Analysis of Trump's Order to Scale Down ROK-US Combined Exercises and the Possibility of a North Korea-US Summit

Executive Summary

On August 16, the day before the Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise was to begin, President Trump instructed Secretary of Defense Hagerty via Truth Social to scale down the exercises. The stated reasons were his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un, defense cost-sharing, and Iran's non-cooperation. However, the actual exercises proceeded as scheduled without cancellation, revealing a clear gap between the announcement and its implementation. This was not a policy decision but a declarative action from Trump's personal channel, reaffirming his unique decision-making pattern, which operates separately from the working-level lines of the Department of Defense. The likelihood of a North Korea-US summit is limited to about 20%, with the most probable scenario (55%) being a continuation of low-intensity tensions and the institutionalization of scaled-down exercises. The government should recognize the US pressure regarding Iran and defense cost-sharing as a single package, not as individual issues, and adjust its response priorities through a three-pronged approach of channels, negotiations, and communication. Companies, rather than rushing to adjust their portfolios, should focus on setting scenario-specific trigger points.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

Issue Situation Analysis: Trump's Order to Scale Down ROK-US Combined Exercises and the Korean Peninsula Situation

1. Background and Progression

The Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) exercise was scheduled to begin on August 17. However, on August 16, the day before its commencement (local time), President Trump posted on Truth Social, stating that he had instructed Secretary of Defense Hagerty to "drastically reduce" the scale of the exercises [1][4].

Trump cited two reasons. First, his "very good relationship" with Chairman Kim Jong Un, noting that North Korea had shown a "non-threatening and respectful attitude" during his term [1]. Second, he reiterated his dissatisfaction with the cost-sharing, stating that the US had borne a significant portion of the exercise expenses [4][6].

The issue of Iran was also brought into play. Trump claimed that President Lee Jae-myung had refused a request for cooperation on Iran's denuclearization [6]. This is linked to US pressure regarding the normalization of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz following the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the Trump administration and Tehran in June [3].

North Korea's reaction to the exercise was also concerning beforehand. On August 14, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement characterizing the UFS as an exercise requiring a "new level of deterrence." It took issue with the qualitative change in the scenario content, specifically the incorporation of practical combat experience accumulated through troop deployments in Russia, rather than it being a routine exercise [2].

2. Current Situation

The exercise commenced as scheduled on August 17. Despite Trump's order to scale it down, it was neither canceled nor postponed [13]. South Korean government officials expressed hope that the "personal chemistry" between Trump and Kim Jong Un would bring North Korea back to the dialogue table [13].

The People Power Party criticized the move, stating that South Korea had been "thoroughly bypassed" [1]. The method of announcement via social media on the very day the exercise began, without prior consultation, was pointed out as problematic.

The government publicly used the phrase "consideration of military contribution" regarding the Strait of Hormuz for the first time. This is interpreted as a response to the criticism about Iran's non-cooperation [8]. The order to scale down the exercises and the pressure for contributions in the Iran issue were effectively presented to South Korea as a single package.

The tone of reporting by US media outlets is also noteworthy. While outlets like Defense News, AP, WSJ, and Politico treated Trump's announcement as an "unilateral action against an ally," they presented Trump's personal conciliatory stance towards North Korea and his cost complaints as parallel core motives [10][12][16][17]. Middle Eastern media, such as Daily Sabah, characterized the move as "another reprimand to Western allies," placing it on the same level as pressure on other alliances like NATO [13].

3. Key Actors and Positions

President Trumpbundled three objectives into a single announcement: maintaining his personal trust relationship with Kim Jong Un, pressuring for alliance cost-sharing, and leveraging the Iran issue. The method of public announcement via social media, without separate statements or working-level consultations, is a characteristic decision-making pattern from Trump's first term [9].

Department of Defense (Secretary Hagerty)was merely the recipient of the instruction and did not disclose specific details about the scale reduction or implementation plan in advance. As the exercise itself proceeded as scheduled, it remains unclear at what point and to what extent actual reductions will be applied.

