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NATO Ankara Summit and Alliance Realignment: Deepening Burden-Sharing Pressure and South Korea's Strategic Response
Overall Summary
Executive Summary
The NATO summit to be held in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7-8 is poised to be a critical juncture, not merely concerning defense burden-sharing disputes, but fundamentally reshaping the alliance. The Trump administration's explicit warning of potential refusal of security assistance to NATO members, citing their non-support for military operations against Iran, signals a shift in U.S. alliance management from implicit security guarantees to explicit reciprocity. This directly translates into structurally intensified pressure on burden-sharing within the ROK-U.S. alliance. In response, European E5 nations, including Germany, France, and the UK, are coordinating their positions in Berlin to enhance strategic autonomy. NATO allies are also actively pursuing defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars and increasing defense spending, creating unprecedented demand in the European defense market. Amidst these dual structural shifts, South Korea must proactively frame the ROK-U.S. alliance burden-sharing negotiations while simultaneously pursuing defense diplomacy that expands its proven competitiveness in Polish defense cooperation to all E5 nations. Ultimately, NATO's transformation presents both a crisis and a strategic opportunity for South Korea to institutionalize security and defense cooperation networks with Europe, necessitating the urgent development of a proactive mid- to long-term strategy.
Phase 1: Issue Situation Analysis
NATO Ankara Summit and Defense Burden-Sharing Controversy: Issue Situation Analysis
1. Background and Progression of the Issue
Disputes over defense burden-sharing among NATO allies are not a new phenomenon. Since his first term, President Trump has consistently pressured European allies for failing to meet the defense spending target of 2% of GDP, a stance that has intensified since the beginning of his second term. However, the current situation transcends mere burden-sharing debates, with the U.S.-Israel military operation against Iran emerging as a key catalyst for conflict. President Trump has publicly warned that the U.S. might refuse security assistance to NATO members who did not support the military operation against Iran [14], a move that has further accelerated the fragmentation of the transatlantic alliance [2].
Underlying this conflict are structural changes in the security environment. The prolonged war in Ukraine has increased pressure on European nations to boost defense spending, a trend confirmed by the latest SIPRI data on global military expenditure. Concurrently, a bipartisan consensus is forming in Washington to demand commensurate contributions from allies for the security assistance provided by the U.S. in Europe. Amidst these complex pressures, the NATO summit scheduled for July 7-8 in Ankara, Turkey, is becoming a crucial test of the alliance's cohesion and future direction.
2. Current Situation (Latest Developments)
With the Ankara summit just weeks away, tensions and moves toward cohesion are simultaneously evident within the alliance. The most notable diplomatic development is the meeting of five major European nations (E5) – Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and Poland – in Berlin to coordinate their joint position ahead of the NATO summit [9]. Hosted by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, the meeting saw the E5 leaders emphasize European unity and declare their intention to strengthen the European pillar within NATO [11]. French President Macron expressed optimism, describing it as a "moment of convergence" where Europe and the U.S. are realigning on key security issues [5].
Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has announced that new defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars will be unveiled at the Ankara summit, stressing the need for allies to translate their economic capabilities into military strength [6][7]. The issue of support for Ukraine is also emerging as a key agenda item. While NATO allies are planning €70 billion in military aid to Kyiv this year, disagreements persist over funding contributions and the role of the U.S. [10]. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is also expected to attend the Ankara summit, indicating that Ukraine's support will be a central topic [7].
The dispute involving Italy remains ongoing. Following President Trump's public criticism of Italy's low defense spending, Secretary General Rutte's mention of hundreds of U.S. military aircraft sorties from Italian bases for operations against Iran prompted an immediate rebuttal from Italy, which clarified that it had only authorized technical and logistical flights [16]. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni stated at the E5 meeting that Italy would fulfill its role in building "a stronger Europe within a stronger NATO" [8], but the conflict with the U.S. over defense spending levels remains unresolved.
