AI-Driven Military Innovation in China’s PLA Strategic Support Force and the U.S.-China Competitive Landscape

Executive Summary

China's Strategic Support Force is pursuing AI military integration centered on systems warfare, leveraging a unified command structure for space, cyber, electronic, and information warfare. However, internal PLA research indicates that the use of offensive combat AI remains in an exploratory phase. This is attributed not to a lack of technological capability but to structural constraints arising from political caution over Party-military relations and the delegation of command authority. In contrast, China's commercial AI ecosystem, with its low-cost deployment models, has the potential to asymmetrically narrow the military AI gap. Consequently, a parallel trend of gradual integration and catch-up is the most likely scenario over the next three to five years. This shifts the focus of U.S.-China military competition from superiority in individual weapon systems to a contest over integrated information and command-and-control capabilities. For South Korea, this poses the dual challenge of strengthening its monitoring of the SSF and developing its own independent command-and-control systems. Moreover, cases of AI misuse by state-backed actors underscore the urgency of AI governance discussions and suggest the need for middle-power participation in multilateral norm-setting.

I. Situational Analysis

AI-Driven Military Innovation in China’s PLA Strategic Support Force: A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

China's efforts to integrate AI into its military gained an institutional foundation with the 2015 establishment of the Strategic Support Force (SSF). The Brookings Institution analyzes this organization as a unified command structure that manages space, cyber, electronic, and information warfare capabilities under one roof [2]. According to the Brookings analysis, while all major powers have declared their intent to utilize AI for military purposes, no country has approached it as purposefully as China [2]. Beijing has already announced a national plan to become a world-leading AI power by 2030, and the Communist Party leadership has formalized an innovation-driven military modernization strategy to support this goal [2].

This trend is an extension of the military-civil fusion policy pursued by the Xi Jinping leadership since 2017. A paper by researchers from the Shandong Corps of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force, cited in an EAI report, is noteworthy for its sober assessment of this strategy's implementation. The paper, which extensively cites U.S. military data, concluded that China's military AI models lag behind the West in their attack chains [3]. The researchers stated that "the PLA's use of AI is still concentrated in auxiliary areas such as intelligent Q&A and content generation," and acknowledged that its application in offensive combat remains in an exploratory phase [3]. As an instance of a Chinese military research institution publicly admitting its own limitations, this can be read as a self-assessment that diverges from its external propaganda.

2. Current Situation

According to EAI analysis, this gap is interpreted as a structural problem stemming not from a lack of technological capability but from political caution surrounding Party-military relations and the delegation of command authority [3]. The PLA is shifting its focus from improving the performance of individual weapon systems to building systems warfare capabilities that integrate information, AI, communications, and logistics [3]. This approach differs from the U.S. focus on competing for superiority in individual platforms. Considering the catch-up speed of China's commercial AI sector, including companies like Zhipu AI, EAI assesses that the current military AI gap is unlikely to persist for long [3].

The growth of China's commercial AI ecosystem supports this assessment. According to a South China Morning Post report citing a Moody's analysis, Chinese tech companies are narrowing the computing gap with the U.S. using far less capital, thanks to lower deployment costs, policy incentives, and access to cheap renewable energy [12]. The Swiss newspaper NZZ noted that while the U.S. continues an investment boom driven by tech companies' profit expectations, China has chosen a different path of disseminating AI to the public at a low cost [9]. President Xi Jinping's portrayal of his country as a "savior of the future" at the opening ceremony of the World AI Conference in Shanghai in July also illustrates the external propaganda aspect of this strategy [9].

The Chinese authorities' assertive stance is also evident outside the military domain. The South China Morning Post reported that Chinese state media outlet CCTV labeled Japan's plan for an AI-equipped satellite a "serious threat," criticizing it as a cornerstone of Tokyo's space militarization strategy [1]. According to Japan's Nikkei Shimbun, the satellite is intended to analyze surveillance data from space to accelerate targeting decisions and enhance interception capabilities; the Ministry of Defense aims to develop a prototype with domestic companies for a launch in the 2030s [1]. This reveals China's dual stance of acknowledging its own military AI gap while strongly opposing the militarization of AI by neighboring countries.

The U.S.-China AI competition is also escalating into a dispute over technology theft. In a 154-page report, Anthropic disclosed that Alibaba had accessed its Claude model 151 million times to extract its capabilities [14]. This disclosure of a specific case, following the U.S. government's condemnation of "industrial-scale malicious distillation" by Chinese companies, is expected to further intensify the U.S.-China technology dispute [14].

