US-Iran Backchannel Negotiations Mediated by Qatar: Is a Phased Agreement Feasible?
Executive Summary
Currently, seven months into the US-Iran airstrikes, the backchannel negotiation track mediated by Qatar remains intact despite President Trump's official rejection of Iran's ceasefire proposal on September 26. The core issue is the mismatch in the sequencing of preconditions between Iran's opening of transit rights in the Strait of Hormuz and the US demands for lifting the blockade and dismantling Iran's nuclear program—a deadlock that remained unresolved during the New York talks on September 28–29. The Trump administration's negotiating posture is shaped by domestic political calculations aimed at keeping the option of resuming airstrikes open after the November midterm elections. Therefore, the current phase should be viewed not as nearing an early end to the war, but as a prolonged war of attrition in which communication channels are merely being kept open. For businesses, the resumption of talks should not be misread as a signal of an imminent breakthrough; instead, they should maintain a dual-monitoring system that tracks both the progress of negotiations and escalating military tensions, while continuing to operate under high-risk assumptions regarding transit through the Strait of Hormuz.
I. Analysis of the Current Situation
Continuation of Qatar-Mediated US-Iran Backchannel Talks on a Phased Agreement
1. Background and Progress of the Issue
US and Israeli airstrikes against Iran have been ongoing for seven months since the outbreak of hostilities on February 28, 2026 [9][19]. Early in the conflict, President Trump predicted that the war would end in "four to five weeks," and although he repeatedly claimed afterward that it would take "two weeks, or at most a few days more," an actual end to the war has not been reached [6]. Following the expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum, Iran reasserted physical control over the Strait of Hormuz, leading to a phase of intensified clashes in September [6].
At the UN General Assembly on September 22–23, the leaders of the US and Iran delivered contrasting speeches just a day apart. In his speech on September 22, President Trump threatened that Iran could be "obliterated" if a deal was not reached quickly [2]. President Pezeshkian responded the following day, stating, "The more the Iranian people face US pressure and bullying, the greater their resistance will grow" [2]. Despite this exchange of harsh rhetoric, an indirect negotiation channel mediated by Qatar was operating separately in New York. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi announced that Iran had conveyed a conditional ceasefire proposal to the US via Qatar, offering to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within seven days [8]. However, President Trump rejected this proposal on September 26. The WSJ, citing an official, reported that Trump was skeptical of the ceasefire proposal and kept open the possibility of resuming airstrikes after the November midterm elections [8].
2. Current Situation
Despite the official rejection, the negotiation channel itself has not been severed. On September 27, just a day after the rejection was announced, President Trump stated in an interview with Axios, "I expect there will be additional meetings with Iran this week." At the same time, he drew a line, saying, "They want to make a deal, but the deal they want is not the deal I want" [3][12]. On September 30, the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially confirmed during a briefing in Doha that shuttle diplomacy between the US and Iran was ongoing. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Al-Ansari stated, "Qatar's mediation efforts are ongoing, and we are currently conveying messages between the US and Iranian sides" [18].
According to Reuters, Qatari mediators held separate meetings in New York on September 28–29 with Foreign Minister Araghchi's team and the US side. The agenda was a revised version of the seven-day plan that Iran had proposed during the UN General Assembly the previous week [14][15]. Al Jazeera reported that as of September 29, the two sides still disagreed on the negotiation agenda itself. Upon leaving New York on Tuesday, Araghchi told Iran's state broadcaster IRIB that he expected to receive an official US response to the proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz later that day [5]. Reuters and The Globe and Mail, citing sources close to the New York negotiations, reported that a phased path to ending the war—swapping Iran's reopening of the Strait of Hormuz for the lifting of the US economic blockade—was under discussion [10][17].
3. Key Actors and Their Positions
United States (Trump Administration)is maintaining the dismantlement of the nuclear program as a prerequisite. Axios, citing a US official, reported that President Trump expressed a willingness to ease sanctions and unfreeze assets in exchange for concrete steps on Iran's nuclear program [1][7][13]. CNN also cited the same official, reporting that while Washington is continuing "positive and constructive" dialogue through mediators, it reaffirmed its position that it will not conclude an agreement unless the Iranian nuclear issue is fully resolved [11]. WSJ, citing a source close to the negotiations, evaluated that this condition is Trump's top priority and that the attempt to extract concessions from Iran is close to a "long-shot gamble" [9].
Iran (Pezeshkian Government)is utilizing transit rights in the Strait of Hormuz as its sole negotiating leverage. Foreign Minister Araghchi stated that Iran had delivered a detailed seven-day plan through Qatar, which included demands for lifting the maritime blockade, granting waivers on crude oil sanctions, and a ceasefire that includes Lebanon [8]. The Iranian side is employing tactics to pressure the negotiation timeline by demanding an official response from the United States [5].
