Risk of Surging Oil Prices and Maritime Freight Rates Amid Tit-for-Tat Tanker Attacks in Escalating U.S.-Iran Conflict

Executive Summary

The U.S. sinking of five Iranian oil tankers and Iran's retaliatory attack on ten vessels on September 9 show that the 'tanker-for-tanker' policy has solidified into a standing rule of engagement. Brent crude surpassed $100 per barrel, and President Trump has indicated that oil prices will not stabilize until after the midterm elections. The baseline forecast for the next three months is a low-intensity stalemate (55% probability), while a pessimistic scenario involving a full blockade of the Strait of Hormuz also carries a significant probability of 30%. The attack on a Panama-flagged tanker in Iraqi territorial waters signals that South Korean-flagged and chartered vessels are also vulnerable. South Korean companies must manage crude oil and LNG procurement and maritime logistics through an integrated situation room framework, while simultaneously diversifying supply sources and reviewing their exposure to secondary sanctions.

I. Situational Analysis

Situational Analysis: Tit-for-Tat Tanker Attacks and Oil Prices Surpassing $100

1. Background and Developments

The current crisis began on February 28, 2026, when the United States and Israel launched airstrikes against targets in Iran, triggering a full-scale war in the Middle East [8]. Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed in the strikes [8]. However, the regime change that Israel had intended did not materialize [8].

After six months of military operations failed to achieve the goal of regime change, the United States shifted its strategy to economic warfare [8]. On June 17, President Trump and the Tehran government signed the 'Islamabad Memorandum' [8], which called for an immediate and permanent cessation of military actions on all fronts [8]. The memorandum expired on August 17 [3][6]. Subsequently, Iran reverted to an offensive posture, beginning to assert its control over passage through the Strait of Hormuz by force [3][6][8].

On August 30, the United States struck a launch site on Larak Island. Iran immediately retaliated against U.S. military bases in Jordan and the UAE, shattering a nearly month-long lull [8]. During this process, the 'tanker-for-tanker' policy approved by President Trump came to the fore [17]. The trigger for its implementation was the IRGC's launch of ballistic missiles at a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier and a guided-missile destroyer [17].

2. Current Situation

On September 8, the United States sank five Iranian oil tankers [1][4][7][9]. Gulf media outlets reported this as a response to an attempted attack by the IRGC on U.S. naval vessels [7]. Iran immediately announced it had attacked ten ships near the Strait of Hormuz [4][9]. Gulf media described this as the largest mutual attack on shipping during the six-month war [4][9]. At least one tanker crew member was reported killed and one missing [9].

On the same day, Iran launched ballistic missiles at the Azraq Air Base in Jordan [7][10][18]. The Jordanian military announced it had intercepted 18 of the 20 missiles launched [7][10]. The remaining two landed in uninhabited areas, causing no casualties [7]. In Iraqi territorial waters, a Panama-flagged oil tanker carrying approximately 2 million barrels of fuel oil caught fire after a drone attack [16]. The UKMTO also reported multiple attacks on merchant vessels in the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman [10]. An IRGC spokesperson announced that the maritime restricted zone would be expanded to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea [10].

In the aftermath, Brent crude surpassed $100 per barrel for the first time since July 24 [1][5][11][13]. According to the WSJ, Brent crude closed at $101.21, up 3.4% from the previous day, while WTI closed at $96.05, up 3.2% [11]. These were the highest closing prices since May 22 [11]. The UAE-based publication MEED also cited attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels on Saudi energy facilities as a factor in the price increase [5]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors passed a resolution referring Iran to the UN Security Council [10].

President Trump remarked that oil prices would likely not stabilize until after the U.S. midterm elections [1][10]. At the same time, he offered a contradictory forecast that the war would end 'immediately' after the elections [10]. Pakistan is reported to have delivered a warning message from Saudi Arabia to Iran [10].

3. Key Actors and Positions

The United States has formalized its 'tanker-for-tanker' principle and is directly targeting Iranian oil tankers [17]. Pressuring Iran's economy through low oil prices has become a priority for the White House [3]. Domestically, however, the U.S. faces physical constraints, with its THAAD and Patriot interceptor stockpiles reduced by at least 38% and up to 65%, respectively [8]. President Trump's remarks about the midterm elections can be read as a signal of his intent to manage the impact of rising oil prices in line with the domestic political calendar [1][10].

Iran is using its ability to control passage through the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in negotiations with the United States [3][6][8]. The IRGC has provided pretexts for escalation by repeatedly attempting preemptive attacks on U.S. warships, and after the retaliatory tanker strikes, it announced an expansion of the maritime restricted zone [10][17]. The airstrike on Jordan demonstrates Iran's willingness to expand its strike range to U.S. military bases throughout the region [7][18].

Jordan avoided becoming a direct party to the escalating conflict by intercepting most of the missiles with its air defense systems at the Azraq base [7][10]. The UAE's vulnerability as a regional logistics hub has been exposed as its own ships have been targeted and attacks on merchant vessels have increased in the Gulf [10][17]. Saudi Arabia, directly exposed to Houthi attacks on its energy facilities, has moved to deter escalation, including by sending a warning message to Iran via Pakistan [5][10].

4. Key Issues

First, the mutual tanker strikes are developing into a pattern reminiscent of the 1980s 'Tanker War' [17]. With commercial vessels becoming direct targets, the risk of drawing in Gulf states and external powers has increased [17].

Second, President Trump's remarks suggest that high oil prices are not a short-term event but are linked to the political variable of the U.S. midterm elections [1][10]. This weakens the basis for any market expectations of a short-term de-escalation scenario.

