The Takaichi-Trump Meeting in New York and the US-Japan Alliance: Achievements and Limits of Aligning with Washington Amid Tensions with Beijing
Executive Summary
Although Prime Minister Takaichi succeeded in securing a meeting with Trump prior to President Xi Jinping's US visit—thereby imprinting Tokyo's concerns on Washington beforehand—Trump's remark two days later describing China as a "World War II ally" exposed structural limits, demonstrating that close US-Japan alignment alone cannot dictate the direction of Washington's China policy. Triggered by Takaichi's remarks on Taiwan, Beijing has simultaneously mobilized party and government channels to deploy a "neo-militarism" narrative alongside rare earth export controls; this suggests that the friction cannot be resolved simply by retracting the remarks, but rather represents a long-term conflict targeting the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy. The US approach to China exhibits a dual nature, with summit-level political rhetoric operating separately from working-level trade channels, while Trump's direct mention of the weak yen during the meeting demonstrates that trade pressure can be applied even to allies. Rather than bandwagoning with either side in the Sino-Japanese conflict, South Korea should adopt a decoupled, issue-by-issue approach; while maintaining separate cooperation channels in areas of clear national interest such as supply chains and monetary policy, Seoul needs to establish its own buffers for semiconductor and critical mineral supply chains, drawing lessons from Japan's experience. With Japan's security document revision in December and the US-China summit scheduled for November serving as key inflection points, South Korea must establish a system to constantly monitor the gap between summit rhetoric and working-level agreements.
I. Analysis of the Issue
The Takaichi-Trump Meeting in New York: Reaffirming the US-Japan Alliance Amid Diverging Approaches to China
1. Background and Progress
In a parliamentary response last November, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that a blockade or armed occupation in a Taiwan contingency could constitute an "existential threat situation" for Japan [3][6]. This remark directly linked the legal basis for the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) use of force to the Taiwan issue [3][6]. For China, the Taiwan issue is non-negotiable [3][6]. Immediately following the remarks, Beijing exerted pressure on Tokyo by imposing export controls on rare earths and permanent magnets [3][8].
A parliamentary delegation led by Representative Shinichi Isa visited Beijing to seek a path toward improving relations [8]. However, Luo Gang, Vice Minister of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC), made it clear that a revision of Japan's stance on Taiwan was a prerequisite for any shift in Beijing's policy toward Tokyo [3][8]. The simultaneous mobilization of party and government channels to deploy a "neo-militarism" narrative and rare earth export controls suggests that Beijing has transitioned to a phase of challenging the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy, moving beyond the Taiwan remarks themselves [3][8].
With these tensions with China unresolved, the Takaichi administration shifted its focus toward closer alignment with the United States [6]. Prime Prime Minister Takaichi has consistently sought to secure a meeting with President Trump prior to President Xi Jinping's US visit, rather than this being a one-off attempt [7]. From Tokyo's perspective, it was vital to imprint its concerns on Washington before the US could strike any deal with Beijing [7][9].
2. Current Situation
Prime Minister Takaichi and President Trump met in New York on September 22 and agreed to strengthen the US-Japan alliance [1]. This meeting took place just two days before the US-China summit [1]. During the meeting, Takaichi focused on highlighting Japan's expanding investments in the United States and its contributions to the US economy [4]. Seated alongside President Trump at the UN Headquarters, Takaichi assessed that the meeting "demonstrated the strength of the US-Japan alliance to the world" [14].
President Trump praised Prime Minister Takaichi, saying she had done a "fantastic job" and would "go down in history" [12]. The two leaders publicly highlighted their friendly working relationship, and Takaichi expressed expectations for deepening bilateral ties [12]. On the surface, it was a seamless display of summit diplomacy.
However, the situation grew complicated two days later. Welcoming President Xi Jinping to the White House, President Trump referred to China as a "World War II ally" [17]. President Xi also highlighted the history of the joint anti-Japanese united front, referring to a "bond forged in blood and fire" [17]. The two leaders' repeated invocation of their historical cooperation against Japan was received with unease in Tokyo [17]. The *Nikkei* reported that the remarks were seen by some observers as potentially strengthening Beijing's justification for pressuring Japan [10].
Just one day after the remarks, the Japanese government reiterated its commitment to postwar reconciliation and the US-Japan partnership, directly rebutting Beijing's "neo-militarism" narrative [10]. Tokyo's swift response itself demonstrates that Trump's remarks caused a significant stir within Japan [10]. In a separate article, the *Nikkei* pointed out an asymmetrical dynamic where the Trump administration prepared a lavish welcome for President Xi while relations between Tokyo and Beijing remained frozen [11].
The tangible outcomes of the US-China summit itself were limited. The Atlantic Council assessed that there were few new agreements beyond extending the trade truce [2]. Prior to the summit, US Trade Representative Greer, along with Treasury Secretary Bessent, held preparatory talks in New York with Vice Premier He Lifeng [5]. This indicates that Washington and Beijing had already established significant working-level alignment on tariff and critical mineral agendas [5].
3. Key Actor Analysis
The Takaichi Governmentis pursuing a strategy of reinforcing its position amid tensions with China by aligning closely with the United States [6][9]. Prime Minister Takaichi sought to directly explain to President Trump the growing economic and military pressure Japan faces from China [14]. At the same time, she engaged in preemptive diplomacy, using the scale of Japan's investment in the US and its contribution to the US economy as leverage to check Washington's rapprochement with Beijing [4][9][14]. However, Tokyo is not in complete lockstep with Washington. Despite strong opposition from the Trump administration, Takaichi reaffirmed Japan's support for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and stated that Japan would continue lobbying other nations to ensure the court's survival [15]. She also directly raised the issue of US sanctions against the ICC Chief Judge during the meeting [1]. Regarding the weak yen, although President Trump raised concerns about its adverse impact on US trade, Takaichi drew a line, stating that the conversation did not lead to detailed discussions on monetary or fiscal policy [13][16].
President Trumphas publicly promoted relations with the Takaichi government while employing a separate logic in managing relations with President Xi [12][17]. His "World War II ally" remark is interpreted as stemming from a pragmatic calculation to improve relations with China rather than consideration for Japan [17]. The fact that the USTR and the Treasury Department conducted working-level coordination with Beijing prior to the summit [5] suggests that the Trump administration's approach to China is moving on a track separate from the Takaichi government's expectations.
Chinamaintains that a revision of Japan's stance on the Taiwan issue is a prerequisite for normalizing relations with Tokyo [3][8]. Beijing continues to exert pressure by simultaneously employing rare earth export controls and a "neo-militarism" narrative to challenge the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy [3][8]. At the same time, China exhibits a dual approach by managing relations with Washington through working-level negotiations and extending the trade truce [2][5]. President Xi's emphasis on the history of anti-Japanese cooperation at the White House is read as an attempt to utilize a narrative of countering Japan as a justification for improving US-China relations [17].
4. Key Issues
The first issue is the substantive binding power of the close US-Japan alignment. While President Trump's friendly rhetoric and the personal trust between the leaders are evident [12], there is an underlying anxiety that US policy toward China could be decided independently, regardless of Tokyo's interests [7][11]. The controversy surrounding the "World War II ally" remark can be seen as a case where this anxiety materialized [10][17].
The second issue is the limits of Tokyo's diplomacy toward the United States. While the card of expanding investment in the US is effective for managing relations with the Trump administration, it does not serve as leverage to sway the outcomes of US-China trade and critical mineral negotiations [5][9]. The pace and direction of Washington's approach to China remain variables beyond Tokyo's control [2][7].
The third issue is the internal policy differences within the US-Japan bilateral relationship. As demonstrated by the ICC and weak yen issues, the Takaichi government is maintaining its own policy positions even while seeking to strengthen its alliance with the United States [13][15][16]. This highlights that the US-Japan alliance is characterized not by complete alignment across all values and policies, but rather by selective alignment centered on security interests.
From South Korea's perspective, without bandwagoning on the bilateral Sino-Japanese conflict, there is a need to independently assess the risks to the rare earth supply chain and how the outcomes of US-China critical mineral negotiations will affect domestic procurement conditions [3][6]. Japan's upcoming revision of its security documents in December and the direction of the US approach to China remain key variables shaping the future security landscape of Northeast Asia.
II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue
The Takaichi-Trump Meeting in New York: Structural Background and Key Variables
1. Root Cause Analysis
The fundamental driver of this meeting is the dual uncertainty facing Tokyo. First, China's pressure on Japan has entered a structural phase that cannot be resolved through negotiation [3][8]. Second, Washington's approach to China is decided outside of Tokyo's sphere of control [7][9].
