations, including the Korean Bar Association, the Korea Newspapers Association, and the Korea Journalists Association.

Responsibility for fake news countermeasures is divided between two main bodies. The Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism is responsible for distribution prevention policies related to fake news in newspapers, online newspapers, and internet news services. The Chairperson of the KCC is responsible for distribution prevention policies related to fake news in information and communication networks and broadcasting. These responsible bodies must establish sector-specific plans for fake news distribution prevention policies in their respective areas every three years and submit them to the Fake News Response Committee. The Committee would then consolidate these sector-specific plans to establish and finalize a basic plan for fake news countermeasures. While the "Act on the Prevention of Fake Information Distribution" includes provisions for requesting the deletion of fake information, appeals against decisions on handling fake information deletion, damages, and fines, the "Act on the Establishment and Operation of a Fake News Response Committee" is an administrative organization law that adopts a committee-based system, incorporating horizontal cooperation and private sector participation.

In addition to these two bills, amendments to the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. were submitted during the 20th National Assembly to counter fake news. In July 2018, the Liberty Korea Party, as its party platform, proposed an amendment to the Act on Promotion of Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, Etc. (led by Representative Kim Sung-tae, with 109 party lawmakers participating) that would obligate service providers such as portals to continuously monitor the distribution of fake news, and establish penalties, including imprisonment for up to seven years for distributing fake news and up to five years for failing to monitor. In the 21st National Assembly, in 2021, the Democratic Party pursued an amendment to the APARE, calling it the "Fake News Damage Relief Act." The core of this amendment was to allow punitive damages of up to five times the actual damages if media outlets intentionally or with gross negligence published false or fabricated reports. The People Power Party criticized this, stating it was an attempt to "gag the media's healthy criticism of the government."

All legislative or amendment attempts to counter disinformation thus far have been controversial and unsuccessful. The opposition party opposed bills proposed by the ruling party, citing political motives or infringement of freedom of expression. When the government changed, the logic was reversed, and the opposing party opposed the bills proposed by the previous ruling party. Meanwhile, civil society organizations have generally criticized and opposed regulatory movements, regardless of which party led them.

3.3 Challenges in Legislation

The foregoing trends indicate that enacting new legislation on fake news faces difficulties for the following reasons. First, the response to disinformation is politically framed, preventing political consensus. The opposition party typically opposes bills proposed by the ruling party, citing political motives, and when the government changes, the positions are reversed, with the opposition party adopting the same arguments as the previous ruling party and opposing the bills. This partisan approach has hindered political consensus and led to the failure of fake news legislation. Meanwhile, civil society organizations, while generally acknowledging the harm of fake news, oppose regulation on the grounds of protecting freedom of expression and press freedom, which could be infringed upon by excessive regulation.

Second, legal controversies also make it difficult to enact legislation to counter disinformation. Criminal regulations carry the risk of infringing upon constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and press if they lead to excessive regulation. The crime of defamation by false statement also has unclear elements, such as the "intent to defame," and the crime of spreading false information under the Public Official Election Act has an excessively high minimum statutory penalty, effectively mandating disqualification from election and thus violating the principle of proportionality. In this regard, Choi Seung-pil argues that both existing criminal penalty provisions and newly proposed bills should be improved to protect various constitutional values, such as the protection of personal rights, maintenance of social order, and national security, while maximally guaranteeing freedom of speech and press (Choi Seung-pil 2020).

Third, even if new laws are created to counter disinformation, it is difficult to ensure their effectiveness in terms of enforcement. Public institutions lack the technical capabilities and other resources to track social media users who produce and disseminate disinformation. Therefore, governments have favored public-private cooperation or誘導行政 (guidance administration) that strengthens the responsibility of platform companies to filter disinformation.

However, a survey by the East Asia Institute in January 2024 revealed that 37.2% of respondents reported encountering fake news or false information related to elections or domestic politics that they suspected was disseminated from abroad via social media or other online platforms. This indicates that disinformation originating from foreign sources is no longer a distant issue. Therefore, let us examine public opinion on disinformation.

4. Public Opinion on Fake News Regulation as Revealed by EAI Survey

The results of the East Asia Institute's January 2024 survey, which can serve as a reference for designing policies to counter disinformation, are as follows.

