← Back · ← Home · ← Back to list
Status of US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations and Prospects for Strait of Hormuz Security: Analysis of the 'Managed Uncertainty' Phase
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
In June 2025, the United States and Iran achieved diplomatic progress, including the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) mediated by Pakistan and Qatar and the holding of high-level negotiations in Switzerland. However, this agreement has been a superficial resolution, failing to fundamentally address Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support for regional proxies. The situation remains in a fragile balance, evidenced by the recurrence of attacks on civilian oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz just nine days after the MoU's signing. The current phase most closely aligns with the baseline scenario of 'managed uncertainty'—neither a complete breakthrough nor a total breakdown—with a probability of 50%. The Trump administration's transactional diplomacy is converging on a strategy that maintains negotiation momentum through economic incentives, such as the 60-day temporary waiver for Iranian oil sales, while simultaneously securing leverage to immediately reimpose sanctions if the agreement is violated. This suggests that U.S. foreign policy is likely to unfold through a 'phased transaction' approach, accumulating short-term, visible achievements. Consequently, both corporations and governments face the core challenge of managing persistent uncertainty. Therefore, this report recommends a core response strategy of 'Conditional Readiness,' which involves proactively preparing to seize opportunities in optimistic scenarios while deferring actual resource allocation until clear trigger points are met, and simultaneously strengthening risk hedging mechanisms immediately.Conditional Readiness strategy as the primary course of action.
Phase 1: Issue Situation Analysis
Prospects for Easing Tensions in the US-Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Strait of Hormuz: Issue Situation Analysis
1. Background and Progress of the Issue
The conflict between the United States and Iran escalated into military clashes in early 2025. After approximately four months of engagement, a diplomatic solution began to emerge. On June 14, 2025, President Trump officially announced the end of the war with Iran and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz [14]. This temporarily eased international concerns over the months-long energy supply crisis and the paralysis of global shipping. However, the prevailing assessment is that this agreement was a superficial resolution that failed to fundamentally address Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support for regional proxies. This is expected to remain a persistent source of instability in future negotiations [14].
Specific progress in the negotiations became visible in mid-June. The United States and Iran, with Pakistan and Qatar acting as mediators, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Islamabad. Subsequently, on June 22, they held the first high-level meeting in Switzerland to finalize a peace agreement [7]. At the Swiss talks, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent stated that Iran had pledged to ensure the 'free and open' passage through the Strait of Hormuz and to allow the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors [7]. In line with this diplomatic progress, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a temporary general license on the same day, permitting the sale of Iranian crude oil, petrochemicals, and petroleum products for 60 days until August 21 [2][8].
2. Current Situation (Latest Developments)
Maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has shown a gradual recovery since the signing of the MoU. According to data from the maritime intelligence firm Kpler, over 172 vessels have transited the strait since June 18, the day after the agreement was signed, with 42 vessels passing through on Saturday alone [15]. In the week following the agreement, 98 oil tankers transited the strait, reaching the highest number since the conflict began. Consequently, crude oil prices have fallen to pre-war levels, and the market has begun to reflect the possibility of normalization [16]. Furthermore, based on the outcomes of the Swiss talks, the United States and Iran have established a direct communication line to prevent military clashes within the Strait of Hormuz, and a 'de-confliction cell,' including Lebanon, has been formed [13][17].
However, the situation remains unstable. Nine days after the MoU signing, an attack on a civilian oil tanker recurred in the Strait of Hormuz [1]. Iran maintains its position that nuclear negotiations cannot begin until all five provisions of the MoU are fully implemented [12]. The New York Times analyzed that the ambiguous wording of the temporary ceasefire agreement, to which the U.S. negotiating team agreed, is hindering peace efforts less than two weeks after the agreement [19]. It is also noteworthy that Iran is continuing its war of nerves with the United States by reaffirming its control over the strait [12]. The shipping industry finds itself in a dilemma, facing the dual pressure of potential Iranian retaliation if they follow U.S. guidance and U.S. sanctions if they comply with Iran's demands [6].
3. Key Actors and Their Positions/Interests
United StatesIn this negotiation, the United States is pursuing two core objectives: controlling Iran's nuclear program and ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. While the Trump administration is highlighting the cessation of military conflict as a foreign policy achievement, it faces the structural limitation of entering negotiations without fundamentally resolving Iran's nuclear capabilities, ballistic missile issues, and support for regional proxies [14]. Treasury Secretary Bessent's direct announcement of the negotiation results and the issuance of the waiver for Iranian oil sales are interpreted as a strategic move to keep Iran engaged in negotiations through economic incentives [7][2].
Iranis employing a strategy to maintain control over the negotiations by setting the implementation of the MoU as a prerequisite for nuclear talks. Iran's UN Ambassador, Iravani, explicitly stated that nuclear negotiations can only commence after all five provisions of the MoU are fully implemented [12]. The joint review by Iran and Oman of potential transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz is seen as an attempt to economically institutionalize Iran's effective control over the strait [10]. Iran maintains a stance of leveraging its nuclear program and control over the strait during negotiations to extract maximum concessions.
Qatar and Pakistanare serving as mediators in this negotiation, acting as a bridge between the two parties. Following the Swiss talks, both countries issued a joint statement evaluating the 'encouraging progress' [13] and are responsible for facilitating the implementation of practical confidence-building measures, such as the establishment of a direct communication line. Qatar is utilizing its unique position, maintaining close security cooperation with the United States while also possessing diplomatic channels with Iran, to expand its influence in the Middle East.
South Koreais attempting active diplomatic engagement as a party with direct interests in the Strait of Hormuz transit issue. On June 26, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun held a phone conversation with Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi, welcoming the signing of the MoU and urging its faithful implementation and progress in subsequent negotiations, while emphasizing the importance of ensuring free and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz [4]. Given that South Korea relies heavily on the Middle East for its crude oil imports, this reflects the critical national interest in stabilizing the strait from an energy security perspective.
International Maritime Industryis facing an uncertain environment where they must make operational decisions caught between the dual pressures from the United States and Iran [6]. Despite the resumption of transit through the strait, the average number of vessels transiting daily remains significantly below the pre-conflict level of 138 [15], suggesting that it will take considerable time for the industry to regain confidence.
4. Summary of Key Issues
The key issues surrounding the current US-Iran negotiations can be summarized into four main points.
First, the ambiguity and implementation reliability of the MoUis a major concern. The unclear wording of the temporary ceasefire agreement has led to differing interpretations between the parties, as starkly demonstrated by the ship attack incident immediately following the agreement [1][19]. With Iran setting the full implementation of the MoU's five provisions as a prerequisite for nuclear negotiations [12], there are concerns that the sequential implementation structure of the agreement could delay the entire negotiation process.