Prime Minister Takaichi's "existential threat situation" remark directly linked the legal requirements for the SDF's use of force to the Taiwan issue [3][6]. For China, the Taiwan issue is non-negotiable [3][6]. The fact that Luo Gang, Vice Minister of the CPC International Liaison Department, explicitly demanded a revision of Japan's stance as a prerequisite for any shift in China's policy toward Japan [3][8] demonstrates that this conflict cannot be resolved simply by retracting the remarks or expressing diplomatic regret. The simultaneous mobilization of party and government channels to deploy a "neo-militarism" narrative and rare earth export controls [8] indicates that Beijing's target is not a specific remark, but rather the overall trajectory of Japan's security policy.
Under these circumstances, Tokyo's options were limited. Lacking effective leverage to improve relations with China on its own, the Takaichi government chose to utilize the solidarity of the US-Japan alliance as an alternative mechanism [6]. This explains why Takaichi consistently attempted to secure a meeting with President Trump prior to President Xi's US visit [7]. This is read as a preemptive move to imprint Japan's position on the Trump administration before Washington could strike any deal with Beijing [7][9].
2. Structural Context
Political Structure
In Japanese domestic politics, the Takaichi government is constrained by the need to simultaneously manage a dual track: expanding defense capabilities and managing conflict with China [6]. The budget request of 1.2 trillion yen for defense and the expansion of independent regional engagement through the POWERR Asia program [6] reflect Tokyo's distrust regarding a potential decline in US commitment to the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, the pressure of the timeline created by China's expansion into the Western Pacific is real [6]. With both constraints operating simultaneously, Tokyo has no choice but to pursue closer alignment with the US while concurrently attempting to manage and contain conflict with China [6][8].
The structural dynamic on the US side is different. The Trump administration's China policy tends to operate on separate tracks: working-level trade and commerce channels on one hand, and summit-level political rhetoric on the other. Prior to the US-China summit, USTR Greer and Treasury Secretary Bessent held preparatory talks in New York with Vice Premier He Lifeng [5]. This coordination was framed in the pragmatic working-level language of "balanced trade with China" [5]. In contrast, President Trump himself employed political rhetoric at the summit, referring to China as a "World War II ally" [17]. The gap between these two approaches creates a duality in Washington's policy that is difficult for Tokyo to navigate.
Economic Structure
The Takaichi government's repeated emphasis on expanding investment in the US [1][4] stems from the fact that this is one of the few bargaining chips Japan holds in US-Japan economic relations. President Trump's direct mention of the weak yen during the meeting and its impact on US trade [13][16] demonstrates that this leverage is not entirely one-sided. The unusually detailed disclosure of the currency discussions between the leaders by Finance Minister Satsuki Katayama [16] also proves that the weak yen issue has emerged as a substantive point of contention in US-Japan economic dialogue. However, the two leaders did not proceed to the stage of detailed discussions on monetary or fiscal policy [13].
Security Structure
China's comparative advantage in refining and processing rare earths and permanent magnets is expected to persist structurally for the next three to five years [3][8]. This means Japan lacks immediate, effective tools to counter Chinese pressure. Conversely, the US-Japan alliance remains the only security buffer Tokyo can rely on. Prime Prime Minister Takaichi's assessment of the UN Headquarters meeting as "demonstrating the strength of the US-Japan alliance to the world" [14] shows that this alliance serves as a critical substitute for deterrence against China. However, whether this security alignment translates into substantive leverage over Washington's broader China policy is a separate matter.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases
The pattern of Japan proactively contacting the United States around the time of US-China summits to imprint its concerns is not unprecedented [7]. Prime Minister Takaichi has consistently sought to arrange meetings prior to President Trump's visits to China or US-China summits [7]. This demonstrates that even when bilateral US-Japan relations are stable, Tokyo views the potential for US-China collusion as a structural risk.
The scene at the White House welcoming ceremony, where President Trump's "World War II ally" remark and President Xi's mention of a "bond forged in blood and fire" were repeatedly exchanged [17], illustrates how US-China summit diplomacy can utilize a historical narrative that excludes Japan as a shared asset. The public invocation of the history of the anti-Japanese united front by the US and Chinese leaders raised concerns in Tokyo that it could provide ammunition for Beijing's "neo-militarism" narrative [10]. The *Nikkei*'s reporting that this could be seen as "strengthening Beijing's justification for pressuring Japan" [10] suggests that Tokyo's anxieties remained unresolved even immediately after the reaffirmation of the US-Japan alliance.
