The Houthi Rebels' Expanding Attacks on the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Outlook for Middle East Stability

Executive Summary

The Houthi rebels' expanding attacks constitute a structural event arising from the overlap of three layers: the Iran-Oman Hormuz negotiations, the Mecca Defense Pact among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, and the Yemeni civil war. Iran is using the Houthis as a low-cost lever to maintain negotiating leverage without leaving traces of direct involvement, all while holding negotiating cards in Hormuz. The Mecca Defense Pact falls short of a NATO-style automatic intervention clause and functions more as a symbolic signal, making it difficult for it to serve as an immediate deterrent against Houthi attacks. The base-case scenario (50% probability)—in which risk premiums rise and detour routes become entrenched rather than the route being completely blocked—appears most likely, while a pessimistic scenario (30%) in which attacks expand across Saudi Arabia's eastern infrastructure following a breakdown of the Hormuz negotiations cannot be ruled out. The South Korean government and businesses need a phased response that does not rush to normalize shipping routes, while separately monitoring both the dynamics of Iran's internal hardliners and the phase in which the effectiveness of the Mecca Defense Pact is being tested.

I. Situational Analysis of the Issue

The Expansion of Houthi Rebel Attacks on the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait: Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

This round of Houthi attacks did not occur in a vacuum. Following the outbreak of the Israel-Iran war in February 2026, Yemen's Houthis, as an Iranian proxy force, resumed attacks targeting Saudi Arabia[2]. This is an extension of the pattern seen during the Gaza war, when the Houthis threatened the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb shipping lanes by targeting Israel-linked vessels[6]. At that time as well, global shipping companies suspended Red Sea transit and opted for the Cape of Good Hope detour[6].

As the Iran war shook the Gulf security landscape, Saudi Arabia moved to secure its own means of deterrence. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signed a joint defense pact in Mecca on August 7[2]. The core provision treats an armed attack on any one of the three countries as an attack on all three[2]. This pact was concluded "amid a situation in which the threat of a renewed Iran war and attacks by Yemen's Houthi forces had already become reality"[6]. Ali Shihabi, a commentator close to the Saudi royal family, stated that the pact "reflects an awareness that U.S. deterrence has weakened considerably, and that regional powers must increasingly manage the Iranian threat themselves"[2].

The Iranian outlet Tehran Times reported the news of the pact's signing immediately[2]. This suggests that Iran views this pact as an encirclement aimed at itself[2]. The fact that the timing of this expansion of Houthi attacks followed immediately after the conclusion of the Mecca pact suggests that the Iran-Houthi axis may be calibrating its pressure levels in response to Saudi Arabia's new security arrangement.

2. Current Situation

Saudi Aramco's refining facilities, Red Sea cargo vessels, and Yemen's port of Mokha have been successively attacked, resulting in at least a dozen or so deaths. A distinctive feature of this phase is that the targets simultaneously encompass refining infrastructure and maritime logistics. This means that the Houthis have expanded their scope of strikes beyond simple blockades of Israel-linked vessels to include Saudi Arabia's energy export capacity and their own control over ports within Yemen.

In the Strait of Hormuz, reports have continued to emerge in August that the Iran-Oman negotiations over the division of control have approached a "final stage"[1][3]. Iran's Foreign Ministry stated that an agreement would soon be reached "if certain forces do not obstruct this process"[1]. However, the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council demanded, as preconditions for opening the strait, a complete end to the war by the United States, withdrawal of its forces, full lifting of sanctions, and payment of reparations[4]. The fact that the Houthis expanded their attacks on the Red Sea front at the very moment Hormuz entered a negotiation phase supports the possibility that Iran is operating both maritime chokepoints as parallel leverage—holding negotiating cards at Hormuz while maintaining pressure through a proxy force in the Red Sea.

According to IMF PortWatch data, transit volume through the Strait of Hormuz plunged from 90 vessels per day before the war to about 4 vessels per day in early August[4]. Considering that detour shipping had already become customary practice on the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb route since the Gaza war phase[6], this expansion of Houthi attacks is likely to have the effect of further entrenching reliance on the already-established detour routes.

