Peace Outside the United Nations: The Trump Board of Peace's Gaza Reconstruction Blueprint and the Experiment of a Transactional International Order
Executive Summary
The Board of Peace's proposed $2.45 billion initial plan for Gaza reconstruction functions more as a political signal and fundraising document than an actionable plan, resting on three problematic pillars: the unresolved prerequisite of Hamas's disarmament, unstable funding from Gulf donors, and a deficit of legitimacy resulting from the exclusion of UNRWA. As long as Prime Minister Netanyahu remains constrained by veto politics within his ruling coalition, expanding the reconstruction zones will remain a mere byproduct of security agreements, while the massive gap between current funds and the actual estimated cost of $35.2 billion to $71.4 billion casts fundamental doubt on the Board's financial capacity. Operating outside the UN system on the principles of selective participation and transactional deals between leaders, this body aligns with US-China summit-style diplomacy and is already expanding to include Asian countries. Rather than responding prematurely to the Board's requests for financial contributions, the South Korean government and businesses should adopt an observational "wait-and-see" strategy, first verifying progress in disarmament verification and the transparency of fund management.
I. Issue Analysis
Issue Analysis: Funding and Transparency Controversies Surrounding the Gaza Reconstruction 'Board of Peace'
1. Background and Progress of the Issue
Discussions on Gaza reconstruction have failed to make substantial progress even after the establishment of the ceasefire in October 2025 [9]. The Egypt-Israel shuttle diplomacy led by Special Envoy Kushner yielded only procedural results, namely the creation of a working group on disarmament verification [3][9]. The fundamental disagreement between Israel and Hamas over the sequencing of disarmament and troop withdrawal remains unresolved [3]. Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to face trial as a defendant in a corruption case [6][9]. He is under a double constraint: the veto power wielded within the ruling coalition by National Security Minister Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Smotrich [6][9]. This structure has served as an incentive for Netanyahu to adhere strictly to disarmament as a prerequisite [6].
Amid this stalemate, President Trump bypassed the UN Security Council route, steering reconstruction discussions through a separate "Board of Peace" [5]. Secretary of State Rubio stated his intention to make the UN "an effective tool for promoting peace" [5]. However, the flagship project of the Gaza peace plan was run in parallel through the Board of Peace, outside the jurisdiction of the Security Council [5]. Rubio himself admitted that he had "not yet decided" whether the plan would eventually go through the Security Council [5]. The US administration had already withdrawn from the UN Human Rights Council in February 2025 [8]. At the same time, it permanently halted funding for UNRWA, the largest healthcare provider in Gaza [8]. Approximately $380 million in grants related to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) were also terminated [8]. This series of measures demonstrates that the Board of Peace is designed to replace existing UN agencies [8].
2. Current Situation
On September 23, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, the Board of Peace unveiled an initial reconstruction plan consisting of 66 projects over six months, valued at $2.45 billion [1][4][7][12][13][14][16]. The projects cover infrastructure, education, and healthcare [1][12]. This was presented as an initial blueprint to support Trump's 20-point plan [1][12][14]. The Board itself acknowledged that "the hurdles to overcome are immense" [1][14]. The South African media outlet Business Day characterized it as a proposal made "at a time when the ceasefire plan is struggling to hold" [14]. Turkey's Hürriyet Daily News reported it as a blueprint released "as the ceasefire struggles to survive" [16].
Rebuilding Gaza's physical infrastructure is estimated to cost approximately $35.2 billion in the medium term, with an additional $71.4 billion needed over the next decade [17]. The proposed $2.45 billion is merely equivalent to initial start-up funds compared to the total estimated cost [17]. At the same time as the New York announcement, French President Macron and Turkish President Erdogan strongly criticized the humanitarian situation in Gaza [10]. The Kuwait Times reported these remarks as a "call for action to end the conflict" [10]. Arab media outlets focused their coverage on whether funding could be secured and the feasibility of the plan, rather than the announcement of the reconstruction plan itself [10][13].
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace highlighted structural controversies surrounding the plan that go beyond funding issues [2]. Fellow Zaha Hassan pointed out that the Board of Peace presented a blueprint centered on "voluntary migration" and land confiscation [2]. She argued that stakeholders should demand a major restructuring of the Board, along with robust oversight and transparency [2]. Until then, she stated, they should support "existing rights-respecting multilateral peace mediation platforms and mechanisms" [2].
