China's Strategic Response to Japan's Top 3 Security Documents and Drone Power Enhancement: Analysis of East Asian Security Paradigm Shift and Geopolitical Risks

Executive Summary

The warning issued by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) organ, PLA Daily, regarding Japan's drone power enhancement should not be interpreted as mere media commentary. Instead, it should be understood as China's official and structural response to the shift in the East Asian security paradigm triggered by Japan's revision of its top three security documents (National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program) in 2022. Given that Japan has specified unmanned defense capabilities as a key means to realize its counterstrike capability and has formalized an investment of 1 trillion yen over five years, China's pressure is likely to be a structural friction that will continue in the medium to long term, with a high probability of entrenching a security dilemma where the actions of both sides mutually reinforce each other. The current situation suggests that the most realistic scenario (55% probability) is the establishment of a complex competition structure where China's cognitive warfare continues while Japan incrementally enhances its unmanned capabilities. An 'asymmetric dual-track strategy' that simultaneously pursues military and technological capability enhancement alongside diplomatic and cognitive domain management is recommended as the optimal response. From the perspective of businesses and investors, it is necessary to approach structural changes, such as stable government investment, expanded Japan-Taiwan drone supply chain cooperation, and capital inflow into defense drone companies, as opportunities for medium- to long-term positioning beyond short-term volatility.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

Analysis of the Issue Situation: Chinese Military Organ's Warning on Japan's Drone Power Enhancement

1. Background and Progression of the Issue

Japan's defense transformation began in earnest with the simultaneous revision of its 'Top 3 Security Documents'—the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), and Defense Buildup Program (DBUP)—adopted at the end of 2022. These documents effectively reinterpret the principle of 'exclusively defense-oriented policy' (senshu bōei) that has formed the bedrock of Japan's post-war security policy, officially sanction the possession of 'counterstrike capability' (tekki kichi kōgeki nōryoku) to attack enemy bases, and mark a historic shift to increase defense spending to 2% of GDP over five years. Specifically, the Defense Buildup Program explicitly designates unmanned defense capabilities as a key means to realize counterstrike capability and stipulates an investment of 1 trillion yen (approximately $6.2 billion) in the unmanned systems sector over five years starting from 2023 [1].

The background to this policy shift lies in China's rapid military expansion. China is showcasing an offensive nuclear posture by strengthening its ballistic missile capabilities launched from nuclear-powered submarines, and recently, it has intensified regional deterrence competition by test-firing submarine-launched ballistic missiles from the South China Sea towards the Pacific [2][18]. In response, the Japanese government has been reviewing measures to strengthen US extended deterrence in conjunction with the revision of the top three security documents, and is concretizing its strategy to simultaneously pursue the development of the Self-Defense Forces' independent deterrence capabilities [2].

Drones have emerged as a symbolic tool in this strategic transformation. With the Ukraine war demonstrating that small unmanned aerial vehicles are asymmetric assets that can change the tide of the battlefield [15], Japan is actively utilizing unmanned platforms as a strategic means to acquire substantial combat capabilities while minimizing the constraints of Article 9 of its constitution. Japan's Ministry of Defense is also pursuing cooperation with Ukrainian drone developers, which has drawn public criticism from Russia [4].

2. Current Situation (Latest Trends)

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) organ, PLA Daily, recently issued a comprehensive warning directly targeting Japan's enhancement of its unmanned combat capabilities. The article warned that Japan is pursuing a 'remilitarisation' agenda by utilizing unmanned platforms to circumvent constitutional constraints and that the potential risks of its attempts to build asymmetric advantages in future warfare should not be underestimated [1]. This is interpreted not merely as commentary but as part of cognitive warfare (認識戰) reflecting the official stance of the PLA.

In response, high-ranking officials from Japan's Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are establishing a rapid information response system via X (formerly Twitter). The unusual move of top uniformed officers, including the spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense and the Chief of Staff, successively opening accounts to engage in information operations countering China's cognitive warfare is drawing attention [12]. This indicates that competition in the information and cognitive domains is intensifying alongside military buildup.

Changes are also evident in the industrial and investment sectors. Funds are flowing heavily into Japanese drone-related stocks, with investors focusing on defense drone companies as an alternative to AI stocks [3]. Japanese industrial drone manufacturer ACSL is expanding its ties with the Taiwanese drone supply chain and has confirmed its participation in the Taipei Aerospace & Defense Technology Exhibition (TADTE) in 2027, indicating a rapid deepening of Japan-Taiwan drone industry cooperation [5][7].