Second, the future of Iran's nuclear programremains an issue. The three core challenges—Iran's nuclear capabilities, ballistic missile development, and support for regional proxies—were not fundamentally resolved in the current MoU and have been deferred to subsequent negotiations [14]. Although Iran has pledged the return of IAEA inspectors [7], the extent to which Iran will permit their access remains uncertain.
Third, the dispute over control of the Strait of Hormuzis significant. The joint review by Iran and Oman of potential transit fees is an attempt to economically institutionalize Iran's claim of sovereign control over the strait, which is expected to face strong opposition from the United States [10]. This issue is highly likely to become a new flashpoint for conflict after the 60-day transit fee exemption period expires.
Fourth, the sustainability of sanctions relief on Iranian oilis a critical factor. The 60-day temporary general license issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury expires on August 21 [2][8], and the extension of sanctions relief thereafter is directly linked to progress in nuclear negotiations. If negotiations stall, sanctions could be reimposed, which could have an immediate impact on the global energy market and South Korea's oil supply.
Phase 2: In-depth Issue Analysis
Prospects for Easing Tensions in the US-Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Strait of Hormuz: In-depth Issue Analysis
1. Analysis of the Root Causes of the Issue
The root cause of the US-Iran conflict extends beyond mere nuclear non-proliferation; it stems from a structural antagonism over regional hegemony in the Middle East. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, both countries have adhered to ideologically and strategically incompatible regional order visions, with Iran's nuclear program becoming the most acute manifestation of this conflict. From Iran's perspective, nuclear capability is not merely an energy policy but a crucial asset that guarantees its strategic autonomy as a regional power and serves as the ultimate deterrent against military threats from the United States and Israel. Conversely, the United States has maintained a maximum pressure stance under the perception that Iran's nuclear armament would trigger a Middle East nuclear domino effect and fundamentally threaten Israel's security.
The direct cause of the recent escalation into military conflict lies in the combination of Iran's acceleration of its nuclear program and its strategic pressure exerted through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran countered U.S. and Western sanctions with the asymmetric strategy of blockading the strait, which effectively functioned as leverage, immediately impacting global energy supply chains. However, as highlighted in an analysis by Foreign Affairs, the current agreement, reached after approximately four months of engagement, is assessed as a superficial resolution that has failed to fundamentally address the three core issues of Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support for regional proxies [14]. This suggests that the current agreement is likely to result in only a temporary easing of tensions rather than eliminating the root causes of the conflict.
The issue of the Strait of Hormuz is a physical manifestation of this structural conflict. Iran regards control of the strait as a strategic asset and has consistently shown an intention to leverage it maximally in external negotiations. The joint review by Iran and Oman of potential fees for passage through the strait [10] indicates that Iran is pursuing a long-term strategy to institutionalize its control over the strait not just as a military card but as a source of economic revenue. This directly conflicts with the U.S.-led principle of freedom of navigation and is expected to be a significant source of friction in future negotiations.
2. Structural Context
Political Structure
At the political level, this negotiation can be understood as an application of the Trump administration's 'transactional diplomacy' approach to Middle Eastern issues. President Trump brought Iran to the negotiating table through a combination of military pressure and economic incentives, but the ambiguous wording of the agreement has already led to interpretive conflicts between the parties [19]. Iran has set the precondition that nuclear negotiations cannot begin until all five provisions of the MoU are fully implemented [12], signifying that a struggle for control over the sequence and pace of negotiations has already begun.
The domestic political context is also crucial. Hardliners in Iran view any concessions on the nuclear program as undermining the legitimacy of the regime, and the ultimate decision-making authority of Supreme Leader Khamenei sets the practical limits of the negotiations. Within the United States, pro-Israel lobby groups and neoconservative hardliners maintain a stance that any compromise with Iran is unacceptable, making it structurally difficult for the Trump administration to advance negotiations while securing support from Congress and allies.
Economic Structure
At the economic level, the key incentive of this agreement is the return of Iranian crude oil to the international market. The 60-day temporary general license issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury permits the sale of Iranian crude oil, petrochemicals, and petroleum products until August 21 [2][8][9], representing a strategic choice to maintain negotiation momentum through economic compensation to Iran. From Iran's perspective, resuming oil exports is crucial for recovering its economy, which has been devastated by decades of sanctions, and this serves as a core incentive for continuing negotiations.
However, this economic structure simultaneously harbors vulnerabilities in negotiation. The temporary 60-day license period is designed as a pressure tool, enabling immediate reimposition of sanctions if negotiations reach an impasse. Conversely, it also provides Iran with an incentive to prolong the process to maximize economic benefits. The post-agreement decline in oil prices to pre-war levels and the record high of 98 oil tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz, the highest since the outbreak of conflict [16], indicate that the market has begun to reflect the possibility of normalization. However, this also signifies the vulnerability that market shocks could recur if negotiations fail.
Security Structure
From a security perspective, the most significant structural flaw in the current agreement is that Iran's nuclear capabilities remain unresolved. Although the return of IAEA inspectors has been promised [7], Iran is evading immediate discussion on the nuclear issue by framing the nuclear negotiations themselves as a subsequent phase of the MoU implementation [12]. This reflects Iran's strategic calculation to preserve its nuclear capabilities as its ultimate bargaining chip and extract concessions incrementally.
Military instability in the Strait of Hormuz also persists as a structural security threat. While the establishment of a direct communication line between the U.S. and Iran to prevent military clashes in the strait and the formation of a de-escalation cell are positive steps [13][17], the recurrence of a civilian oil tanker attack just nine days after the MoU signing [1] casts doubt on the effectiveness of this communication channel. The possibility of non-state actors, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), taking independent actions, and the potential for Iran's regional proxies, like the Houthi rebels, to complicate the negotiation process also remain.
3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases
Comparison with the 2015 JCPOA
The most direct historical reference for understanding the current agreement is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed during the Obama administration in 2015. The JCPOA, structured around limiting Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief, shares a basic framework with the current agreement. However, while the JCPOA contained specific and verifiable obligations through years of meticulous multilateral negotiations, the current MoU is fundamentally fragile due to the ambiguity of its wording, which has led to conflicting interpretations immediately after its signing [19]. The precedent of the Trump administration unilaterally withdrawing from the JCPOA in 2018 has fostered fundamental distrust in Iran regarding the reliability of U.S. commitment to the agreement, which in turn underpins Iran's insistence on preconditions for the MoU's implementation [12].
Similarities with North Korea-U.S. Nuclear Negotiations
The U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations exhibit a structurally similar pattern to the North Korea-U.S. nuclear negotiations. As in the case of North Korea, Iran views its nuclear capabilities as the ultimate safeguard for regime survival and employs a strategy of phased negotiations to maximize economic benefits while delaying a final decision on denuclearization. Just as negotiations stalled after the 2018 Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit, the current U.S.-Iran agreement risks exhausting its initial diplomatic momentum during the implementation of detailed provisions. In particular, Iran's stance of demanding 'action for action' bears a structural resemblance to North Korea's 'action-for-action' principle in denuclearization talks, foreshadowing prolonged and stalled negotiations.
