Kim Jong Un Leads Victory Day Celebrations on the 73rd Anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, with Kim Ju Ae Officially Attending: Complex Implications of Solidifying the Nuclear Armed Forces Line and Visualizing the Succession Structure

Executive Summary

Through the Victory Day celebrations marking the 73rd anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, North Korea simultaneously achieved three political objectives: reaffirming the legitimacy of its nuclear armed forces policy, strengthening Sino-North Korean ties, and making the succession structure visible through the official appearance of Kim Ju Ae. The Rodong Sinmun focused its reporting on Kim Jong Un's visits to the Cemetery of Fallen Soldiers of the Fatherland Liberation War and the Cemetery of Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers, as well as his reunion with war veterans, thereby proclaiming the reproduction of regime legitimacy and a military-first policy to both domestic and international audiences. The use of titles for Kim Ju Ae equivalent to those for past supreme leaders is considered a significant signal indicating that North Korea's power succession structure is entering a new phase. The most realistic scenario (60% probability) involves the continuation of the nuclear armed forces policy and the entrenchment of structural tensions, requiring South Korean companies to strengthen supply chain risk management and develop business strategies based on the premise of a prolonged risk premium for the Korean Peninsula. The likelihood of the optimistic scenario of diplomatic reopening is only 15%, necessitating a cautious approach to investment decisions based on short-term expectations of tension reduction.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

Kim Jong Un Leads Celebrations for the 73rd Anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, with Kim Ju Ae Officially Attending

Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Progression of the Issue

North Korea defines the Armistice Agreement signed on July 27, 1953, as a "victory in the Fatherland Liberation War" and has commemorated this day annually as "Victory Day." In North Korea's official historical narrative, the Korean War is positioned as a war won against the aggression of American imperialism, and this narrative functions as the core ideological foundation for justifying the Kim dynasty's legitimacy and its military-first policy. This year, marking the 73rd anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, was actively utilized as an opportunity to showcase the achievements of the nuclear armed forces strengthening policy domestically and internationally.

The immediate background for this event includes the ongoing trend of North Korea promoting its rise as a "global military power" after enshrining its nuclear armed forces policy in the country's highest law. The Rodong Sinmun has repeatedly emphasized the logic that this policy has led North Korea to become a powerful nation, using Victory Day as a symbolic stage to reaffirm its legitimacy. Furthermore, given North Korea's redefinition of inter-Korean relations as "relations between two belligerent states" and its declaration of readiness for war using all physical means, including nuclear forces [3], the Victory Day event serves not merely as a commemorative ceremony but as a political ritual to proclaim military resolve domestically and internationally.

2. Current Situation

This year's Victory Day events were concentrated in Pyongyang and South Pyongan Province from July 26 to 27. The Rodong Sinmun reported, "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un visited the Cemetery of Fallen Soldiers of the Fatherland Liberation War on July 26, on the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of the victory," and "Comrade Kim Jong Un warmly met with war veterans and sincerely wished them good health and longevity" [12]. On the same day, Kim Jong Un also paid respects at the Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs on Mount Taesong, accompanied by a large contingent of high-ranking Party, state, and military officials, including members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea [17].

Symbolic gestures of Sino-North Korean friendship were also prominent. The Rodong Sinmun stated, "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un visited the Cemetery of Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Hoechang County, South Pyongan Province on July 26, on the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War, and paid sublime respects to the martyrs" [8]. Attending this event were Party Central Committee secretaries such as Jo Yong Won, Kim Song Nam, and Ju Chang Il, along with Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, Minister of National Defense No Kwang Chol, and National Defense Ministry Advisor Pak Jong Chon. The ceremony was held with an honor guard of the Korean People's Army present [8]. This visit to the cemetery, which includes the grave of Mao Zedong's son Mao Anying, is interpreted as a diplomatic gesture symbolically reaffirming the Sino-North Korean blood alliance [1].

On July 27, a grand commemorative performance was held at the Pyongyang Indoor Stadium. The Rodong Sinmun reported, "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un, along with war veterans and meritorious individuals invited to the Victory Day celebration, watched the performance" [15]. During the performance, recent footage of the Pyongyang summit between Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping, as well as images of Chinese troops' participation in the Korean War, were shown, further highlighting Sino-North Korean solidarity [6]. Following this, a small-scale military parade was also held outside the venue [6]. War veterans and meritorious individuals from across the country who traveled to Pyongyang had a commemorative photo session with Kim Jong Un on July 28 [14]. The Rodong Sinmun published an article titled "Our Party Regards War Veterans as Models of the Great Korean People," promoting the Party's special regard for veterans [18].