Similar to people in many countries around the world, about 80% of South Koreans consider disinformation to be a serious problem, and half have directly encountered fake news. When asked, "Have you personally received or seen news that you judged to be fake within the last six months?", 44.6% answered "Yes," which is about 9% lower than the 55.4% who answered "No." According to the "2021 Social Media User Survey" conducted by the Korea Press Foundation in 2021, 77.2% responded affirmatively to the question, "Have you encountered news/current affairs information that you judged to be false or fake on the social media you use?" It is questionable whether the significantly lower figures in the EAI survey compared to the Korea Press Foundation survey are due to the "last six months" condition. Among those who had directly encountered fake news, 68.0% answered, "Through the internet, such as portals, Facebook, and Kakao," indicating that social media is identified as a channel for fake news in Korea, as in many other countries. Regarding the reasons for judging information as false or fake (multiple responses), the highest percentages were for "the content did not align with known facts or common sense" (65.3%), "the source was unclear" (43.2%), "the title was too sensational" (36.5%), "the poster or source was untrustworthy" (35.7%), and "the content differed from information from other sources" (33.2%). Reasons such as "negative reactions from other users" (6.3%) or "high view count" (4.5%) were low. Passive responses were more common than active responses when encountering fake news. 48.2% answered "I did nothing in particular," 32.5% "I blocked the account that created the fake news," 25.3% "I informed others about whether it was fake news," and 16.8% "I reported the account that created the fake news." Passive responses, such as no action or blocking accounts, were about twice as common as active responses like informing others or reporting.

What, then, is the public opinion regarding responses to false information or fake news? First, the opinion that disinformation should be punished is more prevalent than the opinion that caution should be exercised considering freedom of the press. The older the age group, the stronger the opinion for punishment. Only 18.4% agreed with the statement, "Although there are problems, fake news should not be regulated because attempts to punish it could stifle press freedom," while 58.6% disagreed (23% were neutral). In other words, the opinion for regulation is three times stronger than the opinion against it. By age group, older adults and the elderly (40s and above) believe regulation is necessary, while those in their 20s and 30s have a relatively lower perception of its necessity (percentage agreeing with the need for regulation: 18-29 years old 46.0%, 30s 48.2%, 50s 54.9%, 60s 69.8%, 70+ years old 72.4%).

<Table 2> Fake news should not be regulated because it may stifle press freedom

Second, when asked about the degree of responsibility of YouTubers, politicians, and media outlets with different ideological orientations for fake news, strong partisan differences emerged, along with some generational differences. Overall, YouTubers were seen as more responsible than the media and politicians. The combined percentage of respondents who answered "not at all responsible," "not very responsible," "neutral," "somewhat responsible," and "very responsible" on a 5-point scale was similar for conservative YouTubers (67.9%) and progressive YouTubers (65%). However, by age group, the belief that conservative YouTubers bear more responsibility was stronger among those in their 40s and 50s, while the belief that progressive YouTubers bear more responsibility was stronger among those in their 60s and 70s. Among supporters of the Democratic Party, 81.4% believed conservative YouTubers were more responsible, while only 50.9% of People Power Party supporters held this view. Conversely, among those who believed progressive YouTubers were more responsible, 82.2% of People Power Party supporters strongly agreed, while only 46.1% of Democratic Party supporters did.

For ruling party politicians and opposition party politicians, the overall percentage of respondents who answered they were "somewhat responsible" or "very responsible" was similar, at 53.1% and 54.8%, respectively. However, for ruling party politicians, the proportion of respondents who answered they were more responsible was lower among those aged 18-29 and 70+ compared to other age groups. For opposition party politicians, the proportion was lower among those aged 18-29 and 50s. Again, partisan support clearly divided perceptions of politicians' responsibility for false information and fake news. The percentage of Democratic Party supporters who believed ruling party politicians were more responsible was 69.6%, while only 32.6% of People Power Party supporters held this view. Conversely, 73.3% of People Power Party supporters believed opposition party politicians were more responsible, while only 35.6% of Democratic Party supporters did.

For conservative media and progressive media, 56.4% and 55.4% respectively answered they were more responsible, with significant differences across age groups. Regarding conservative media, over 60% of middle-aged and older adults believed they were more responsible, but this figure dropped to 51.8% for those in their 60s and 44.4% for those aged 70 and above. Meanwhile, regarding progressive media, 67-68% of those aged 60 and above believed they were more responsible, while only about half of middle-aged and older adults, and 44.1% of those aged 18-29, believed so. Ideological partisanship is also evident regarding the media. 74.6% of Democratic Party supporters believed conservative media were more responsible, while only 34.8% of People Power Party supporters held this view. Conversely, 77.9% of People Power Party supporters believed progressive media were more responsible, whereas only 35.3% of Democratic Party supporters did.

[Table 3] How much responsibility do the following people have for producing and disseminating fake news or disinformation? (Percentage by party affiliation)

Third, regarding the entities responsible for responding to fake news, the strongest opinion was that the producers, i.e., the individuals or organizations that initially created the disinformation, bear responsibility, with 40.7%. This was followed by politicians who politically exploit disinformation (29.8%), platforms that disseminate disinformation without filtering (15.6%), and individuals who knowingly spread disinformation (8.8%). Only 3.4% believed the government should be responsible for the response. The view that producers or politicians should be responsible for the response was stronger among women than men, and the view that producers should be responsible was slightly stronger among those with college degrees or higher compared to those with high school education or less. Regarding platform responsibility, supporters of the Justice Party showed a high agreement rate of 26.9%, and supporters of the Democratic Party showed approximately 6% higher support than supporters of the People Power Party. For the view that politicians should be responsible for the response, a difference of about 14% was observed between the young adult group aged 18-29 and the elderly group aged 70 and above, with 23.4% and 37.3% respectively.