The Hormuz Crisis Following the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s
Tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have historically recurred. The so-called 'Tanker War' during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s was the first empirical demonstration of the impact that attacks on merchant vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf could have on global energy supply chains. At that time, the U.S. played a role in ensuring the strait's security through Operation Earnest Will, which involved reflagging Kuwaiti tankers with the American flag. In the current situation, the contest for control over the safety of passage through the strait between the U.S. and Iran is being replayed. The consideration by Iran and Oman of imposing transit fees [10] can be seen as an extension of Iran's historical attempts to institutionalize its effective control over the strait.
4. Key Variables in Issue Development
Variable 1: Completeness of MoU Implementation and Timing of Nuclear Negotiations
The most decisive variable in the future development of this issue will be the completeness of the implementation of the five provisions of the MoU and the subsequent timing of the commencement of nuclear negotiations. Iran has set the complete implementation of the MoU as a prerequisite for nuclear negotiations [12], while the U.S. seeks to secure the early return of IAEA inspectors and free passage through the Strait of Hormuz [7]. The speed and direction of negotiations will be determined at this point of conflicting interests. The expiration of the 60-day license on August 21st will be a critical juncture, and if no tangible progress is made in nuclear negotiations by this date, the cycle of sanctions reimposition and heightened tensions could resume [2][8].
Variable 2: The Direction of the Strait of Hormuz Control Dispute
The consideration of transit fees by Iran and Oman [10], along with Iran's continued assertion of control over the strait [12], carries the risk of setting a precedent that the U.S. finds unacceptable. As long as the U.S. adheres to the principle of freedom of navigation, Iran's attempt to monetize passage could lead to a fundamental rift in negotiations. Conversely, if the current situation, where the number of transits through the strait is only about 25% of the pre-war daily average of 138 vessels, persists [16], the uncertainty in the global energy market will not be resolved.
Variable 3: Actions of Regional Proxies and the Non-State Actor Variable
Independent actions by Iran's regional proxies, such as the Houthi rebels, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias, are non-linear variables that could complicate the negotiation process at any time. The formation of a de-escalation cell, including Lebanon [13], reflects the complexity of this issue, but it remains unclear whether Iran exercises complete control over these forces. The oil tanker attack shortly after the MoU signing [1] serves as a warning sign that non-state actors can disrupt negotiations regardless of the Iranian government's intentions.
Variable 4: Consistency of U.S. Foreign Policy and the Domestic Political Dynamics of the Trump Administration
The foreign policy of the Trump administration has a structural characteristic of being heavily dependent on the President's personal judgment. If negotiations do not progress at the speed expected by President Trump, a sharp pivot towards maximum pressure cannot be ruled out. Simultaneously, Israel's reaction is also a significant variable. Israel may view any nuclear agreement with Iran as a threat to its security and could potentially neutralize the negotiations themselves through independent military action. The South Korean Foreign Minister's emphasis on freedom and safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and urging the implementation of the MoU in a phone call with the Iranian Foreign Minister [4] clearly illustrates how energy-import-dependent nations, including South Korea, are reacting sensitively to U.S. diplomatic consistency as stakeholders in these negotiations.
Phase 3: Scenario Analysis
Prospects for U.S.-Iran Nuclear Agreement and De-escalation of Strait of Hormuz Tensions: Scenario Analysis
1. Optimistic Scenario (Probability: 20%)
Development
The optimistic scenario posits a situation where the U.S. and Iran reach a comprehensive final agreement within the 60-day temporary period, encompassing nuclear inspections, freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, and sanctions relief. The core premise of this scenario is that Iran promptly fulfills the five implementation provisions of the MoU, and based on this, nuclear negotiations substantively commence [12]. Iran's promise to allow IAEA inspectors' return during the Swiss talks and the establishment of a direct communication line for Hormuz can be interpreted as positive signals supporting the possibility of this scenario [7][17]. The U.S. issuance of a 60-day general license permitting the sale of Iranian crude oil until August 21st also suggests that both sides share a desire to maintain negotiation momentum [2][8].
For this scenario to materialize, several conditions must be met. First, the Trump administration must make a strategic compromise, accepting a phased approach to Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and support for regional proxies, while prioritizing nuclear non-proliferation. Second, hardliners within Iran must maintain a cooperative stance under the approval of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Third, mediators like Qatar and Pakistan must effectively coordinate the resolution of conflicting interpretations between the two sides [13]. In this case, traffic in the Strait of Hormuz would rapidly recover to the pre-war level of 138 transits per day [15], and the return of Iranian crude oil to the international market would become substantial.
Impact
If the optimistic scenario is realized, there will be a structural increase in global energy supply. Iran possesses the capacity to supply millions of barrels of crude oil per day to the international market upon sanctions relief, which will exert downward pressure on international oil prices. Given that oil prices have already shown a trend of declining to pre-war levels since the agreement [16], the extent of price reduction could be amplified if a comprehensive agreement is reached. This scenario is particularly favorable from South Korea's perspective, as Iran has been a traditional oil supplier, and sanctions relief would offer the dual benefits of diversifying oil imports and reducing procurement costs. South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' emphasis on the importance of free navigation in Hormuz and urging MoU implementation in its call with the Iranian Foreign Minister reflects this economic interest as a diplomatic move [4].
2. Baseline Scenario (Probability: 50%)
Development
The most realistic baseline scenario involves the U.S.-Iran negotiations remaining in a state of 'managed uncertainty' rather than reaching a full agreement or complete breakdown. In this scenario, both sides would continue negotiations by repeatedly extending the 60-day temporary agreement or accumulating partial agreements, but fundamental disagreements would persist regarding the final disposition of Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support for regional proxies. As an analysis in Foreign Affairs points out, the current agreement, reached after approximately four months of exchanges, is assessed as having papered over the core issues of Iran's nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, and support for regional proxies without fundamentally resolving them [14], and this incomplete structure is likely to continuously hinder negotiations.
In the baseline scenario, the transit situation in the Strait of Hormuz would follow a pattern of partial normalization interspersed with intermittent escalations of tension. The oil tanker attack that occurred nine days after the agreement signing [1] can be interpreted as a precursor to this pattern. Although the number of vessels transiting the strait reached a peak of 98 after the agreement [16], this remains significantly below the pre-war daily average of 138 transits [15]. The joint consideration by Iran and Oman of imposing transit fees through a joint working group [10] indicates that Iran is pursuing a long-term strategy of institutionalizing its control over the strait as economic leverage, which will be a continuous source of friction with the U.S. The shipping industry will remain caught in a dilemma, facing retaliation from Iran if it complies with U.S. directives and sanctions from the U.S. if it complies with Iran's demands [6].
Regarding nuclear negotiations, Iran's insistence on the implementation of the MoU as a precondition for commencing talks [12] will lead to a continued struggle for initiative over the sequence and pace of negotiations. The New York Times' analysis, which points out that the ambiguous wording of the temporary ceasefire agreement reached by the U.S. negotiating team has already caused conflicting interpretations between the two sides [19], clearly illustrates the structural fragility of this scenario. Consequently, in the baseline scenario, negotiations will likely proceed with advances and setbacks for several months, with the outline of a final agreement becoming visible perhaps in late 2025 or early 2026.
Impact
In the baseline scenario, the global energy market will continue to experience high volatility and maintain an uncertainty premium. Oil prices will fluctuate between levels lower than a complete blockade but higher than full normalization, hindering the predictability of cost structures for energy-intensive industries. For the shipping industry, the costs associated with maintaining alternative routes and war risk insurance premiums will not be fully eliminated, leading to continued increases in logistics costs. For South Korean companies, this scenario implies the need to maintain flexibility in their crude oil procurement strategies and continue investing in supply chain diversification.
3. Pessimistic Scenario (Probability: 30%)
Development
The pessimistic scenario posits a situation where conflicting interpretations of the MoU's ambiguous wording reach a critical point, leading to a complete breakdown of negotiations and a renewed escalation of military tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. There are multiple potential triggers for this scenario. The most realistic pathway involves the recurrence of attacks on merchant vessels in the strait, prompting the U.S. to resume military responses. An oil tanker attack already occurred nine days after the agreement signing [1], and the New York Times reported that a 72-hour surge in violence, including attacks on container ships by the Iranian military, undermined peace efforts [19]. If this pattern repeats and the U.S. deems it a violation of the MoU, it could lead to the early revocation of the 60-day temporary license and a reimposition of sanctions.
A second trigger could be the acceleration of Iran's nuclear program. If Iran delays the return of IAEA inspectors or expands its uranium enrichment activities, pressure from U.S. hardliners will increase, and the Trump administration may declare a suspension of negotiations. A third pathway involves Iran and Oman's attempt to impose transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz [10]. If the U.S. defines this as a direct challenge to the principle of freedom of navigation and warns of military action, the foundation of trust between the two sides could completely collapse. Iran's assertion of its sovereign right to control the strait while engaging in a war of nerves with the U.S. [12] increases the realism of this pathway.
In the pessimistic scenario, the Strait of Hormuz would revert to a state of effective blockade, or passage would be possible but subject to an extremely high risk premium. While historical examples show that a complete blockade is physically difficult, as evidenced by the continued traffic volume despite Iran's declaration of re-blockading the strait [11], intermittent attacks and threats alone could severely shock the global energy supply chain. In this scenario, the U.S.-Iran conflict could escalate beyond a bilateral issue into a complex regional crisis, drawing in major regional and international actors such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and China.
Impact
In the pessimistic scenario, the global energy market would face an extreme supply shock. The Strait of Hormuz is a strategic chokepoint through which approximately 20% of global oil trade passes; an effective blockade of the strait would cause international oil prices to surge in the short term. South Korea, heavily reliant on the Middle East for its oil imports, would be one of the most directly affected countries in this scenario. The cost structures of energy-intensive industries such as refining, petrochemicals, aviation, and shipping would fundamentally deteriorate, leading to increased production costs across the manufacturing sector and upward pressure on consumer prices.
4. Scenario-Based Impact Analysis on the Global Economy and Industries
Energy Industry
The energy industry is the sector most directly affected across all three scenarios. In the optimistic scenario, the full return of Iranian crude oil to the market would expand global supply and stabilize oil prices downwards, reducing raw material procurement costs for refining and petrochemical companies. The fact that the U.S. Treasury Department's 60-day general license comprehensively permits the sale of Iranian crude oil, petrochemical products, and petroleum products [2][5] suggests that the pace of supply increase could be rapid in the optimistic scenario. In the baseline scenario, partial return of Iranian crude oil to the market and intermittent escalations of tension would alternate, maintaining high oil price volatility. In the pessimistic scenario, supply shocks due to the re-blockade of Hormuz would cause oil prices to surge, and energy security would become a top policy priority for major countries.
Shipping and Logistics Industry
The shipping industry is the sector most sensitive to the transit situation in the Strait of Hormuz. In the optimistic scenario, the number of vessels transiting the strait would recover to the pre-war level of 138 per day [15], and war risk insurance premiums and detour costs would normalize, leading to a decrease in global logistics costs. In the baseline scenario, the shipping industry would remain caught between the dual pressures of the U.S. and Iran [6], with continued uncertainty premiums. The consideration of transit fees by Iran and Oman [10] could act as a structural factor for increased shipping costs in both the baseline and pessimistic scenarios. In the pessimistic scenario, demand for the alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope would surge, and global shipping freight rates would skyrocket, leading to an overall increase in trade costs.
Financial and Capital Markets
Financial markets would react differently across the three scenarios. In the optimistic scenario, the risk premium in the Middle East would dissipate, leading to a re-evaluation of emerging market assets and energy-related stocks. The prospect of resuming business with Iran would increase expectations for European and Asian companies to enter the Iranian market. In the baseline scenario, volatility in commodity markets and energy-related stocks would remain high due to the fluctuations between progress and setbacks in negotiations. In the pessimistic scenario, a preference for safe-haven assets would strengthen, stocks of companies with high exposure to the Middle East would decline, and global inflationary pressures would re-emerge, impacting the monetary policy decisions of major central banks.
Scenario-Based Implications for the South Korean Economy and Industries
South Korea faces a dual vulnerability in all three scenarios due to its reliance on Middle Eastern energy and its exposure to shipping networks. In the optimistic scenario, South Korea could benefit from reduced procurement costs through the resumption of Iranian crude oil imports and seize opportunities for re-entry into the Middle Eastern market. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs' urging of free navigation in Hormuz and MoU implementation in its call with the Iranian Foreign Minister [4] is interpreted as a strategic diplomatic move to manage these economic interests. In the baseline scenario, South Korean companies would find it difficult to resume direct trade with Iran due to the unresolved legal uncertainties surrounding sanctions, necessitating continued investment in energy procurement diversification and supply chain risk management. In the pessimistic scenario, South Korea would face a compounded shock of unstable oil supply and soaring logistics costs, making the expansion of energy reserves and the securing of alternative supply sources urgent policy priorities.
In conclusion, while the 'managed uncertainty' of the baseline scenario is the most realistic outlook for the current U.S.-Iran negotiation phase, the risk of a shift towards the pessimistic scenario should never be underestimated, given the ambiguity of the negotiation wording [19], Iran's strategic intent to control the Strait [12], and the possibility of recurring intermittent military clashes [1]. Companies need to pre-emptively develop contingency plans for each scenario and, in particular, strengthen their decision-making frameworks towards diversifying energy procurement and hedging shipping risks.