3. Key Actors and Positions

China (SSF and CCP Leadership)Maintains a systems-integration-oriented military AI strategy as its official line, but is internally constrained by caution regarding Party-military relations. The issue of delegating command authority to AI has significant potential to conflict with the Communist Party's principle of controlling the military. Therefore, political constraints, separate from technological capabilities, are acting as a factor slowing the pace of operational deployment [3].

United States (Department of Defense, Congress, Department of the Treasury)Is reinforcing a discourse that frames losing the AI competition as an existential threat. Treasury Secretary Kathryn M. Besant openly expressed a sense of crisis, stating, "If China gets ahead in AI, even America's vast defense budget won't be able to protect the country" [11]. Some analyses suggest this is linked to political calculations aimed at quelling domestic opposition to data center construction [11].

JapanIs pursuing AI satellites as a means to upgrade its interceptor systems, provoking a backlash from China [1]. Middle powers such as Southeast Asian nations and SingaporeAre being drawn into a dynamic where they are forced to choose between the United States and China. Singapore has been invited to join the China-led World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) but is weighing this against the compatibility of participating in the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative [16]. A draft U.S. State Department document reportedly contains a message cautioning Pax Silica participants against simultaneously joining competing initiatives [7].

4. Key Issues

The first key issue is the pace of China's military AI operational deployment. The central question is how quickly the gap will close, given that China's capabilities are currently self-assessed as being confined to auxiliary roles, while its commercial AI sector is catching up rapidly [3][12]. The second issue is the delegation of command authority. The PLA's focus on systems warfare integration is both a technological choice and a product of the political imperative to maintain the Party's control over the military [3]. The third issue is the pressure on middle powers to choose sides. Countries like Singapore and other Southeast Asian nations are being forced to make a choice in the U.S.-China competition over AI norms and platforms, a challenge that is spreading to middle powers across Asia, including South Korea [7][16][5].

II. In-Depth Analysis

AI-Driven Military Innovation in China’s PLA Strategic Support Force: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

China's particularly purposeful approach to military AI integration is rooted in a long-standing strategic calculation to offset its conventional military gap with the United States through a technological leap. The Brookings Institution notes that Beijing has declared a national plan to become a world-leading AI power by 2030 and has formalized an innovation-driven military modernization strategy to support this goal [2]. This is structurally similar to the Cold War logic of the Soviet Union attempting to offset U.S. nuclear superiority with missile technology. The difference, however, is that China has made not a specific weapon system but the general-purpose technology of AI the central pillar of its national capabilities.

Behind this approach lies the unique institutional constraint of Party-military relations in China. EAI analysis attributes the PLA's limited use of offensive combat AI to an exploratory phase not because of a lack of technology but due to "political caution surrounding Party-military relations and the delegation of command authority" [3]. The Communist Party has long considered absolute control over the military a prerequisite for the regime's survival. AI-based autonomous decision-making systems have the potential to disrupt this line of control. The moment an algorithm replaces a commander's judgment, there is a risk that the final decision-making authority of the Party's Central Military Commission could become a mere formality. This is why the Chinese military leadership prioritizes the political stability of the command structure over the speed of technology adoption.

At the same time, it is unusual that voices acknowledging the limits of China's capabilities are emerging from within the military. The paper by researchers from the Shandong Corps of the People's Armed Police explicitly states that "the PLA's use of AI is still concentrated in auxiliary areas such as intelligent Q&A and content generation" [3]. This shows that, separate from its external propaganda, the military's internal evaluation system is benchmarking its position against U.S. military data. This dual structure—projecting a narrative of being an AI powerhouse externally while soberly measuring the gap with the West internally—is likely closer to the reality of the SSF's operations.

2. Structural Context

From a political-structural perspective, the SSF was designed from its 2015 inception as an organization that unifies space, cyber, electronic, and information warfare under a single chain of command [2]. This differs from the U.S. military's domain-specific command structures, such as Cyber Command and Space Force. By opting for an integrated organization from the outset, China sought to link information superiority and command decisions in a single loop. This design itself reflects the concept of systems warfare. The PLA's current shift in focus from the performance of individual weapons to "systems warfare capabilities that integrate information, AI, communications, and logistics" [3] can be seen as a logical consequence of this organizational design.

