MASI 2010 Annual Meeting Transcript: Session II. Cluster 2

Date: July 8, 2010, 14:00~15:20

Venue: Grand Ballroom, Westin Chosun Seoul

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

Last year, we introduced ourselves. Given budget limitations and the lack of a defined format for this meeting, let us share our research materials and plans. EAI has new plans: we are making progress in developing our writing materials but need to expand our mother institutions. However, this is not systematic. Therefore, one purpose of this ASI network is not only to produce research outcomes but also to establish networks for mutual learning. We have plans for the second year. I suggest we take turns introducing ourselves and our institutions, and evaluating one year's performance. Then, we can freely discuss our plans for the next year. Are there any suggestions for the meeting? (No answer) Okay. May I ask Professor Yen to start?

Tiehlin Yen

Thank you, Doctor Chun. In the last session, I discussed the Institute of International Relations at Chengchi University, our thoughts, and our actions. I must emphasize that the Center for Security Studies under IIR at Chengchi University was newly established last November, funded entirely by the MacArthur Foundation. The center's director, Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu, was scheduled to be here. Approximately five years ago, he conceived the idea of securing funding from the United States to conduct cross-strait peace research, with the hope that our research would ultimately contribute to cross-strait peace and stability. Based on my observations, this endeavor shows great promise. Within the first six months alone, we have achieved considerable success in terms of exchanges between our institutions and several other institutions in China.

Upon my arrival and my interactions with all the participants, I gained the impression that everyone knows F. Everyone was asking, “Do you know F?” He has been very successful, that is certain, and I believe his vision is shared by everyone here. He made things happen. In a very short period, we have undertaken a major project. As I mentioned in the first session, at the end of this month, PhD students will engage in discussions about the future of China and Taiwan together—a one-week program. This will continue next year and the year after. It will become institutionalized if we can secure more funding. Hopefully, a Korean foundation might be willing to assist.

The second major issue is that following the signing of the AFGA, the Free Trade Agreement with China just last week, people are discussing what comes next. Will we discuss political issues in the near future or not? There is considerable debate, with both pros and cons. The current government is working on this, and I believe the other side is also considering it. Regarding economic issues, we already have a mechanism and a system in place; there is no turning back. Therefore, we are examining the possibility of China initiating something like a peace agreement to end hostilities between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. If such an event occurs, if Hu Jintao, within the next three to six months or by the end of this year, makes a speech similar to 2008, presenting a six-point framework for engagement between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, stating a desire to engage with Taiwan to discuss signing a peace agreement to end hostilities, what would be the response of the Taiwanese government? This is a significant issue, with extensive debate currently in our academic journals and public discourse, as well as in the last session with Yen.

I believe the current administration anticipates this; it is imminent. We also believe, based on our observations, that President Hu Jintao has his own sense of national purpose and a personal crusade to leave a legacy. In the year preceding his departure in 2012, concerning cross-strait relations, even if he cannot achieve the unification of Taiwan within his lifetime, he aims to establish a permanent and irreversible exchange mechanism between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Regardless of who is in power or the next generation of political leadership, this mechanism will endure. The devotion between the people of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and people-to-people exchanges will continue indefinitely. Therefore, if this observation holds true, something will happen sooner rather than later, before 2012. Something like Hu Jintao publicly announcing, “We want to sign an agreement.” Consequently, extensive preparations will be necessary. Our institution has taken it upon itself to prepare for this, in terms of political dialogue and military confidence-building. This institution, the Center for Security Studies, must first engage in this type of dialogue. We are considering serving as a platform to allow active-duty officers or influential individuals from both sides to visit Taiwan or attend conferences in a third country or mainland China to discuss potential future developments and strategies that can inform political discussions. This will help both governments and regimes understand the issues, challenges, obstacles, and difficulties, and find a way to proceed with this dialogue to ensure the positive and perpetual development of cross-strait relations. Thank you very much.

Moderator: Chaesung Chun

And what kind of research outputs are you focusing on? Like books, or briefings?

Tiehlin Yen

I apologize if I was not clear earlier. This institute has just been established, operating for its first six months. Our organization comprises approximately 30 scholars, mostly serving in part-time capacities. We have divided them into four groups. The first is the Defense group, focusing on cross-strait military balance. The second is the National Security group, examining regional connections and emphasizing neighboring countries' support for cross-strait dialogue, particularly for future political and military discussions. For Taiwan, we must consider the opinions of the opposition party, the general public, and especially the United States, Japan, and South Korea regarding future political and military dialogues. The third group is the non-traditional security group. We focus on Taiwan's capacity for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, given its 300,000-strong armed forces. However, Taiwan has never undertaken such work. Firstly, China is uncomfortable with Taiwan deploying military capabilities overseas for disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. Secondly, the international community may find it inappropriate, fearing potential opposition from China that could undermine such efforts if Taiwan deploys its military forces. Yet, we possess about 200 helicopters and amphibious ships that could certainly contribute in the event of another tsunami, disaster, or earthquake. This capability, if unused, is a waste, merely for training for unforeseen scenarios, which is unproductive. We wish to contribute. Currently, our parliament is discussing mandating disaster relief as a primary mission for the Taiwanese armed forces. How can we utilize our existing capabilities to assist the international community during disasters? That is the focus of the third group. The last group deals with cross-strait relations, precisely what I have been discussing. Many focus on cross-strait relations, student exchanges, fostering future leadership and elites, and promoting mutual understanding. The aim is that when they assume power or hold important positions, they can make decisions based on their early learning and understanding of the situations on both sides, rather than making precipitous choices. Thus, there have been no specific publications yet, but we anticipate our research will eventually be fruitful. These 30 scholars are actively engaged. By the end of this year, we might have a few publications, but since they are part-time, we cannot compel them to write for us. However, we hold meetings periodically, approximately once a month, for policy dialogues, inviting ministers of foreign affairs and defense, as well as mainland think tanks, to discuss public and policy issues. We also invite ambassadors—we refer to them as ambassadors even without diplomatic relations—directors, and division chiefs to share their perspectives, such as the American viewpoint on cross-strait issues. I believe our annual publication next year will be very fruitful. Thank you very much... (Continued)

Moderator

Chaesung Chun

Participants

Jae Ho Chung

Matthew Ferchen

Jing Gu

Xuetang Guo

Young-Sun Ha

Sung-han Kim

Jennifer Lee

Shin-wha Lee

Sook-Jong Lee

Paul B. Stares

Tiehlin Yen

Prepared by the Asia Security Initiative Research Center at the East Asia Institute. The East Asia Institute, an Asia Security Initiative core institution, acknowledges the MacArthur Foundation for its generous grant and continued support. The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government.