3. Key Actors and Their Positions/Interests

Kim Jong Undirectly led the entire event, reaffirming his authority as the supreme leader. He appeared at all key moments of the event, from visits to the Cemetery of Fallen Soldiers and the Cemetery of Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers to watching the commemorative performance and taking commemorative photos with veterans. This is interpreted not as a mere ceremonial attendance but as a political staging to solidify his image domestically as the inheritor of the victory narrative and the completer of the military power buildup. In particular, the propaganda that the enshrining of the nuclear armed forces policy in the country's highest law has led to the rise as a "global military power" is a method of embedding the legitimacy of the nuclear-economic parallel development policy pursued since Kim Jong Un took power within the historical framework of Victory Day.

Kim Ju AeHer official attendance at this event marks a particularly noteworthy change. Previously, Kim Ju Ae had primarily appeared at military-related events [5]; this was her first confirmed official attendance at the Victory Day celebrations [4][10]. The Rodong Sinmun previously used the honorific "respected daughter" for Kim Ju Ae, a term confirmed by Rodong Sinmun searches to have been used only for Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un [5]. This use of titles and the expansion of her public appearances suggest a connection to the succession structure. However, it is also analyzed as part of Kim Jong Un's ruling strategy to strengthen his image as "the great father of the people" and consolidate absolute rule through the Confucian concept of filial piety [2]. Therefore, there are differing opinions among experts as to whether Kim Ju Ae's appearance signifies the finalization of succession arrangements; some argue that it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, considering North Korea's male-dominated Confucian culture and power structure [13].

Key Cadres of the Workers' Party of Koreashowed signs of being mobilized en masse for this event. Party secretaries such as Jo Yong Won, Kim Song Nam, and Ju Chang Il, along with leaders of the diplomatic and security apparatus including Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, Minister of National Defense No Kwang Chol, and Advisor Pak Jong Chon, accompanied the visit to the cemetery [8]. The entire leadership of the Party, state, and military, including members of the Presidium of the Political Bureau, attended the visit to the Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs on Mount Taesong [17]. This demonstrates that the Victory Day event is not merely a commemorative ceremony but a political ritual for the collective expression of loyalty and confirmation of unity among the Party leadership.

Chinaemerged as a key diplomatic partner in this event. Kim Jong Un's visit to the Cemetery of Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the screening of footage from his recent Pyongyang summit with Xi Jinping during the commemorative performance convey a message of reaffirming the Sino-North Korean blood alliance both domestically and internationally [6][8]. This aligns with North Korea's diplomatic intention to showcase Sino-North Korean solidarity amidst the US-led pressure campaign and to position China as a strategic patron.

War Veterans and Meritorious Individualswere actively utilized as living symbols of regime legitimacy during this event. The Rodong Sinmun declared, "Our Party Regards War Veterans as Models of the Great Korean People," [18] and promoted the Party's special regard for them. The commemorative photo session with veterans who traveled from across the country can be seen as an attempt to build Kim Jong Un's "people-friendly" image while simultaneously linking the authority of the veteran generation to the legitimacy of the current regime.

4. Summary of Key Issues

The key issues arising from this Victory Day event can be summarized into three main points.

First, whether Kim Ju Ae's official attendance at the event signifies the finalization of the succession structure.The unprecedented honorific "respected daughter" used by the Rodong Sinmun [5] and her continuous public appearances, primarily at military events [5], suggest the possibility of finalized succession arrangements. However, it is necessary to consider the complex context, including North Korea's male-dominated Confucian culture and power structure, as well as Kim Jong Un's strategy to enhance his ruling image [2][13]. The fact that this was her first official attendance at an event with strong military symbolism like Victory Day further amplifies its significance.

Second, the deepening strategic closeness of Sino-North Korean relations.The visit to the Cemetery of Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers and the screening of footage from the Xi Jinping summit during the commemorative performance are deliberate diplomatic signals highlighting the Sino-North Korean blood alliance [6][8]. This is interpreted as an intention to solidify China as a strategic patron amidst the US-led pressure campaign against North Korea and to strengthen the confrontational structure of Sino-North Korean solidarity against the South Korea-US alliance.

Third, the institutionalization of the nuclear armed forces strengthening policy and its integration with domestic propaganda.North Korea's strategy of enshrining its nuclear armed forces policy in its highest law and promoting it as the basis for its rise as a "global military power" is a strategy to internally solidify the legitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons through the historical framework of Victory Day. The Rodong Sinmun's emphasis on the mission of the succeeding generation in an article titled "We Will Carry Forward the Victorious Tradition of Juche Korea" [19] should be understood in this context. This may act as a structural factor that further narrows the possibility of denuclearization negotiations in the future.

