[EAI·GENRON NPO] 2021 Korea-Japan Security Dialogue Held

YouTube Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQN1_zDeQR8

The East Asia Institute (EAI) and GENRON NPO held the Korea-Japan Security Dialogue (KJSD) conference online on February 15. This event, held in 2021 through the EAI-GENRON NPO cooperation, aims to bring together experts in diplomacy and security from both South Korea and Japan to discuss security issues in the Northeast Asian region. During this dialogue, discussions were held on the security challenges and prospects for peace in Northeast Asia, as well as the Biden administration's policies towards China and North Korea, and measures for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan were explored. Through the Korea-Japan Security Dialogue, experts from both countries agreed on the necessity of security cooperation not only at the bilateral level but also at the multilateral level to deter the spread of the US-China conflict and achieve denuclearization of North Korea.

Participating Organizations

East Asia Institute (EAI)

GENRON NPO

Program

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List of Participants (in Korean alphabetical order)

South Korean Participants

Young-joon Park Professor, Department of Military Strategy, Korea National Defense University

Won Gon Park Professor, Department of International Studies, Handong Global University

Seong-ho Shin Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University

Sang-chul Lee Director, War Memorial of Korea; Former Senior Secretary to the President for National Security First, Office of the President

Jae-sung Lee Director, National Security Research Center, EAI; Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Seoul National University

Japanese Participants

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Conference Video

[Session 1] Challenges for Northeast Asian Security and Conflict Prevention in 2021

[Session 2] Analysis of China Strategy and Korean Peninsula Policy under the Biden Administration

[Session 3] Prospects and Realization Measures for Stable Peace in Northeast Asia

Presenter

Seo Jeong-hye, Research Fellow, East Asia Institute (EAI)

Video Script

First, I would like to extend a warm welcome to Mr. Kanno, President of Konoike Construction, and Professor Kanno, who always participates in our meetings, as well as to the many senior members present. Today, it has been two days since Korea celebrated Liberation Day. In that sense, we are holding this meeting with the feeling of starting anew. I would also like to express my special gratitude to the three Korean participants who have kindly agreed to join us today despite their busy schedules. Today's ROK-Japan dialogue is of paramount importance, especially as the overall relationship between Korea and Japan, particularly the political relationship, is not in a good state, leading to many difficulties in security matters. Therefore, I hope that through today's meeting, we can gather wisdom on how to resolve these issues.

I would like to express my gratitude once again to Konoike Construction for arranging this valuable opportunity. While there are indeed risks, the current situation can be seen as an early stage of strategic positioning amidst the competition in the Indo-Pacific theater. Since the advent of the Biden administration, President Biden himself stated about two weeks ago that they would review the overall strategy toward China for the next three months.

A review by 15 experts from the U.S. government is underway. This will be an opportunity to re-evaluate the strategies the U.S. has employed toward China. This review is expected to conclude by the end of May. As I will discuss later, North Korea, facing the 8th Party Congress, will likely pursue a strategy of observing the U.S. approach to North Korea for the time being. Therefore, although the first half of the year presents continued risks, it will be a crucial period for the long-term development of the Indo-Pacific theater.

The Biden administration is inheriting the strategy toward China, but while the principles may be the same, the specific means and methods will differ significantly. Given that the Trump administration's strategy toward China is considered to have been unsuccessful, the Biden administration's strategy toward China is expected to take a very different form. As mentioned earlier, China is pursuing a highly aggressive strategy, aiming for territorial expansion, gray zone tactics, economic coercion, expanding spheres of influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road, exporting its development model, and increasing its global influence. Therefore, for the United States, re-evaluating its China strategy is a critical issue.

Recently, through various documents, there have been active discussions within the U.S. about setting clear deadlines for China. While China is currently focused on economic pressure, if it pursues strategies such as territorial expansion or supporting the outbreak of war, the U.S. will inevitably respond militarily. This is a strategy that clearly defines the U.S. response. Most importantly, our concern lies in re-evaluating the alliance system. Therefore, while the China strategy is important, the immediate concern is not the possibility of military conflict between the U.S. and China, but rather how to re-evaluate the U.S.-centered alliance system to prevent the current competition in economic and technological domains from escalating into military conflict.

The problem is that re-evaluating the existing alliance system is not easy. This is because U.S. allies have diverse economic relationships with China, leading to differing stances toward China. The recent investment agreement between China and Europe exemplifies this. Within Europe, some countries are more accommodating toward China, while others, like the UK, are participating in Indo-Pacific security strategies, indicating vastly different positions. Europe and Asia also differ significantly.

