Iran Considers Strikes on U.S. Bases in Europe as NATO Allies Bolster Defense Posture: A Geopolitical Risk Analysis

Executive Summary

As the war with Iran becomes protracted, the depletion of U.S. interceptor missile stockpiles—by at least 38% for THAAD and up to 65% for Patriot—is a physical constraint that is diminishing the Trump administration's own authority to decide on escalation. Reports that figures close to the Iranian regime considered striking U.S. military bases in Europe, such as those in Bulgaria and Cyprus, immediately after President Trump rejected negotiations are interpreted as leverage to pressure a return to the negotiating table. NATO has reaffirmed its deterrence and defense posture, citing its track record of four successful intercepts of Iranian missiles heading toward Turkey, and preventive measures are already underway, including enhanced security at Bulgaria's Bezmer Air Base and Greece's consideration of relocating Patriot systems to Crete. The United States is likely to respond with a combination of bolstering its defense posture and applying economic pressure, such as a ground blockade, rather than military escalation. This can be seen as a consequence of the chronic low-production structure of the U.S. defense industry coming to the surface. The South Korean government and defense companies need to recognize this not as a temporary event but as a structural variable, consult on the asset allocation priorities for U.S. Forces Korea, expedite the deployment of indigenous interceptor systems like L-SAM, and prepare to meet the air defense needs of NATO member states.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

Iran Considers Striking U.S. Bases in Europe: A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

The war with Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, with U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, has now, as of August, turned into a protracted war of attrition lasting over five months [7]. The United States initially aimed for a short, decisive intervention, but the actual course of the war has deviated significantly from this goal [7]. Although an Israeli airstrike killed Supreme Leader Khamenei, it did not lead to the regime's collapse, and Iran immediately launched a counterattack [7].

In the process, the depletion of U.S. interceptor missile stockpiles has accumulated. THAAD inventories are estimated to have decreased by at least 38%, and Patriot inventories by up to 65% [7][3]. The Atlantic Council analyzed that the war with Iran has, since February, consumed up to three-fifths of the U.S. military's Patriot interceptor missile stockpile and up to half of its THAAD stockpile [3]. Due to production bottlenecks for components, resupply is expected to take several years, and this inventory shortage is now a key factor in the White House's discussions on the timing and conditions for negotiations with Tehran [3].

Against this backdrop, the Financial Times reported on August 19 that officials and figures close to the Iranian regime had considered striking U.S. military bases in southeastern Europe if President Trump were to escalate the war [15][4]. According to the Times of India, the Iranian military command has reportedly already reviewed targets including those in Bulgaria and Cyprus [4]. Bulgaria, in particular, was cited as a specific reason for the target review, as it was confirmed to have recently approved U.S. use of aerial refueling tankers at Bezmer Air Base [4]. Le Temps reported that this news caused a significant stir in Sofia [8].

2. Current Situation

Two sources close to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) confirmed to the French-language outlet La Nouvelle Tribune that the Iranian command had reviewed multiple response scenarios targeting U.S. military facilities in southeastern Europe [6]. Al Jazeera noted that this report emerged immediately after President Trump rejected new negotiations with Iran [13]. The Italian daily Il Sole 24 Ore reported that, following the expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, the United States is considering additional sanctions to squeeze Iran's economy, including even a ground blockade [16]. In effect, a phase of escalation is proceeding concurrently with the review of European targets.

In response, NATO immediately declared its defense posture. A NATO official told Arab News that "the Alliance's deterrence and defense posture is strong and effective," citing as evidence the four instances where NATO's air defense network intercepted Iranian ballistic missiles heading toward Turkey [12]. A NATO official speaking to Al Jazeera also stated, "NATO is prepared to respond to all threats and will take all necessary steps to defend all allies" [13].

Local responses have already entered the implementation phase. Bulgaria has enhanced security measures at Bezmer Air Base [13]. The Greek Ministry of National Defence announced it is considering relocating the Patriot air defense battery deployed on the island of Karpathos to the Souda Naval Base on Crete [14]. A Greek official explained that if the Souda base is assessed to be exposed to a significant threat, the battery could be moved to strengthen the defense of the surrounding area [14]. The timing of this measure—coming after the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes against Iran this year and immediately after reports of Iran's review of European targets—suggests a direct connection [14].

3. Key Actors and Stances

The Iranian Regime and the IRGC: The very act of Iranian sources leaking information about the target review to the European press serves as a preemptive warning to the Trump administration. The Times of India interpreted this as "a message to Europe that it too could receive missiles" [4]. By repeatedly emphasizing that the decision to escalate rests entirely with Washington, Iran is employing a rhetorical strategy of shifting responsibility for any retaliation to the U.S. side [10].

The United States: Having rejected new negotiations with Iran, the Trump administration is considering further economic pressure against the country [16][13]. However, the physical constraint of depleted Patriot and THAAD stockpiles is acting as a significant brake on any decision to escalate [3][7]. Compounded by a carrier gap in the Western Pacific and losses of unmanned aerial vehicles, this is having ripple effects on the deterrence posture toward China and North Korea, leaving the U.S. facing a resource allocation dilemma between defending Europe and escalating the conflict in the region [7].