3. Key Actors and Their Positions/Interests

Japanese Government and Self-Defense Forcesare systematizing unmanned combat capabilities, including drones, as a core component of their counterstrike capability, using the top three security documents as legal and policy grounds. From Japan's perspective, enhancing drone capabilities is a practical means to counter the threats from China and North Korea while maximally maintaining the boundaries of constitutional interpretation. Furthermore, the strategic necessity to strengthen independent deterrence capabilities is supporting these actions amid growing uncertainty regarding the reliability of US extended deterrence [10][19].

Chinese People's Liberation Army and Chinese Governmentcharacterize Japan's drone power enhancement as a hollowed-out version of its constitutional pacifism and a threat that disrupts the regional military balance. The public warning issued through PLA Daily is not mere media commentary but a strategic message reflecting the PLA's official stance, carrying a dual purpose: to convey China's serious concerns about Japan's military modernization and to conduct cognitive warfare targeting regional public opinion [1]. The Global Times also criticizes Japan's involvement in the South China Sea as an expression of 'strategic ambition,' reinforcing China's offensive narrative [8][16].

United Statesactively supports Japan's defense buildup from the perspective of burden-sharing within the alliance. The trilateral security cooperation framework among South Korea, the US, and Japan continues to strengthen, with the military chiefs of the three nations reaffirming their goal of North Korean denuclearization [14]. However, the issue of US commitment reliability raised during the Trump administration has created a structural incentive for Japan to accelerate its independent defense buildup [10].

Taiwanis deepening its drone industry cooperation with Japan in both security and economic aspects. Taiwan's drone industry is showing rapid growth, with production value expected to surge from approximately 5 billion New Taiwan Dollars in 2024 to 12.9 billion in 2025 [7]. Taiwan is also moving to build capabilities to counter China's maritime pressure by introducing maritime drones [6]. Through its drone supply chain linkages with Japan, Taiwan is proceeding towards effectively institutionalizing security cooperation [5].

4. Summary of Key Issues

First, the tension between constitutional constraints and substantive rearmament is emerging as a key issue. Japan maintains that drones are operated within the framework of Article 9 of its constitution, defining them as 'defensive means,' but China interprets this as substantive progress in rearmament that bypasses constitutional limitations [1]. This gap in interpretation acts as a structural factor that deepens strategic distrust between the two countries.The tension between constitutional constraints and substantive rearmamentis emerging as a core issue. Japan maintains that drones are 'defensive means' and will be operated within the framework of Article 9 of the Constitution, but China interprets this as substantive progress in rearmament that bypasses constitutional constraints [1]. This gap in interpretation acts as a structural factor that deepens strategic distrust between the two countries.

Second, the linkage between the top three security documents and drone strategy is a significant issue. The security documents revised in 2022 explicitly identify unmanned defense capabilities as a priority for realizing counterstrike capabilities, clarifying that Japan's drone investment is not merely technological modernization but aims at restructuring its strategic deterrence framework [1][2]. The speed and scope with which the directions set forth in these documents translate into actual force projection will be a determining factor in the future regional security structure.Connectivity between the Three Security Documents and drone strategyis a significant issue. The security documents revised in 2022 explicitly designate unmanned defense capabilities as a priority for the implementation of counter-strike capabilities, making it clear that Japan's drone investments are not merely technological modernization but aim to reshape the strategic deterrence structure [1][2]. The speed and scope with which the directions set forth in these documents translate into actual force deployment will be a variable determining the regional security landscape going forward.

Third, the expansion of regional solidarity mediated by drones is amplifying China's strategic concerns. Japan-Taiwan drone supply chain cooperation, Japan-Ukraine drone technology cooperation [4][5][7], and other initiatives demonstrate that drones are functioning as mediators of geopolitical solidarity beyond mere weapon systems. China perceives these solidarity structures as forming part of a containment network aimed at itself.The spread of regional solidarity mediated by dronesis amplifying China's strategic concerns. Japan-Taiwan drone supply chain cooperation and Japan-Ukraine drone technology cooperation [4][5][7], among others, demonstrate that drones are functioning as mediators of geopolitical solidarity beyond mere weapon systems. China perceives these solidarity frameworks as forming part of an encirclement aimed at its own country.

Fourth, the formation of new fronts in cognitive and information warfare also warrants attention. The comprehensive warning from PLA Daily and the establishment of a rapid information response system by Japan's Ministry of Defense [12] suggest that military competition is extending beyond physical force buildup into the information space concerning public opinion and perception. Competition in this domain is highly likely to structurally escalate regional tensions through a mutually reinforcing dynamic with the physical arms race.The formation of a new front in cognitive and information warfareis also noteworthy. The full-scale warning from PLA Daily and the establishment of an SNS response system by Japan's Ministry of Defense [12] suggest that military competition is extending beyond physical force buildup into the information space concerning public opinion and perception. Competition in this domain is highly likely to structurally escalate regional tensions in a mutually reinforcing manner with conventional arms races.