Qataris acting as a mediator, maintaining the only permanent channel alongside Oman. Doha has formalized a shuttle diplomacy approach to convey messages between both sides and continued to make separate contacts with each party on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York [18][14].
4. Key Issues
The first issue is sequencing. Iran wants to receive relief from the blockade and sanctions waivers simultaneously in exchange for first reopening the Strait of Hormuz. Conversely, the United States maintains that there will be no sanctions relief unless verifiable measures on the nuclear program are taken first [9][11].
The second issue is the US domestic political calendar. As reported by WSJ, President Trump is conducting negotiations while keeping open the possibility of resuming military options after the November midterm elections, leaving the timeline for concluding a deal susceptible to the election schedule [8].
The third issue is the method of verification. The terms "concrete steps" and "verifiable actions" mentioned in the Axios and CNN reports have not yet been publicly defined in terms of which specific nuclear facilities or enrichment levels they target. Unless this is resolved, working-level disagreements over the sequencing of the phased agreement and the verifying entity are highly likely to persist [1][7][13].
II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue
Continuation of Qatar-Mediated US-Iran Backchannel Talks on a Phased Agreement
In-Depth Analysis
1. Root Cause: Divergence Between Military Objectives and the Situation on the Ground
The starting point of the current negotiation phase is the US-Israeli airstrikes against Iran that began on February 28, 2026 [6][9]. At the onset of hostilities, Washington set three goals: regime change, the dismantlement of nuclear facilities, and the neutralization of Iran's missile and drone programs [6][9]. The Israeli airstrikes even led to the death of Supreme Leader Khamenei [6][9]. Nevertheless, the regime change intended by Israel did not materialize [6][9]. Early in the conflict, President Trump predicted that the war would end in "four to five weeks." He subsequently repeated the claim that it would take "two weeks, or at most a few days more" on several occasions [6]. Seven months later, these predictions remain unfulfilled [6]. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) assessed at the six-month mark of the war that the United States had "no good options" [6]. The reality that military pressure alone has failed to force Iran's surrender or trigger a regime collapse is the fundamental background behind the discussions on a phased agreement that have now surfaced. Washington's return to the negotiating table represents an acknowledgment of the limits of military options rather than a shift in principles.
The root cause on the Iranian side is economic exhaustion. As the blockade dragged on, gaining access to frozen assets and resuming crude oil exports emerged as critical variables for sustaining the regime [1][17]. Foreign Minister Araghchi's use of transit rights in the Strait of Hormuz as a bargaining chip reflects the reality that Iran has few viable negotiating levers left other than the control over the strait it reasserted through physical force [4][6]. Given that both sides turned to negotiations without securing a decisive military victory, these backchannel talks resemble a search for compromise at the end of a war of attrition rather than the dictation of terms by a victor.
2. Structural Context
Security Structure. The Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint through which a significant portion of the world's seaborne crude oil passes. Following the expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum, Iran reasserted physical control over the strait, which actually led to intensified clashes in September [4][6]. The structural transformation of these transit rights into a primary negotiating lever led to the concept of a phased agreement discussed during the New York backchannel talks, which would swap the lifting of the blockade for the resumption of transit [10][17]. However, the fundamental disagreement over the sequencing of opening transit rights remains unresolved. Iran demanded the lifting of the maritime blockade, crude oil sanctions waivers, and a ceasefire in exchange for first relinquishing its control over transit. The United States maintains that it will not accept this unless the dismantlement of the nuclear program is prioritized [2]. This competing dynamic over preconditions was repeated verbatim during the New York negotiations on September 28–29 [5][14].
Political Structure. The Trump administration's negotiating posture is influenced by the US domestic political calendar. WSJ reported that President Trump is skeptical of Iran's seven-day ceasefire proposal and has kept open the possibility of resuming airstrikes after the November midterm elections [8]. This suggests a calculation to delay the signing of an official agreement until after the elections while keeping the negotiation channel open. On the Iranian side, internal dynamics between hardliners and moderates are also expected to affect the pace of negotiations. President Pezeshkian's remark during his UN General Assembly speech that "the more we face pressure and bullying, the greater our resistance will grow" highlights the need to manage hardline messaging directed at domestic audiences [2].
Economic Structure. The cards offered by the United States are sanctions relief and the unfreezing of assets. Axios reported that President Trump is willing to provide these in exchange for concrete measures on Iran's nuclear program [1][7][11][13]. This is similar to the exchange mechanism under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which swapped verifiable reductions in nuclear activity for sanctions relief. However, with the added variable of seven months of military conflict since the outbreak of war, the current discussions are being conducted in a form combined with war-termination negotiations rather than as a simple nuclear negotiation.