NATO: At the Secretariat level, NATO has publicly reaffirmed its immediate will to defend its members [12][13]. However, actual air defense assets depend on individual adjustments by member states. Emphasizing the effectiveness of its deterrence by citing the Turkish intercept cases can be seen as an approach that seeks to back the credibility of its collective defense commitment with past performance rather than current, tangible capabilities [12].

Bulgaria: With its own decision to approve U.S. operation of refueling tankers at Bezmer Air Base being cited as a direct reason for the target review, Bulgaria finds itself immediately feeling the security costs of its policy choice [4][8]. Although it has responded by enhancing security measures, the very situation of its territory being mentioned as a potential proxy battlefield in the Iran-U.S. conflict is reported to have sent considerable shockwaves through Sofia's political circles [8].

Greece: Its consideration of moving Patriot systems from Karpathos to Crete is an autonomous response, redeploying its own air defense assets based on its own judgment [14]. This shows that, separate from NATO's collective defense declarations, individual member states are undertaking independent defense adjustments based on their own threat assessments.

Cyprus: Although mentioned as a potential target, no specific response measures have been reported to the same extent as in Bulgaria. Its relationship with security alliance frameworks outside the EU and its unique status as a non-NATO country could act as factors constraining its response options.

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the physical limitation of U.S. military air defense assets. If an additional front were to open in Europe while Patriot and THAAD stockpiles are already significantly depleted, the issue of coordinating asset reallocation priorities between the United States and its allies will inevitably arise [3][7].

The second issue is the relationship between NATO's collective defense commitment and the autonomous measures of individual member states. The phenomenon of Greece and Bulgaria taking separate actions based on their own judgments, independent of the NATO Secretariat's defense declarations, is intertwined with the trend of Europe transitioning from a U.S.-centric single-pillar structure to a dual-pillar U.S.-Europe structure [2].

The third issue is whether Iran's threat of escalation will translate into actual action or remain a signal aimed at securing negotiating leverage. The fact that Iranian sources leaked the information to the press immediately after Trump's rejection of negotiations [13] suggests the possibility that the report itself was designed as a tool of diplomatic pressure rather than a military warning.

II. In-Depth Analysis

Iran Considers Striking U.S. Bases in Europe: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Root Cause Analysis

The origin of this situation is the unexpected protraction of the war with Iran. When the war began in February 2026, the United States aimed for a short, decisive intervention [7]. Despite the elimination of Supreme Leader Khamenei, the regime did not collapse [7]. Instead, Iran immediately launched a counterattack [7]. In effect, the war of attrition, lasting over five months, has granted the Iranian leadership more strategic time than anticipated.

During this time, Iran learned about both the limits of its own deterrence and the vulnerabilities of the United States. The UAE announced that since February, it had intercepted 537 ballistic missiles, 2,256 drones, and 26 cruise missiles [7]. The very fact that Patriot and THAAD batteries were engaged simultaneously across the Gulf demonstrates Iran's saturation attack capabilities [7]. At the same time, these engagements depleted U.S. interceptor missile stockpiles by at least 38% for THAAD and up to 65% for Patriot [7][3]. From Iran's perspective, this confirmed an asymmetric attrition dynamic in which it continues to accumulate its missile assets while its adversary depletes its interceptor assets.

This asymmetry is the fundamental driver that has led Iran to seek a new escalation ladder. The Economic Times assessed this as the addition of "a new rung on Iran's escalation ladder" [1]. The outlet notes that Iran has already proven it can impose real costs on the U.S. military and its regional allies [1]. Reports that striking undersea infrastructure near the Strait of Hormuz was also under consideration [1] show that Iran's targeting is expanding geographically beyond the Persian Gulf. The review of European targets is an extension of this expansion, not a separate, new decision.

The timing of this report, coinciding with President Trump's rejection of new negotiations with Iran, is another pillar of the causal structure [13]. Reports emerged simultaneously that the U.S. was considering an additional blockade of Iran's economy, particularly a ground blockade, following the expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding [16]. From Iran's perspective, in a situation where diplomatic exits are closing and economic pressure is mounting, it is highly likely that a calculation was at play to secure leverage for resuming negotiations through the threat of escalation.

2. Structural Context

Security Structure: Coinciding with NATO's Transition to a Dual-Pillar System

This situation coincides exactly with NATO's transitional period from a U.S.-centric single-pillar structure to a dual-pillar U.S.-Europe structure [2]. With the fifth year of the Ukraine war and the Trump administration's "America First 2.0" agenda converging, the U.S. Department of Defense is in a phase of dual pressure: pressing allies to increase defense spending and force contributions while demanding that its own defense industry accelerate production [2]. The dismissal of the commander of the U.S. Army's V Corps in Europe is cited as a symbolic example of the friction in this readjustment process [2].