3. Key Actors and Their Positions and Interests
United States (Trump Administration)has assumed the role of the most assertive pressure group in this phase. President Trump has hinted at the possibility of refusing support to some NATO members for not backing the U.S. in the Iran conflict [14] and has publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Italy's defense spending levels [20]. The core U.S. interest lies in securing greater defense burden-sharing and political support for its strategic interests from European allies. Simultaneously, the U.S. is seeking separate diplomatic achievements through bilateral meetings with Turkish President Erdoğan [12][17].
Germanyis emerging as a new leader in Europe during this period. As analyzed by NZZ, with NATO requiring a new leader within Europe, Chancellor Merz has positioned himself as a focal point for European unity by hosting the E5 meeting in Berlin [9][11]. Germany has expressed its intention to significantly increase defense spending, responding to U.S. pressure while strategically aiming to enhance its influence within the transatlantic alliance by strengthening European defense capabilities.
Franceas a long-standing advocate for European strategic autonomy, President Macron is playing a mediating role by emphasizing a "reconvergence" between Europe and the U.S. [5]. However, France also maintains the position that Europe must build its own defense capabilities independent of the U.S., seeking a balance between strengthening the transatlantic alliance and fostering European self-reliance.
Italyis in the most difficult position as a direct party to this conflict. Prime Minister Meloni has faced direct criticism from President Trump [8] and publicly clashed with the NATO Secretary General over the use of its bases for the Iran conflict [16]. While Italy has expressed its willingness to increase defense spending, it faces the dilemma of formulating concrete implementation plans amidst domestic fiscal constraints and political limitations.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutteis playing a balancing role, seeking to maintain alliance cohesion while accommodating U.S. demands. He aims to highlight tangible alliance achievements by announcing new defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars at the Ankara summit [6], but, as evidenced by the controversy over remarks concerning Italian bases, he faces difficulties in maintaining delicate diplomatic equilibrium [16].
Turkeyholds a unique position as the host of the summit. President Erdoğan is seeking to maximize diplomatic gains through bilateral meetings with Trump [12][17] and has displayed authoritarian tendencies by launching a large-scale security operation arresting over 200 individuals ahead of the summit [19] and revoking the press credentials of critical media outlets [18].
4. Summary of Key Issues
The key issues surrounding the NATO Ankara Summit can be summarized into four main points.
First, the issue of fairness in defense burden-sharingis paramount. The Trump administration has consistently signaled that it may reconsider its security commitments to NATO members failing to meet the 2% GDP defense spending target. While Italy is a prime example, this is a structural issue affecting numerous European allies, not just Italy.
Second, the scope of NATO's regional roleis in question. The fact that the U.S. expected European support in the Iran conflict raises the fundamental question of whether NATO's mission should extend beyond Euro-Atlantic defense to regions outside Europe, such as the Middle East [2][20]. European allies hold differing views from the U.S. on this matter.
Third, the tension between European strategic autonomy and the transatlantic allianceis evident. The Trump administration's pressure is paradoxically fueling the strengthening of European defense capabilities [2], which could potentially undermine U.S. influence within NATO in the long run, thus conflicting with U.S. strategic interests.
Fourth, the issue of funding contributions for Ukraine supportis critical. With the U.S. potentially withdrawing support for Ukraine, how Europe will share and procure the €70 billion in military aid is a key agenda item for the Ankara summit and a test of alliance cohesion [10]. Whether NATO can move beyond mere declarations to achieve tangible results, and whether the E5 cooperation framework will lead to concrete actions beyond joint statements, are the main points of interest for this summit [11].
Phase 2: In-depth Issue Analysis
NATO Ankara Summit and Defense Burden-Sharing Controversy: In-depth Issue Analysis
1. Analysis of the Root Causes of the Issue
The fundamental cause of the defense burden-sharing conflict within NATO stems from the inherent asymmetry in the alliance's design structure. During the Cold War, NATO was structured such that the U.S. provided the overwhelming majority of nuclear deterrence and conventional forces, while European allies enjoyed security under a relatively low-cost umbrella. This structure persisted by inertia even after the Cold War, allowing European nations to benefit from the 'peace dividend' by reallocating defense spending to welfare and economic investments. Consequently, NATO's official goal of 2% GDP defense spending remained largely nominal for many member states for an extended period.