Asia perceives a direct threat, but shared threat perception does not necessarily lead to common action. The U.S. is seeking to build a more flexible and multi-layered alliance system. Examples include multilateral security dialogues like NATO, and looser but globally oriented democratic alliances like the Quad, as well as alliances based on shared values like the G7. It is expected that these alliances will be reshaped by combining various forms in accordance with the positions of the allied nations. Therefore, allied nations need to adopt a more flexible approach to respond to the long-term threat from China while considering their respective interests. Furthermore, it is very difficult to respond to China's frequent economic coercion.

Public opinion polls in Korea show a sharp decline in favorability toward China, largely influenced by Korean perceptions of China's retaliatory measures following the THAAD deployment. The problem is that such economic coercion makes it very difficult for allies to act. Therefore, the U.S. is recently discussing various mechanisms to automatically assist its allies if China engages in economic coercion against them. Thus, a coordinated response to China's economic coercion is crucial. This applies to supply chains as well.

Multilateral economic systems are also expected to follow suit. As these systems are gradually perfected, a more organized diplomatic and security response to China will become possible. For now, given the significant military gap between the U.S. and China, the key question is how to systematically re-evaluate the alliance system while maintaining that gap. The threat from North Korea, as mentioned earlier, includes weapons of mass destruction, but from the perspective of South Korea and Japan, the threat from long-range missiles such as short-range, medium-range, and SLBMs is significantly increasing.

Amidst such threats, the likelihood of North Korea engaging in military provocations against neighboring countries in the first half of this year is not high. This is because North Korea is prioritizing economic development due to its internal economic difficulties. The U.S. is also reviewing its policy toward North Korea for a certain period. As mentioned earlier, it is expected that the North Korea policy will be finalized in June or July, after the review of China policy is completed. Until then, North Korea will likely act cautiously, and the security situation is expected to be relatively stable.

However, the arms race between South and North Korea, separate from the nuclear issue, is intensifying. We need to strengthen our conventional weapons to counter the threat from North Korea, thus widening the gap in military capabilities between the two Koreas. On the other hand, if we are to pursue denuclearization negotiations, we must also reduce our military capabilities. From South Korea's perspective, responding to China is also crucial, which could create difficulties in our military strategy due to the complex relationship between South and North Korea and China.

Therefore, if the situation deteriorates in the latter half of the year, the possibility of needing to quickly address the North Korean risk will increase. Regarding Taiwan, China's hardline strategy toward Taiwan could intensify at any time. China's military superiority over Taiwan is steadily increasing, and even with U.S. intervention, China is not guaranteed to lose, posing an ongoing issue for Taiwan. Therefore, the risk increases as the military balance between the U.S. and China narrows.

In that sense, Taiwan faces the most significant risk. Finally, the possibility of conflict between North Korea and China, and between South Korea and China, is also increasing. The China Coast Guard Law, enacted in December and effective in February, has drawn significant attention in South Korea. While China's militarization is important, the law's provisions are extensive, allowing the use of force in certain situations, which could apply to the Yellow Sea. Therefore, the risk is likely to increase due to the broad scope of permissible force under this law.

From Japan's perspective, security in the East China Sea is a pressing issue, as discussed in the recent summit phone call. Furthermore, from a systemic perspective, preventing accidental clashes through mechanisms like the Quad is crucial. In South Korea's case, there are ongoing issues such as joint military exercises between China and Russia in the East Sea, and the dispute over the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) around Ieodo. Therefore, the possibility of conflict between South Korea and China in these short-term bilateral relations remains.

Thank you for inviting me to this meaningful event. I will briefly comment on the presentation made by the Japanese side. I believe a more in-depth discussion will take place in the next session. I believe that the United States has entered a phase of significant decline.

Therefore, I believe there is a need for closer cooperation with countries that share values of liberal democracy, such as South Korea and Japan. Regarding the North Korean issue, I agree with most of what has been said. As someone who studies military affairs, I believe the threat from North Korea is becoming increasingly serious. Particularly, the 8th Party Congress clearly indicated that North Korea has no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons and intends to possess even more advanced nuclear capabilities, effectively aiming to possess all the nuclear weapons held by nuclear powers like the U.S., China, and Russia. My greatest concern, as mentioned earlier, is regarding the KN-23 missile, which is considered North Korea's equivalent of the Iskander missile. It has a range of approximately 600 kilometers, and some argue it can reach as far as Vladivostok. This would place Japan within its range, serving as a strategic or tactical weapon.

North Korea clearly stated at the 8th Party Congress that it would develop tactical nuclear weapons, referred to as KN-23. Furthermore, the multiple rocket launcher, referred to as KN-24, which is considered North Korea's equivalent of the HIMARS, can both be equipped with nuclear warheads. The fact that North Korea intends to develop missiles equipped with nuclear warheads poses a very serious threat to South Korea and Japan. In a situation where tactical nuclear weapons have not yet been deployed, the ability to detect most of North Korea's short-range missiles, which could be used as weapons of mass destruction, suggests that even a minor armed conflict could escalate into nuclear war.

