Prime Minister Takaichi's Visit to the U.S. and Structural Tensions in China-Japan Relations: A Geopolitical Risk Analysis
Executive Summary
Prime Minister Takaichi's remarks in the Diet on Taiwan directly linked the conditions for collective self-defense under Japan's security legislation to the Taiwan issue. In response, China has employed both rare earth export controls and a “new militarism” narrative to challenge Japan's overall security policy. With Lu Kang, Vice Minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, stipulating that a change in Japan's stance on Taiwan is a precondition for any shift in its policy toward Japan, the conflict has entered a structural phase that cannot be resolved by a mere retraction of the remarks. Tokyo is attempting to reaffirm the U.S.-Japan alliance by arranging an early meeting with President Trump ahead of his summit with Xi Jinping, but signs that Washington and Beijing are coordinating on critical minerals and tariffs in New York expose a divergence in their respective policies toward China. As China's comparative advantage in rare earth refining and processing is expected to persist for the next three to five years, South Korea needs a dual-track strategy: avoid taking sides in the bilateral conflict while separately addressing supply chain risks and potential spillover from the Taiwan Strait. In the short term, Seoul should assess the impact of U.S.-China critical minerals negotiations on domestic procurement. In the medium term, it must monitor Japan's revision of its national security documents in December and specify its potential participation in alternative supply chain projects.
I. Issue Analysis
Prime Minister Takaichi's Visit to the U.S. and Structural Tensions in China-Japan Relations: An Issue Analysis
1. Background and Developments
Last November, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in the Diet that a blockade or armed occupation of Taiwan in a contingency could constitute a “situation that threatens Japan's survival” [3][6]. This remark directly linked the legal basis for the use of force by the Self-Defense Forces to the Taiwan issue [3][6]. For China, the Taiwan issue is non-negotiable [3][6]. Immediately after her statement, Beijing began pressuring Japan by leveraging export controls on rare earths and magnets [3][6].
A key feature of the current situation is that both party and government channels are being used to apply pressure simultaneously. A bipartisan delegation of Japanese Diet members visited Beijing on August 27 to seek improved relations, but during a two-hour meeting, Lu Kang, Vice Minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party, stated unequivocally that Beijing has no intention of changing its policy toward Japan unless Prime Minister Takaichi's perception of Taiwan changes (according to Shinichi, public relations director of the Reformist Center Union, who attended the meeting) [3]. This indicates that Beijing has moved beyond the specific remarks to challenge Japan's overall security policy trajectory [3]. This is also why the “new militarism” narrative is being employed concurrently [3][6].
The Takaichi administration has pursued a dual-track approach: maintaining its course of strengthening defense capabilities while trying to contain conflict with China [3][9]. One track involves a 1.2 trillion yen defense budget request and expanded independent regional engagement through the POWERR Asia program; the other is the attempt to manage conflict by dispatching the parliamentary delegation to Beijing [9]. However, Lu Kang's statement has effectively nullified the latter effort [3].
2. Current Situation
During her four-day visit to New York for the UN General Assembly, Prime Minister Takaichi is arranging a meeting with President Trump for around Tuesday [1][4]. The intention is clearly to engage the U.S. side before President Trump's summit with President Xi Jinping in Washington on Thursday [1]. Nikkei Asia, part of the Nihon Keizai Shimbun group, characterized this as an attempt by “Tokyo to keep Trump engaged in checking China” [1].
On Sunday, September 20, Washington and Beijing began preliminary coordination in New York for the summit. Treasury Secretary Besant and USTR Representative Greer met with Vice Premier He Lifeng to discuss an agenda that included AI, tariffs, and critical minerals, including rare earths [5][10][13][14][16][17]. There are reports that the renewal of the Busan Rare Earths Agreement and the potential establishment of a U.S.-China trade commission were also on the agenda [13]. This supports the scenario that Tokyo fears: that Japan's policy of security pressure on China could be deprioritized by Washington while the U.S. and China reach a substantive compromise on economic issues [7].