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

Kim Jong Un Leads Celebrations for the 73rd Anniversary of the Armistice Agreement, with Kim Ju Ae Officially Attending

In-depth Issue Analysis: Analysis of Root Causes, Structural Context, and Historical Precedents

1. Analysis of Root Causes of the Issue

The root cause of this Victory Day event lies in the convergence of three political demands that the North Korean regime structurally requires: the reproduction of legitimacy, the justification of the nuclear armed forces policy, and the visualization of the succession structure. These three demands are not independent but are organically integrated within the ruling logic of the Kim Jong Un regime, with the symbolic stage of Victory Day serving as the arena for their convergence.

First, in terms of reproducing legitimacy, North Korea defines the Korean War as a "war won against the aggression of American imperialism" and has used this historical narrative as the ideological foundation of the Kim dynasty's regime. The Rodong Sinmun described July 27 as "a symbol of the heroism and invincibility of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" [12], positioning the significance of this day not merely as a historical anniversary but as the core of national identity. Specifically, the Rodong Sinmun refers to the war veterans as "living proof of regime legitimacy" through expressions such as "sublime respect from the people for the first defenders of our nation, the creators of the noble tradition of victory" [18]. Thus, Victory Day functions as a mechanism for renewing the regime's historical legitimacy through annually repeated rituals.

Second, in terms of justifying the nuclear armed forces policy, this event is directly linked to North Korea's promotion of its rise as a "global military power" after enshrining its nuclear armed forces policy in the country's highest law. Given North Korea's redefinition of inter-Korean relations as "relations between two belligerent states" and its declaration of readiness for war using all physical means, including nuclear forces [3], Victory Day serves as a political ritual to reaffirm its military resolve domestically and internationally. The Rodong Sinmun's repeated emphasis on "achieving the historic cause of a prosperous and strong nation" [15] in its Victory Day reports reflects the intention to internalize the logic that the strengthening of nuclear forces is a historical extension of the "victory" in the Korean War.

Third, in terms of visualizing the succession structure, Kim Ju Ae's first official attendance at this event carries political implications beyond mere family participation. The Rodong Sinmun had already used the expression "respected daughter" for Kim Ju Ae in its report on November 27, 2022, a term that, according to the Rodong Sinmun database, has only been used for Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Suk, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un [5]. Applying a title previously reserved only for supreme leaders to Kim Ju Ae suggests that her political status extends beyond that of a "leader's daughter."

2. Structural Context

Political Structure:North Korea's Victory Day events are a central pillar of political rituals that visibly manifest Kim Jong Un's system of sole leadership. During this event, Kim Jong Un visited the Cemetery of Fallen Soldiers of the Fatherland Liberation War, the Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs on Mount Taesong, and the Cemetery of Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers, accompanied by a large number of high-ranking Party, state, and military officials [8][12][17]. This is not merely a memorial event but a ritualistic act that publicly reaffirms the hierarchy of power centered around the supreme leader. In particular, the Rodong Sinmun's declaration, "Our Party Regards War Veterans as Models of the Great Korean People" [18], illustrates a structure that reproduces the vertical relationship of the Party dedicating itself to the people and the people dedicating their loyalty to the Party within the historical context of Victory Day.

Kim Ju Ae's official attendance is emerging as a new variable within this political structure. According to analysis by the East Asia Institute (EAI), Kim Jong Un intends to solidify his position as "the great father of the people" by featuring his young daughter, and to utilize Kim Ju Ae as a model of filial piety in North Korean society, which is imbued with Confucian culture [2]. This is part of a ruling strategy to strengthen absolute rule through the logic of Confucian values, which are more powerful than ideological constraints: "A father loves his children unconditionally, and children do not blame their parents for shortcomings or betray them when things are difficult" [2].

Economic and Social Structure:Behind North Korea's large-scale commemoration of Victory Day lies the need for internal cohesion. The Rodong Sinmun emphasized, "The heroic spirit of the victory generation serves as precious ideological and spiritual nourishment and a cornerstone of victory, continuously driving our people and the Korean People's Army towards the historic cause of building a prosperous and strong nation" [15], constructing a narrative that transforms the memory of war into a spiritual driving force for overcoming current economic difficulties. This is structurally similar to the historical pattern where North Korea promoted the "theory of the great socialist family" to foster unity when its legitimacy was threatened by the collapse of the communist bloc in the 1990s [2]. In times of increasing economic pressure, regimes tend to strengthen internal cohesion by combining historical heroic narratives with familial ideology.