Regional Structure. The GCC member states do not maintain a unified stance toward Iran. While Bahrain keeps its distance, the UAE continues practical contacts with Tehran, and Saudi Arabia maintains a hardline stance [4][6]. Qatar has positioned itself as a mediator, proposing a regional joint security initiative that does not exclude Iran [4]. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs' official confirmation of ongoing shuttle diplomacy during its September 30 briefing in Doha is an extension of this positioning [18].
3. Comparison with Historical Precedents
The closest precedent is the conclusion of the JCPOA in 2015 and the unilateral withdrawal by the first Trump administration in 2018. At that time, the structure also involved a phased exchange of nuclear restrictions for sanctions relief. A lack of trust regarding verification mechanisms repeatedly surfaced throughout the negotiation process. In the current negotiations, the United States is again demanding "concrete and verifiable" nuclear measures [1][7], raising the possibility that the same verification issues from the JCPOA negotiations will recur. The difference is that this time, an actual armed conflict has been ongoing for seven months. While the 2015 agreement was a product of peacetime diplomacy, the current discussions are wartime negotiations addressing both the cessation of hostilities and nuclear issues, which alters the nature of the risks should the talks fail.
Qatar's role as a mediator itself has precedents. Qatar has functioned as a channel trusted by the United States in negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and hostage negotiations between Israel and Hamas. This time as well, Qatari mediators adopted a shuttle approach on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, contacting Foreign Minister Araghchi's team and the US side separately [14][15]. This is identical to the mediation method Qatar has repeatedly utilized. However, unlike past cases, this mediation is relatively more difficult as it simultaneously involves two major axes: nuclear proliferation and Gulf regional security.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is the US midterm election schedule. Observations have already been raised that President Trump has incentives to keep negotiation channels open while delaying the final signing until after the elections [8]. The assessment of whether the option of resuming airstrikes or concluding a deal after the elections is more politically advantageous domestically will likely dictate the intensity of negotiations over the coming weeks.
The second variable is whether the issue of sequencing preconditions can be resolved. Without an agreement on whether to first open transit rights or lift the blockade, the concept of a phased agreement itself can hardly enter the implementation stage [2][10]. The key is whether the negotiations on the revised proposal reported by Reuters contain a compromise on this sequencing issue [14].
The third variable is the verifiability and specificity of the nuclear measures to be proposed by Iran. The US side maintains its position that it will not finalize an agreement unless the issue is "fully resolved" [11]. The level of inspection and verification that Iran is willing to accept is expected to be the practical watershed for whether a deal can be concluded.
The fourth variable is changes in the attitudes of GCC states. If Saudi Arabia's hardline stance softens or the UAE's pragmatic contacts expand, both Qatar's mediation space and Iran's incentives to negotiate could be affected [4][6]. It is necessary to individually track whether the differences in policy lines among Gulf states are narrowing.
III. Final Recommended Response Measures
Continuation of Qatar-Mediated US-Iran Backchannel Talks on a Phased Agreement
Final Recommended Response Measures and Action Plan
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Response Measures
The current phase should be assessed not as the eve of a war-ending settlement, but as a stage of maintaining negotiation channels amid a prolonged war of attrition. President Trump officially rejected Iran's seven-day ceasefire proposal on September 26 [8]. Yet, just a day later, he stated that "there will be additional meetings with Iran this week" [3][12]. The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed on September 30 that shuttle diplomacy is continuing [18]. This pattern of simultaneous rejection and re-engagement suggests a calculation by Washington to keep the door to negotiations open while delaying the timing of any signing. This assessment is supported by the indication of a possible resumption of airstrikes after the November midterm elections, as reported by WSJ [8].
The core issue is the sequencing of preconditions. Iran demands the lifting of the maritime blockade and crude oil sanctions waivers first, using the opening of transit rights in the Strait of Hormuz as leverage [2]. The United States maintains that it will not pay the price for transit rights unless the dismantlement of the nuclear program comes first [2]. Trump's willingness to ease sanctions and unfreeze assets, as reported by Axios, is not a signal that this precondition has been relaxed, but rather a conditional proposal predicated on "concrete and verifiable" nuclear measures [1][7][11][13]. The US official cited by CNN also emphasized that the negotiating team will not finalize an agreement unless the nuclear issue is fully resolved [11]. Therefore, businesses must guard against interpreting the "resumption of negotiations" as an "early settlement."
