China's Digital Chokepoint Strategy: A Shift in Cyber Warfare and South Korea's Response

Executive Summary

China is extending its strategy of leveraging control over critical mineral supplies to the digital infrastructure domain. A strategic playbook is emerging: build a Digital Silk Road—comprising wireless networks, undersea cables, and satellite networks—to secure access in peacetime and exercise that access in a crisis. This development should be seen as a core issue in emerging and non-traditional security, namely state-sponsored cyber threats, and as the next phase in the U.S.-China technological rivalry that has continued since the Huawei incident. For now, this asymmetric situation is most likely to persist without China fully exercising its leverage. Beijing is expected to maintain its secured access while simultaneously promoting a defensive narrative. South Korea should prioritize a middle-power approach: rather than openly confronting China, it should focus on strengthening its capabilities to detect threats to critical networks and expanding its role as an alternative provider in digital infrastructure cooperation with third countries.

I. Situational Analysis

China's Digital Chokepoint Strategy: A Shift in Cyber Warfare

1. Background and Developments

As of 2026, the international community's attention is focused on physical chokepoints. Iran has used its control over the Strait of Hormuz as an actual means of disruption.[4][7] Houthi rebels have seized strategic locations in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.[12][14] The impact of these physical blockades on the global economy has been repeatedly confirmed by various media outlets.[8][9]

Foreign Affairs points out that the logic of this physical chokepoint strategy is migrating to the digital domain.[1] China's use of its critical mineral supply as leverage in trade negotiations is a well-known fact.[1] The problem is that the same logic is now being implemented in cyberspace through state-sponsored actors. A commentary published by EAI in 2019 identified the origins of this trend within the context of the U.S.-China technological rivalry. Professor Kim Sang-bae of Seoul National University analyzed that the Huawei incident led the United States to begin viewing China as a "threat to its technological hegemony."[3] Since then, cybersecurity has become a central axis of conflict, extending beyond trade friction to affect the overall U.S.-China relationship.[3]

China's construction of digital chokepoints is not a one-off event but the result of a long-term infrastructure strategy. The CSIS Reconnecting Asia project analyzes that China's Digital Silk Road is expanding simultaneously across multiple domains, including wireless networks, surveillance cameras, undersea cables, and satellite networks.[2] This infrastructure stretches from the seabed to space, forming the physical foundation that enables AI and big data applications.[2][5] In his book, Jonathan Hillman warned that if Beijing becomes the central operator of the world's networks, it could inherit the strategic and commercial advantages currently enjoyed by the United States.[5]

2. Current Situation

A recent analysis in Foreign Affairs argues that this infrastructural advantage is now leading to a change in how cyber warfare is conducted.[1] The core of this approach is that state-sponsored actors secure access inside an adversary's digital infrastructure during peacetime and convert this access into leverage during a crisis. This applies the same logic of "secure in peacetime, exercise in crisis"—as demonstrated by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz and China with critical minerals—to the digital domain.[1]

China's response has focused on a defensive narrative. According to statements from Chinese intelligence authorities reported by the Financial Times, Beijing claims that it is, on the contrary, the target of AI-based "cognitive warfare" by hostile forces.[11] This reveals a public communication strategy in which China seeks to frame itself as a victim, not a perpetrator, in cyberspace. A significant gap thus exists between Western analysis and the Chinese authorities' self-portrayal.

At the regional level, competition over physical chokepoints is occurring in parallel. The Diplomat has explored the possibility of India strategically exploiting China's "Malacca Dilemma."[15] This suggests that the competition over digital chokepoints is not proceeding separately from the existing competition over maritime chokepoints, but is intertwined with it.