Security Structure:The reaffirmation of the Sino-North Korean military alliance is the core security message of this event. The Rodong Sinmun reported, "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un visited the Cemetery of Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Hoechang County, South Pyongan Province on July 26, on the occasion of the 73rd anniversary of the victory in the Fatherland Liberation War, and paid sublime respects to the martyrs" [8]. The presence of the Foreign Minister and the Minister of National Defense at this event simultaneously conveyed diplomatic and security messages. The screening of recent footage from the Pyongyang summit between Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping and images of Chinese troops' participation in the Korean War during the commemorative performance at the Pyongyang Indoor Stadium [6] serves as a security signal to both domestic and international audiences that Sino-North Korean solidarity is ongoing. This is also a structural choice to manage security dilemmas by solidifying strategic cooperation with China amidst the US-led pressure campaign against North Korea.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

North Korea's Victory Day events have been held annually, but there is a pattern where the intensity of political messaging and the scale of the event significantly differ on specific anniversaries. For the 70th-anniversary event in July 2023, North Korea invited high-ranking officials from China and Russia, held a large-scale military parade, and displayed the Hwasong-18 ICBM, orchestrating the largest event to date [7]. This demonstrates a precedent where North Korea actively utilizes major anniversary events as a stage for external displays of military power and strengthening diplomatic solidarity. The fact that this year's 73rd-anniversary event featured a relatively smaller military parade compared to the 70th anniversary [6] suggests that North Korea has shifted the political focus of the event from showcasing military power to emphasizing the visualization of the succession structure and Sino-North Korean friendship.

In terms of Kim Ju-ae accompanying Kim Jong Un on official state events, Kim Jong Un's own succession designation process provides an important historical precedent. Kim Jong Un is known to have been designated as Kim Jong Il's successor from the age of 8 [5]. The North Korean practice, where public exposure and the bestowal of titles have served as signals for succession designation, can be equally applied in Kim Ju-ae's case. The Rodong Sinmun's use of the expression "the child whom Kim Jong Un cherishes the most" [5] in its November 27, 2022 issue aligns with the linguistic patterns used in past succession designation processes. However, Park Won-gon, Director of EAI's Center for East Asian Studies, points out that "it is difficult for a female leader to seize power in North Korea, which maintains a conservative, male-dominated Confucian culture" [13], analyzing that Kim Ju-ae is likely to remain a propaganda tool to strengthen the ruling system at the current stage.

In terms of reaffirming the North Korea-China blood alliance, the pattern of historical memory shared through participation in the Korean War functioning as a structural foundation for bilateral relations continues. The act of the supreme leader of North Korea directly paying homage at the Cemetery of Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers, where Mao Zedong's son Mao Anying is buried [1][8], is a typical example of symbolic politics where both leaderships share the historical legitimacy of the blood alliance. This pattern has been repeatedly utilized as a diplomatic mechanism to restore relations by invoking memories of historical solidarity whenever North Korea-China relations become strained.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

The key variables that will determine the future development of the issue can be broadly summarized into four categories.

The first variable is Kim Ju-ae's frequency of attending official events and changes in her titles. How the appellations bestowed upon Kim Ju-ae by the Rodong Sinmun and her status at official events change will be a key indicator for determining whether a succession framework is being finalized. In particular, if the pattern of accompaniment, which has been concentrated in the military sector, expands to the party and government sectors, it could be interpreted as a signal of substantive succession designation beyond a mere propaganda tool [5][13].

The second variable is the level of strategic closeness in North Korea-China relations. The combination of paying homage at the Cemetery of Martyrs of the Chinese People's Volunteers and screening a video of the North Korea-China summit during the commemorative performance at this event is a strategic choice to solidify solidarity with China amidst the U.S.-led pressure on North Korea [6][8]. The frequency and content of future high-level exchanges between North Korea and China will serve as substantive indicators for this variable.

The third variable is the intensity of domestic and international propaganda for the nuclear armed forces policy. The pattern of the Rodong Sinmun repeatedly promoting the achievements of the nuclear armed forces strengthening policy as a basis for the rise of a "global military power" on the occasion of the Victory Day anniversary reflects North Korea's dual strategy of pursuing domestic cohesion and external deterrence simultaneously. The intensity of this propaganda may be adjusted in the future depending on changes in relations with the United States and South Korea [3].

The fourth variable is the sustainability of the symbolic utilization of the war veteran generation. While the Rodong Sinmun declares, "Our Party upholds the war veterans as exemplars of the great Korean people" [18], and invokes them as living proof of regime legitimacy, this symbolic resource will gradually become scarce as the biological attrition of the war generation accelerates. How North Korea reconstructs the "succession generation" [15] as bearers of legitimacy will emerge as a key task for the reproduction of regime ideology.