[Table 4] Who do you think should be more responsible for responding to disinformation and fake news?

Fourth, regarding measures to respond to fake news or disinformation, the expulsion of disinformation spreaders from platforms received the highest agreement rate at 79.7%, followed by strengthening the responsibility of social media companies (76.4%) and punishing those who share disinformation (72.6%). The agreement rate for establishing a supervisory agency to monitor disinformation was only 64.8%, which aligns with the previous survey results indicating that responsibility lies more with individual users and platform companies than with the government. Responses regarding countermeasures showed little difference by party affiliation but varied by age group. Platform expulsion was least agreed upon by 18-19 year olds at 66.1%, but the agreement rate increased with age, reaching 90.2% among those aged 70 and above. Strengthening the responsibility of social media companies also showed an increasing agreement rate with age, from 59.2% among 18-29 year olds to 89.5% among those aged 70 and above. For punishing perpetrators, the agreement rate was 60.4% among 18-29 year olds, gradually increasing to 84.5% among those aged 70 and above. For the establishment of a supervisory agency, 52.5% of 18-29 year olds agreed, and the agreement rate slightly decreased in their 40s before rising again, reaching 81.6% among those aged 70 and above. The establishment of a supervisory agency showed some differences by party affiliation, with 61.4% of Democratic Party supporters agreeing compared to 75.2% of People Power Party supporters.

[Table 5] Do you agree that the following measures are necessary to respond to fake news or disinformation?

5. Recommendations for Responding to Disinformation and Manipulated Information

Since disinformation and manipulated information are primarily disseminated through social media, trust in social media has significantly declined. However, public distrust should not be interpreted as a call for stringent social media regulation. This is because the internet and social media can serve as spaces for countering authoritarianism and as public forums for sharing diverse information and opinions. Pew Research conducted a survey in 2022 across 19 advanced economies to understand how this duality is perceived. The response that social media is good for a country's democracy was 57%, higher than the 35% who said it is bad. In the United States, the Netherlands, France, and Australia, more respondents said it is bad than good, while in all other countries, the opinion that it has a positive function for democracy prevailed. In Korea, the response that social media is good for Korean democracy was 66%, twice the 32% who said it is bad (Wike et al. 2022).

While actively responding to disinformation and manipulated information is necessary, it must not undermine freedom of expression or the openness and diversity of democracy. It is desirable to limit disinformation and manipulated information to content already deemed illegal by existing laws. If criminal or civil penalties are to be strengthened, it is advisable to precede such measures with social education. Within the existing system, strengthening the functions of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) or relevant ministries to oversee online disinformation and manipulated information is fully achievable. Above all, strengthening media literacy education is essential to help internet users discern disinformation and manipulated information. Platform companies, as conduits for the dissemination of such information, must enhance their technological capabilities to filter it and ensure transparency and accountability in their algorithms. Consideration should be given to methods such as clarifying responsibilities and imposing fines for non-compliance, as exemplified by the Digital Services Act (DSA). When amending or enacting laws related to disinformation and manipulated information, responses should be pursued in a bipartisan manner. In South Korea's politically polarized landscape, achieving political and social consensus is crucial for the effectiveness of responses to disinformation and manipulated information. It is necessary to pay attention to the cases of European countries that are responding to disinformation and manipulated information that cause political and social harm while balancing freedom of expression and regulation.

Meanwhile, the influx of disinformation and manipulated information from foreign sources is no longer a distant issue but a reality. Proactive responses are particularly necessary for content related to national security and public safety. Furthermore, it is essential to actively counter disinformation from foreign entities or their domestic agents that seeks to undermine the integrity of elections during major domestic election periods or to support specific candidates or parties, as this harms South Korean democracy. The direction for responding to disinformation and manipulated information from foreign sources will likely involve utilizing or establishing intelligence agencies. In this regard, the U.S. administration's approach can serve as a precedent; a design that concentrates control in a single entity, avoiding the dispersion of intelligence gathering and oversight functions as seen in the U.S., appears desirable.

The most effective remedy for disinformation and manipulated information is for traditional media outlets to regain trust. When they adhere strictly to fact-based reporting ethics and provide objective news, citizens will not rely on social media as a source for political and social news.

6. References

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[1]There were concerns about functional overlap with the State Department's GEC when the FMIC was established. The motto of the FMIC is "Exposing deception in defense of liberty."

[2]Nova Resistencia is reported to be a neo-Nazi organization active in South America, Europe, and North America, deeply involved in Russia's disinformation and propaganda ecosystem.

■ Author:Lee, Sook-jong, Senior Fellow at the East Asia Institute and Adjunct Professor at Sungkyunkwan University.

■ Editor:Park, Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Contact and Editorial: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr