Linking the US-Saudi Civil Nuclear Agreement with the Normalization of Relations with Israel: Realignment of the Middle East Nuclear Order and South Korea's Strategic Response

Executive Summary

The civil nuclear agreement signed between the United States and Saudi Arabia is a complex geopolitical issue that, beyond superficial energy cooperation, shakes the foundations of the regional security order in the Middle East and the normative basis of the global non-proliferation regime. The Trump administration's addition of the normalization of relations with Israel as a condition for the agreement's entry into force has reduced nuclear cooperation to a bargaining chip in regional diplomacy. Coupled with the effective suspension of the 'gold standard' of abandoning uranium enrichment, this has amplified concerns about a nuclear domino effect. The most likely scenario currently involves negotiations remaining in a structural deadlock due to the Palestinian issue and Iranian variables. As this stalemate prolongs, the normative vacuum in the non-proliferation regime is expected to deepen. South Korea, with its triple interests as a nuclear exporter, a beneficiary of the non-proliferation regime, and an ally dependent on the US nuclear umbrella, must pursue a dual-track approach: upholding non-proliferation principles through multilateral platforms and strategically positioning itself in the Saudi nuclear power market. Specifically, a strategy is required to proactively present a reliable nuclear cooperation model that adheres to non-proliferation principles, thereby accumulating both mid-to-long-term export competitiveness and diplomatic trust.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

US-Saudi Civil Nuclear Agreement and Controversy over Conditions for Normalization of Relations with Israel

Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Progress of the Issue

Historical Context of Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Ambitions and the 'Golden Bolt' Clause

Saudi Arabia's pursuit of civilian nuclear energy development goes beyond a simple energy diversification strategy; it aligns with the Kingdom's long-term national vision to reshape the strategic balance within the Middle East. Saudi Arabia has officially stated its goal to construct 16 nuclear reactors by 2030, a plan being pursued within the framework of 'Vision 2030,' which aims to transition away from an oil-dependent economy. However, the core reason Saudi Arabia's nuclear program touches a sensitive nerve in the international community lies in the remarks publicly made by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in 2018. In a CBS interview, he stated, 'If Iran develops a nuclear bomb, Saudi Arabia will develop one as soon as possible.' This statement has become the backdrop against which discussions on Saudi Arabia's civilian nuclear cooperation are always considered alongside concerns about potential weaponization.

The key sticking point in the nuclear cooperation negotiations between the United States and Saudi Arabia was the so-called 'Golden Bolt' provision, specifically whether to include in the 123 Agreement (a nuclear cooperation agreement based on Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act) clauses prohibiting uranium enrichment and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained its position not to relinquish the right to enrich uranium using its domestic reserves. MBS has stated, 'We have uranium, and we will develop it into a full nuclear fuel cycle,' creating a direct conflict with U.S. non-proliferation principles. From the Obama administration to the Biden administration, the U.S. has made the 'Gold Standard'—demanding Saudi Arabia forgo enrichment and reprocessing—a prerequisite for negotiations. However, the Trump administration's first term showed attempts to relax this standard, raising concerns within the non-proliferation community.

Linking the Abraham Accords with Saudi-Israel Normalization Negotiations

The Abraham Accords, brokered by the Trump administration's first term in 2020, led to the normalization of relations between Arab nations such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, and Israel. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia's accession to the Abraham Accords became the paramount objective in U.S. Middle East diplomacy, as Saudi Arabia's official recognition of Israel could represent a structural turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Biden administration inherited these negotiations and pursued a comprehensive package deal for Saudi-Israeli normalization in 2023. However, the negotiations were completely halted following Hamas's surprise attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent outbreak of the Gaza War.

Following the inauguration of the Trump administration's second term, these negotiations resumed. The U.S. restructured the talks by offering a package deal that included security guarantees for Saudi Arabia, sales of advanced weaponry, and civilian nuclear cooperation. In this process, the nuclear agreement evolved from a mere energy cooperation document into a geopolitical leverage tool for reshaping the Middle East region.

2. Current Situation

Agreement Signing and Trump's Addition of Conditions

On July 22, 2025, the United States and Saudi Arabia officially signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with a 30-year term. This agreement laid the legal groundwork for U.S. companies to participate in the construction and operation of Saudi nuclear power plants, and was superficially hailed as a milestone in bilateral energy cooperation. However, just one day after the signing, President Trump declared that the nuclear agreement would not enter into force unless Saudi Arabia joined the Abraham Accords and normalized relations with Israel, fundamentally shaking the negotiation framework.

This statement immediately raised questions about the legal validity and diplomatic credibility of the agreement. Interpretations diverged on whether the signed document contained a conditional clause for its entry into force or if Trump had retroactively imposed political conditions. The Saudi side officially did not accept this condition, and diplomatic sources in Riyadh suggested it was a U.S. tactic to increase negotiation leverage.

Saudi Arabia's Adherence to Palestinian Conditions

Saudi Arabia has consistently demanded a 'clear and irreversible pathway' toward the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as a prerequisite for recognizing Israel. This is not merely diplomatic rhetoric but is intrinsically linked to Saudi domestic politics and the Kingdom's religious and symbolic standing in the Islamic world. As the custodian of Islam's holy sites, Mecca and Medina, Saudi Arabia's identity is tied to this role. Any decision to disregard Arab public opinion on the Palestinian issue could severely damage the legitimacy of the monarchy's domestic rule. With the Gaza War dragging on and civilian casualties mounting, it is evident that Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel would provoke fierce backlash from Arab public opinion.

The current Netanyahu government relies on far-right coalition partners who oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state, leaving virtually no political room to accommodate Saudi Arabia's demand for a pathway to statehood. This structural deadlock serves as the core obstacle to the negotiations.

Iran's Opposition and Regional Repercussions

Iran strongly objected to the US-Saudi nuclear agreement, deeming it a serious undermining of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. The Iranian Foreign Ministry warned that the agreement would set a dangerous precedent that could promote nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. From Iran's perspective, the agreement is interpreted not merely as civilian nuclear cooperation, but as part of an effort by the United States to strategically strengthen Saudi Arabia as a partner, thereby isolating Iran regionally. Particularly, in a situation where Iran itself faces international sanctions and pressure over its nuclear program, the provision of nuclear cooperation to Saudi Arabia is perceived as a prime example of double standards.

3. Key Actors and Positions/Interests

United States: The Complex Calculus of the Trump Administration

The Trump administration's pursuit of this agreement is a result of overlapping interests at multiple levels. First, the commercial interests of the US nuclear industry serve as a significant driver. In a context where Russia's state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom and China's state-owned nuclear corporation CNNC are aggressively expanding their presence in the Middle Eastern and global nuclear power markets, there is a concern that a strategic vacuum would emerge if US companies are unable to enter the Saudi nuclear market. This concern is the practical background for the agreement's pursuit. Second, Trump views the Abraham Accords as his diplomatic legacy and possesses a strong political motivation to make Saudi Arabia's accession to the accords a key diplomatic achievement of a second term. Third, within the US non-proliferation policy community, concerns exist regarding the negative impact on the global non-proliferation system of concluding an agreement without provisions for renouncing enrichment and reprocessing, which creates internal tensions within the administration.

Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy

The foreign policy strategy of Saudi Arabia, led by MBS, is unfolding in a direction that maximizes strategic autonomy among major powers such as the United States, China, and Russia. Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 2023 with Chinese mediation and maintains cooperation with Russia through OPEC+. This multi-pronged diplomatic approach not only enhances its negotiating power with the United States but also reflects a strategic intention not to be subservient to any single major power. Saudi Arabia's refusal to relinquish enrichment rights in nuclear cooperation negotiations should be interpreted not merely as a technical demand, but as part of a hedging strategy against Iran's nuclear capabilities. Saudi Arabia adheres to the logic that it would be a strategic imbalance for itself to abandon nuclear sovereignty while Iran possesses nuclear capabilities.

Israel: Netanyahu's Dual Position

Israel's position contains internal contradictions. While Netanyahu welcomed Saudi Arabia's accession to the Abraham Accords as a 'historic leap,' he simultaneously adopts a dual stance, expressing grave security concerns regarding the enhancement of Saudi Arabia's nuclear capabilities. Israeli security experts warn that if Saudi Arabia concludes a nuclear agreement while retaining enrichment rights, it could set a precedent that threatens Israel's nuclear monopoly (although Israel does not officially admit to possessing nuclear weapons, it is considered a de facto nuclear state). Concurrently, Netanyahu faces domestic political constraints due to the opposition of his far-right coalition partners, making it difficult to accept a pathway to Palestinian statehood, which has become a practical obstacle to Saudi-Israeli normalization.

Iran: The Context of Regional Hegemonic Competition

Iran perceives this agreement as an attempt to deepen its strategic isolation and is launching a diplomatic offensive to highlight the double standards of the non-proliferation regime to the international community. Iran's backlash goes beyond mere rhetorical protest and reflects a genuine concern that it could affect its own nuclear negotiation leverage. From Iran's standpoint, the enhancement of Saudi Arabia's nuclear capabilities constitutes a new dimension of threat in the Sunni-Shia regional power struggle.

4. Summary of Key Issues

Issue 1: Abandonment of Enrichment/Reprocessing Rights — A Test for the Non-Proliferation Regime

The most fundamental issue of this agreement lies in whether Saudi Arabia will accept provisions renouncing its rights to uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. The most stringent non-proliferation standard in nuclear cooperation agreements signed by the United States is exemplified by the agreement concluded with the UAE in 2009, where the UAE accepted the so-called 'gold standard' of foregoing enrichment and reprocessing. Conversely, if the agreement enters into force with Saudi Arabia refusing this standard, it could set a precedent for lowering standards in future nuclear cooperation negotiations with other countries. Notably, this precedent could be leveraged by partners like South Korea and Japan when they seek to renegotiate their rights to enrichment and reprocessing.

Issue 2: Conditional Entry into Force of the Nuclear Agreement — A Question of Diplomatic Credibility

Trump's post-hoc addition of political conditions to the signed agreement raises questions about the legal stability of the agreement and the diplomatic credibility of the United States. International nuclear cooperation agreements typically undergo ratification procedures by the legislatures of both countries, and it is unusual for the executive branch to unilaterally alter the conditions for their entry into force. This sends a signal of uncertainty to other countries that have concluded or are negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States.

Issue 3: Linking with the Abraham Accords — The Structural Deadlock of the Palestinian Issue

The linkage of Saudi approval of Israel to the conditions for the nuclear agreement's entry into force directly clashes with the structural deadlock of the Palestinian issue. The current Israeli governing coalition is highly unlikely to accept the pathway to Palestinian statehood demanded by Saudi Arabia, implying that a swift resolution of the negotiations is improbable. Simultaneously, this linkage amplifies the complexity of the negotiations by intertwining the technical and commercial aspects of nuclear cooperation with highly political issues.

Issue 4: Concerns about a Middle East Nuclear Domino Effect

If Saudi Arabia's nuclear capability enhancement materializes, the concern of a 'nuclear domino effect' arises, as it would increase the incentive for regional countries such as Egypt, Turkey, and the UAE to pursue similar nuclear capabilities. The Middle East already presents a complex nuclear environment with the de facto nuclear possession by Israel and Iran's nuclear program coexisting. The addition of Saudi Arabia's nuclear capabilities could exacerbate the regional nuclear security dilemma. This extends beyond the Middle East, impacting the global non-proliferation issue and affecting the credibility of the NPT regime as a whole.

This report has been compiled by integrating publicly available diplomatic documents, local media reports, and expert analyses. The situation may change as negotiations progress.

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

US-Saudi Civil Nuclear Agreement and Controversy over Conditions for Normalization of Relations with Israel

In-depth Issue Analysis: Root Causes, Structural Context, and Historical Precedents

1. Analysis of Root Causes

Saudi Arabia's Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy and the Clash of Nuclear Sovereignty Consciousness

The fundamental tension underlying the controversy surrounding the US-Saudi civilian nuclear agreement lies between Saudi Arabia's pursuit of 'strategic autonomy' and the non-proliferation principles long upheld by the United States. Saudi Arabia's intention is not merely to acquire nuclear technology for power generation but consistently to secure its sovereign rights across the entire nuclear fuel cycle. MBS's assertion of intent to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle, citing Saudi Arabia's domestic uranium reserves, demonstrates that Saudi Arabia perceives nuclear technology not just as an energy source but as a strategic asset supporting its status as a regional power.

This perception is underpinned by an existential threat assessment of Iran's nuclear program. Saudi Arabia believes that if it alone abandons nuclear sovereignty while Iran possesses or is close to possessing nuclear capabilities, it would lead to a severe imbalance in the regional balance of power. This implies that MBS's 2018 remarks were not mere rhetoric but reflected the core logic of Saudi security strategy. Therefore, while the current controversy appears on the surface to be a technical negotiation over enrichment rights, it is substantively an expression of fundamental geopolitical competition over who will design the nuclear order in the Middle East and under what conditions.

Weakening of US Non-Proliferation Principles and the Clash with Transactional Diplomacy

The fundamental dilemma for the US side arises from the tension between the normative goal of non-proliferation and the pragmatic interest of maintaining a strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia. The Trump administration exhibits a clear tendency to prioritize transactional benefits over non-proliferation principles, and in this agreement, it is assessed to have pushed for the conclusion by effectively suspending the 'gold standard' of foregoing enrichment. This decision stems from a competitive motive to maintain leverage over Saudi Arabia while preventing China and Russia from preempting the Saudi nuclear market. In the context of aggressive approaches by China's state-owned nuclear energy company (CNNC) and Russia's Rosatom to the Saudi nuclear power market, the concern that a strategic vacuum would emerge if the US withdrew from negotiations citing non-proliferation principles was at play.

Constraints of the Palestinian Issue and Saudi Domestic Politics

The Palestinian issue and the constraints of Saudi domestic politics

Saudi Arabia's demand for a clear pathway to establishing a Palestinian state as a prerequisite for normalizing relations with Israel is not merely a matter of diplomatic principle but reflects the realities of Saudi domestic politics and the need to maintain leadership within the Islamic world. The Saudi royal family bases its legitimacy on its role as the custodian of Islam's holy sites, and any decision that disregards Arab public opinion on the Palestinian issue could severely damage the monarchy's religious and political authority. As the Gaza war drags on and civilian casualties in Palestine mount, it is evident that Saudi Arabia's unconditional recognition of Israel would provoke strong backlash from Arab public opinion and the Islamic world. This is a structural constraint that even MBS, despite his immense power, cannot easily ignore.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: Competition for Rearranging the Middle East Order

The Middle East is currently in a period of multipolar transition, with the US-led order weakening and multiple great powers competing to expand their influence. The United States has pursued a strategy of containing Iran and maintaining its regional influence by building an Arab Sunni alliance centered around Israel through the Abraham Accords. However, the normalization of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, mediated by China, was a symbolic event demonstrating Saudi Arabia's pursuit of strategic diversification away from a one-sided reliance on the US. Saudi Arabia is employing a 'hedging' strategy, maintaining security cooperation with the US while simultaneously pursuing economic and technological cooperation with China and Russia. This nuclear agreement negotiation should be understood within this context.

Israel's position is also caught in a complex political structure. While the Netanyahu government welcomes the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia as a "historic leap," it maintains a dual stance, expressing serious security concerns about Saudi Arabia's nuclear capabilities. This reflects an internal contradiction between Israel's interest in maintaining its strategic advantage as the sole nuclear power in the Middle East and its diplomatic goal of escaping regional isolation through normalization with Arab countries.

Economic Structure: Competition in the Nuclear Power Market and Pressure for Energy Transition

From an economic perspective, this agreement is part of the great power competition surrounding the global nuclear power market. Saudi Arabia is pursuing a plan to build 16 nuclear reactors, representing a massive market worth tens of billions of dollars. US-based Westinghouse, Russia's Rosatom, China's CNNC, South Korea's KHNP, and France's EDF are fiercely competing for this market. The US's willingness to proceed with the agreement, even by relaxing non-proliferation conditions, is driven by concerns that ceding this market to competitors would result not only in economic losses but also in the loss of technical and normative influence over Saudi Arabia's nuclear program.