The speed with which the Japanese government directly rebutted the neo-militarism narrative—reiterating its postwar reconciliation policy and the US-Japan partnership just one day after the remarks [10]—aligns with past precedents where similar historical narrative disputes demanded immediate responses from Tokyo. However, what distinguishes this case from previous ones is that the friendly meeting and the controversial remarks occurred in rapid succession within an extremely compressed timeframe, just two days before the US-China summit [1][17].
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is the specific outcome of the US-China negotiations on critical minerals and tariffs. Japan's deterrence calculations regarding China will shift depending on the level of agreement reached at the actual summit on the agenda items pre-coordinated in New York by Greer and Bessent [5]. According to the Atlantic Council's analysis, new agreements at this US-China summit were limited beyond extending the trade truce, with another meeting scheduled for November [2]. While this provides short-term relief for Tokyo, it also means the same uncertainty could resurface over the coming months.
The second variable is the extent to which the language regarding Taiwan is adjusted in Japan's revision of its security documents in December [3][6][8]. Because the phrasing of this language is directly linked to the intensity of Beijing's pressure, whether strengthening the US-Japan alliance alone can offset tensions with China will be put to the test at this juncture.
The third variable is the extent of the gap between President Trump's political rhetoric and the working-level channels of the US administration. If friendly summit-level rhetoric and working-level trade approaches toward China move in opposite directions, Tokyo will bear the burden of deciphering Washington's true intentions after the fact. The policy differences between the US and Japan over the ICC are an extension of this gap. While acknowledging that Washington's distrust of the ICC is "very strong" [15], Prime Minister Takaichi maintained that Japan would continue lobbying to support and sustain the ICC [15]. This demonstrates that close US-Japan alignment does not translate into blind Japanese compliance with the US on all issues, while also revealing Tokyo's determination to secure policy autonomy within the alliance.
The fourth variable is the trajectory of the weak yen issue. President Trump's direct mention of the US trade burden caused by the weak yen [13][16] reveals that substantive friction points lie beneath the friendly veneer of US-Japan economic cooperation. If this issue develops into consultations on monetary and fiscal policies, the utility of the Takaichi government's card of expanding investment in the US may also be reassessed.
III. Policy Recommendations
Comprehensive Recommendations and Action Plan
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommendations
The recent Takaichi-Trump meeting simultaneously revealed both the robustness and the limitations of the US-Japan alliance. Prime Minister Takaichi achieved her goal of securing a meeting prior to President Xi Jinping's US visit [7][9]. President Trump also publicly praised Takaichi, creating a friendly atmosphere [12]. However, Trump's remark two days later describing China as a "World War II ally" [17] exposed structural limits, demonstrating that no matter how proactive Tokyo's diplomacy is, it cannot control the direction of Washington's China policy [10][11].
South Korea does not need to view this issue solely through the lens of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The core takeaway is that the US's summit-level rhetoric toward China operates separately from its working-level trade approach [5][17]. This is an uncertainty faced not only by Japan but also by South Korea. President Trump's direct mention of the weak yen during the meeting [13][16] demonstrates that Washington pursues its trade interests even during summit diplomacy with allies. This also hints at the potential for trade pressure regarding the Korean won't exchange rate.
South Korea's recommended response is to pursue a decoupled, issue-by-issue approach rather than bloc bandwagoning. It is rational to keep a distance from Japan on sensitive issues such as disputes over defense white papers and Taiwan-related phrasing [6], while keeping separate channels of cooperation open in areas of clear mutual benefit, such as supply chains, rare earths, and monetary policy coordination. At the same time, to prepare for the possibility that U.S. policy toward China may fluctuate between summit rhetoric and working-level negotiations, South Korea should reference Japan's response path in semiconductor and critical mineral supply chains while establishing its own independent buffers.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-term (1–3 Months)
The detailed terms of the critical minerals and tariff agreements resulting from the follow-up measures of the U.S.-China summit must be verified [2][5]. It is necessary to assess the impact of the "balanced trade with China" policy [5]—pre-coordinated in New York by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Department of the Treasury—on the domestic semiconductor and battery industries' sourcing of raw materials from China. Furthermore, to prepare for the possibility of the United States raising issues regarding the exchange rate of the Korean won, fiscal authorities should prepare scenario-specific response arguments by referencing the case of the Japanese yen [13][16].
