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Changing East Asian Security/Economy Architecture

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Others
Published
March 31, 2011

The East Asia Institute (EAI) in South Korea, together with its partner institutions—the Shanghai Center for RimPac Strategy and International Studies at Shanghai Jiao Tong University and National Chengchi University in Taiwan—jointly held Smart Talk seminars. As a collaborative event within the “Northeast Asia” cluster of the MacArthur Asia Security Initiative, these seminars were held in Shanghai and Taipei on January 19 and January 21, 2010, respectively.

Under the title “Northeast Asia Security Challenges,” these Smart Talk seminars focused on the rise of China, China’s new role in the world, the changing East Asian security architecture, Inter-Korean relations, and Cross-Strait relations. This collaborative research effort seeks to foster greater understanding among Northeast Asian countries and facilitate policy recommendations from diverse perspectives on the key issues affecting the region.

The following is a summary of the main points and views expressed by participants from the three institutions at both seminars.

U.S.-China Relations and the Desirable Security Architecture for East Asia

Chinese Experts

During the Smart Talk seminars, Chinese experts argued that since the post-Cold War period, the United States has adopted a dual policy of engagement and hedging toward China. The Obama administration has inherited this dual policy, with Asia as the focus of such an effort. This suggests that Washington’s foreign policy is perceived as still seeking to maintain U.S. hegemony. Despite China’s growing power, Chinese experts believe that the United States remains the sole superpower in the world and the strongest power in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of economic and military strength, science and technology, and cultural influence. Nevertheless, U.S. national power has relatively waned since the Global Financial Crisis, its influence in the Asia-Pacific region has also decreased, and its hegemony has wavered.

Chinese experts evaluated that since President Barack Obama’s state visit to China in November 2009, the United States has initiated a multi-field, multi-level, and multi-round strategic reengagement with the Asia-Pacific region. This move by Washington was regarded by Chinese experts as damaging mutual trust between the United States and China, as well as impacting China’s regional relations, particularly with neighboring countries such as Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and India. Chinese experts at the seminar expressed concern that the United States might seek to maintain its leadership and hegemony in East Asia at the cost of regional peace and stability by potentially becoming directly involved in regional conflicts. Chinese experts also noted that while the United States and Japan wish to avoid war on the Korean Peninsula, they still desire to maintain the current stalemate, as stability and unification do not align with their maximum interests.

Taiwanese View

Regarding the role of the United States in Asia, Taiwanese experts believed that it undoubtedly plays an important and significant role in both Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait relations. The United States continues to serve as the protector of South Korea and Taiwan, as it is the ally of the former and a supporter of the latter through the Taiwan Relations Act. Furthermore, the presence of the United States is viewed as a stabilizer that prevents either side on the Korean Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait from taking provocative actions or displaying intentions to alter the status quo.

Taiwanese experts specified that the role of the United States comprises the following elements: acknowledging the “One China” policy in the Shanghai Communiqué with the People’s Republic of China (PRC); upholding the Taiwan Relations Act; continuing arms sales to Taiwan to enhance its defense capabilities and confidence in Cross-Strait dialogues; maintaining strategic and economic dialogue between China and the United States; and preserving U.S.–Taiwan relations.

According to Taiwanese scholars, the U.S. objective in this region is to maintain peace and stability. Washington supports Taipei’s efforts to engage Beijing and increase interactions across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese experts also anticipate that the currently improving Cross-Strait relations could contribute to positive-sum relations among the United States, China, and Taiwan, which would serve U.S. interests in Asia. As for Inter-Korean relations, the United States has demonstrated strong support for South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s efforts to deter any potential provocative actions by North Korea. Washington has also strengthened security cooperation with Seoul to reassure its commitment to the stability of the Korean Peninsula.

Taiwanese experts also predicted that although U.S. support is indispensable for both South Korea and Taiwan, it will clearly be limited to a certain extent in the future. The United States is no longer the dominant force in the East Asia region. With the changing power dynamics among Asian countries, it is becoming more complex for the United States to address security and other regional challenges. The rapid rise of China and its increasing influence on Asian regional economic and security developments make the U.S. future role more uncertain. Furthermore, the serious economic and financial problems at home make it difficult for the United States to become involved in any additional foreign conflicts in the foreseeable future.