South Korean Governmentmaintained a cautious official stance. While emphasizing that the exercise began as planned, it offered the card of "considering military contribution" in the Strait of Hormuz, showing a degree of accommodation to US dissatisfaction [8]. Reactions within the ruling and opposition parties were divided. The opposition People Power Party targeted the government's negotiation capacity with the US, emphasizing the "bypassing" argument [1].

North Koreahad already shown a strong stance of vigilance through a statement released just before the UFS commencement. Given that it took issue with the qualitative change in the exercise scenarios, specifically the reflection of combat experience from troop deployments in Russia, it is uncertain whether Trump's order to scale down will actually lower the tone of North Korea's rhetoric [2]. Kim Jong Un has not yet issued an official response.

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the credibility of extended deterrence. A precedent has been set where Trump can unilaterally adjust the scale of combined exercises based on reasons of cost and personal relationships. This raises questions about the institutional predictability of the ROK-US alliance [9].

The second issue is the absence of consultation procedures. The announcement via social media on the day the exercise began suggests the possibility that the working-level channels of the South Korean side were not informed of the details in advance. This is the substance of the "bypassing" controversy [1].

The third issue is the linkage with the Iran issue. The fact that a security matter on the Korean Peninsula was treated as a bargaining chip in exchange for cooperation on Middle East policy raises concerns that the linkage of security issues may be repeated in the future [6][8].

The fourth issue is North Korea's actual response. Whether the scaling down of exercises will lead North Korea to dialogue or result in low-intensity provocations while maintaining its already escalated rhetoric will be observed in the coming weeks [2].

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

In-depth Issue Analysis: Structural Cracks Revealed by Trump's Order to Scale Down ROK-US Combined Exercises

1. Analysis of Fundamental Causes

The superficial justifications for this measure are threefold: personal relationship with Kim Jong Un, exercise costs, and Iran's non-cooperation. However, the decision-making process that bundled these three justifications reveals a more fundamental problem. Trump did not go through policy review procedures at the State Department or the Department of Defense. He recalibrated a core security asset of the alliance with a single social media post [1][4].

This aligns with the decision-making pattern observed since Trump's first term, framing security issues within a bilateral transactional framework [5]. The logic presented by Steve Myron, a member of the White House Economic Advisory Council, reveals the theoretical basis of this pattern: the perception that the US, as a 'benevolent hegemon,' has borne excessive costs for providing public security goods [7]. ROK-US combined exercises are not exempt from this framework; they are treated as a cost item rather than a means of maintaining deterrence.

The expression "very good relationship" with Kim Jong Un is unrelated to substantive negotiation outcomes [1]. The official goal of a second Trump administration remains "complete denuclearization of North Korea" [11], as reaffirmed at the Munich Security Conference's ROK-US-Japan foreign ministers' meeting [11]. Nevertheless, Trump personally operates his relationship with Kim Jong Un on a separate track. This dual structure is the fundamental cause of the order to scale down the exercises, indicating that the working-level policy lines and the President's personal channel operate independently.

The linkage with the Iran issue represents another layer of causation. The MOU signed by the Trump administration with Tehran in June aimed at normalizing navigation in the Strait of Hormuz [3]. However, with the armistice state remaining unstable, the US is in a phase of pressuring its allies for participation. Bringing up South Korea's non-cooperation as a justification for scaling down exercises should be seen as an attempt to secure tangible leverage in the Iran issue.

2. Structural Context

Political Context: Domestically in South Korea, the People Power Party is attacking the government with a "bypassing" frame [1]. The core of the controversy lies in the method of announcement on the day the exercise began, without prior consultation. This reinforces the perception that the Lee Jae-myung administration's foreign and security policy lines have failed to establish effective communication channels with the Trump administration. The government's hasty mention of "considering military contribution" in the Strait of Hormuz is also interpreted as a defensive response to this political pressure [8].

Economic Context: The issue of defense cost-sharing is the underlying structure of this matter. Trump has exerted similar pressure on NATO member states, a consistent pattern from the threat of withdrawing US troops from Germany in 2019 to the agreement at the June 2025 NATO summit for member states to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP [5]. South Korea and Japan are also facing continuous pressure to increase defense cost-sharing and purchase US-made weapons [5]. The scaling down of exercises is an extension of this pressure, with the unique aspect this time being the combination of cost issues with the justification of appeasing North Korea.