President Trump's public criticism of Italy's low defense spending is an expression of accumulated dissatisfaction within the U.S. regarding this structural imbalance [20]. However, what distinguishes the current conflict from previous phases is its convergence with the new geopolitical event of the U.S.-Israel military operation against Iran. President Trump explicitly cited European allies' lack of support in the Iran operation as grounds for warning of potential refusal of U.S. support to NATO members [14]. This signifies that the burden-sharing debate is expanding beyond mere financial contributions to encompass fundamental questions about the scope of the alliance's strategic solidarity and the boundaries of its obligations.
The case of Italy vividly illustrates the complexity of this conflict. Italy strongly objected to Secretary General Rutte's statement that U.S. military aircraft had conducted sorties for the Iran operation from Italian bases, clarifying that it had only approved technical and logistical flights [16]. This reveals the differing political and legal interpretations among allies regarding U.S. military operations and exposes flaws in the alliance's mechanisms for information sharing and prior consultation. European nations are inevitably sensitive to domestic political implications when their territories and bases are used for military operations they have not consented to, which directly impacts trust within the alliance.
At a deeper level, this conflict reflects a shift in U.S. strategic priorities. The Trump administration perceives the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific as more critical strategic theaters than European security, maintaining the position that U.S. presence in Europe is difficult to justify unless European allies develop their own defense capabilities [2]. This reflects a structural realignment of U.S. foreign policy, extending beyond President Trump's personal disposition, and signals that U.S. security commitments to Europe are unlikely to be maintained at previous levels regardless of which administration is in power.
2. Structural Context
Political Structure
On the political level, the NATO defense burden-sharing conflict arises at the intersection of a leadership vacuum within the alliance and pressures for multipolarity. During the Cold War, the U.S. served as NATO's undisputed hegemonic leader, setting the alliance's direction and assuming the responsibility for bearing its costs. However, the advent of the Trump administration has clearly signaled that the U.S. will no longer unconditionally fulfill this role, thereby triggering the need for a realignment of leadership within the alliance. The emergence of discussions, as analyzed by NZZ, suggesting that NATO requires a new leader within Europe and that Germany should assume this role, should be understood in this context [11].
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz's hosting of the E5 summit in Berlin to lead European unity [9] suggests Germany's conscious acceptance of this leadership role. However, potential concerns within Europe regarding Germany's historical military expansion, the complexities of German domestic politics, and the traditional rivalry for European leadership with France could act as obstacles to Germany's smooth fulfillment of this role. President Macron's expression of optimism, mentioning a "moment of convergence" [5], serves not only as a diplomatic gesture for stabilizing U.S.-Europe relations but also as an indication of France's intention to maintain its leadership in European security discourse.
Turkey's role is also a significant political variable. As the host of the Ankara summit, Turkey is highlighting its special relationship with the U.S. through President Erdoğan's pursuit of bilateral meetings with Trump [12][17]. Turkey, while a NATO member, has maintained relations with Russia and pursued an independent foreign policy not fully aligned with Western sanctions against Iran. The Turkish authorities' revocation of press credentials for opposition-leaning media ahead of the summit [18] raises concerns about democratic backsliding within Turkey and poses an uncomfortable question about the balance NATO will strike between its identity as a democratic alliance and geopolitical pragmatism.
Economic Structure
On the economic front, the defense burden-sharing conflict is deeply intertwined with the fiscal structures of European nations and the sustainability of their welfare state models. The low defense spending maintained by European countries is not merely a matter of free-riding but a result of the politico-economic trade-off between welfare and defense expenditures. In democratic systems with strong voter demand for welfare, significantly increasing defense spending is a politically challenging choice. However, with the fundamental change in Europe's security environment following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, increased defense spending has become an unavoidable task, a trend confirmed by SIPRI data.