3. Key Actors and Positions

Chinapresents two faces. Externally, it has positioned itself as an infrastructure provider for developing countries through the Digital Silk Road, accumulating stakes in telecommunication networks, undersea cables, and satellite networks.[2][5] At the same time, the central concern raised by Foreign Affairs is that China is securing the potential to convert this infrastructural advantage into security leverage through state-sponsored cyber actors.[1] Domestically, its intelligence authorities are officializing a defensive narrative that portrays the country as a victim of AI-based cognitive warfare.[11]

United Stateshas consistently framed this issue as a threat to its technological hegemony since the Huawei incident.[3] However, it is unclear whether the U.S. response posture to the new threat identified in the Foreign Affairs analysis—the concept of peacetime infiltration that can be converted into leverage in a crisis—has moved beyond its existing framework of technology controls on China.[1]

Iranis not a direct party to this discussion, but serves as a key comparative case, having impressed the concept of an "economic chokepoint lever" on the international community through its control of the Strait of Hormuz.[1][4][7] The Houthi rebels' seizure of control in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait demonstrates the same logical structure.[12][14] In that these physical cases are the starting point for the Foreign Affairs analysis, the events originating from Iran and Yemen function as a conceptual reference for the digital chokepoint theory.

Indiaand other regional countries are mentioned as a potential axis of response to China's infrastructure leverage. The Diplomat examines the possibility of India leveraging China's Malacca Dilemma, but India's capacity to respond is limited by its own history of border disputes with China (Doklam, Galwan Valley).[15]

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the verifiability of the concept itself. With physical chokepoints, a blockade or seizure can be visibly confirmed, but with digital chokepoints, it is difficult to prove pre-emptive infiltration by state-sponsored actors in peacetime. This directly relates to the question of effectiveness for monitoring "state-sponsored cyber threats" as an emerging security item.

The second is the inseparability of infrastructure and security. The Digital Silk Road began as a commercial expansion of telecommunications and satellite infrastructure,[2][5] but the fact that its outcome can be converted into potential security leverage blurs the line between trade/industrial policy and cybersecurity policy.

The third is the asymmetry of response frameworks. While the United States has responded primarily through technology controls since the Huawei incident,[3] the threat raised by Foreign Affairs concerns latent access rights within already installed infrastructure, a problem that is difficult to address with after-the-fact technology controls alone.

The implications for South Korea can be summarized in three points. First, there is a need to re-evaluate the dependency on Chinese-made equipment and services in telecommunication networks, undersea cables, and satellite infrastructure. Second, the system for constant monitoring of state-sponsored cyber threats should not be treated as a separate track from physical chokepoint risks, but rather within an integrated crisis management framework. Third, as the U.S.-China technological rivalry increasingly overlaps with supply chain and economic security issues in the cyber domain, it is necessary to establish collaborative channels in advance between the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Ministry of National Defense.

II. In-Depth Analysis

China's Digital Chokepoint Strategy: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The fundamental reason for the emergence of the digital chokepoint strategy lies in the fact that infrastructure ownership and security vulnerabilities are inseparable. In the physical world, the Strait of Hormuz becomes a lever simply due to the geographical fact of its proximity to Iran's territorial waters.[1] In the case of critical minerals, the basis for leverage is the industrial fact that China controls most of the mining and refining processes.[1] In the digital domain, the basis for this leverage is the status of being the infrastructure's builder and operator. According to CSIS analysis, China's Digital Silk Road is being built across multiple layers, from wireless networks to undersea cables and satellite networks.[2] Who builds this infrastructure is directly linked to who has access to it later.

The core of the root cause here is the strategic playbook of "secure in peacetime, exercise in crisis." Foreign Affairs identifies this as having the same structure as Iran's case with the Strait of Hormuz and China's with critical minerals.[1] State-sponsored cyber actors choose to plant access into an adversary's systems long before a conflict arises. Because securing access does not in itself cause immediate damage, it is difficult for the target country to perceive it as a crisis. This asymmetric cognitive structure is the fundamental incentive for the strategy.

2. Structural Context

In terms of political structure, this strategy is an extension of the U.S.-China technological rivalry. An EAI commentary noted that the U.S. government began to view China as a "threat to its technological hegemony" following the 2018 Huawei incident.[3] Professor Kim Sang-bae analyzed that the conflict at the time "progressed from a trade war to issues of friction over legal and institutional systems, including national security, in the technology and cyber domains."[3] This structure remains in place today. However, while the focus in 2018-2019 was on controlling the network equipment supply chain, the center of gravity has now shifted to the issue of access rights within already established infrastructure. If the exclusion of Huawei was based on a logic of "blocking entry," the digital chokepoint represents the next stage: the logic of "exercising previously secured access."