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

In-depth Issue Analysis: Chinese Military Organ's Warning on Japan's Drone Power Enhancement

1. Analysis of the Fundamental Causes of the Issue

The fundamental cause of this issue is ostensibly the competition in drone technology, but at a deeper level lies the far more fundamental dynamic of the structural realignment of the East Asian balance of power. It is essential to first understand that this warning was issued at the intersection of China's rapid military expansion and Japan's corresponding shift in its security paradigm.

Japan's enhancement of its drone capabilities is not an independent policy choice but a direct product of the strategic framework established by the top three security documents in 2022. With the simultaneous revision of the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program, Japan has effectively reinterpreted the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy maintained for 77 years since the war and officially sanctioned the possession of counterstrike capability to attack enemy bases [1]. The explicit designation of unmanned defense capabilities as a key means to realize counterstrike capability in these documents is not merely a technological investment decision but a declaration of a fundamental shift in Japan's strategic identity. China's characterization of drone power enhancement as evidence of 'remilitarisation' stems precisely from its accurate reading of this strategic context.

China's offensive military actions are also a direct cause that has accelerated Japan's strategic transformation. China has intensified regional nuclear deterrence competition by test-firing submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from the South China Sea towards the Pacific [2][18] and is pressuring regional competitors in new ways, such as dispatching coast guard vessels as far east as the Pacific [9]. These actions by China have reinforced Japan's perception that its security cannot be guaranteed by US extended deterrence alone, serving as a justification for the necessity of building independent deterrence capabilities. Ultimately, the vicious cycle of the security dilemma, where China's military expansion fuels Japan's defense buildup, which in turn provokes China's vigilance, can be considered the most fundamental cause of this issue.

It is not coincidental that the technological platform of drones has emerged at the forefront of this conflict. Unmanned systems are the most efficient means for Japan to acquire substantial combat capabilities under the constraints of Article 9 of its constitution. While the expansion of manned fighter jets or ground forces would cause constitutional and political controversy, unmanned platforms allow for the development of asymmetric capabilities with relatively lower political resistance [1]. The fact that the war in Ukraine has empirically demonstrated the battlefield effectiveness of small drones [15] has also served as a significant cause, providing a strong practical basis for this strategic choice.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure

At the political level, this issue is friction arising from the realignment of regional alliance structures within the context of US-China strategic competition. Amidst intensifying US-China competition, Japan has chosen a path of deeper integration into the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy, with strengthened trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan being a concrete manifestation [14]. From China's perspective, Japan's drone power enhancement is not merely a defense buildup but an act of Japan actively participating in the US-led containment network against China.

Notably, Japan's Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces have begun to directly counter China's cognitive warfare by establishing a rapid information response system via X (formerly Twitter) [12]. The successive opening of social media accounts by the spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense and the Chief of Staff indicates that Japan recognizes competition in the information and cognitive domains as a strategic challenge, alongside military buildup. This also signifies that Japan clearly recognizes PLA Daily's comprehensive warning not as mere media reporting but as part of China's cognitive warfare strategy.

The political structure is also evident in the South China Sea issue. Despite not being a direct claimant, Japan asserts itself as a 'stakeholder with legitimate interests' in the South China Sea disputes and is actively intervening [16]. China interprets this as Japan's strategic ambition and an attempt to expand its regional influence [8]. This political conflict structure positions the drone competition not merely as an arms race but as part of a hegemonic struggle over the reshaping of the regional order.

Economic Structure

At the economic level, structural changes are underway involving the civil-military integration of the defense industry and the realignment of supply chains. As the Japanese government has formalized its commitment to invest 1 trillion yen in the unmanned systems sector over five years [1], private investors are channeling substantial funds into drone-related companies [3]. This signifies that the increase in defense spending is not merely an expansion of government expenditure but is also promoting structural changes that are reorienting the entire private industrial ecosystem towards defense.

From a supply chain perspective, the deepening cooperation between Japan and Taiwan in the drone industry is noteworthy. Japan's industrial drone manufacturer ACSL is pursuing an expansion of its supply chain in Taiwan [5], and cooperation with Japan is playing a crucial role in the explosive growth of Taiwan's drone industry exports, projected to surge from NT$140 million in 2024 to NT$2.9 billion in 2025 [7]. This transcends mere commercial cooperation, carrying strategic implications for the integration of defense industry supply chains among nations that perceive China as a common security threat. From China's perspective, Japan-Taiwan drone industry cooperation can only be viewed as both an economic challenge and a security threat.

Security Structure

The core of the security structure lies in the expansion of Japan's strategic autonomy and the qualitative transformation of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Traditionally, Japan maintained an asymmetrical alliance structure reliant on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence. However, following the revision of its three key security documents, Japan is shifting towards possessing independent counterstrike capabilities [2]. This reflects a realistic assessment that the premise of U.S. commitment to its allies is no longer absolute [10]. Drone capabilities represent the most visible manifestation of this expansion of strategic autonomy.

