[Public Opinion Briefing No. 65-1] MB Approval Rating Stagnant / Party Support Ratings

[Public Opinion Briefing No. 65] Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey

1. MB Approval Rating Stagnant / Party Support Ratings

2. President Lee Myung-bak's Stance on Sejong City / Opposition to Mandatory Kindergarten for 5-Year-Olds

Analysis of National Approval Ratings: MB Approval at 39.2%, Down for Two Consecutive Months

Presidential Approval Rating Down for Two Consecutive Months: 44.5% in September → 41.8% in October → 39.2% in November

President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating, which had shown an upward trend after surpassing the 40% mark in September through a drive for pragmatic centrism, has declined for two consecutive months. After reaching 44.5% in September, with some media reports indicating approval ratings exceeding 50% from certain polling agencies, it slightly decreased to 41.8% in the survey conducted on October 24. This November, the national approval rating has fallen back into the 30% range at 39.2%. This finding is from the November regular public opinion barometer survey conducted by the East Asia Institute and Korea Research on November 28, the day after President Lee Myung-bak's public dialogue, which garnered attention for his apology regarding the Sejong City issue. The survey was conducted via telephone with 800 adult men and women nationwide, with a sampling error of ±3.5% at a 95% confidence level (response rate 13.6%).

Examining the support base, while the decline in approval ratings last month (October) was primarily observed among centrist voters and fluid Grand National Party supporters, the November survey shows a significant drop in support among the ruling party's traditional base, including voters in the Chungcheong region, the PK region, conservatives, and those with lower incomes and education levels.

[Figure 1] President Lee Myung-bak's Approval Rating Trend (%)

Approval rating decline is steeper in the Chungcheong region and traditional Grand National Party support base.

Approval rating decline is steeper in Busan, Ulsan, Gyeongnam (PK), among conservatives, those aged 50+, and low-income individuals earning less than 1 million KRW per month.

This appears to be influenced by the Sejong City issue and heightened economic anxiety.

First, examining the President's approval rating by region, it was highest in the Daegu-Gyeongbuk (TK) region at 59.0%, followed by Seoul at 43.7% and Incheon/Gyeonggi at 42.5%, all exceeding the national average. However, it was low among respondents in the Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam (PK) regions at 32.5%, and in the Chungcheong region, where attention was focused on the Sejong City issue, at 31.9%. It was lowest in the Honam region, where criticism of the government is strongest, at 16.7%. In the Chungcheong region, the rating dropped by 10.9 percentage points compared to October, and in the PK region, the decline reached 11.6 percentage points. In the Honam region, it also fell by 7.6 percentage points compared to the previous month.

The low presidential approval rating in the PK region, the traditional base of the current ruling party, is likely related to the fact that while Grand National Party leader Park Hee-tae narrowly won against Song In-bae of the pro-Roh faction in the October 28 by-election, the conflict between the pro-Lee and pro-Roh factions intensified in the general election, leading to the election of many Pro-Park Unity candidates, and that favorable public opinion towards the pro-Roh faction and the Democratic Party grew after the death of former President Roh Moo-hyun. Furthermore, the low presidential approval rating in the Chungcheong region is interpreted as a backlash against the President's official announcement of revisions to the original Sejong City development plan through a dialogue with the public the day before the survey.

Meanwhile, by age group, the approval rating was 54.7% among those aged 50 and over, but only 40.9% among those in their 40s, 30.0% among those in their 30s, and 20.0% among those in their 20s. Although within the margin of error, the ratings for those in their 30s and 40s showed a slight increase compared to the previous month. However, the rating for those in their 20s dropped by 5.9 percentage points. Notably, the approval rating among those aged 50 and over, who have consistently maintained a rating above 60% this year and served as the core support base for the current government and the Grand National Party, fell by 9.7 percentage points, marking the largest decline.

By income level, the approval rating was lowest among households earning less than 1 million KRW per month at 53.2%, followed by the low-income bracket of 1-2 million KRW at 41.9%, and 33.0% for the 2-3 million KRW bracket. The rating was 43.4% for the 3-4 million KRW income bracket. For those earning 4 million KRW or more, the rating was 34.7%, maintaining the general pattern of lower presidential approval ratings among higher income groups. However, the presidential approval rating decreased by 7.6 percentage points and 3.1 percentage points, respectively, from the previous month among income groups below 1 million KRW and below 2 million KRW. The 2-3 million KRW bracket also saw a 5.7% decrease. Overall, a trend of declining approval ratings was observed among lower to middle-income groups.