The planned announcement of new defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars at the Ankara summit [6][7] illustrates the scale of this economic transition. Secretary General Rutte's emphasis on allies translating economic capabilities into military strength [6] calls for a restructuring of the defense industry ecosystem, beyond mere expenditure increases. This entails complex economic challenges, including the integration and standardization of the European defense industry and the redefinition of its relationship with the U.S. defense industry. The plan for €70 billion in military aid to Ukraine [10] has become a core point of economic contention regarding who will bear these costs and how they will be shared.
Security Structure
On the security level, the current conflict reveals fundamental tensions surrounding the interpretation of NATO's strategic scope and collective defense obligations. While Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, concerning collective defense, primarily envisions Euro-Atlantic security, the Trump administration is applying pressure to effectively expand NATO's geographical and strategic scope by using European support for the Iran operation as a metric for alliance contribution [14][20]. This increases the risk of European allies becoming involved in U.S. military operations to which they have not consented, paradoxically accelerating discussions on European strategic autonomy.
In the context of Russia's prolonged invasion of Ukraine, NATO allies are expected to reaffirm their Article 5 collective defense commitments and redefine Russia as a long-term threat[1], demonstrating the enduring relevance of the alliance's traditional security functions. However, the United States' hints at reducing its military presence in Europe, pressuring European nations to strengthen their self-defense capabilities[2], impose the realistic challenge of Europe needing to possess the ability to defend itself without the U.S. This will lead to increased defense spending and expansion of the defense industry in the short term, but heralds a structural change towards strengthening Europe's strategic autonomy within NATO in the medium to long term.
3. Comparison of Historical Precedents and Similar Cases
NATO's defense spending disputes are a historically recurring pattern, and there are examples demonstrating the institutional resilience with which the alliance has survived even in 'permanent crisis'[4]. The most direct historical precedent is France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command in the 1960s under de Gaulle. De Gaulle, in protest against American hegemonic leadership, declared France's strategic autonomy, which was perceived as a serious crisis for the alliance at the time. However, France remained within NATO's political structure and rejoined the integrated military command during President Sarkozy's tenure in 2009, thus maintaining the alliance's continuity. This case suggests that conflicts within alliances tend to be resolved through adjustment and compromise rather than extreme rupture.
The "Double-Track Decision" controversy of the 1970s-80s provides a similar precedent. When NATO decided to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe in response to the Soviet threat of intermediate-range missiles, large-scale anti-nuclear protests erupted in countries like West Germany and the Netherlands, escalating tensions within the alliance. However, the alliance overcame this crisis through a dual strategy of pursuing both negotiation and deployment, which eventually led to the INF Treaty. This case illustrates that internal alliance conflicts can act as a catalyst for reaching new strategic agreements.
The pressure on defense spending during Trump's first term (2017-2021) is another significant direct precedent. At the time, Trump criticized NATO as "obsolete" and strongly pressured European allies to increase their defense expenditures. In response, many NATO member states began to increase their defense spending, and by 2024, the number of countries meeting the 2% of GDP target had significantly increased. This shows that while U.S. pressure can cause conflict in the short term, it can lead to increased defense spending by allies in the medium to long term. The current situation under Trump's second term is an extension of this pattern, but it is differentiated by the added complexity of the conflict due to the new variable of the Iran war.
The Suez Crisis (1956) offers another useful comparative case. This incident, where Britain and France militarily intervened in Egypt without U.S. consent and were forced to withdraw under strong American pressure, demonstrates how unilateral military action, even within an alliance, can cause severe damage to alliance cohesion. The current situation, where the U.S. is conducting operations in Iran without European consent and using European bases while demanding support from Europe, shares structural similarities in terms of the conflict caused by a lack of prior consultation and unilateralism within the alliance, albeit in the opposite direction[20].
4. Key Variables in Issue Development
The key variables determining the future development of this issue can be broadly categorized into four.