3. Key Actors and Positions
US Trump Administration: The administration is utilizing the Board of Peace as a parallel body operating outside the UN Security Council's approval process [5]. Secretary Rubio has not clarified whether the Board will be integrated into the Security Council framework [5]. This is interpreted as an attempt by the United States to take direct control of Gaza policy while minimizing its reliance on the UN multilateral system [5][8].
High Representative Mladenov: As the High Representative for Gaza, he appealed for support for the plan at the New York meeting [13]. His remarks can be seen as reaffirming the conditional nature of the plan, the implementation of which depends on the pace of Hamas's disarmament and the withdrawal of Israeli forces [13].
Netanyahu Government: Facing the dual constraints of a corruption trial and the veto power of far-right coalition partners (Ben-Gvir and Smotrich), the government has no incentive to withdraw disarmament as a prerequisite [6][9]. The Israeli military has continued airstrikes and territorial expansion in Gaza even after the ceasefire [3][9]. This acts as a factor restricting physical access for reconstruction projects [3].
Hamas: Hamas maintains its fundamental difference in position regarding the sequencing of disarmament [3][9]. Combined with the issue of transferring governing authority, this serves as a direct variable in the geographic expansion of reconstruction (starting in Rafah and moving north).
Gulf Oil-Producing States (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE): These countries have positioned themselves as key US economic partners through investment pledges of approximately $4 trillion under Trump's "America First" investment initiative [11]. However, the financial burden of the war with Iran is putting significant pressure on their economies [11]. This raises doubts about their financial capacity to also cover Gaza reconstruction costs [11].
UNRWA and Human Rights Organizations: Although UNRWA is the largest healthcare provider in Gaza, it has been targeted by the permanent suspension of US funding [8]. Human rights organizations, including the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, are calling for a cautious approach, citing the Board's governance structure and lack of transparency [2].
France and Turkey: Presidents Macron and Erdogan publicly criticized the humanitarian situation in Gaza during the same week as the New York meeting [10]. This suggests that the plan led by the Board of Peace lacks broad international support [10].
4. Key Issues
The first issue is the plan's sequential dependency. The reconstruction projects themselves are tied to the prerequisite of Hamas's disarmament [13]. This structure means that any stalemate in negotiations directly translates into delays in reconstruction [3][9].
The second issue is the substance of the funding. The proposed $2.45 billion falls far short of the $35.2 billion required for medium- to long-term recovery [17]. Furthermore, the financial capacity of the Gulf oil-producing states, the primary potential donors, has become uncertain in the aftermath of the war with Iran [11].
The third issue is the legitimacy of governance. The exclusion of UNRWA, along with the blueprint for "voluntary migration" and land confiscation [2][8], raises fundamental questions about whether the Board is a neutral administrator of reconstruction or an instrument for executing the agenda of a specific party [2].
The fourth issue is the relationship with the UN system. The Board of Peace is operating in parallel, bypassing the Security Council's approval process [5]. Beyond this specific case, this can be seen as part of a broader pattern in which the United States seeks to manage international issues through selective coalitions and transactional coordination rather than multilateral institutions [5][8].
II. In-Depth Analysis
In-Depth Analysis: Funding and Transparency Controversies Surrounding the Gaza Reconstruction 'Board of Peace'
1. Root Cause Analysis
The root cause of the Board of Peace initiative lies in the Trump administration's distrust of the UN system itself. Secretary of State Rubio pledged to make the UN "an effective tool for promoting peace" [5]. However, the core projects of the Gaza plan were run in parallel through the Board of Peace, outside the jurisdiction of the Security Council [5]. This contradiction is not accidental. The administration judged that the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council and the consensus-based structure of the 193 member states were obstacles to swift execution. The establishment of a separate board was the result of this assessment.