The Diplomat identified this as a “potential misalignment between Japanese and U.S. policy toward China” [7]. The Brookings Institution notes that Trump has shown considerable deference to Xi Jinping in his public statements [12]. On the Taiwan Strait issue, reports that Beijing has hinted at the possibility of canceling the summit if further arms sales to Taiwan are approved have led to observations that Washington is taking a cautious approach to the Taiwan issue [15].
3. Key Actors and Positions
The Takaichi Administration in Japanis pursuing a strategy of compensating for the burden of conflict with China by strengthening its close ties with the U.S. [3]. Its aim is clearly to secure a reaffirmation of Washington's stance on checking China before the U.S.-China summit by arranging an early meeting with Trump [1][4]. However, it is also pursuing its own course of increasing defense spending and expanding independent regional engagement, indicating it is not solely relying on the U.S. to fill security gaps [9]. In terms of energy security, it is attempting a multi-faceted response to risks from China, such as separately seeking to enhance energy resilience in the Asia-Pacific region through a meeting with the IEA Secretary General [11].
The Chinese Government and Communist Partyare maintaining pressure by simultaneously activating government channels (rare earth export controls by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce) and party channels (the “new militarism” narrative from the International Department) [3][6]. As confirmed by Vice Minister Lu Kang, the principle of no improvement in relations without a change in Japan's stance on Taiwan is not just rhetorical pressure but has been presented as a precondition for negotiations [3]. At the same time, ahead of the summit with Washington, Beijing is also pursuing a line of economic pragmatism, employing a dual-track approach of being tough on Japan while flexible with the U.S. [13][10].
The U.S. Trump Administrationhas a strong incentive to produce tangible results on trade, AI, and critical minerals ahead of the September 24 summit with Xi Jinping [2][8][10]. The preliminary coordination in New York by the economic team, including Besant and Greer, supports this [5][10]. The PIIE predicts that progress in the AI sector will be limited at this summit but believes it will not be a complete failure due to the strong inertia characteristic of U.S.-China relations [8]. This pragmatic U.S. approach toward China differs from the solidarity in checking China that Tokyo hopes for [7].
4. Key Issues
The first issue is the substantive content of U.S.-Japan solidarity. A key point to watch is whether what Takaichi can obtain from her meeting with Trump will be limited to a symbolic gesture or will lead to a concrete commitment on the Taiwan issue [1][7]. The fact that Washington is showing caution on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan suggests a potential gap between Tokyo's expectations and the actual outcome [15].
The second issue is whether China's pressure on Japan can coexist with its pragmatism toward the U.S. The key question is whether Beijing can maintain a double standard: keeping the door open for compromise with the U.S., such as renewing the rare earths agreement, while adhering to its principles in relations with Japan [13][3]. This implies that the “joint front to pressure China amid U.S.-China conflict” that Japan hopes for may be difficult to actually form.
The third issue is the timeline of the conflict. Given that China's comparative advantage in refining and processing is expected to persist structurally for the next three to five years, EAI's existing analysis is that this conflict should be viewed not as a short-term issue to be resolved quickly, but as a multi-year structural risk [3][6]. The language regarding Taiwan in the revised Japanese national security documents, scheduled for December, is likely to be the next inflection point in the conflict [9].
II. In-Depth Analysis
Prime Minister Takaichi's Visit to the U.S. and Structural Tensions in China-Japan Relations: An In-Depth Analysis
1. Analysis of Root Causes
The immediate trigger for this conflict was Prime Minister Takaichi's remarks in the Diet, but the more fundamental issue is the legal structure her statement touched upon. Defining a Taiwan contingency as a “situation that threatens Japan's survival” amounts to directly applying the conditions for exercising the right of collective self-defense, introduced by the 2015 security legislation revision, to the Taiwan issue [3][6]. This statement removes the strategic ambiguity that previous Japanese governments had maintained, which is why China reacted so sensitively.