First, the substantive outcome of the Ankara Summit. Whether the announcement of defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars[6][7] and commitments to support Ukraine[10] lead to concrete agreements, and whether President Trump explicitly reaffirms the Article 5 collective defense commitment, will be key indicators of the alliance's cohesion. If the summit remains at the level of diplomatic rhetoric in a joint declaration, the conflict will persist; if concrete burden-sharing mechanisms and implementation schedules are agreed upon, short-term stabilization may be possible.
Second, the pace of Europe's pursuit of strategic autonomy. It is important to see if the unity shown by the E5 countries at the Berlin meeting continues after the Ankara Summit and leads to practical European defense cooperation[3][9]. In particular, the key will be whether Germany can effectively play a leadership role in European defense within NATO and whether cooperation with France can take precedence over competition. While the strengthening of Europe's autonomous defense capabilities increases Europe's negotiating power against American coercive pressure, it also paradoxically accelerates structural changes in the transatlantic alliance.
Third, the trends in U.S. domestic politics. The extent to which President Trump's pressure on NATO receives support within the U.S. Congress and the security community, and how the U.S. foreign policy stance evolves ahead of the 2026 midterm elections, are important variables. If Trump's pressure gains bipartisan support, the structural pressure on Europe will be prolonged; if the traditional pro-alliance factions within Congress exert a restraining influence, the intensity of the conflict may be mitigated.
Fourth, the development of the Russia-Ukraine war. The longer the war lasts and the more persistent the Russian threat, the greater the pressure on European allies to increase defense spending, and the greater the need for U.S. support. Conversely, if a ceasefire or negotiations begin in any form, the urgency of the defense spending dispute may somewhat subside. President Zelensky's attendance at the Ankara Summit[7] reaffirms that this variable is a key agenda item for the summit. The interaction of these four variables will be the core driving force determining the direction and speed of NATO's structural transformation.
5. Final Recommended Response Measures
NATO Ankara Summit and Defense Spending Disputes: Comprehensive Recommended Response Measures
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Response Measures
Strategic Situation Assessment
The NATO alliance structure is entering a phase of fundamental realignment, going beyond mere defense spending disputes, with the Ankara Summit as a catalyst. President Trump's public criticism of Italy's low defense spending and his warning about the possibility of withholding U.S. support to NATO member states[14][20] confirm that the U.S. approach to alliance management is shifting from a past system of implicit security guarantees to explicit principles of reciprocity. Simultaneously, movements to strengthen Europe's strategic autonomy are accelerating, as evidenced by the coordination of common positions by European E5 countries in Berlin[9][11] and the NATO Secretary General's announcement of defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars[6][7]. At the intersection of these two trends, South Korea faces the dual challenge of re-examining the stability of the ROK-U.S. alliance and actively leveraging defense and security cooperation with Europe as a new strategic asset.
The core assessments are as follows: First, NATO's transformation will serve as a precedent that structurally strengthens the U.S. pressure for cost-sharing on the ROK-U.S. alliance, making it an issue of long-term alliance redesign rather than short-term negotiation. Second, Europe's increased defense spending and strengthened self-defense capabilities offer unprecedented market opportunities for South Korean defense companies while simultaneously opening a strategic window for building security cooperation networks with Europe. Third, the realignment of leadership in Europe, centered around Germany[11], provides a structural opportunity for South Korea to deepen security partnerships with major European countries through bilateral and multilateral channels.
Core Recommended Response Measures
First, it is necessary to establish a proactive strategic framework for ROK-U.S. alliance cost-sharing negotiations.As confirmed by the NATO case, the Trump administration uses allies' defense spending contributions as an indicator of strategic loyalty rather than a mere financial metric[14]. In defense cost-sharing negotiations, South Korea must proactively prepare a new negotiation framework that comprehensively quantifies the strategic value of U.S. Forces Korea and South Korea's contributions, going beyond simple monetary discussions. A strategy is needed to visualize South Korea's substantial contributions by comprehensively calculating defense cost-sharing payments, U.S. arms purchases, ROK-U.S. combined exercise costs, the economic value of base provision, and contributions to Indo-Pacific security.