Phase 4: Response Measures Analysis
Prospects for U.S.-Iran Nuclear Agreement and De-escalation of Strait of Hormuz Tensions: Response Measures Analysis
1. Responses to Optimistic Scenario (Probability: 20%)
Core Response Direction
In the optimistic scenario, where a comprehensive final agreement between the U.S. and Iran is realized within 60 days, the core response direction required for both corporations and the government is 'proactive positioning.' In this scenario, the most crucial aspect is to secure the benefits of market normalization early, which necessitates preparing concrete action plans even before the agreement is reached. This is because three opportunity windows—the return of Iranian crude oil to the international market, the recovery of traffic in the Strait of Hormuz to pre-war levels, and the resumption of trade with Iran—could open simultaneously [2][16].
Response Option 1: Prepare for Resumption of Iranian Crude Oil Imports
The first response option is to immediately commence preparatory work for the resumption of Iranian crude oil imports. South Korea was a traditional importer of Iranian crude oil, but imports were completely suspended after the U.S. ended its sanctions waiver in 2019. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs' emphasis on the importance of free navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and its call for the implementation of the MoU during a phone call with the Iranian Foreign Minister reflect its intention to manage these economic interests diplomatically [4]. Specifically, this includes restoring contact channels with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), inspecting domestic refiners' facilities for processing Iranian crude oil, and reviewing payment mechanisms to be applied after sanctions are lifted.
The main advantage of this option lies in the dual benefits of diversifying oil imports and reducing procurement costs. Iranian crude oil, primarily heavy crude, is highly compatible with South Korea's complex refining facilities, and it is likely that price incentives will be offered for market re-entry in the early stages after sanctions are lifted. On the downside, there remains the possibility of incomplete sanctions relief or reimposition. The 60-day general license issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury is valid only until August 21 [8], and if negotiations fail, companies that have signed import contracts will be exposed to immediate sanctions risks. Therefore, it is advisable to implement this option in phases after the comprehensive agreement is officially confirmed, and a two-track approach focusing on preparatory work before the agreement is reached is recommended.
Response Option 2: Prepare for Participation in Iran's Energy Infrastructure Reconstruction Projects
The second option is to proactively explore the possibility of participating in Iran's energy infrastructure reconstruction and modernization projects. Iran's energy infrastructure is likely to have suffered considerable damage from approximately four months of military conflict, and a large demand for reconstruction is expected after a comprehensive agreement is reached. South Korean engineering and construction companies have accumulated significant experience in the Iranian market in the past, which could serve as a competitive advantage upon market re-entry.
The advantage of this option is that it can establish a long-term and stable revenue base, unlike the short-term resumption of crude oil imports. However, there are several significant constraints in terms of feasibility. First, China and Russia have already made substantial infrastructure investments in the Iranian market during the sanctions period, and to gain a competitive edge over them, South Korean companies need to offer package deals combining financing capabilities and technological competitiveness. Furthermore, if U.S. policy toward Iran changes again, there remains a risk of project suspension; therefore, political risk mitigation clauses must be included in the contract structure.
Priority Response Measures
The priority response measures in the optimistic scenario should be structured under the principle of 'prepare immediately, implement in phases.' Before the official confirmation of the agreement, focus should be placed on internal preparations for the resumption of Iranian crude oil imports and the restoration of diplomatic channels. After official confirmation, a phased approach of concluding import contracts and exploring participation in energy infrastructure projects would be appropriate. In this process, closely monitoring the scope and conditions of U.S. sanctions waivers becomes a prerequisite for all implementation options.
2. Responses to Baseline Scenario (Probability: 50%)
Core Response Direction
In the most realistic baseline scenario, characterized by 'managed uncertainty,' the core response direction required is 'risk hedging and securing flexibility.' In this scenario, traffic in the Strait of Hormuz is expected to partially recover but remain below pre-war levels, and U.S. sanctions on Iran are likely to be partially eased and then reimposed cyclically depending on the negotiation phase. The reality that the shipping industry faces a dual pressure—facing retaliation from Iran if it complies with U.S. directives and facing U.S. sanctions if it complies with Iran's demands [6]—clearly illustrates the structural dilemma faced by companies in this scenario.
Response Option 1: Supply Chain Dualization and Maintenance of Alternative Routes
The first response option is a supply chain dualization strategy that structurally reduces dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. Specifically, this involves expanding oil procurement channels utilizing infrastructure that bypasses Hormuz, such as Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline and the UAE's Abu Dhabi-Fujairah Pipeline, and accelerating diversification of non-Middle Eastern oil supply sources to the U.S., Canada, Norway, and West Africa. The fact that attacks on civilian oil tankers in the strait have recurred even after the agreement [1] attests to the necessity of such structural responses.
The advantage of this option is clear in that it reduces exposure to specific geopolitical events and enhances supply stability. However, a disadvantage is that it is difficult to avoid increased procurement costs. The capacity of Hormuz bypass pipelines is limited, and the transportation costs for non-Middle Eastern oil are higher than for Middle Eastern oil. Therefore, this option assumes a strategic decision to secure supply stability even at the cost of some increase in expenses. In terms of feasibility, it is an option that can be implemented immediately in the short term and can be given high priority as a preemptive measure in case the currently partially recovering traffic in Hormuz decreases again.
Response Option 2: Utilization and Expansion of Strategic Petroleum Reserves
The second option is to strengthen the strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) management system. In the baseline scenario, oil prices are expected to fluctuate depending on the negotiation phase, while traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains volatile. Although oil prices have already shown a downward trend towards pre-war levels after the agreement [16], they could rebound immediately if negotiations stall or if clashes in the strait recur. To counter such price volatility, expanding reserves by taking advantage of the current relatively low-price environment is an effective strategy.
The advantage of this option is that it can achieve two objectives simultaneously: buffering price volatility and preparing for supply disruption risks. The disadvantages include the physical capacity limitations of reserve facilities and the burden of reserve costs. However, considering that Iran and Oman are considering imposing transit fees on Hormuz traffic [10], expanding reserves before transit cost increases become a reality could be a cost-effective choice in the medium to long term.
Response Option 3: Protect Interests Through Diplomatic Engagement
The third option is to actively reflect South Korea's interests in the negotiations through diplomatic channels. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs' emphasis on free navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and its call for the implementation of the MoU during a phone call with the Iranian Foreign Minister [4] indicate that diplomatic efforts in this direction are already underway. In the baseline scenario, negotiations are likely to be prolonged, so utilizing mediation channels with Qatar and Pakistan to indirectly convey South Korea's position could also be considered [13].
The advantage of this option is its high cost-effectiveness. Diplomatic engagement is a means that can influence negotiation outcomes without direct economic costs, and there is room to leverage it, especially since South Korea has separate bilateral issues, such as frozen assets, with Iran. On the other hand, the disadvantage is that South Korea's influence is structurally limited. The U.S.-Iran negotiations are essentially a conflict of strategic interests between the two countries, and the space for South Korea to exert direct influence is narrow. Therefore, it is realistic to position this option as a complementary role to other options rather than an independent means of response.