From Beijing's perspective, the Taiwan issue is directly linked to its domestic political legitimacy. The Xi Jinping regime has linked the unification of Taiwan to the narrative of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. For the Japanese prime minister to specify this issue as a legal trigger for the use of force by the Self-Defense Forces is perceived by the Chinese Communist Party not as a simple diplomatic friction, but as an infringement on its core interests. It is in this context that Vice Minister Lu Kang presented a change in Japan's stance on Taiwan as a precondition for shifting its policy toward Japan to the visiting Japanese parliamentary delegation [3]. This means the situation is structural and cannot be resolved by retracting individual remarks or expressing regret.
Another root cause is the Takaichi administration's security policy itself. The 1.2 trillion yen defense budget request and the expansion of independent regional engagement through POWERR Asia stem from Tokyo's distrust of a potential decline in U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific [9]. China interprets this not as an isolated statement but as a rightward shift in Japan's overall security policy. The simultaneous mobilization of the “new militarism” narrative through both party and government channels is an effort to formalize this perception both domestically and internationally [3][6].
2. Structural Context
Security Structure: This issue represents a transfer of the U.S.-China strategic competition over the Taiwan Strait to the bilateral China-Japan relationship [6]. The United States is showing a cautious attitude on the Taiwan issue. There have been reports that Beijing hinted at the possibility of canceling the Trump-Xi summit if further arms sales to Taiwan are approved, and the White House has remained silent on the matter [15]. In this context, Japan's unilateral move to specify the Taiwan issue as a trigger in its security legislation exposes a divergence in U.S. and Japanese policies toward China. The Diplomat characterized this as a “potential misalignment between Japanese and U.S. policy toward China” [7]. Tokyo's haste to arrange a meeting with Trump before the Trump-Xi summit should be seen as an attempt to reaffirm the solidarity of the U.S.-Japan alliance before this misalignment solidifies [1][4].
Economic Structure: China's comparative advantage in the refining and processing stages of the rare earth and magnet supply chain is structural [6]. Japan's efforts—such as deep-sea mining off Minamitorishima, technology for recovering rare earths from waste liquids, and securing alternative suppliers—are all medium- to long-term projects that will take years to commercialize [6]. Meanwhile, Washington and Beijing are discussing the renewal of the Busan Rare Earths Agreement and the establishment of a U.S.-China trade commission in their preliminary talks in New York [13]. If the U.S. and China reach a substantive compromise on critical minerals, there is a risk that Japan alone will be left exposed to China's export controls. This creates a double pressure for Tokyo: China holds the means of pressure, and the U.S. might exhaust its leverage to mitigate that pressure in its trade negotiations with China.
Political Structure: Tensions are also palpable within the Takaichi administration between its China policy and its monetary and fiscal policies. The fact that a meeting between Bank of Japan Governor Ueda and Prime Minister Takaichi did not take place ahead of the recent monetary policy meeting is evidence of this. While not a direct factor in the conflict with China, this shows that the Takaichi administration has little room to maneuver in coordinating domestic policy. If the conflict with China becomes protracted, the government's political capital could become fragmented.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases
China's method of economic pressure on Japan is consistent with past actions, such as the 2010 rare earth export restrictions and the anti-Japanese protests and customs delays following the 2012 nationalization of the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. However, the current situation differs from the past in two respects. First, the basis for the pressure is not a territorial dispute but is directly linked to China's core interest narrative regarding Taiwan. While territorial issues were negotiable, Beijing's official position is that the Taiwan issue is non-negotiable from the outset [3][6]. Second, this time a party channel, the CCP's International Department, has intervened by explicitly stating preconditions. This makes the path to resolution narrower, as it is not a matter of practical friction at the ministerial level but one involving the party's political judgment.
A comparison with the initial phase of the U.S.-China trade war in 2018 is also relevant. At that time, U.S. allies also tried to align with Washington's hardline stance on China, but a gap emerged between their expectations and actual U.S. actions when the first Trump administration ultimately sought compromises with China on an issue-by-issue basis. In the current situation as well, President Trump has been observed publicly showing deference to President Xi [12]. For Tokyo, this is seen as a sign of a familiar pattern re-emerging: a dynamic where the U.S. itself opts for a pragmatic compromise at the very moment its allies are trying to move closer to Washington to check China.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is the language concerning Taiwan in the revision of Japan's national security documents, scheduled for December [9]. Whether Japan goes as far as to codify the “situation that threatens Japan's survival” remark in the documents or moves to partially restore ambiguity will determine the intensity of China's response.