Third, while the IAEA's resolution to refer Iran to the Security Council has added a diplomatic pressure track [10], the pace of military conflict is outstripping it. As damage accumulates for neighboring countries like Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, the potential for the bilateral U.S.-Iran dynamic to expand into a multilateral conflict across the Gulf is a key variable in the current phase.

II. In-Depth Analysis

In-Depth Analysis: Root Causes and Structural Context of the Tit-for-Tat Tanker Attacks

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The root of the current crisis lies in the failure of the February 28 U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iran to achieve their original objective. Although Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed, the Iranian regime itself did not collapse [2][6][8]. With the military goal of regime change unmet, the United States shifted its exit strategy toward economic warfare [6][8]. This shift led to the signing of the Islamabad Memorandum in June, but the agreement only stipulated the cessation of military actions and did not address fundamental issues like passage rights in the Strait of Hormuz or sanctions [3][6][8]. When the memorandum expired in August, Iran chose to assert its control over passage by force [3][6][8]. The unresolved underlying conflicts, which negotiations failed to address, have now resurfaced through military action.

From Iran's perspective, the threat of a Hormuz blockade is one of the few asymmetric levers it has to counter pressure for regime change. Outmatched by the U.S. in conventional military power, Iran has long used its control over the strait, through which one-fifth of the world's oil supply passes, as a bargaining chip [2][3]. The U.S. 'tanker-for-tanker' policy is a response aimed at neutralizing this leverage [7][17]. This policy, approved by President Trump, came to the fore after the IRGC launched ballistic missiles at a U.S. aircraft carrier and destroyer [17]. Ultimately, both sides escalated their responses by directly targeting each other's key instruments, culminating in the mutual tanker attacks on September 9.

2. Structural Context

Politically, the U.S. midterm election schedule is acting as a variable in managing the escalation. President Trump's statement pegging oil price stabilization to the post-election period in itself suggests a policy timeline [1][10]. It can be interpreted as a sign that he intends to maintain a hardline stance until the election, while leaving open the possibility of a shift in approach afterward. However, this statement also serves as a market signal that high oil prices will persist for a considerable time.

Militarily, constraints on U.S. interceptor stockpiles are acting as a ceiling on escalation. With its THAAD and Patriot inventories reduced by at least 38% and up to 65% respectively, the U.S. is under pressure to maintain its hardline response [8]. This constraint provides a background for why the U.S. is opting for low-intensity exchanges involving repeated strikes on limited targets like oil tankers and launch sites, rather than escalating to a full-scale war.

Economically, a structure of dual pressure has formed, with Iran using its control over passage as leverage and the United States using its economic blockade of Iran as leverage [6][8][18]. The Bangkok Post described this as a stalemate in which 'Iran holds a grip on the Strait of Hormuz, while the U.S. pushes a policy that squeezes Iran's ports and economy' [18]. Within this structure, both sides are following a logic of attrition, aiming to increase the other's costs to improve their own negotiating position rather than achieving a complete victory. The situation is compounded by separate attacks by Houthi rebels on Saudi energy facilities, creating overlapping supply risks across the entire Gulf region [5].

In terms of the security architecture, U.S. military bases in the region are constantly exposed as targets for Iranian retaliation. The ballistic missile attack on the Azraq base in Jordan, despite the partial success of interception systems, demonstrates that Iran maintains both the capability and the will to strike U.S. assets in the region [7][10][18]. With indications that Iran is also considering strikes on U.S. bases in Europe, the possibility that the geographic scope of escalation may not be limited to the Gulf region cannot be ruled out [8].

3. Historical Precedents and Comparison with Similar Cases

The UAE-based newspaper The National has pointed to the possibility of a repeat of the 1980s 'Tanker War' [17]. During the Iran-Iraq War, both sides attacked commercial shipping in the Gulf, causing international oil prices and maritime insurance premiums to soar. A similar trajectory is observable in the current crisis, with attacks directly targeting merchant vessels on the rise. The case of a Panama-flagged oil tanker catching fire after a drone attack in Iraqi territorial waters illustrates this point [16]. A key difference from the 1980s is that the United States is now playing an offensive role by directly sinking Iranian tankers [1][4][7][9]. This contrasts with its primarily defensive role at the time, which focused on escorting ships from Gulf states.

As EAI noted in a previous report, a pattern of alternating negotiation and tension was already observed through the signing and expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum [3]. The fact that Brent crude surpassed $100 less than a month after the assessment of a 'new normal of high oil prices in the $88-95 per barrel range, characterized by alternating negotiation and tension,' suggests that the amplitude of this pattern is expanding larger and faster than expected [3][11]. In other words, this is not a simple cycle of lulls and flare-ups, but rather is taking on the characteristics of an escalation ladder, where the targets and intensity of attacks increase with each phase.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the U.S. midterm election schedule. Whether a shift in approach actually materializes after the election, as President Trump's remarks suggest, or whether the hardline stance continues will determine the future path of oil prices [1][10].

The second variable is the speed at which the U.S. can replenish its interceptor stockpiles. As long as the depletion of THAAD and Patriot inventories continues, the U.S. will have a greater incentive to rely on maritime and air strikes instead of ground responses, which could increase the frequency of attacks on oil tankers [8].

The third variable is whether Iran follows through on expanding its maritime restricted zone. If the zone is actually extended to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea as announced by the IRGC, transit risks could spread from the Strait of Hormuz to the entire Gulf [10].

The fourth variable is the intensity of Houthi rebel involvement. Since Iran can adjust the level of pressure through Houthi attacks on Saudi energy facilities without direct involvement, the frequency of these attacks can serve as an indirect indicator of Iran's willingness to negotiate [5].