Medium-term (3–12 Months)
South Korea must track the strength of the Taiwan-related phrasing in Japan's December revision of its security documents [6][3]. If this phrasing is strengthened, Sino-Japanese conflict could become prolonged, which could in turn spill over into supply chain risks for rare earths and magnets [3][8]. Separate from this path, it is also necessary to examine opportunities for supply chain restructuring in which South Korean companies can participate as negotiations between the United States and Japan to expand investment in the U.S. translate into concrete projects.
Long-term (1 Year or More)
Under the assumption that U.S. policy toward China will fluctuate between summit rhetoric and working-level lines throughout the Trump administration's term, a continuous monitoring system between trade and security agencies must be established. As another U.S.-China summit is scheduled for November [2], there is a high probability that discrepancies between summit-level agreements and working-level agreements will recur. The long-term task is to view this not as a one-off event but as a structural pattern that will persist throughout the administration's term, and to prepare response manuals accordingly.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
First, whether a concrete agreement on critical minerals and rare earths is announced in the follow-up working-level negotiations of the U.S.-China summit [2][5]. This agreement directly affects domestic industries with a high dependence on China.
Second, the strength of the Taiwan-related phrasing in Japan's December revision of its security documents [6]. If the phrasing is softened, it can be interpreted as a signal of easing Sino-Japanese tensions; if strengthened, it can be read as a signal of prolonged conflict.
Third, whether China's export controls on rare earths to Japan persist or expand [3][8]. This would not be limited to measures targeting Japan but could spill over into the regional supply chain as a whole.
Fourth, the frequency of recurring discrepancies between U.S. summit-level remarks and working-level policies [5][17]. The more frequent this pattern becomes, the more it could affect allies' trust in the United States.
Fifth, whether the United States raising issues regarding the yen's exchange rate materializes into trade pressure [13][16]. This can serve as a leading indicator for similar pressure on the Korean won.
4. Summary and Conclusion
Prime Minister Takaichi achieved the goal of preemptive diplomacy by securing a meeting with President Trump prior to President Xi Jinping's visit to the United States [1][7]. However, President Trump's "World War II ally" remark reaffirmed that Tokyo cannot control Washington's overall direction of approach toward China [17][10]. The U.S.-Japan alliance simultaneously harbors hopeful elements, such as friendly relations at the summit level, and conflictual elements, such as the discrepancy between summit rhetoric and working-level negotiations. South Korea must not dismiss this structure as a problem unique to Japan, but must manage the dual nature of U.S. policy toward China as an independent risk. At this juncture, the most realistic path is a double-track approach: keeping a distance from Japan regarding disputes over security phrasing, while continuing interest-oriented, separate cooperation in the areas of supply chains and monetary coordination.
References
[1] [Nikkei Asia] Trump, Takaichi reaffirm alliance days before US-China summit
[2] [Atlantic Council - GeoEconomics Center] What did (and didn’t) happen at the Trump-Xi summit
[4] [Nikkei Asia] Takaichi to stress Japanese investment in US in talks with Trump
[5] [USTR (Office of the United States Trade Representative)] Ambassador Greer to Travel to New York
[7] [Nikkei Asia] Takaichi raises China concerns but Trump may still cut deal with Xi
[9] [The Diplomat] Takaichi’s Pre-emptive Diplomacy: What Japan Needs From the Trump-Xi Summit
[10] [Nikkei Asia] Trump remarks on China as WWII 'ally' raise eyebrows in Japan
[11] [Nikkei Asia] Japan-China ties wither as Trump readies red carpet for Xi Jinping
[14] [Bangkok Post] Ditch ‘enemy state’ label, Japanese PM tells UN
[19] [Nikkei Asia] Editor's Choice: Another Trump-Xi ambiguous summit
[20] [Nikkei Asia] Trump-Xi summit: How the Chinese leader's trip to Washington unfolded
[21] [Channel News Asia] Trump warns in UN speech he could 'annihilate' Iran without peace deal
[22] [Nikkei Asia] Trump and Xi set to talk trade and AI as truce hangs in balance
[23] [Nikkei Asia] Japan's Takaichi grows cautious of setting GDP defense spending target
[24] [Nikkei Asia] US, Japan finance chiefs discuss yen after Trump raises concerns in summit
[25] [The Times of India] Trump embraces Xi as peer, alarms partners and critics
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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