The second variable is the outcome of the Trump-Xi summit. If the U.S. and China reach a substantive agreement on economic issues including rare earths, AI, and tariffs [13][14][17], it will likely become more difficult for Japan to secure sustained U.S. support for its security pressure on China. Conversely, if the summit ends without results or becomes strained over the Taiwan issue, the gap between U.S. and Japanese policies toward China could actually narrow.
The third variable is how China manages its rare earth export controls. As long as its structural comparative advantage in refining and processing is maintained [6], Beijing has the capacity to use this tool as a card in a long-term struggle. Until Japan's efforts to secure alternative suppliers reach the commercialization stage, China is expected to continue demanding a change in Japan's stance on Taiwan while modulating the intensity of its pressure.
The fourth variable is the domestic political sustainability of the Takaichi administration. The government's capacity to respond will be determined by the level of domestic support for its dual-track approach of simultaneously expanding defense spending and managing conflict with China, and by how many resources it can allocate in the competition for priority with other domestic issues like monetary and fiscal policy.
III. Final Policy Recommendations
Prime Minister Takaichi's Visit to the U.S. and Structural Tensions in China-Japan Relations: Comprehensive Recommendations and Action Plan
1. Overall Assessment and Recommended Response
This issue has the appearance of a bilateral conflict between Japan and China, but in substance, it is a derivative of the U.S.-China strategic competition. Vice Minister Lu Kang's statement was not about an individual issue but a matter of principle. The fact that he “stipulated that a change in Japan's stance on Taiwan is a precondition for any shift in its policy toward Japan” [3] defines the nature of the situation. This is a structural issue that cannot be resolved by Prime Minister Takaichi retracting her remarks or expressing regret. Considering that China's comparative advantage in refining and processing is “expected to persist structurally for the next three to five years” [3][6], this conflict requires a multi-year risk management framework rather than an ad hoc response.
South Korea's basic position must be clear: a principle of not taking sides in the bilateral China-Japan conflict [3][6][9]. Intervening by either endorsing or opposing Japan's language on Taiwan or its defense white paper disputes offers no practical benefit. Instead, a dual-track approach is appropriate: separately addressing the two spillover channels created by this conflict—rare earth supply chain risks and the fallout from Taiwan Strait tensions—on an issue-by-issue basis [3][6][9]. How the demonstration of U.S.-Japan alliance solidarity and the outcome of the U.S.-China summit change Tokyo's calculations is a matter to be tracked separately, not something for which South Korea should preemptively take a position.
The core of the recommended response is speed and selectivity. The rare earth and critical mineral supply chains must be assessed immediately. The spillover channels from the Taiwan Strait should be monitored without intervention. Cooperation with Japan should be limited to areas with clear practical benefits, such as supply chains, maritime security, and intelligence sharing, rather than defense or historical language [9].
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plan
Short-Term (1–3 months): The outcomes of both the Takaichi-Trump meeting and the Trump-Xi summit (September 24) must be tracked simultaneously [1][4]. The fact that preliminary talks in New York between Besant, Greer, and He Lifeng are covering the renewal of the Busan Rare Earths Agreement and the establishment of a U.S.-China trade commission [13] is a sign that the U.S. and China are operating a separate channel for compromise on critical minerals. The South Korean government and companies must immediately analyze how the agreements from this channel will affect domestic procurement conditions for rare earths and magnets. It is time to review the inventory status of items for which domestic companies are dependent on China, assess the timeline for securing alternative procurement, and consider expanding short-term stockpiles [6].
