[EAI Working Paper] China’s Gambit on the Korean Peninsula

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Editor's Note

On November 13, 2020, the East Asia Institute (EAI) and the Brookings Institution jointly held the second online seminar in the series titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition." In Session 1: Politics and Security, Jung H. Pak addressed that the continued U.S.-China rivalry has weakened China’s willingness to cooperate on major security issues, including North Korea’s denuclearization, while its attempts to expand its influence on the Korean Peninsula and reduce U.S. influence in Northeast Asia have increased. Furthermore, China's influence on the security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula has also been boosted by the enhancement of relations with North Korea in 2018, the convergence of interests among China, North Korea, and South Korea, and the Trump administration's precarious approach. In order to coordinate strategic understanding between China and South Korea amid consistent efforts at the regional and global levels on North Korean denuclearization, the author points out that the U.S. should take a multilateral approach instead of the unilateralism practiced during the Trump administration without outstanding progress. To achieve this plan, the U.S. should consider launching and regularizing trilateral talks with China and South Korea. The U.S., South Korea, and China need to confirm the goal of North Korea’s denuclearization and the necessity of implementing strong sanctions to prevent nuclear proliferation. Moreover, these countries need to develop a roadmap for negotiations to provide both carrots and sticks in North Korea’s verifiable denuclearization efforts. At the same time, they need to study how economic cooperation can increase the inflow of information into North Korea and integrate North Korea into the regional economy.

Quotes from the Paper

Introduction

China is seeking to weave engagement with North and South Korea to try to increase its influence over the Korean Peninsula, including on the North Korean nuclear issue, and weaken the perception of Washington’s relevance in the region as it seeks to establish its regional dominance. Chinese President Xi Jinping almost certainly sees opportunities to make progress on those goals, given the stalemate in U.S.-North Korea nuclear talks and the significant fissures that have opened in U.S.-South Korea ties under the Trump and Moon administrations.

Warming ties to Pyongyang, after a rough start

After seven years of icy ties during which high-level exchanges came to a near standstill, Beijing and Pyongyang have jumpstarted robust diplomacy, trading high-level party and military delegations and encouraging the growth of economic cooperation. From 2018-2019, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un met five times, including Xi’s visit to Pyongyang in June 2019, the first time a Chinese head of state visited North Korea since 2005.

Beijing’s motivations

Yet Xi’s efforts to grow closer to Kim, despite the latter’s highly provocative actions in late 2017 and disregard for China’s preferences, reveal Beijing’s longstanding preferred approach for dealing with North Korea: one that places a premium on stability, puts off denuclearization to a distant future—or perhaps even accommodates North Korea’s nuclear weapons status, as former U.S. diplomat Evans Revere has suggested—and stresses economic inducements rather than pressure. Using the momentum of summitry that was unleashed by the unprecedented meetings between President Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the latter’s unilateral moratorium on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile testing, Beijing has sought to amplify its call for reduction of sanctions pressure on Pyongyang, putting it at odds with U.S. policy.

Beijing’s view of Seoul

While Xi has visited Pyongyang in 2019, he has yet to go to Seoul (as of November 2020), suggesting that Beijing is placing a higher priority on building ties to Pyongyang and that tension remains after South Korea agreed in 2016 to deploy THAAD, the U.S. missile defense system, in response to North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016. Beijing opposed the THAAD deployment as a threat to China’s security, and in retaliation, implemented an unofficial economic boycott against South Korea, which cost the smaller country $7.5 billion in losses in 2017 alone, compared to China’s self-inflicted losses of $880 million.

Trying to drive a wedge in the U.S.-South Korea alliance

Even as Beijing sought to punish Seoul for its alliance with Washington, Chinese leaders saw mounting signs of deepening U.S.-South Korea cleavages. President Trump has repeatedly criticized the alliance, threatened to end the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, blustered about military action against North Korea without regard to the potentially devastating impact on South Korea, demanded an exorbitant 400% increase in host nation support for U.S. troops stationed on the Peninsula, and hinted at a desire to withdraw U.S. troops.

A wary North and South Korea likely to limit Beijing’s influence

As of late 2020, China’s ties to both Koreas are stable, though tensions exist under the surface. While there appears to be a troubling convergence of interests between Beijing, Pyongyang, and Seoul, mutual suspicion and fundamental differences in national priorities will limit China’s ability to press Pyongyang and Seoul to yield to its preferences.

Implications for the U.S.-South Korea alliance

In the near to medium term, Beijing is likely to seek to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula, even if it means putting off the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization to the distant future. To do so, Chinese leaders will probably emphasize the need for “security guarantees,” relaxation of sanctions implementation, and discourage U.S. or South Korean actions—such as military drills or criticism of the North’s human rights violations—that have the potential to trigger North Korean ire, but which also threaten China’s interests. Moreover, to mollify Kim Jong Un, China since late 2018 has been easing trade restrictions, to the frustration of U.S. and United Nations officials who have been trying to keep sanctions pressure on North Korea.

Author’s Biography

Jung H. Pak is a Senior Fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. She received her doctorate from Columbia University in U.S. history. Her research interests include the national security challenges facing the United States and East Asia, including North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the regime’s domestic and foreign policy calculus, internal stability, and inter-Korean ties. She is also focused on developing interdisciplinary forums to bolster regional dialogue on counterterrorism, nonproliferation, cybersecurity, and climate change. Her recent publications include *Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator*.