By educational attainment, a significant decline in approval ratings was observed among those with a junior high school education or less, who had served as a support base for the President and the ruling party, compared to the previous month. The rating was 44.7%, an 18.1 percentage point decrease from the October survey results. The rating among high school graduates was 47.8%, similar to the previous month, and among college graduates and above, it was 33.0%, also similar to the previous month. While the pattern of a more critical view of President Lee Myung-bak among highly educated individuals was maintained, the significant decline in approval ratings within the President's core support base was also confirmed across educational variables.

[Table 1] Changes in Presidential Approval Base Compared to the Previous Month (%)

Note: The margin of error is ±3.5% based on 800 respondents. For subgroups, the margin of error increases significantly (±7.0% for a sample of 200 people), making it difficult to consider the month-on-month approval rate difference as statistically significant. Therefore, interpretations here should not be taken as absolute. Gangwon/Jeju are combined with 33 people and excluded from interpretation.

Approval Decline Trend Pronounced Among Ideologically Conservative

Conservatives Sensitive to State Affairs and Economic Issues

While the decline in approval rates in the previous month's survey was primarily found among respondents with centrist and progressive tendencies, this month's survey showed a larger drop in approval ratings among respondents with conservative tendencies. Respondents with progressive tendencies, who were at 23.8% in the October survey, did not experience further decline, reaching 25.9% this survey. The centrist group also saw a 2.6 percentage point increase from 39.3% last month to 41.8%. While this is a slight improvement compared to last month, it falls short of the levels seen in the September survey, when the power of centrist pragmatism peaked, with approval ratings reaching 47.0% among centrists and 31.5% among progressives.

[Figure 2] Changes in Presidential Approval Rating by Ideological Tendency: July-November (%)

However, what is more noteworthy is that approval ratings for President Lee Myung-bak, which had consistently remained high among respondents who identify as conservative, dropped to 46.5% this survey, a decrease of 9.7% from the previous month. While various factors may have contributed to the decline in approval ratings among conservatives, economic headwinds such as the unimproved perceived economy, the recent possibility of a double-dip recession both domestically and internationally, and concerns about a secondary financial crisis following the Dubai debt default announcement could have exacerbated economic anxiety among conservatives.

Recent survey results from this institute indicate that voters with conservative tendencies tend to view the economic situation in Korea more pessimistically. In a survey on class perception conducted by the East Asia Institute (EAI) in collaboration with the JoongAng Ilbo in September, 62.9% of progressives and 67.5% of centrists responded that the Korean economy had worsened compared to a year ago, while 71.3% of conservatives held this view, indicating a relatively higher pessimistic outlook on the Korean economy among conservative respondents. Furthermore, when asked about the reasons for negative responses regarding President Lee Myung-bak's state administration in the regular survey conducted in October, progressives and centrists primarily cited that the Lee Myung-bak administration mainly represented the interests of the established elite or engaged in unilateral state management. In contrast, conservatives pointed to dissatisfaction with the current administration's economic policy management as the core reason.

[Figure 3] Evaluation of the Korean Economy Over One Year by Ideological Tendency: "It Has Worsened" (%)

Source: EAI ․ JoongAng Ilbo Class Perception Survey (2009.9)

[Figure 4] Reasons for Negative Evaluation of Presidential State Administration by Ideological Tendency (%)

Source: EAI ․ Hankook Research Regular Public Opinion Barometer Survey (2009.9)

Note: Other responses include dissatisfaction with policies and ideology, lack of moral integrity, and poor management of close associates. These are not indicated on the graph.

Analysis of Party Support Rates: Grand National Party 30.7%, Democratic Party 21.4%, Unaffiliated Decreasing

Grand National Party 27.6%→ 30.7%, Democratic Party 16.5%→21.4%, Unaffiliated 38.3%→ 24.0%

As the number of unaffiliated voters decreased, some were absorbed by the support bases of the two major parties, while support for other parties significantly increased.

[Figure 1] Party Support Rates: October-November (%)

The party support survey results from the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Hankook Research's Regular Public Opinion Barometer, conducted on November 28th, showed opposite results to the October survey conducted just before the October 28th by-election. The number of unaffiliated voters significantly decreased, while support for both the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party declined by 3.1%p and 4.9%p respectively, with a trend of increasing unaffiliated voters. However, the November survey showed a significant decrease in unaffiliated voters and a slight increase in the support rates for the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party.