In the economic structure, the key point is that the commercial logic and security implications of the Digital Silk Road are inseparable. Jonathan Hillman pointed out that if China becomes the world's "chief network operator," it could inherit the commercial and strategic advantages long enjoyed by the United States.[5] This means that exporting telecommunications infrastructure is not merely a commercial contract but a long-term transfer of geopolitical assets. From the perspective of developing countries, the economic incentives of cheap and rapid infrastructure provision are so great that a structure has formed in which it is difficult to exclude Chinese infrastructure based on security concerns alone.

In the security structure, China's self-defensive narrative forms a separate layer. Statements from Chinese intelligence authorities, as reported by the Financial Times, claim that the country is being targeted by hostile forces' AI-based "cognitive warfare."[11] This shows that the debate over state-sponsored cyber threats is also a discursive competition over the perpetrator-victim frame. While the West points to China as the source of state-sponsored threats, Beijing is creating a dual discursive structure that redefines itself as the target.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The most direct comparisons are the cases of physical blockades in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Iran converted its control over the Strait of Hormuz into an actual means of attack, causing global crude oil prices to surge in the aftermath.[4][8] By seizing islands and ports near Bab el-Mandeb, Houthi rebels gained de facto control over the Red Sea shipping route itself.[12][14] Both cases show the same pattern of "peacetime geographical advantage" being converted into "crisis-time effective blockade power." The Tehran Times defines the linkage of these two straits as a single geo-economic deterrence system stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.[9]

The unique nature of digital chokepoints becomes clearer when compared to these physical cases. A strait blockade is public and visible. The blockade itself is reported in real-time by media around the world.[4][7][16] In contrast, securing access in cyberspace is invisible. There is a significant time lag before the target country becomes aware of the breach, and even after awareness, debates over attribution follow. This invisibility is precisely what makes digital chokepoints more difficult to manage than physical ones.

The second axis of comparison is the critical minerals lever. China's critical minerals lever and its digital chokepoints are on a continuum in that the actor is the same.[1] However, there is a difference: while developing alternative sources for critical minerals takes years, digital access, once secured, can be maintained for a long time without replacing physical assets. For this reason, the cost of resolving a digital chokepoint could potentially be greater than the cost of resolving dependency on critical minerals.

The third axis of comparison is China's own geographical vulnerability, represented by the "Malacca Dilemma." The Diplomat explored the possibility of India strategically exploiting this dilemma.[15] This comparison reveals an asymmetry: China is in the vulnerable position of being encircled at maritime bottlenecks, while in the digital domain, it seeks to occupy the position of the encircler. This suggests the possibility that Beijing's strategic priorities are designed to offset the vulnerability of its physical sea lanes with superiority in the digital domain.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the politics of attribution and evidence disclosure. Unlike a physical blockade, with state-sponsored cyber threats, identifying the actor is itself a point of contention. The timing and manner in which the United States or its allies disclose a breach will determine the legitimacy and intensity of subsequent countermeasures.

The second variable is a shift in the attitudes of countries that have adopted the Digital Silk Road. The proliferation of wireless networks, undersea cables, and satellite networks mapped by CSIS is still ongoing.[2] Whether recipient countries reconsider their contracts due to security concerns or maintain the current path for economic incentives will determine the future geographical scope of the chokepoints.

The third variable is the outcome of the discursive competition between the United States and China. The degree of international support for Western measures to pressure China on cyber issues will depend on how persuasive China's attempt to redefine itself as a victim of cognitive warfare is in the court of international public opinion.[11]

The fourth variable is the spillover effect from crises at physical chokepoints. If the prolonged crises in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb[4][12][14] cause governments to prioritize the defense of physical supply chains, it is possible that resource allocation and policy attention for digital chokepoints will be relatively deprioritized. In the current situation where both types of crises are unfolding simultaneously, the competition for policy resources itself becomes a variable that dictates the pace of developments.