From Saudi Arabia's perspective, the economic motivations are clear. By replacing domestic electricity generation, which currently consumes about 700,000 barrels of oil per day, with nuclear power, Saudi Arabia can divert more oil for export. This would generate billions of dollars in additional export revenue annually. This aligns with the economic diversification goals of 'Vision 2030,' providing a structural incentive.

Security Structure: Nuclear Domino Concerns and Regional Arms Race

The most serious security concern is the potential for Saudi Arabia's acquisition of enrichment rights to trigger a nuclear domino effect in the Middle East. With Iran already possessing the capability to produce highly enriched uranium, other regional countries like Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE are likely to demand similar rights if Saudi Arabia secures them. This could undermine the very foundation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Iran's strong reaction, describing the agreement as the "end of the non-proliferation regime," is not merely diplomatic rhetoric but also includes a strategic calculation to offset international pressure on its own nuclear program.

Israel's security concerns are also concrete. Israel fears that its strategic advantage as the sole nuclear power in the Middle East will be diluted by Saudi Arabia's nuclear advancements. Simultaneously, it is engaged in complex calculations, weighing the security benefits of normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia against these concerns. Within the Israeli security community, there is widespread apprehension that Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions could threaten Israel's strategic superiority in the long term, providing the structural background for the Netanyahu government's dual stance.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Case Studies

UAE's Acceptance of the 'Golden Standard': A Benchmark

The most frequently cited precedent in discussions of the Saudi nuclear agreement is the 123 Agreement signed between the US and the UAE in 2009. The UAE voluntarily renounced its enrichment and reprocessing rights, accepting the 'Golden Standard,' in exchange for a nuclear cooperation agreement with the US. This was lauded by the non-proliferation community as a model case and has since been used by the US as a benchmark in nuclear cooperation negotiations with other countries. However, unlike the UAE, Saudi Arabia possesses domestic uranium reserves and faces a more complex security environment characterized by regional power competition with Iran, making the simple application of the UAE model an unacceptable option for Saudi Arabia.

Another lesson from the UAE case is that the acceptance of the 'Golden Standard' is determined by a country's security environment and its dependence on great powers. As a small nation heavily reliant on security cooperation with the US, the cost for the UAE to accept non-proliferation conditions was relatively low. In contrast, Saudi Arabia, as a regional power, seeks autonomy and is in a position to strategically leverage relationships with China and Russia in addition to the US. This difference is a structural factor that fundamentally alters the negotiation dynamics.

Indo-US Nuclear Agreement (2008): A Precedent for Non-Proliferation Exceptions

The US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement, signed in 2008, granted an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) for India, a signatory to the NPT, setting a significant exception to the non-proliferation regime. The Bush administration at the time flexibly applied non-proliferation principles to draw India into a strategic partnership, creating the perception among countries like Pakistan and Iran that great powers selectively apply non-proliferation principles based on strategic interests. From Saudi Arabia's perspective, the Indo-US nuclear agreement can be used as an argument that its demand for enrichment rights is not unprecedented but rather an extension of the flexibility already applied by the US to its strategic partners.

The crucial difference between the Indian case and the current Saudi agreement is that India entered the negotiations as a de facto nuclear state already possessing nuclear weapons, whereas Saudi Arabia is seeking to acquire potential nuclear capabilities while not yet possessing them. This implies that the Saudi agreement could have more serious non-proliferation implications than the Indian case in terms of the nuclear domino effect.

North Korea's Nuclear Development and the Limits of the NPT Regime: A Cautionary Tale

North Korea's nuclear development path exemplifies the structural limitations of the non-proliferation regime. As an NPT member, North Korea accumulated nuclear technology under IAEA safeguards before officially withdrawing from the NPT in 2003 and declaring its pursuit of nuclear weapons. This path serves as historical evidence that civilian nuclear cooperation can be diverted for military nuclear capabilities, and it is frequently cited as a justification for international concerns regarding Saudi Arabia's demand for enrichment rights. The fear that Saudi Arabia might transition to developing nuclear weapons, as MBS has suggested, if Iran achieves nuclear weapons capability, is based precisely on this precedent.

Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) and Lessons from Negotiation Failures

The 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) was designed to limit Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, but it effectively collapsed due to the unilateral withdrawal by the first Trump administration. This experience exposed the issue of reliability, as US nuclear-related agreements can be fundamentally altered by changes in administration. From Saudi Arabia's perspective, the failure of the JCPOA reinforces concerns that nuclear-related agreements with the US may not guarantee long-term stability, providing another reason for Saudi Arabia to resist relinquishing enrichment rights. In essence, it serves as a strategic insurance policy to secure a structure that allows it to maintain its nuclear capabilities even if US policy changes in the future.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

Variable 1: Resolution Potential of the Palestinian Issue and the Direction of the Gaza War

The most decisive variable in the development of this issue is the Palestinian question, particularly the direction of the Gaza War. As long as the Gaza War continues and civilian casualties in Palestine persist, it is difficult to expect a change in Saudi Arabia's position, given its consistent demand for a clear pathway to Palestinian statehood as a prerequisite for normalizing relations with Israel. Conversely, if the Gaza War concludes and a concrete agreement on Palestinian self-governance is reached, space for renewed negotiations could open up. However, the structural constraints of the Israeli domestic political landscape, with the far-right coalition partners of the Netanyahu government strongly opposing the establishment of a Palestinian state, pose a fundamental obstacle to negotiations.

Variable 2: US Congressional Oversight of Non-Proliferation

Even if the US administration adopts a flexible approach to non-proliferation principles, Congress can exercise its independent oversight function. Under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, nuclear cooperation agreements are subject to congressional review. If bipartisan proponents of non-proliferation oppose an agreement without enrichment renunciation clauses, its ratification could be delayed or modified. Given that Democratic lawmakers and some Republican members have expressed concerns about the weakening of non-proliferation principles, Congress's reaction will be a significant variable in determining the final form of the agreement.

Variable 3: Progress in Iran Nuclear Negotiations

The progress of Iran's nuclear program is directly linked to Saudi Arabia's nuclear ambitions. If a new nuclear deal is reached between the US and Iran, limiting Iran's nuclear capabilities, the rationale for Saudi Arabia's pursuit of nuclear capabilities could weaken. Conversely, if Iran moves closer to developing nuclear weapons or if nuclear negotiations completely break down, Saudi Arabia's demand for enrichment rights will intensify, and the US will face pressure to accommodate it. The trajectory of the Iranian nuclear issue acts as an external variable determining the final conditions of the US-Saudi nuclear agreement.

Variable 4: Intensity of China-Russia Competition in Nuclear Cooperation with Saudi Arabia

The intensity of China and Russia's engagement in the Saudi nuclear power market will affect the US's negotiating leverage. If China or Russia offers Saudi Arabia comprehensive nuclear cooperation, including enrichment rights, the US will face pressure to further relax non-proliferation conditions. Conversely, if these countries' competitive offers are deemed unlikely to materialize, the US will have greater leverage to adhere more strictly to non-proliferation principles. This variable is a key factor determining the rigidity and flexibility of the US's negotiating strategy with Saudi Arabia.

Variable 5: MBS's Consolidation of Domestic Political Power and Decision-Making Capacity in Foreign Policy

Finally, the degree of consolidation of MBS's domestic political power could influence the outcome of the negotiations. Whether MBS's power is sufficiently consolidated to make a decision on normalizing relations with Israel despite domestic opposition, and whether he can bear the political cost of such a decision, are key variables for the agreement's conclusion. Currently, the ongoing Gaza War and the hardening of Arab public opinion have created an environment where it is difficult for MBS to make a decision that bypasses the Palestinian issue. However, MBS has a history of making unexpected strategic decisions, and the possibility that his personal judgment could drastically alter the course of negotiations cannot be entirely ruled out.

In summary, the US-Saudi civil nuclear agreement controversy transcends a mere technical cooperation negotiation, representing a multi-layered geopolitical event where the rearrangement of the Middle East order, the normative basis of the non-proliferation regime, and great power strategic competition intersect. The development of this issue will be determined by the interplay of the five key variables presented above, exhibiting a complex system characteristic where no single variable independently dictates the outcome.