The recommended response principles are as follows: Avoid making early bets on specific scenarios, and maintain a dual-monitoring system that simultaneously tracks the progress of negotiations and signals of escalating military tension. Regarding the risk of transit through the Strait of Hormuz, maintain high-risk assumptions until the phased agreement actually enters the implementation stage.
2. Short-/Medium-/Long-Term Action Plans
Short-term (1–2 weeks). Track the frequency of working-level contacts and changes in the agenda of the Qatari mediation channel. The key is whether the pattern of separate meetings between Minister Araghchi's team and the US side, as reported by Reuters on September 28–29, is repeated [14][15]. During this period, crude oil and LNG transport contracts involving transit through the Strait of Hormuz should increase the proportion of spot transactions, while the conclusion of long-term fixed contracts should be put on hold. Concurrently, check the rehabilitation status of the Saudi East-West Pipeline to assess the capacity to secure alternative routes [1].
Medium-term (1–3 months, around the US midterm elections in November). This period overlaps with the timeframe for the potential resumption of airstrikes reported by WSJ [8]. It is expected that the Trump administration's actual policy direction—whether initiating the implementation of the phased agreement or reactivating military options—will materialize during this time. Complete the diversification of regional hubs in the Gulf during this period, and decide whether to renegotiate logistics and energy contracts that are highly dependent on transit through Iranian-controlled waters.
Long-term (3 months or more). If the phased agreement enters the actual implementation stage—meaning Iran's verifiable nuclear measures and US sanctions relief are documented—proceed with the phased readjustment of crude oil and LNG import sources and the reassessment of risks associated with Iran-related assets. Conversely, if negotiations stall again and military options are reactivated, transition the reduction of dependence on transit through the Strait of Hormuz into a permanent operational posture.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
- Continuity of negotiation channels: Frequency of official statements by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirming shuttle diplomacy [18], and Foreign Minister Araghchi’s schedule and movements during his stay in New York [5] - Concrete signals regarding nuclear measures: Whether specific items of "verifiable" measures are explicitly mentioned in statements by US officials cited by Axios, CNN, and other outlets [1][11] - Signals of easing competition over preconditions: Changes in the sequencing of actions, such as whether the United States implements partial sanctions relief first without securing transit rights, or whether Iran implements nuclear-related measures first - US domestic political triggers: The results of the November midterm elections and changes in the tone of the Trump administration’s rhetoric toward Iran following the elections [8] - Signals of re-escalating military tensions: The intensity of Iran’s exercise of effective control in the Strait of Hormuz, and whether there are fractures in the policies of Gulf states toward Iran (such as Bahrain distancing itself or the UAE continuing pragmatic engagement) [4][6] - Negative triggers: An official declaration of the breakdown of negotiations, an official announcement of the suspension of the Qatari mediation channel, or a recurrence of armed conflict in the Strait of Hormuz
4. Summary and Conclusion
Despite Trump’s official rejection on September 26, the Qatari mediation channel has not been severed [3][8][18]. In New York, a phased path toward ending the conflict—exchanging the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz for the lifting of the economic blockade—continues to be discussed at the working level [10][17]. However, disagreements over preconditions regarding the dismantling of the nuclear program remain unresolved [2], and the willingness to ease sanctions reported by Axios remains a conditional proposal predicated on verifiable nuclear measures [1][7][13]. With both paths—the implementation of negotiations and the resumption of bombings—remaining open after the November midterm elections [8], South Korean companies should avoid betting on a single scenario and instead maintain a continuous response system that tracks both the progress of negotiations and indicators of military tension.
References
[5] [Al Jazeera] US-Iran talks in New York: What’s the latest?
[12] [Gulf News] Trump expects talks with Iran to resume in coming week
[13] [Daily Sabah] Trump reportedly open to Iran sanctions relief for nuclear progress
[14] [Business Times (SG)] US, Iran set to hold separate talks with mediators
[15] [Dagens Industri] Qatar ska medla mellan USA och Iran i New York
[16] [Hürriyet Daily News] US, Iran resume indirect talks through Qatar
[17] [Hasht-e Subh] Reuters: US and Iran Explore Phased Path to End War2 hours ago
[18] [Daily Sabah] Qatar continues US-Iran shuttle diplomacy to end Middle east war
[19] [Al-Monitor] US and Iran discuss phased deal to reopen Hormuz and end US blockade, sources say
[20] [Channel News Asia] Iran says its UN delegation does not plan further US talks
[21] [Gulf News] US-Iran conflict: Tehran ready for talks or war as Trump expects new diplomacy
[24] [South China Morning Post] Trump expects new Iran talks despite rejecting deal offer
[25] [Daily Sabah] Iran offers Hormuz reopening, nuclear talks in conditional US deal
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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