Furthermore, the simultaneous criticisms from Russia towards Japan [4] and warnings from China indicate that Japan is facing security pressure on multiple fronts. Russia has characterized Japan's cooperation with Ukrainian drone developers as a 'hostile act,' suggesting that Japan's drone strategy carries global implications, linking European conflicts with Indo-Pacific security. The structure where China and Russia independently issue warnings regarding Japan's drone capabilities highlights the complexity of the security environment Japan confronts.

3. Comparative Analysis of Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

Historically, China's aggressive response to Japan's defense capability transitions is not unprecedented. However, this case presents several significant distinctions compared to the past.

The most similar historical precedent is China's backlash against the mid-1990s revision of the Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Guidelines. At that time, China strongly opposed Japan's introduction of the 'contingency situations in areas surrounding Japan' concept, which established a legal basis for supporting U.S. forces in the event of a Taiwan contingency, characterizing Japan's expanded military role as a 'revival of militarism.' However, the conflict at that time remained largely at the level of diplomatic rhetoric and did not take the form of comprehensive warnings through military publications. The current comprehensive warning from the PLA Daily signifies a qualitative shift, indicating that China perceives Japan's defense capability transition as a far more serious security threat.

The rearmament process of West Germany during the Cold War also offers a useful comparison. West Germany pursued rearmament upon joining NATO in 1955, which the Soviet Union vehemently opposed, labeling it a 'revival of fascism.' West Germany managed the concerns of neighboring countries by limiting its independent military capabilities within the NATO collective defense framework while simultaneously building substantial defense capacity. There is a structural similarity to West Germany's experience in that Japan's current strategy involves strengthening asymmetric capabilities through drones within the framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance. However, unlike West Germany, where the multilateral security framework of NATO provided legitimacy for rearmament, Japan must pursue its strategic transition under the more stringent constraints of Article 9 of its constitution.

The experience of drones altering the battlefield landscape in the Ukraine war serves as the most direct ongoing parallel case [15]. As small unmanned aerial vehicles have demonstrated asymmetric effects by neutralizing armored forces and air defense systems, all major military powers have prioritized the enhancement of their drone capabilities. Japan's pursuit of cooperation with Ukrainian drone developers [4] is an attempt to directly absorb these combat experiences and is perceived as a strategic warning signal by both China and Russia.

Taiwan's case is also noteworthy. Taiwan is building asymmetric capabilities to counter China's maritime pressure by ordering dozens of maritime drones [6], and has rapidly expanded its drone industry production scale from NT$5 billion to NT$12.9 billion in just one year [7]. The fact that Japan and Taiwan share drone supply chains, forming a de facto defense industry cooperation network, is a structural factor that leads China to perceive Japan's drone capability enhancement not as an isolated issue but as the formation of a regional containment network against China.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

The key variables that will determine the future development of this issue can be broadly categorized into four.

First, the volatility of Japan-China relations.If Japan-China relations shift towards a phase of easing, Japan may face a strategic dilemma between the U.S. strategy of pressuring China and its own security interests [18]. Conversely, if Japan-China conflict intensifies, Japan's defense capability enhancement will accelerate further. The direction of Japan-China relations is the most critical exogenous variable determining the speed and intensity of Japan's security strategy.

Second, the boundaries of Japanese domestic politics and constitutional interpretation.China's assertion that drone capabilities are being used as a means to effectively circumvent the constraints of Article 9 of the Constitution is a contentious issue within Japanese domestic politics. If discussions on constitutional revision progress or the actual operational scope of counterstrike capabilities expands, the intensity of China's backlash will be significantly higher than at present. Conversely, domestic political constraints in Japan could serve as a buffer, moderating the pace of defense capability enhancement.

Third, the pace of drone technology development and supply chain structure.As cooperation between Japan and Taiwan in the drone industry deepens [5][7], and Japanese companies' technological capabilities advance, the level of threat perceived by China will also increase. In particular, the competition to develop next-generation drone systems combining AI and autonomous flight technologies is likely to evolve beyond mere quantitative increases into a competition for qualitative asymmetric superiority [10].

Fourth, the level of institutionalization of security cooperation among Japan, the U.S., and South Korea.As the military leaders of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea reaffirm the goal of North Korean denuclearization and strengthen trilateral security cooperation [14], if cooperation in the drone sector becomes institutionalized, China's strategic pressure could expand from targeting Japan alone to targeting the entire Japan-U.S.-South Korea bloc. Conversely, if cracks emerge in Japan-U.S.-South Korea cooperation, the justification for Japan's independent drone capability enhancement could weaken. This variable is a key factor determining the regional ripple effects of the issue.