Priority Response Measures
In the baseline scenario, it is appropriate to set supply chain dualization as the first priority, strategic reserve expansion as the second, and diplomatic engagement as the third. These three options are not mutually exclusive and can be pursued in parallel. Notably, supply chain dualization and reserve expansion are 'scenario-neutral' options that are effective in both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, thus possessing high feasibility.
3. Responses to Pessimistic Scenario (Probability: 30%)
Core Response Direction
In the pessimistic scenario, where negotiations fail and tensions in the Strait of Hormuz escalate, the core response direction required is 'crisis management and damage minimization.' An attack on a civilian oil tanker in the Strait of Hormuz recurred just nine days after the signing of the MoU [1], and the issue of ambiguous wording in the agreement, as pointed out by The New York Times [19], demonstrates that the possibility of negotiation failure is a realistic risk. The fact that Iran is continuing its war of nerves with the U.S. by reaffirming its control over the strait [12] and the consideration of imposing transit fees by Iran and Oman [10] should be monitored as leading indicators that increase the possibility of a shift to a pessimistic scenario.
Response Option 1: Activate Emergency Energy Supply Plan
The first response option is to immediately activate a pre-established emergency energy supply plan. Specifically, this includes activating the mechanism for cooperation in releasing strategic reserves as a member of the International Energy Agency (IEA), reviewing the criteria and procedures for releasing domestic strategic reserves, and establishing a plan for emergency transition to alternative non-Middle Eastern supply sources. In the pessimistic scenario, traffic in the Strait of Hormuz will decline sharply again, leading directly to a surge in international oil prices and instability in domestic energy supply.
The advantage of this option is its immediate responsiveness in the event of a crisis. The IEA's collective reserve release mechanism has proven effective on several occasions in the past, and coordinated action among member states can be expected to have a much greater market stabilization effect than unilateral action. The disadvantage is that releasing reserves is merely a means to buy time, not a fundamental solution to the supply problem. Therefore, this option is primarily a short-term crisis management tool and must be pursued in conjunction with other options for medium- to long-term supply stabilization.
Response Option 2: Fundamental Restructuring of Energy Import Structure
The second option is to restructure the energy import system to structurally reduce dependence on the Middle East. If the pessimistic scenario materializes, it signifies not just a temporary crisis but a situation where the structural instability of the Middle Eastern energy supply chain persists long-term. To counter this, medium- to long-term strategies should include expanding imports of U.S. LNG, diversifying LNG supply sources that bypass Hormuz, such as Australia, Qatar, and Malaysia, and accelerating the transition to renewable energy to reduce dependence on fossil fuels itself.
The advantage of this option is that it is the most effective long-term response measure, as it reduces fundamental vulnerability to geopolitical risks. However, the disadvantage is that its implementation requires significant time and cost. Restructuring the energy import system necessitates years of infrastructure investment and contract renegotiation, making it unsuitable as a short-term crisis response measure. Therefore, while this option should be pursued as a medium- to long-term strategy once the pessimistic scenario materializes, it is advisable to concurrently undertake preparatory work during the current period of uncertainty.
Response Option 3: Enhance Maritime Risk Management
The third option is to strengthen risk management for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. In the dual dilemma where the shipping industry faces conflicting pressures from both the U.S. and Iran [6], vessel operators require clear criteria and procedures for navigation decisions. Specifically, this includes mandating war risk insurance, clarifying procedures for requesting naval escorts when transiting Hormuz, and establishing a real-time information sharing system for high-risk areas. Although the U.S. and Iran have established a direct communication line to prevent military clashes in the strait [17], this does not fully guarantee the safety of civilian vessels, necessitating enhanced risk management at the civilian level.
The feasibility of implementing this option is high, but the disadvantage is the unavoidable increase in costs due to soaring war risk insurance premiums. In the pessimistic scenario, rising insurance premiums will drive up overall shipping costs, leading to increased logistics expenses for exporting and importing companies, which will directly impact corporate profitability. Therefore, financial measures such as reflecting the increase in shipping costs in contract prices or utilizing hedging instruments should also be pursued in parallel.
Priority Response Measures
In the pessimistic scenario, it is appropriate to set the activation of the emergency energy supply plan as the first priority, enhanced maritime risk management as the second, and the restructuring of the energy import system as the third. The first and second priorities are short-term response measures that can be implemented immediately upon crisis occurrence, while the third priority is a medium- to long-term structural transformation strategy that should be pursued by leveraging the crisis to gain momentum.
4. Common Priority Response Measures Across Scenarios
Scenario-Neutral Core Responses
Deriving common response measures that are effective across all three scenarios is practically the most important task. This is because allocating resources preferentially to 'scenario-neutral' response options that function effectively regardless of which scenario materializes is the optimal strategy in the current phase of high uncertainty.
First, diversifying energy sources serves as a versatile response measure: expanding options through the reintroduction of Iranian crude oil in the optimistic scenario, dispersing Middle East dependency in the baseline scenario, and securing alternative supply sources in the pessimistic scenario. Second, establishing a real-time monitoring system for negotiation trends is essential infrastructure for early detection of scenario shifts and rapid adaptation of response strategies. The fact that Iran has set the complete implementation of the five MoU clauses as a prerequisite for initiating nuclear negotiations [12], the consideration of transit fees by Iran and Oman [10], and the recurrence of attacks on vessels in the strait [1] are all leading indicators of scenario shifts that require continuous monitoring. Third, strengthening legal and regulatory response capabilities to changes in U.S. sanctions policy toward Iran is essential for minimizing legal risks for businesses in any scenario. Temporary measures such as the 60-day general license from the U.S. Department of the Treasury [2][8] can be changed at any time, and having the capacity for rapid legal response is a fundamental prerequisite for corporate management.
In conclusion, the current U.S.-Iran negotiation phase involves a high degree of uncertainty, with the potential to unfold in any direction across a wide spectrum between complete agreement and complete breakdown. In this environment, the most effective response strategy is not to over-bet on a specific scenario but to design organizations and supply chains in a way that internalizes flexibility and adaptability as core competencies. Given the analysis that ambiguous wording in the agreement is already hindering peace efforts [19] and the reality that the war of nerves between the U.S. and Iran over control of the strait continues [6], thorough preparation and a phased approach, rather than hasty implementation based on optimistic projections, represent the most rational strategic choice at this juncture.