The Grand National Party's support rate, which had fallen from 31.9% in September to 27.6% in October, re-entered the 30% range at 30.7% this month. Similarly, the Democratic Party, after receiving 21.8% support in the survey on May 23rd (the first time since the emergence of the Roh Moo-hyun administration), dropped to the 10% range at 16.5% in last month's October survey, but re-entered the 20% range in this month's survey.

Although the change is within the margin of error, it can be attributed to a portion of the unaffiliated voters, who stood at 38.3% in the previous month's survey, decreasing to 24.0% in this month's survey and being absorbed by the support of the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party. In the absence of any specific factors boosting party support, if the political conflicts primarily occurred within the National Assembly and the political sphere after the parliamentary audit and the October 28th by-election, and the Constitutional Court's ruling on the Media Law on October 29th, it is presumed that the cynical attitude towards existing political parties has eased as conflicts subsequently arose around the government's policy implementation processes, such as the revision of Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers Project.

Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that support for minor parties excluding major parliamentary parties increased to 9.6%, a significant rise of 7.0 percentage points from the previous month's survey (2.6%). Considering reports that a hypothetical pro-Roh new party, officially planned for establishment in January next year, received about 5% support in some survey agencies, ranking third after the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party, this suggests that the recent increase in support for non-parliamentary parties may be related to the pro-Roh new party.

[Table 1] Changes in Party Support Rates (February-November 2009) (%)

Strong Support for Grand National Party in TK/Seoul Metropolitan Area vs. Democratic Party in Honam

Chungcheong: Grand National Party 28.2% vs. Democratic Party 12.2% vs. Liberty Forward Party 6.4% vs. Unaffiliated 33.2%

Sharp Increase in Democratic Party Support in Seoul and PK

Although the President and the government are leading the political agenda centered on Sejong City and the Four Major Rivers Project, the major political parties are gradually intensifying their preparations for the upcoming local elections, with potential candidates gradually emerging within each party. An analysis of regional party support provides significant implications for predicting future election dynamics.

In this survey, the Grand National Party leads the Democratic Party in traditional strongholds such as the TK region, as well as in Seoul and the Seoul Metropolitan Area (Incheon/Gyeonggi). Conversely, the Democratic Party holds an advantage in the Honam region. In the TK region, the Grand National Party's support reached 49.5%, nearly a majority, with the Democratic Party at only 8.6%. In Seoul, the Grand National Party garnered 30.4% support and the Democratic Party 22.5%. In the Incheon/Gyeonggi region, the Grand National Party led with 35.4% against the Democratic Party's 19.6%. In contrast, in the Honam region, the Democratic Party held a significant lead with 44.5% compared to the Grand National Party's 4.0%.

In Seoul, the gap between the Grand National Party (35.5% support) and the Democratic Party (12.6% support) was a substantial 22.9 percentage points in the October survey. However, in the November survey, the Grand National Party's support decreased by 5.1 percentage points, while the Democratic Party's support increased by 9.9 percentage points, narrowing the support gap to a single digit (8.2 percentage points). This suggests fierce competition is anticipated in the upcoming Seoul mayoral primary and general election.

In addition, the Chungcheong region and the PK region are expected to become key areas of interest for the next local elections. In the Chungcheong region, where public opinion is volatile due to the Sejong City issue, the Grand National Party received 28.2% support, higher than last month, leading the Democratic Party (12.2%) and the Liberty Forward Party (6.4%). However, the unaffiliated voters accounted for 33.2%, the highest nationwide. In the PK region, conversely, the Grand National Party's support was limited to 28.5%, while the Democratic Party garnered 22.5%, narrowing the gap to 6.0 percentage points.

[Table 2] Regional Party Support Rates (%)

However, the interpretation of party support in the Chungcheong and PK regions requires more cautious and detailed supplementary analysis. While analyzing regional party support in this regular survey, it is observed that outside of the Chungcheong and PK regions, the ranking of preferred parties remains consistent with minor variations in the support gap between the two major parties across regions. However, in the Chungcheong and PK regions, party support rates show significant fluctuations even in the short term, and sometimes the order of preferred parties is reversed.

For example, public opinion in the Chungcheong region shows that the Democratic Party led the Grand National Party by 9.9 percentage points in the August survey, while the Grand National Party led by 6.0 percentage points in the September survey, 3.4 percentage points in the October survey, and by as much as 16.0 percentage points in this survey. While this phenomenon might be due to the large sampling error resulting from a small number of respondents in regional analyses, it also indicates that public opinion in the Chungcheong region is highly complex and volatile.

[Table 3] Changes in Party Support by Social Class (October-November) (%)