Security Context: Discussions about the redeployment of US Forces Korea were already underway. In May, reports indicated that the US Department of Defense was considering transferring approximately 4,500 of the 28,500 USFK personnel to other regions in the Indo-Pacific [5]. The scaling down of exercises is not separate from this trend and should be viewed as a signal for a broader readjustment of extended deterrence posture. The discussion on the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) is also occurring concurrently [5]. The military hardware of the ROK-US alliance (stationed troops, exercise scale, command structure) is simultaneously subject to re-evaluation.

North Korea's response is also a structural variable. In its August 14 statement, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs characterized the UFS as a qualitatively escalated threat rather than a routine exercise, citing the incorporation of combat experience from troop deployments in Russia and mentioning a "new level of deterrence" [2]. The timing of Trump's order to scale down exercises, three days after this statement, is also noteworthy. The possibility that North Korea's level of protest influenced Trump's decision in some way cannot be ruled out.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

The most direct precedent is the period immediately following the 2018 North Korea-US summit in Singapore. At that time, Trump declared a halt to ROK-US combined exercises, referring to them as "war games" in a press conference. Similar to the current case, the statement was made spontaneously at the summit venue without prior coordination with the Department of Defense. However, in 2018, there was a clear occasion in the form of a summit. The difference now is that the scaling down was decided solely by Trump's unilateral judgment, without any summit discussion.

The pattern of pressure on NATO member states is also a point of comparison. In 2019, with the threat of withdrawing US troops from Germany, and during the process of agreeing to a 5% GDP defense spending increase by 2025, Trump repeatedly used alliance military commitments as bargaining chips [5]. The scaling down of exercises can be seen as an instance where this pattern was applied equally to the ROK-US alliance. In both European and Asian alliances, Trump treats security commitments not as fixed principles but as fluid subjects of negotiation.

In terms of North Korea's escalating rhetoric and provocation patterns, the correlation between the series of missile launches and statements in early August serves as a reference. The phased pattern of "comment-launch-statement" observed from the launches on August 6 and 12, followed by the statement on August 13, is assessed to be continuing in the current UFS situation [2]. If this pattern holds, an escalation in rhetoric may not immediately lead to high-intensity provocations. However, it is too early to determine how the new variable of Trump's order to scale down exercises will affect this pattern.

4. Key Variables Shaping the Issue's Development

The first variable is the actual extent of the scaling down. Trump's announcement only mentioned "drastic reduction" without providing specific plans [1][4]. The exercise itself began as scheduled on August 17 [13]. The extent to which the Department of Defense will practically reduce the scenarios will be the benchmark for assessing the actual damage to the extended deterrence posture.

The second variable is North Korea's response. South Korean government officials have expressed expectations that the "personal chemistry" between Trump and Kim Jong Un will lead North Korea to dialogue [13]. However, it is difficult to predict whether North Korea will interpret this move as a signal for resuming dialogue or, conversely, as a sign of weakened US resolve for extended deterrence, thereby strengthening its hardline stance. How North Korea's "comment-launch-statement" pattern unfolds during the exercise period will be a short-term litmus test.

The third variable is the degree of linkage with the Iran issue. If the "military contribution" in the Strait of Hormuz mentioned by the government leads to concrete actions, it could solidify into a trade-off with the scaling down of ROK-US combined exercises [8]. In this case, the ROK-US alliance would enter a new management structure where regional security issues (deterrence against North Korea) and extra-regional issues (Middle East affairs) are linked as a single package.

The fourth variable is the possibility of a North Korea-US summit. Given that Trump cited his relationship with Kim Jong Un as a justification for scaling down the exercises, the key point to watch is whether this statement will lead to actual summit discussions. If a summit becomes visible, the scaling down of exercises could be reinterpreted as a preliminary measure for the negotiation phase. Conversely, if discussions for a summit do not progress, this measure is likely to remain an unilateral concession with justification but no substantive diplomatic outcome.