5. Final Recommended Response Measures
Prospects for U.S.-Iran Nuclear Agreement and Easing of Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz: Comprehensive Recommended Response Measures
1. Overall Judgment and Recommended Response Measures
Overall Assessment of the Current Situation
While the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the U.S. and Iran and the commencement of high-level negotiations in Switzerland represent significant diplomatic progress, it is crucial to clearly recognize that the current situation is the 'beginning of negotiations,' not the 'end of the crisis.' Just nine days after signing the MoU, an attack on a civilian oil tanker recurred in the Strait of Hormuz [1]. Iran maintains its precondition of refusing to commence nuclear negotiations until all five clauses of the MoU are fully implemented [12], and the ambiguity of the agreement's wording has already led to interpretive conflicts between the two sides [19]. The fact that traffic in the Strait of Hormuz is only at 25% of the pre-war daily average of 138 transits [16] demonstrates that market uncertainty remains high. Considering these complex circumstances, the current phase is closest to the 'Baseline Scenario (Managed Uncertainty, Probability 50%)' presented earlier and exists in a fragile balance that could shift to the pessimistic scenario at any time.
Connecting this to the direction of U.S. foreign policy, the Trump administration's transactional diplomacy is consistently evident in these negotiations. The issuance of a 60-day temporary license for Iranian oil sales [2][8] is a typical Trump-style approach aimed at maintaining negotiation momentum through economic incentives, while simultaneously retaining leverage to immediately reimpose sanctions if the agreement is not fulfilled. However, if the Trump administration attempts to resolve Iran's ballistic missile capabilities and regional proxy issues concurrently with nuclear non-proliferation, the complexity of the negotiations will increase exponentially, and the possibility of a comprehensive agreement within 60 days will be significantly reduced [14]. Ultimately, U.S. foreign policy is likely to converge towards accumulating tangible results through 'phased transactions,' which imposes 'continuous uncertainty management' as a core task for both corporations and the government.
Basic Direction of Recommended Response Measures
Based on this overall assessment, this report recommends the'Conditional Readiness' strategy as the core response direction. This strategy consists of three principles: First, proactively prepare to seize opportunities in anticipation of the optimistic scenario, but phase the actual resource allocation until a clear trigger point is met. Second, immediately strengthen risk hedging mechanisms in preparation for the baseline and pessimistic scenarios to minimize losses due to uncertainty. Third, establish a continuous monitoring system to dynamically adjust response strategies by tracking changes in U.S. foreign policy direction in real-time. These three principles operate complementarily, aiming to achieve both minimal losses and maximal opportunity capture, regardless of which scenario materializes.
2. Short-term/Mid-term/Long-term Action Plans
Short-term Action Plan (0-60 days: Present - August 21, expiration of US temporary license)
The core of the short-term plan is to simultaneously manage risks and prepare to seize opportunities during the 60-day temporary agreement period. This period is the most critical juncture that will determine the direction of negotiations, and the response during this time will determine the success or failure of subsequent medium and long-term strategies.
In terms of energy supply chain management, energy companies and refiners must immediately commence legal and logistical preparations for the resumption of crude oil imports from Iran. As the US Treasury's general license permits Iranian crude oil transactions until August 21 [2][5], legal and logistical preparations must be completed within this period, including transaction structure design, securing financial settlement channels, and reviewing insurance contracts. However, it is advisable to phase the actual contract signing and payment execution after confirming the progress of nuclear negotiations. Simultaneously, efforts to secure alternative supply sources to reduce short-term dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil must be intensified, and diversification options to US crude oil and LNG, and Central Asian crude oil must be concretized.
For shipping and logistics companies, a clear internal decision-making protocol must be established to address the current dual pressure situation surrounding navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, where following US directives leads to retaliation from Iran, and complying with Iran's demands results in US sanctions [6]. Specifically, legal and risk management teams must collaborate to establish criteria for legal risk assessment for each navigation decision and build real-time communication channels with the US OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) and the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs' emphasis on the importance of free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz in its call with the Iranian Foreign Minister [4] suggests that diplomatic support is possible at the government level, thus necessitating active utilization of public-private cooperation channels.
In terms of diplomatic and policy responses, the South Korean government must strengthen diplomatic channels with mediating countries such as Qatar and Pakistan and enhance access to information regarding the progress of US-Iran negotiations. It is particularly important to secure advance information on the policy direction after August 21, when the US 60-day temporary license expires. To this end, the working-level channels with the US Treasury and State Department through the South Korean Embassy in the US must be strengthened, and networks with policy think tanks such as the Brookings Institution should be utilized to proactively grasp negotiation trends.
Mid-term Action Plan (2-6 months: August - December)
The mid-term plan branches into two paths depending on the outcome of negotiations after the 60-day temporary agreement. Preparations for both scenarios—negotiations progressing and negotiations deadlocked or failing—must proceed simultaneously.
In the scenario where negotiations progress, concrete action plans for resuming economic cooperation with Iran must be activated. Iran has been a traditional source of crude oil for South Korea, and sanctions relief would provide a dual benefit of diversifying crude oil imports and reducing procurement costs [4]. Energy companies should prepare for long-term supply contract negotiations with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), while managing legal risks by including a 'termination clause in case of reimposed sanctions' in the contract structure. Furthermore, participation in projects to modernize Iran's aging energy infrastructure could be considered from a mid-term perspective. The review of a toll collection plan for the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and Oman [10] could affect shipping cost structures, necessitating prior scenario analysis of these costs and their reflection in freight contract terms.
In the scenario where negotiations deadlock or fail, a structural reorganization of the energy supply chain will be inevitable. In this case, the supply portfolio must be reconfigured to reduce dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil in the medium term, with expanded imports of US LNG and crude oil, and strengthened long-term contracts with Central Asian and African oil-producing countries as key tasks. Simultaneously, logistics cost analyses for alternative routes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, such as the Strait of Oman and the Cape of Good Hope, must be completed, and contingency logistics plans based on these analyses should be established. Expanding energy reserves is also a critical task, and consideration should be given to increasing Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) levels beyond current standards.
In alignment with US foreign policy direction, if the Trump administration opts for a strategy of 'phased deals' with Iran to accumulate tangible achievements in the mid-term, a system is needed to promptly analyze and respond to the impact of each phase's agreement on South Korea's economic activities with Iran. Particularly, if the US leverages negotiation leverage by selectively lifting or strengthening sanctions in specific areas, compliance systems must be reinforced to prevent South Korean companies from inadvertently becoming targets of US sanctions.
Long-term Action Plan (Over 6 months: 2026 onwards)
The core of the long-term plan is to redesign energy policy and diplomatic strategy to overcome the structural vulnerabilities of Middle Eastern energy security. The most significant lesson revealed by the current US-Iran conflict is that excessive dependence on the single bottleneck of the Strait of Hormuz entails structural vulnerabilities in South Korea's energy security. South Korea relies on the Middle East for a significant portion of its crude oil imports, most of which transit through the Strait of Hormuz. Therefore, in the long term, energy import diversification must be elevated to a core national strategy, and concrete action plans must be established for its implementation.