Within this structure, Iran's mention of Bulgaria and Cyprus as targets goes beyond simple military calculations. Bulgaria is the country that recently approved U.S. use of aerial refueling tankers at Bezmer Air Base [4]. Iran's threat has been injected at a time when two trends are proceeding simultaneously: the placement of U.S. power projection infrastructure in the frontline states of NATO's eastward expansion, and the pressure on Europe to seek greater self-reliance. EAI assesses that Europe is currently "besieged on all sides" [9]. With negotiations to end the war in Ukraine stalled, Russia's westward ambitions continuing, and internal friction over readjustment ongoing within NATO, a threat from Iran has now been added to the mix [9].

Logistics Structure: Chronic Low Production of Interceptor Assets

The depletion of U.S. interceptor missile stockpiles is judged to be not a temporary shock triggered by the war with Iran, but the result of the chronic low-production structure of the U.S. defense industry coming to the surface [7]. Resupply is expected to take several years due to component production bottlenecks [7][3]. The Atlantic Council analyzes that this inventory problem is already acting as a tangible variable in the White House's discussions on the timing and conditions for negotiations with Tehran [3]. Compounded by a carrier gap in the Western Pacific and the loss of 25% of its MQ-9 drones, this is a structural problem with ripple effects across the entire deterrence posture toward China and North Korea [7].

When this structure is combined with the threat to European targets, the U.S. dilemma is compounded. To defend its bases in Europe, the U.S. would need to deploy additional Patriot and THAAD assets, but those very assets have already been significantly depleted on the Gulf front. This is not a simple logistics problem; it leads to the fundamental question of whether the United States can provide credible air defense in two or more theaters simultaneously.

Political Structure: Asymmetric Exposure of Individual European Nations

The responses of Bulgaria and Greece are of a different nature from NATO's collective response. The official NATO position is limited to a declaration of defensive intent in principle [12][13]. Actual measures are being taken at the individual country level. Bulgaria has independently enhanced security at Bezmer Air Base [13], and Greece is independently considering relocating the Patriot battery from Karpathos to the Souda base on Crete [14]. This reveals the reality that in the face of an actual threat, NATO's principle of collective defense is fragmented into the individual judgments and asset deployments of each country. The structure in which countries that host U.S. bases bear the asymmetric risk of becoming targets in return has the potential to act as a new variable in the defense burden-sharing debate during NATO's transition to a dual-pillar system.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

This is not the first time Iran has employed its escalation ladder in this manner. The Economic Times, defining this review of European targets as a "new rung on Iran's escalation ladder," points to precedents where Iran has already proven its ability to impose real costs on the U.S. military and its regional allies [1]. The missile and drone saturation attacks in the Gulf region serve as an empirical example [7]. The current review of European targets can be interpreted as an attempt to geographically extend this proven capability.

The four instances where Iranian ballistic missiles aimed at Turkey were intercepted by NATO's air defense network [12] show that NATO has already accumulated combat interception experience against Iranian missiles. The fact that NATO immediately cited this precedent right after the reports on the review of Bulgarian and Cypriot targets [12] suggests that its response to the current threat is not based on an entirely new scenario but is being conducted as an extension of its existing, proven defense systems. However, while the Turkish intercepts occurred in a regional country directly bordering Iran, Bulgaria and Cyprus are in southeastern Europe, much farther away, indicating a qualitative difference in the geographical expansion.

The consideration of striking undersea infrastructure in the Strait of Hormuz [1] is in line with typical gray-zone tactics, where a state actor targets civilian or dual-use infrastructure instead of military targets to maximize economic costs. The review of striking U.S. military bases in Europe shares a similar logical structure in that it is a method of maximizing the adversary's political burden rather than seeking a direct clash between regular forces. By targeting bases that are U.S. facilities but located on European territory, Iran can be seen as making a calculation aimed at distributing the political costs of escalation not only to the United States but across all NATO allies.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is whether the Trump administration decides to escalate the conflict. The target review itself was reported as being conditional on "if Trump escalates" [15][4][10]. Whether negotiations with Iran are resumed and whether additional sanctions, including a ground blockade, are implemented [16] are the primary variables that will determine the likelihood of an actual strike.

The second variable is the replenishment rate of U.S. interceptor assets. With Patriot and THAAD stockpiles already significantly depleted [7][3], NATO's actual defense capability will be determined by whether it can secure assets for new deployments in Europe. As replenishment is expected to take several years [3], this variable is unlikely to be resolved in the short term.

The third variable is the speed of NATO's transition to a dual-pillar system and the coherence of individual member states' responses. The key question is how well NATO's collective defense declarations and the independent actions of individual countries like Bulgaria and Greece [13][14] will be coordinated going forward. Considering a previous analysis that the most likely baseline scenario (with a 55% probability) is one in which U.S. pressure for burden-sharing and European efforts toward self-reliance proceed in parallel with continued friction [2], this incident has the potential to serve as an event that adds the real pressure of a security threat to that dynamic of friction.

The fourth variable is the gap between Iran's actual intent to act and its capability to do so. So far, all reports are at the level of "considered" or "discussed" [15][4][6]; the actual decision to strike and the ability to execute it are separate matters. Differences in internal calculations within the Iranian leadership—between factions that want to use the threat of escalation as negotiating leverage and those concerned about the risk of a full-scale conflict with all of NATO that an actual strike on Europe would entail—will likely determine future developments.