Taiwanese experts recommended the following points:

• The United States should nurture constructive factors for a rising China.

• Regional countries should encourage greater U.S. engagement in Asia to alleviate any sense of loss associated with China’s rise.

• Regional powers need to assist in managing U.S.-China mutual expectations and avoid friction by enhancing common interests and reducing conflicting interests.

Korean View

Korean scholars believe that the U.S.-China rivalry originates from the bilateral security dilemma inherent in power transition. This was manifested in disputes at the 2010 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, exchange rate disputes, the Cheonan Incident and subsequent ROK-U.S. military exercises, the South China Sea issue, China-Japan maritime disputes, post-crisis economic management, and the forward-deployed diplomacy of the United States. They assessed that strategic mistrust exists and calls for mutual cooperation. The problem lies in misperceptions or incomplete information about the other party’s intentions, evident through offensive behavior and a lack of trust and consensus regarding the process and end-state of this power transition in the twenty-first century.

In terms of economic policies, Korean experts noted that the United States has been strengthening its position in East Asia by securitizing its economic network, primarily through FTA networks. Conversely, China has been attempting to preempt these linkages, as demonstrated by the China-ASEAN FTA, the China-Taiwan ECFA, and continued efforts to pursue a South Korea-China FTA and even a trilateral South Korea-China-Japan FTA.

As a Cold War-type bipolar confrontation and mindset is unlikely to materialize, South Korea’s role can be critical in transforming the East Asian international political environment from Hobbesian anarchy to networked regional governance. This can be termed “complex network diplomacy,” signifying a combination of factors such as utilizing the complex ROK-U.S. alliance to transform the global and regional military architecture. Other areas could include strategic cooperation with China, Japan, and Russia; knowledge diplomacy to address future challenges on the Korean Peninsula; and middle power network diplomacy to help resolve the security dilemma between the United States and China.

Future Strategies for Cross-Strait and Inter-Korean Relations

Chinese View

North Korea’s provocations in 2010 and the subsequent military exercises by South Korea and the United States resulted in heightened regional military tensions. Chinese experts were concerned that this might lead to a regional war on the Korean Peninsula, reminiscent of the Korean War that occurred over sixty years ago. This is therefore regarded as a critical challenge for China’s national security planners.

The Chinese side evaluated the position of the Lee Myung-bak government toward North Korea as wishful thinking, based on unquestioned military support from Washington and Tokyo and an expectation of the North Korean regime’s collapse. Chinese experts predicted that Kim Jong-Il and his son Kim Jong-un will maintain power despite domestic economic difficulties, but with continued political and military stability.

Regarding the unification issue, Chinese experts also noted that if North and South Korea reach the point of reunification, whether by force or peaceful evolution, China will have to reassess the consequences of reunification and its relationship with a united Korea.

According to Chinese experts, to enhance its future role in Northeast Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula, China must:

• Coordinate with the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other concerned countries to promote stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia.

• Oppose military alliances, military threats, and the use of military means to resolve disputes, while adhering to the principle of solving disputes through dialogue and negotiations.

• Maintain a consistent sequence of policies toward North Korea, making timely and necessary adjustments. In this regard, the main points related to North Korea are:

• Respect DPRK state sovereignty and territorial integrity, without interference in its internal affairs.

• Encourage North Korea to reform and open up by changing its closed-door policy and isolated position, and to rejoin the international community.

• Assist North Korea in developing its economy, improving people’s lives, and creating favorable conditions for the unification of the Korean Peninsula.

• Pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; oppose the development of nuclear weapons.

• Oppose North Korean military provocations against South Korea.

• Persuade North Korea to act in accordance with international norms.

In assessing China’s strategy toward the Korean Peninsula, Chinese experts expressed their views on the following points:

• The future of the Korean Peninsula will depend on the policies of North and South Korea toward each other. Disputes should be resolved by Koreans themselves, and any foreign military presence should be gradually withdrawn.