Accelerating the energy transition is also a crucial pillar of the long-term strategy. Expanding the share of renewable energy and transitioning to a hydrogen economy go beyond mere carbon neutrality goals; they represent an energy security strategy to structurally reduce dependence on Middle Eastern energy. In particular, considering the impact of soaring energy prices on the South Korean economy during the recent conflict, policy must be redesigned to re-evaluate investments in energy transition from the perspective of risk management costs and to accelerate the pace of investment.
From a diplomatic strategy perspective, 'multi-layered Middle East diplomacy' that maintains multiple diplomatic channels within the region must be strengthened. While preparing for the possibility of normalizing relations with Iran, a balanced diplomacy that simultaneously strengthens relations with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman is necessary. Qatar's emergence as a key mediator in US-Iran negotiations [13] suggests that strengthening diplomatic and economic cooperation with Qatar is advantageous for expanding access to Middle Eastern information and enhancing diplomatic influence.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
Key Monitoring Indicators
For effective situation management, specific indicators that can detect the progress or regression of negotiations early on must be established and systematically tracked. It is effective to manage monitoring indicators by categorizing them into three groups: diplomatic/security indicators, energy/maritime indicators, and economic/financial indicators.
As diplomatic and security indicators, first, the return of the IAEA inspection team to Iran and the scope of inspections are the most critical leading indicators. Although Iran has promised to return to IAEA inspections [7], its actual implementation is a key parameter for negotiation progress, and a more comprehensive scope of inspection increases the likelihood of a comprehensive agreement. Second, the implementation progress of the 14 articles of the MoU must be tracked weekly. This is because the fulfillment of Iran's five preconditions for preemptive action [12] determines the timing of the start of nuclear negotiations. Third, the frequency and nature of military incidents in the Strait of Hormuz must be monitored. The recurrence of tanker attacks just nine days after the signing of the MoU [1] demonstrates the fragility of the agreement, and the frequency and scale of such incidents directly influence the negotiation atmosphere. Fourth, major statements and administrative actions by the Trump administration regarding its Iran policy must be tracked in real-time. In particular, statements by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Secretary of State Marco Rubio are key indicators for gauging the direction of US negotiation strategy [7].
As energy and maritime indicators, first, the daily number of vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz must be managed as the most critical real-time indicator. A faster recovery rate from the current level of 25% compared to the pre-war average (138 passages/day) indicates progress towards an optimistic scenario. A recovery to over 70% would be an appropriate trigger for fully activating contingency plans for the optimistic scenario. Second, changes in the international market supply of Iranian crude oil must be tracked weekly. Changes in Iranian crude oil export volumes during the 60-day temporary license period indirectly reflect the progress of negotiations [2][8]. Third, the volatility of Dubai crude and Brent crude oil prices must be monitored daily, and energy cost hedging positions should be adjusted in case of sharp increases.
Economic and financial indicators include tracking the fluctuations of the Iranian Rial exchange rate, the spread of Iran-related CDS (Credit Default Swaps), and changes in maritime insurance premiums in the Middle East. These indicators reflect in real-time how the market assesses negotiation progress and can be directly utilized for corporate financial risk management.
Key Trigger Points
Trigger points are clear benchmarks for transitioning between response strategy phases and must be defined in advance. This helps prevent decision-making errors due to emotional judgment or information delays.
Positive Triggers (Criteria for activating optimistic scenario contingency plans):The optimistic scenario contingency plans will be fully activated when the official confirmation of the IAEA inspection team's return to Iran, the recovery of daily transit volume through the Strait of Hormuz to over 70% of pre-war levels, the extension of the US license for Iranian crude oil sales for 60 days or its conversion to a permanent license, and the official declaration of the start of nuclear negotiations are confirmed simultaneously or sequentially.
Negative Triggers (Criteria for activating pessimistic scenario contingency plans):The pessimistic scenario contingency plans will be activated when two or more of the following conditions occur simultaneously: military incidents in the Strait of Hormuz occur more than twice a week, the US does not extend the 60-day temporary license and allows it to expire, Iran officially declares refusal of IAEA inspections, or the US officially warns of further military action.
Neutral Triggers (Criteria for continuing basic scenario management):When the 60-day temporary agreement is partially extended, or negotiations continue without progress, and neither the positive nor negative triggers are met, the basic scenario management plan will be maintained, and the arrival of trigger points will continue to be monitored.
4. Summary and Conclusion
While the US-Iran nuclear agreement and the easing of tensions in the Strait of Hormuz represent clear diplomatic progress, it is premature to interpret this as the end of the crisis. The current situation most closely aligns with the baseline scenario of 'managed uncertainty,' with three simultaneous destabilizing factors: the ambiguity of the agreement's wording [19], Iran's insistence on preconditions [12], and the intermittent recurrence of violence in the strait [1]. The Trump administration's transactional diplomacy is likely to converge towards pursuing short-term achievements, suggesting that negotiations will proceed in the form of phased partial agreements rather than a complete resolution.
In this environment, the core competency required of businesses and governments is 'agility amidst uncertainty.' A disciplined decision-making system is needed that maintains a strategy of 'conditional preparedness' to respond swiftly regardless of which scenario materializes, while transitioning response phases based on clear trigger points. In the short term, risk hedging and preparation for opportunity capture must be pursued concurrently; in the mid-term, action plans for two distinct paths based on negotiation outcomes must be prepared simultaneously; and in the long term, energy policy and diplomatic strategy must be redesigned to structurally reduce dependence on Middle Eastern energy. South Korea's emphasis on free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and urging the implementation of the MoU in its call with the Iranian Foreign Minister [4] is the right direction, and concrete action plans must follow to translate this into tangible economic benefits. Ultimately, the direction of the current US-Iran negotiations poses complex challenges spanning South Korea's energy security, maritime logistics, and Middle East diplomacy strategy, demanding systematic and proactive responses starting immediately.
References
[2] [Arab News] US authorizes Iranian oil sales amid talks on final peace deal
[3] [Mint] US greenlights Iranian oil sales after ‘productive’ Switzerland talks
[4] [Yonhap News Agency] S. Korean, Iranian FMs discuss Hormuz transit, Mideast situation over phone
[5] [Geo News] US authorises Iranian oil sales amid talks on final peace deal
[11] [Al-Monitor] Hormuz: Traffic flows despite Iran's closure announcement
[12] [Arab News] Iran links nuclear talks to MoU, asserts control over Hormuz
[13] [The National (UAE)] Vance says Iran nuclear talks to start this week
[14] [Foreign Affairs] The Long Shadow of the Iran War
[15] [BBC News] Dozens of ships head through Strait of Hormuz after US-Iran deal
[16] [Nikkei Asia] Hormuz tanker traffic climbs to 25% of prewar level
[18] [Il Sole 24 Ore] Stretto di Hormuz, aumenta il traffico navale dopo l’accordo tra Iran e USA
[19] [The New York Times] Vague Language of U.S.-Iran Deal Comes Back to Haunt Peace Efforts
[20] [Al-Monitor] US authorizes Iranian oil sales amid talks on final peace deal
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.