Second, the government-industry cooperation system for entering the European defense market must be strengthened.With NATO allies scheduled to announce new defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars at the Ankara Summit[6][7], the increase in defense spending by European countries can be converted into concrete export opportunities for South Korean defense companies. It is necessary to strengthen government-level defense diplomacy to expand the competitiveness of the South Korean defense industry, as demonstrated by the K2 tank and K9 self-propelled howitzer contracts with Poland, to all E5 countries, and to actively propose partnership models that include local production and technology transfer in Europe.
Third, ROK-Europe security cooperation channels must be institutionalized.In a situation where analyses suggest Germany should take on a new leadership role within NATO[11], South Korea must elevate and regularize security dialogue channels with key E5 countries such as Germany, France, and Poland. It is particularly important to identify cooperation agendas in new security domains such as cyber security, supply chain security, and critical technology cooperation, thereby deepening the substance of ROK-Europe security partnerships.
Fourth, strategic risk hedging through alliance diversification should be pursued.In a situation where the Atlantic alliance is accelerating its cracks and questions are being raised about the reliability of U.S. alliance commitments[2][4], South Korea must pursue strategic diversification by strengthening multilateral security cooperation networks with Europe, Japan, and Australia, while maintaining the ROK-U.S. alliance as its foundation. This will reduce vulnerability to unilateral U.S. decisions and contribute to enhancing South Korea's strategic autonomy.
2. Short-Term/Mid-Term/Long-Term Action Plans
Short-Term Action Plan (0-6 months): Situation Response and Foundation Building
The top priority is to thoroughly analyze the outcomes of the Ankara Summit and immediately draw implications for South Korea. By analyzing the details of the defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars to be announced by NATO[6] and the level of agreement on defense spending burden-sharing, the baseline for defense cost-sharing negotiations that the U.S. will demand from South Korea must be identified in advance. In particular, considering the possibility that President Trump's method of public pressure applied to Italy may be similarly applied to South Korea, it is necessary to re-organize the status of South Korea's defense cost contributions from an international comparative perspective.
Immediate actions to seize defense export opportunities must also be taken concurrently. By analyzing the list of defense contracts to be announced at the Ankara Summit, specific items and countries accessible to South Korean defense companies should be identified, and government-level defense diplomatic support should be rapidly mobilized. The utilization of the embassy network in host countries should also be strengthened to understand the defense spending increase plans and procurement priorities of various European countries. Furthermore, based on the will for European unity confirmed at the E5 Berlin meeting[9][11], working-level consultations to expand defense cooperation with key countries such as Germany and Poland should be initiated immediately.
In terms of ROK-U.S. alliance management, while closely monitoring the Trump administration's patterns of alliance pressure, diplomatic messages highlighting South Korea's contributions should be proactively prepared. It is important to have response scenarios and communication strategies in place in advance to prepare for situations where public criticism similar to that directed at Italy by the U.S. might be aimed at South Korea.
Mid-Term Action Plan (6 months - 2 years): Deepening Structural Cooperation
In the medium term, efforts should focus on establishing an institutional framework for ROK-Europe security cooperation. Considering Germany's trend of strengthening its new leadership role within NATO[11], a plan to elevate and regularize the ROK-Germany security consultation channel to the ministerial level should be pursued. Cooperation possibilities with France in nuclear deterrence, space, and cyber security should be explored, and based on the established defense cooperation with Poland, a strategy to expand into a security cooperation network in Eastern Europe should be pursued.
Qualitative deepening of defense cooperation is also a mid-term task. Beyond simple finished product exports, a comprehensive defense partnership model that includes local production in Europe, joint research and development, and technology transfer must be developed. As European countries are simultaneously pursuing the development of their own defense industries in response to NATO's pressure to increase defense spending, a strategic approach is needed for South Korean companies to become integrated into the European defense ecosystem as supply chain partners. To this end, efforts should be made to conclude intergovernmental cooperation agreements between the Defense Acquisition Program Administration of South Korea and the defense authorities of various European countries, and policy incentives should be established to support the establishment of local subsidiaries and joint ventures by South Korean defense companies in Europe.