This distrust is not confined to a single institution. The US administration withdrew from the UN Human Rights Council in February 2025 [8]. At the same time, it permanently halted funding for UNRWA, the largest healthcare provider in Gaza [8]. Approximately $380 million in grants related to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) were also terminated [8]. Although these three measures occurred at different times, they converge in a single direction: to exclude UN agencies from the Palestinian relief system and fill the vacuum with an alternative mechanism designed by the United States. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace characterized this by stating that the UN is "not declining, but being dismantled" [5]. The intensity of this phrasing reflects the perception that this trend is not a temporary policy adjustment but a structural departure.
This is compounded by the funding issue. The $2.45 billion proposed by the Board of Peace is a mere fraction of the estimated $35.2 billion needed for medium-term physical recovery and the additional $714 billion required over the next decade [17]. This gap reveals that the Board released its blueprint without possessing the actual financial capacity to carry out the reconstruction. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pointed out that the Board presented a blueprint for "voluntary migration" and land confiscation [2]. The fact that such a blueprint emerged in the absence of secured funding suggests that the Board's priority may lie in reshaping Gaza's demographic composition and land ownership structure rather than in reconstruction itself.
2. Structural Context
In terms of political structure, the constraints within the Israeli ruling coalition are the most significant. Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to face trial as a defendant in a corruption case [6][9]. He is bound by the veto power wielded within the coalition by National Security Minister Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Smotrich [6][9]. Both figures have consistently opposed any Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the very possibility of Hamas's survival [6]. Under this structure, Netanyahu has little political incentive to ease the prerequisite of disarmament. The disagreement over the sequencing of disarmament and withdrawal is not a mere negotiating tactic but a matter directly linked to his political survival [6][9]. The design of the reconstruction sequence—starting in Rafah and expanding northward—is also closely related to these political constraints. As long as the transfer of Hamas's governing authority and the pace of Israeli military withdrawal dictate where reconstruction can begin, the reconstruction plan remains inevitably a byproduct of security agreements.
In terms of economic structure, the uncertainty of Gulf funding sources has emerged as a key variable. The Trump administration's "America First" investment initiative has relied heavily on investment pledges of approximately $4 trillion from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates [11]. The pledges from these three nations account for the vast majority of the total $6 trillion in commitments [11]. However, the military conflict with Iran is imposing significant costs on these three Gulf economies [11]. This restricts their resource capacity to fulfill their future investment pledges to the United States [11]. Given a structure where a substantial portion of Gaza reconstruction funds is expected to come from Gulf donors, this constraint directly impacts the Board of Peace's $2.45 billion plan. It is a structure where funding depends on the financial capacity of Gulf nations rather than political will.
In terms of security structure, the vacuum in the disarmament verification framework is critical. Although Israel and Hamas reached a consensus on a disarmament verification proposal presented by a US general, no provisions were established regarding accountability in the event of verification failure [9]. This means that the disarmament verification process—the very prerequisite for initiating reconstruction—was designed without any mechanism to assign responsibility should conflict recur. Consequently, there are no rules to determine the fate of the funds and infrastructure if verification fails after reconstruction capital has been deployed.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases
The concept of bypassing the UN to establish a reconstruction body is not new. In post-war Iraq, the United States directly managed reconstruction funds and contracts through the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) without UN Security Council approval. At the time, controversies over legitimacy led to domestic backlash within Iraq and criticism from the international community. During the reconstruction of Afghanistan, a structure in which the United States disbursed funds through bilateral channels, separate from multilateral trust funds, was also repeated. The common thread in both cases is that reconstruction funds were deployed before the security situation had stabilized, resulting in a failure to secure transparency in fund disbursement and local legitimacy. The situation facing the Board of Peace—where the reconstruction blueprint was unveiled before disarmament and troop withdrawal were finalized—is structurally similar to these precedents.
The decision to exclude UNRWA is also noteworthy as an experiment running in the exact opposite direction of UN transitional administrations, such as those in Kosovo or East Timor. Past UN-led reconstruction models sought to secure legitimacy by absorbing local service networks. In contrast, the Board of Peace chose to exclude UNRWA, which possesses the most extensive service network in Gaza [8]. This aligns more with accommodating the long-standing demands of a specific party—namely, Israel—rather than securing legitimacy. Consequently, it weakens the incentives for Palestinian society and Arab donors to accept this body as a neutral administrator.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is whether an agreement can be reached on the sequencing of disarmament and withdrawal. Without this agreement, expanding reconstruction north of Rafah is impossible [3]. The absence of accountability provisions in the event of verification failure makes this variable even more volatile [9].