3. Key Actors and Positions

The Houthi Rebels are an armed force within Yemen that depends on Iran's military and financial support, occupying a geopolitical position that allows them to pressure both Saudi Arabia and Israel simultaneously. During the Gaza war, senior Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al-Houthi stated that he would expand military action so long as issues related to Palestine remained unresolved[6]. This expansion of attacks shows that, amid the Iran war, the Houthis have widened their operational scope to include the Saudi mainland and ports within Yemen.

Saudi Arabia took steps to reduce its reliance on the U.S. security umbrella through the conclusion of the Mecca pact, but with its own refining facilities coming under attack immediately after the pact's signing, the effectiveness of the new security arrangement was put to the test right away. For Saudi Arabia, if the pact with Turkey and Pakistan turns out to be merely a symbolic signal, it faces a situation in which the gap in substantive deterrence against the Houthi/Iran threat is laid bare[2].

Iran is pursuing a dual strategy: operating an official negotiating channel through Oman at Hormuz while simultaneously applying asymmetric pressure through the Houthis in the Red Sea. Iranian security officials have declared that they will maintain the blockade of the strait absent a U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East and the lifting of sanctions[1], and this same logic can be applied similarly to the Red Sea situation. In other words, Houthi attacks outside the negotiating table have the effect of strengthening Iran's leverage inside the negotiating table.

The United States's economic motivation to protect the Strait of Hormuz has structurally weakened since the shale revolution. The share of Gulf crude oil in U.S. imports has fallen from 25% in 2014 to about 8% in 2025[2]. The assessment that the United States has weaker incentives than before to undertake active maritime defense operations for the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb route as well has led Gulf states to seek self-help measures[2][7].

4. Key Issues

First is the question of the Mecca pact's effectiveness. With assessments already suggesting that the pact falls short of a NATO-style automatic intervention clause[2], the fact that Houthi attacks now reach Saudi mainland infrastructure is becoming an occasion for an early test of the pact's substantive deterrent effect.

Second is the question of whether the tensions unfolding simultaneously at the two maritime chokepoints of Hormuz and the Red Sea are independent matters or part of an integrated Iranian pressure strategy. The timing coincidence—Red Sea attacks intensifying just as the Hormuz negotiations progress—is difficult to view as mere coincidence.

Third is the extent of erosion of the principle of freedom of navigation. With Iran having floated the idea of imposing transit fees at Hormuz[3][4], combined with the Houthi attacks on the Red Sea, the entire broad maritime corridor from the Gulf to the Gulf of Aden is now exposed to cost and safety risks. As pointed out by UAE media, the concern that a transit-fee precedent could spread to other maritime chokepoints[4] has the potential to be similarly replicated in the Red Sea as well.

II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue

The Expansion of Houthi Rebel Attacks on the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait: In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The expansion of Houthi attacks cannot be adequately explained solely within the framework of Iran's proxy-war strategy. Although the Houthis are a force backed by Iran, their own independent interests within Yemen are also at work simultaneously. The attack on the port of Mokha is suggestive in this regard. Mokha is a port controlled by a rival faction within Yemen. The fact that the Houthis struck this port shows that, separate from Iran's regional strategy, there is an overlapping motive to shift the balance of power in the Yemeni civil war in their own favor.

At the same time, from Iran's perspective, the Houthis are a low-cost lever. While conducting negotiations with Oman over the Strait of Hormuz, Iran maintains the conditional position that an agreement will be reached "if certain forces do not obstruct this process"[1]. This conditional phrasing can be read as leaving room in case the negotiations go awry. By maintaining tension in the Red Sea through the Houthis while sitting at the negotiating table over Hormuz, Iran can preserve its negotiating leverage without leaving a trace of direct involvement.

The possibility that Saudi Arabia's conclusion of the Mecca pact directly triggered the expansion of attacks cannot be ruled out either. The mutual defense clause among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan was perceived by Iran as a new encirclement[2]. The fact that Tehran Times reported the news of the pact's signing immediately supports the notion that Iran perceived this pact as a threat internally[2]. That the timing of Houthi attacks followed immediately after the pact's conclusion can be interpreted as an attempt to impose costs during the early stage of Saudi Arabia's construction of its new security arrangement, thereby testing the pact's effectiveness.