Active participation in discussions for the redesign of the ROK-U.S. alliance is also necessary. As confirmed by the NATO case, the U.S. is demanding that allies build greater self-defense capabilities[2], which will apply equally to South Korea. South Korea should frame the strengthening of its own defense capabilities not as a passive response to U.S. pressure, but as an active choice for expanding strategic autonomy, and utilize this as leverage in the redesign discussions of the ROK-U.S. alliance.
Long-Term Action Plan (2+ years): Redefining Strategic Positioning
In the long term, South Korea should pursue strategic positioning as a security hub connecting the Indo-Pacific and Europe. By combining NATO's trend of expanding engagement in Indo-Pacific security with South Korea's strengthening cooperation as a NATO partner nation, a strategic vision should be established for South Korea to serve as a bridge connecting the security orders of both regions. This will expand South Korea's diplomatic influence and also contribute to diversifying the security dependence structure, which is currently heavily reliant on the U.S.
In the defense sector, the goal should be to leap forward as a global defense power beyond the European market. With NATO allies' increased defense spending becoming a structural trend[6], a comprehensive defense industry development strategy should be pursued, including expanded R&D investment, development of next-generation weapon systems, and strengthened export financing for defense products, to enable South Korean defense companies to occupy a key position in the global defense supply chain.
Building multilateral security cooperation systems in preparation for the prolonged cracks in the Atlantic alliance is also a long-term task[4]. While strengthening trilateral security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, diverse multilateral cooperation channels such as ROK-Europe security cooperation, ROK-Australia cooperation, and the Quad should be developed in parallel to build a complex security network that can protect South Korea's security interests under any changes in the international security environment.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
Key Monitoring Indicators
Alliance Stability IndicatorsThe foremost indicators to monitor are the reaffirmation and the strength of the language used regarding the collective defense clause (Article 5) in the joint declaration of the Ankara Summit. Whether President Trump signs the NATO joint declaration and the extent of disagreement expressed during the signing process are key indicators of the reliability of U.S. alliance commitments. Furthermore, changes in the size of U.S. forces stationed in Europe, changes in the scale and frequency of ROK-U.S. combined exercises, and trends in discussions within the U.S. regarding the reduction of U.S. Forces Korea should also be continuously tracked.
Defense Spending Pressure IndicatorsThe upward revision of defense spending targets demanded by the Trump administration from NATO allies should be closely watched. As discussions are underway to raise the current target of 2% of GDP to over 3%, it is necessary to proactively analyze how this standard will be applied to defense cost-sharing negotiations with South Korea. The level and method of public pressure applied by the U.S. to NATO allies can also be interpreted as a precursor to similar pressure on South Korea.
European Defense Market IndicatorsThe scale, items, and recipient countries of defense contracts to be announced at the NATO Ankara Summit[6][7] must be meticulously analyzed. The annual trends in defense budget increases of European countries, changes in major weapon system procurement plans, and the success of European export contracts for South Korean defense companies should be regularly checked. In particular, the pace of defense spending increases and changes in procurement priorities in Eastern European countries such as Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states are important signals indicating further opportunities for the South Korean defense industry.
European Leadership Realignment IndicatorsThe pace of Germany's defense spending increase and its expanded role within NATO[11], the actual operational level of the E5 cooperation framework, and whether Macron's "reconvergence" remarks[5] lead to actual improvements in Europe-U.S. relations should be tracked. The response strategy of South Korea must differ depending on whether the movement to strengthen Europe's strategic autonomy leads to the strengthening of the European pillar within NATO or develops into the establishment of a separate European defense system.