• The peaceful reunification of North and South Korea will be beneficial to both sides, as well as for China and regional security. Any incitement of conflict would be unacceptable to Beijing.

• A balancing engagement strategy toward the two Koreas will be beneficial to them and China. North-South dialogue on military force reduction and economic cooperation is strongly supported by Beijing.

In providing policy recommendations, Chinese experts suggested that bilateral talks between the two Koreas on economic cooperation and cultural exchanges should take place first and would benefit from being held in Beijing, Shenyang, or another location in China. Chinese experts further suggested that surrounding countries should consider observer status for North Korea in China-Japan-South Korea trilateral summits, as its isolation facilitates conflict.

The security concerns of North Korea must also be taken into consideration. To address these worries, experts suggested that China and the two Koreas might wish to discuss the possibility of a Chinese nuclear umbrella for North Korea and South Korea’s implementation of an engagement strategy toward the North. They also put forward the need to consider the establishment of a Yellow Sea Economic Circle among the relevant parties.

Taiwanese View

According to Taiwanese experts, Cross-Strait relations under the Ma Ying-Jeou administration are experiencing the warmest period since 1949. The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and other developments contribute to the prediction that positive relations will continue across the Taiwan Strait. However, uncertainties remain. Domestic politics is a key variable in determining Taiwan’s relationship with the mainland. The upcoming Taiwan presidential election in 2012 will be a major factor influencing the possibility for political negotiations between Taipei and Beijing in the near future. Taiwanese scholars noted that domestic politics plays a crucial role in both relationships. When the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan was in power, it opposed the one China principle and the 1992 consensus, favoring only limited engagement with China. The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, however, endorses the 1992 consensus, allowing for each side’s interpretation of China, and favors normalized economic ties with the mainland.

Korean View

Regarding the current situation in North Korea, Korean experts predicted that Kim Jong-il will attempt to consolidate his son’s succession by selecting new members for the party and the military. He has also been mindful of the China factor for the survival of his son’s regime and leadership. It has been noted that regardless of the policies Kim Jong-un might pursue with his regime, as long as circumstances remain constant, he may have to rely on China for the time being. As current relations with the United States, South Korea, and Japan remain unfriendly and military-oriented, any North Korean leadership will have to depend on China for survival, at least during the initial phase of its development.

Korean scholars assessed that “party-to-party” relations between China and North Korea are very important and highly valued as the backbone of their bilateral relationship. However, the Chinese Communist Party is currently unwilling to exert any pressure or influence on Pyongyang to serve its own national interests. Consequently, it could be argued that China’s influence on North Korea is limited. It has been argued that peace and stability are preserved and maintained through a balance of power. The status quo is the prerequisite for the peace and stability sought by both countries. For both China and North Korea, a peaceful and stable international environment in Northeast Asia signifies the preservation of the balance of power and the status quo, yet a more stable environment will be sought by both.

Regarding China’s future policy role, Korean experts argued that as long as China upholds its alliance with North Korea and continues to value its relations with South Korea, China must handle both relationships within the context of trilateral relations. Under current circumstances, China will face a constant alliance dilemma with North Korea and a security dilemma with South Korea and the United States whenever security challenges arise. Therefore, China must engage in a trilateral game with the two Koreas. This will require wisdom and intelligence on South Korea’s part in establishing relations with North Korea. For South Korea’s future policy toward the North, Korean experts suggested the following: first, to maintain a long-term perspective on a future for North Korea; second, to prepare for any contingency situation by considering a desirable future for North Korea and adapting flexible policies accordingly; third, to sustain a coherent and principled policy of engagement toward Pyongyang.

North Korea will be assured of other countries’ genuine intentions for coexistence only when it perceives a very detailed and well-devised plan for its own future. For this purpose, international co-engagement will be crucial. The Six-Party Talks should be transformed into a venue to guarantee North Korea’s survival for the next leadership while also pressing for fundamental change through reform and opening.■


Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. As an Asia Security Initiative core institution, the East Asia Institute acknowledges grant support from the MacArthur Foundation that made this event possible. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. This report was produced by Professor Chaesung Chun with assistance from Eun Hae Choi, Jina Kim, and Stephen Ranger.

*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

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