2. Structural Context

Security Structure. The U.S. security umbrella in the Gulf region is in a phase of structural weakening. The share of Gulf crude oil in U.S. imports has fallen from 25% in 2014 to about 8% in 2025[2]. This means Washington's economic motivation to protect the Strait of Hormuz has shallowed. Gulf states, recognizing this structural change, have moved to seek independent deterrence, but the Mecca pact is closer to a symbolic signal that falls short of a NATO-style automatic intervention clause[2]. The Houthis are exploiting precisely this gap. At the very moment Saudi Arabia declared that it had secured a new security partnership, the attacks amount to an attempt to demonstrate, on the ground, that this partnership does not translate into immediate deterrence.

Economic Structure. The Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb route is already one where detour shipping has become customary practice since the Gaza war phase[6]. Global shipping companies have maintained the shift to the Cape of Good Hope detour as a standing option[6]. This means that rather than creating a new supply chain shock, Houthi attacks are operating in a manner that once again drives up the already-established risk premiums and detour costs. Compared with the plunge in Hormuz transit volume from 90 vessels per day before the war to about 4 vessels per day in early August[4], the Red Sea route is closer to a case of a sustained risk premium being imposed rather than complete blockage. The problem is that if both straits become unstable simultaneously, the logistics costs of the detour routes themselves also rise in tandem.

Political Structure. Within Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman requires Aramco's stable export capacity as a core pillar of the Vision 2030 economic diversification strategy. Attacks on Aramco's refining facilities strike precisely at this vulnerability in the economic strategy. With the memory of the production disruption Saudi Arabia experienced after the 2019 attack on the Abqaiq and Khurais facilities still fresh, this attack has the effect of reminding Riyadh of military and economic threats simultaneously.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparison of Similar Cases

The closest precedent is the 2019 attack on Aramco facilities. At that time as well, the Houthis claimed the attack, but the United States and Saudi Arabia raised the possibility of direct Iranian involvement. In this round, ambiguity over responsibility is likely to be similarly repeated. The pattern of the Houthis stepping to the fore while Iran keeps its distance behind the scenes is a typical method by which Iran maintains regional means of pressure while avoiding responsibility for direct confrontation.

This is also structurally similar to the attempted Red Sea blockade during the 2023-2024 Gaza war phase. At that time, the Houthis threatened the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb route by targeting Israel-linked vessels, and the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes against Houthi military facilities in Yemen in January 2024[6]. However, the military strikes did not fundamentally eliminate the Houthis' attack capability. This expansion of attacks can be viewed as that incomplete deterrence failure recurring under the new conditions of the Iran war.

The historical trajectory in which unified Yemen, formed in 1990, subsequently split into civil war is also worth referencing[5]. Even though Yemen achieved unification through agreement, a unified state authority failed to take root, and this created the structural conditions under which numerous armed factions, including the Houthis, could maintain independent military forces within national territory. The very fact that the Houthis can strike a port controlled by a rival faction, such as Mokha, reflects the reality that Yemen still fails to function as a single sovereign entity.

4. Key Variables in the Development of the Issue

The first variable is the success or failure of the Hormuz negotiations. If the Iran-Oman negotiations over the division of control reach a final agreement, Iran's incentive to maintain tension on the Red Sea front may diminish. Conversely, if the negotiations founder at the stage of final U.S. approval[1][3], pressure via the Houthis on the Red Sea is likely to be strengthened as an alternative lever.

The second variable is whether the Mecca pact is actually implemented in substance. The observation point is whether the mutual defense clause among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan actually leads to military response. Considering Turkey's dual-alliance structure with NATO and Pakistan's constraints regarding India and the IMF[2], if the pact remains at a symbolic level, the Houthis may judge that the cost of additional provocation is low.

The third variable is change in the internal balance of power within Yemen. If the attack on Mokha is linked to the Houthis' domestic political objectives, future attack patterns may oscillate between threatening international shipping lanes and internal power struggles, depending on how the Yemeni civil war unfolds. In this case, the international community's response would extend beyond a simple matter of maritime safety and touch upon the sensitive domain of intervention in Yemen's domestic affairs.