Trigger Points and Response Scenarios
Trigger 1: U.S. demand for a significant increase in defense cost-sharing.If the Trump administration officially demands defense spending exceeding 3% of GDP from NATO allies, or initiates negotiations to increase defense cost-sharing with South Korea to more than double the current level, South Korea must immediately present a comprehensive contribution calculation method and activate a communication strategy to manage public opinion and parliamentary sentiment in advance.
Trigger 2: U.S. hints at reducing or redeploying U.S. Forces Korea.If President Trump implements a reduction of U.S. forces stationed in Europe or applies similar pressure to South Korea[2], South Korea must immediately implement an emergency plan that simultaneously pursues strengthened ROK-Europe security cooperation and enhanced self-defense capabilities. In this scenario, strengthening multilateral security cooperation with Japan and Australia becomes a particularly important complementary measure.
Trigger 3: Emergence of South Korean competitors in the European defense market.If defense companies from competing countries such as Turkey, Israel, and India emerge as direct competitors to South Korea in the European market, South Korea must shift its strategy to emphasize technological superiority and delivery reliability as core competitive advantages, while more actively proposing local production and technology transfer conditions.
Trigger 4: Deepening NATO-Indo-Pacific Partnership. If NATO moves towards institutionalizing cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, South Korea should leverage this as a strategic opportunity to upgrade its security cooperation channels with Europe and pursue a diplomatic strategy that maximizes its NATO partner status.
4. Summary Conclusion
The controversy over defense cost-sharing surrounding the NATO Ankara Summit presents a complex geopolitical event offering both threats and opportunities for South Korea. The Trump administration's public criticism of Italy and its use of allies' contributions as a measure of strategic loyalty [20] foreshadows intensified pressure on the ROK-US alliance. In response, South Korea needs a strategic approach that simultaneously pursues three pillars: comprehensive visualization of defense cost contributions, strengthening its own defense capabilities, and deepening defense and security cooperation with Europe.
Europe's increase in defense spending and expansion of its defense market present unprecedented opportunities for South Korean defense companies [6][7], while the reshaping of European leadership, particularly centered around Germany [11], provides structural conditions for advancing ROK-Europe security partnerships to new levels. Given the high probability that the fragmentation of the transatlantic alliance will become a long-term trend [4], South Korea must establish a resilient diplomatic and security strategy capable of protecting its interests amidst any international security environment changes, by maintaining the ROK-US alliance as its foundation while diversifying its security cooperation networks. NATO's transformation should not be a passive object of adaptation for South Korea, but rather an opportunity for active strategic redesign.
References
[3] [Al-Monitor] European leaders pledge unity after recent tensions ahead of NATO summit
[4] [Foreign Affairs] NATO’s Permanent Crisis
[5] [Daily Sabah] Macron sees renewed Europe-US alignment ahead of Ankara NATO summit
[6] [Daily Sabah] NATO to unveil billions in defense deals at Ankara summit: Rutte
[7] [Al-Monitor] NATO's Rutte says billions in new defense contracts will be announced at summit
[8] [ANSA] Meloni: 'Rafforziamo la componente europea della Nato. L'Italia farà la sua parte'
[9] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Germany's Merz rallies European NATO allies ahead of summit
[10] [Maliweb] L’OTAN en quête de 70 milliards d’euros pour Kiev car Washington ne veut plus payer
[11] [Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ)] Vor dem Nato-Gipfel betont Europa in Berlin seine Einigkeit
[12] [Al-Monitor] Erdogan says bilateral talks with Trump likely at NATO summit in Turkey
[15] [Kathimerini] EU sends dual message to Ankara
[16] [Al-Monitor] Italy rebukes NATO's Rutte over remarks on US use of bases in Iran war
[17] [Daily Sabah] Erdoğan signals one-on-one talks with Trump at NATO summit
[18] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Turkey journalists angered after NATO summit exclusion
[19] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Turkey arrests more than 200 in crackdown before NATO summit
[20] [Al Jazeera] Iran accuses NATO of ‘complicity’ in US war: What role did EU nations play?
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.