The second variable is the actual capacity of Gulf donors to mobilize funds. With the geopolitical situation surrounding Iran constraining their financial flexibility [11], it remains uncertain whether even the $2.45 billion can be stably secured.
The third variable is the legitimacy vacuum resulting from the exclusion of UNRWA. If Palestinian residents and Arab donors perceive the Board as an instrument acting on behalf of Israeli demands, the mobilization of funding and personnel could be severely curtailed [2][8].
The fourth variable is whether the plan will be integrated into the UN Security Council framework. Secretary Rubio himself has stated that he has "not yet decided" whether the plan will go through the Security Council [5]. Unless it is integrated into the Security Council, the Board's legal foundation and international oversight mechanisms will remain weak.
III. Recommended Policy Responses
Recommended Policy Responses and Action Plan
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Responses
The Board of Peace's $2.45 billion plan is assessed to be a document for political signaling and fundraising rather than an actionable implementation plan. This assessment is based on three grounds:
First, the plan itself is built upon the unresolved premise of disarmament. High Representative Mladenov admitted that the entire plan depends on the progress of Hamas's disarmament [13]. Within the Israeli ruling coalition, Prime Minister Netanyahu is constrained by the veto power of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich [6][9]. The disagreement over the sequencing of disarmament and withdrawal is not a negotiating tactic but a matter of his political survival [6][9]. Unless this structure changes, expanding the reconstruction zones will remain merely a byproduct of security agreements.
Second, the scale of the funding itself casts doubt on the capacity for execution. Compared to the estimated $35.2 billion needed in the medium term and $71.4 billion over the next decade for physical recovery in Gaza [17], the proposed $2.45 billion is merely equivalent to initial seed money. This is compounded by the uncertainty of Gulf funding sources. The investment pledges of approximately $4 trillion from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are faltering in terms of implementation capacity due to the financial burden of war [11]. Given that these three countries are the primary candidate donors for Gaza reconstruction, the funding pipeline itself is highly unstable.
Third, the foundation of legitimacy is weak. The Board has moved toward excluding UNRWA, the largest healthcare provider in Gaza [8]. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace pointed out that the Board presented a blueprint for "voluntary migration" and land confiscation [2]. The same institution recommended that stakeholders demand "major restructuring, robust oversight, and transparency" before cooperating with the Board [2]. This recommendation targets the risk of the Board being perceived not as a neutral administrator of reconstruction, but as an instrument for executing the agenda of one specific party.
Taking these three factors together, the recommended course of action for the South Korean government and businesses is not early intervention, but an observational "wait-and-see" approach. Rather than immediately responding to potential requests from the Board for financial contributions or project participation, the priority should be to first verify progress in disarmament verification and whether transparency is secured in the alternative mechanisms replacing UNRWA.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-Term (1–3 Months)
At the government level, a preliminary working-level consultation channel should be established between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and Finance to prepare for potential formal or informal cost-sharing requests from the Board of Peace. Even if a request is received, the government should avoid an immediate response and prepare a principled stance of "reviewing the request only after progress in disarmament verification and confirmation of financial management transparency." This approach leaves room for a conditional response without directly rejecting the U.S. request.
At the corporate level, even when receiving inquiries about participating in Gaza reconstruction in the infrastructure, construction, and healthcare sectors, companies must assess risks by clearly identifying whether the contracting party is the Board of Peace, an international organization, or an entity under the Palestinian Authority. Projects under the Board's name carry dual risks: political legitimacy disputes and opaque financial flows.
Medium-term (3–12 months)
The initiation and pace of reconstruction in the Rafah area should serve as key monitoring indicators. The core issue is whether the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the transfer of Hamas's governing authority are actually taking place. If progress is confirmed at this stage, the viability of the Board model will be partially demonstrated; if the deadlock persists, it will reveal that the blueprint was merely a fundraising document. Based on this assessment, it is rational for South Korea to adjust its level of participation in phases.