In the economic structure, the combination of state-led investment and the commercial AI ecosystem is prominent. A South China Morning Post report citing a Moody's analysis stated that Chinese tech companies are narrowing the computing gap with the U.S. using far less capital, thanks to lower deployment costs, policy incentives, and access to cheap renewable energy [12]. The Swiss newspaper NZZ noted that while the U.S. continues an investment boom reliant on tech companies' profit expectations, China has chosen a path of disseminating AI widely at a low cost [9]. This low-cost diffusion strategy in the private sector also affects resource allocation in the military sector, creating a structure where the military application of commercial AI technology becomes relatively easier. EAI's assessment that the current military AI gap is unlikely to persist for long [3], given the rapid catch-up speed of commercial AI firms like Zhipu AI, is connected to this economic foundation.

In the security structure, the U.S.-China military competition is clearly expanding into a competition over AI norms. A backgrounder on the U.S.-China AI summit compiled by Brookings assessed that the gap between U.S. and Chinese approaches to AI has actually widened over the past six weeks through discussions at the G7 summit and the UN [8]. While Nikkei Shimbun reported on the possibility of discussions on AI safeguards at a Trump-Xi summit, it also noted that skepticism exists in and around Silicon Valley that the fundamental structure of the technology conflict will not be easily resolved [15]. This shows that while the SSF's AI-driven military innovation is an agenda item that can be discussed at the bilateral negotiating table, it is fundamentally inseparable from the structural competitive axes of military deterrence and technological hegemony.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The SSF's integrated approach has points of comparison with the Soviet Union's military-technological leap strategy during the Cold War. To counter U.S. superiority in nuclear forces, the Soviet Union concentrated national resources on missile technology and space development. This bears a logical similarity to China's current AI-first strategy in its attempt to offset a conventional imbalance with technological specialization. However, whereas the Soviet missile competition was centered on hardware platforms, China's AI integration is more software-oriented, reconfiguring the flows of command, control, and information themselves. This difference also changes the nature of the control risk. While the final decision to launch a missile is made by a human, an AI-based systems warfare framework involves algorithms in the decision-making process itself.

The integration of information warfare and military operations seen in the Ukraine war is also being studied as a lesson within the Chinese military. A Chinese study reported by the South China Morning Post conducted a detailed analysis of how Kyiv used drone attacks on airbases in mainland Russia as part of an "information offensive." The study concluded that possessing advanced technology alone is insufficient and that the ability to "weave together" information strategy and military operations is decisive for success [13]. This directly aligns with the systems warfare concept pursued by the SSF. In viewing integrated operational capability, rather than individual technological superiority, as the key to victory, the Ukraine case is being absorbed as a combat lesson within the Chinese military.

China's reaction to Japan's AI satellite plan is another relevant case. Chinese state media outlet CCTV described Japan's plan for an AI-equipped surveillance satellite as a "serious threat" [1]. According to Nikkei Shimbun, the satellite is designed to analyze information collected from space to accelerate targeting decisions and enhance interception capabilities [1]. This reveals a pattern where China uses similar moves by neighboring countries to justify its own military AI integration. In other words, the expansion of the SSF is driven not only by purely internal dynamics but also proceeds in parallel with diplomatic rhetoric that reframes the responses of regional competitors as security threats.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the pace of change in Party-military relations. The issue of delegating command authority to algorithms depends more on political decisions than on technical readiness. The extent to which the Xi Jinping leadership is willing to relax this line of control will determine the speed of the SSF's transition to offensive combat AI.

The second variable is the catch-up speed of the commercial AI sector. The key is how quickly technological advancements from private companies like Zhipu AI are absorbed for military use [3]. If the low-cost computing diffusion structure noted by Moody's [12] continues, the timeline for closing the civil-military gap could be accelerated.

The third variable is AI governance negotiations at the U.S.-China summit level. The SSF's room for external maneuver will depend on whether discussions on AI safeguards at a Trump-Xi meeting make substantive progress or solidify into a normative competition [8][15]. If negotiations repeatedly fail, the military AI race is likely to accelerate in a normative vacuum.

The fourth variable is the pace of response from regional countries. China's backlash against Japan's AI satellite plan [1] suggests that a regional AI arms race has already entered an interactive phase. As the responses of various Asian countries accumulate, the expansion of the SSF will solidify not just as an internal Chinese matter but as a variable affecting the overall regional deterrence posture.