Medium-Term (6 months–1 year)The final language on Taiwan in Japan's revised security documents, due in December, will be a key milestone for gauging the long-term trajectory of Sino-Japanese tensions [9]. If the language is softened, Beijing may adjust the intensity of its pressure. If it is maintained or strengthened, the conflict will become more entrenched. At this juncture, it will be necessary to re-examine the commercialization timelines for alternative supply projects, such as Japan's deep-sea mining off Minamitorishima and its waste liquid adsorption and recovery technologies, and to explore concrete possibilities for South Korean corporate equity participation or technological cooperation [6]. A review of potential equity investments in non-Chinese refining projects should also be conducted concurrently [6].
Long-term (1–3 years)Based on the projection that China's comparative advantage in refining and processing will persist for another 3–5 years [3][6], supply chain diversification must shift from a series of one-off responses to a system of continuous portfolio management. At the same time, it is crucial to continuously monitor how the U.S.-Japan alliance's efforts to check China coexist with the pragmatic economic track in U.S.-China relations—in other words, whether the "potential mismatch between Japan and the US on China" [7] becomes structural. This analysis will provide the basis for South Korea to determine where it can secure its practical interests within the framework of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is the specificity of the joint message from the Takaichi-Trump meeting. The key point to watch is whether it explicitly mentions checking China or remains at the level of general statements on alliance solidarity [1][4]. The second is the outcome of the Trump-Xi summit. If the renewal of the Busan rare earths agreement and the establishment of a U.S.-China trade commission are confirmed [13], this can be interpreted as a signal that Japan's leverage for pressuring China has been relatively weakened. The third is the U.S. decision on arms sales to Taiwan. As Beijing has hinted at the possibility of canceling the summit over this issue [15], Washington's actual choice will determine the trajectory of risk in the Taiwan Strait.
The fourth is the changing intensity of China's rare earth export controls. An easing of controls would suggest the conflict is shifting into a management phase, whereas a tightening would indicate a deepening of its structural entrenchment. The fifth is the final wording on Taiwan in the December revision of Japan's security documents [9]. The trigger criterion is that if a sharp change is detected in any of these five indicators, a reassessment of supply chain risks must be launched immediately.
4. Summary and Conclusion
The Takaichi administration recognizes the structural nature of its conflict with China but has adopted a strategy of offsetting it through closer alignment with the United States [3][9]. However, as Washington displays a cautious and pragmatic stance on the Taiwan issue and critical minerals negotiations ahead of the U.S.-China summit, a gap exists between Tokyo's expectations and Washington's actual priorities [7][12][15]. Whether this gap narrows or widens will be the key variable shaping the future of both U.S.-Japan and China-Japan relations.
South Korea's guiding principle for its response should be a dual-track approach: pursuing practical interests while avoiding bandwagoning [3][6][9]. Rare earth supply chain risks are an immediate concern that must be addressed now. The potential spillover effects from the Taiwan Strait should be monitored, but this is not an issue for premature engagement. While the matter should not be treated as a purely bilateral issue between Japan and China, it is necessary to reaffirm that South Korea has no reason to be drawn into disputes over wording on Taiwan or defense policy debates.
References
[1] [Nikkei Asia] Takaichi seeks Trump meeting early next week ahead of US-China summit
[5] [USTR (U.S. Trade Representative)] Ambassador Greer to Travel to New York
[7] [The Diplomat] The Potential Mismatch Between Japan and the US on China
[12] [Brookings Institution] Why Beijing isn’t taking the bait with Trump
[13] [South China Morning Post] US announces AI dialogue with China, launches Board of Trade
[15] [The Diplomat] The Perils of Mind-Reading in the Taiwan Strait
[16] [Daily Sabah] Top US, Chinese officials set for AI, trade, minerals talks
[18] [Nikkei Asia] Xi visits Washington, NSE listing, UN General Assembly debate
[19] [The Diplomat] 4 Fault Lines that Could Shape the Trump-Xi Summit
[21] [Bangkok Post] Top US, Chinese economic officials meet ahead of Trump-Xi summit
[22] [Al Jazeera] US, China open high-level talks ahead of Trump-Xi summit
[24] [Nikkei Asia] Analysis: Trump factor limits diplomatic outcome of Xi's outreach to Modi
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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