At the same time, the actual contributions of Gulf donors must be tracked. The extent to which the investment pledges promised by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates are actually allocated to Gaza reconstruction—filling the $2.45 billion target—will serve as an indicator to gauge the Board's financial substance [11].
Long-term (1 year or more)
A separate response strategy is required for the trend of the Board of Peace model expanding beyond Gaza into Asia. The participation of countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Central Asian nations demonstrates that this transactional order experiment is not confined to a specific region. South Korea needs to maintain a dual-track approach between the UN-centered multilateral framework and the U.S.-led transactional coalitions. It must avoid a structure where it is only asked to share the financial burden for an organization operating without even a decision on whether to go through the UN Security Council [5].
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
First, whether the disarmament verification working group is actually operational. Although both sides have reached a consensus on the verification plan proposed by a U.S. general, there is currently no clause assigning responsibility in the event of a verification failure [3][9]. Whether this gap is filled serves as the primary trigger.
Second, whether transparency is secured in the aid delivery system designed to replace UNRWA. It is appropriate to withhold any expansion of cooperation without confirming the actual implementation of the "sweeping restructuring and robust oversight" demanded by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [2].
Third, the actual disbursement rate of the $2.45 billion and the level of disclosure regarding the sources of funding. If the Board does not disclose its financial flows, this should be interpreted as a signal that legitimacy issues are compounding and worsening alongside funding problems.
Fourth, whether Ben-Gvir and Smotrich depart from the Israeli ruling coalition. The departure of these two figures from the coalition or changes in the intensity of their hardline rhetoric serve as leading indicators to gauge Netanyahu's room for negotiation [6][9].
Fifth, the actual scale of investment disbursed by the three Gulf states. The impact of the financial burden resulting from the aftermath of the war with Iran on the fulfillment of Gaza reconstruction pledges should be monitored quarterly [11].
4. Summary and Conclusion
The Board of Peace's 66-project blueprint rests on a triple constraint: the unresolved premise of disarmament, funding that is significantly insufficient compared to the required costs, and a legitimacy deficit resulting from the exclusion of UNRWA. Unless these constraints are resolved, the plan is highly likely to function as a document for political signaling and fundraising rather than an implementation roadmap. South Korea should establish a principle of conditional response to cost-sharing requests and adjust its level of participation only after confirming that leading indicators, such as disarmament verification and financial transparency, are met. Concurrently, amid the trend of this model expanding into Asia, South Korea needs to proactively design a balance between UN-centered multilateralism and transactional coalitions.
References
[1] [Daily Sabah] US-backed board unveils $2.45B Gaza reconstruction plan
[2] [Carnegie Endowment] The Board of Peace and Funding for Gaza Reconstruction: On Whose Account?
[4] [Cyprus Mail] Board of Peace pitches $2.45 billion Gaza ‘reconstruction’ plan
[5] [Carnegie Endowment] The UN Isn’t Declining. It’s Decomposing.
[7] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Trump's Board of Peace proposes $2.45B to rebuild Gaza
[8] [Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)] How Much Does the U.S. Fund the United Nations?
[10] [Kuwait Times] Board of Peace unveils $2.5bn Gaza plan
[12] [The National (UAE)] Board of Peace proposes six-month $2.4bn plan for Gaza reconstruction
[13] [Jordan Times] RegionUS-backed Board of Peace unveils $2.5bn Gaza recovery plan
[14] [Business Day (ZA)] Trump-backed Board of Peace proposes $2.45bn plan to start rebuilding Gaza
[16] [H3rriyet Daily News] Gaza board proposes $2.45 bln blueprint
[19] [Foreign Policy] A $2.45 Billion Recovery Plan for Gaza
[20] [Al Jazeera] Board of Peace plans $2.4bn Gaza reconstruction as Israel kills seven
[21] [Daily Sabah] Gaza Board of Peace reaffirms commitment to objectives before UNGA
[23] [Wafa] Cabinet warns of worsening humanitarian conditions in the Gaza Strip amid ...
[24] [Daily Sabah] T3rkiye, 7 countries call on Israel to commit to Gaza peace plan
[25] [Jordan Times] LocalJordan, Arab, Islamic nations call for full Gaza plan implementation
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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