I believe that South Korea, the U.S., and Japan need to seriously discuss this issue. Regarding the issue of nuclear capabilities, I disagree with some of the points raised. I will express my views on South Korea's future direction if I have the opportunity later. However, I have a different perspective on whether Japan should possess greater nuclear capabilities. Specifically, South Korea's current preparations appear to be aimed at reducing its dependence on the U.S. alliance rather than being used in the Indo-Pacific theater.

We have always considered the identity of the United States and its foreign policy as constants when discussing Northeast Asian security, U.S.-China relations, and global dynamics. These factors have remained largely consistent regardless of the administration. Consequently, we have analyzed how other actors, such as North Korea, China, and the ROK-Japan relationship, respond to these constants, treating them as variables within the stable framework of the U.S. However, as Professor Chang mentioned, a fundamental structural change is occurring: I question whether the U.S. can truly regain its former stature. While the Biden administration has pledged a return to traditional diplomacy and alliance policies, emphasizing an "America is back" approach, the reality within the U.S. does not appear to easily support this rhetoric.

A few weeks ago, I attended a meeting with Professor Victor Cha and others in Washington. We discussed the three core priorities of the Biden administration's foreign policy for the foreseeable future: first, COVID-19; second, economic issues; and third, and most surprisingly to me, how to resolve domestic racial conflicts in the United States. I believe all three of these are domestic issues, not foreign policy matters. However, based on various sources from within the U.S., it appears that the Biden administration will be compelled to focus on these three domestic issues for the time being. Furthermore, the recent impeachment trial of Donald Trump, where a majority of House Republicans did not vote to impeach him, highlights the domestic political landscape in the U.S. This situation will likely serve as a fundamental constraint on U.S. foreign policy, including the Biden administration's actions, for the foreseeable future. The impact of this on Northeast Asia, U.S.-China relations, North Korea policy, and ROK-Japan relations remains to be seen.

Once again, we must carefully reconsider the fundamental outlook. I believe that is necessary. The meaning of 'Puma' in Korean is 'father,' and it is said that Confucius also said that if a father has a son, he should not be neglectful. It is similar to the sun rising in the east. There are many things that are similar. There are many things that are similar. There are many things that are similar.

I believe that the current situation is not something that can be easily dismissed. It is said that when people are in trouble, they tend to blame others. However, it is important to understand the underlying causes. In any case, there are many things that we need to consider. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation.

It is not something that can be easily dismissed. It is said that when people are in trouble, they tend to blame others. However, it is important to understand the underlying causes. In any case, there are many things that we need to consider. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation.

It is said that when people are in trouble, they tend to blame others. However, it is important to understand the underlying causes. In any case, there are many things that we need to consider. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation.

It is said that when people are in trouble, they tend to blame others. However, it is important to understand the underlying causes. In any case, there are many things that we need to consider. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation.

It is said that when people are in trouble, they tend to blame others. However, it is important to understand the underlying causes. In any case, there are many things that we need to consider. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation.

It is said that when people are in trouble, they tend to blame others. However, it is important to understand the underlying causes. In any case, there are many things that we need to consider. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation. It is important to have a good understanding of the situation.

I agree wholeheartedly with the point that the role and capabilities of the United States are not what they used to be.

Furthermore, it is also true that the main interests of the United States are focused on domestic issues. Moreover, the key issues in the conflict between the United States and China have been limited to trade, the economy in general, and technology. Therefore, there is considerable diversity within the United States regarding this relationship. Even during the Trump administration, there were American industries, such as agriculture, that suffered losses from trade disputes with China. The technology sector is also similar, and there are differing views within the United States on how strongly to respond to China.

In this regard, it is not easy to view the US-China relationship as simply one of competition. The United States has many influential actors, making it difficult to speak of the US-China relationship in a uniform manner. However, the foreign policy and security domain we are discussing is indeed very difficult to reconcile with such complex interests. Therefore, if there is a conflict over specific issues between the US and China, the US-China relationship is highly likely to change. Thus, the nature of the US-China relationship will vary significantly by domain. Even in the event of a specific military conflict, it is unlikely that the United States will continue to adopt a lukewarm attitude or fail to show clear foreign policy. The United States still advocates for an active policy of forward deployment of missile defense systems in the military aspect. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the US response on a case-by-case basis. As seen in Kurt Campbell's previous paper, the United States is discussing the forward deployment of forces in East Asia.

The United States intends to pressure China by utilizing its military superiority. Therefore, despite the current complex situation, it is difficult to argue that the United States' involvement in foreign policy and security is decreasing. Second, there is considerable debate surrounding the ultimate objective of the US strategy toward China. During the latter half of the Trump administration, there was criticism of China's regime, referred to as a "new Cold War." However, under the Biden administration, a much more diverse range of discussions is underway.

Recently, a paper titled "Great Power Competition" was published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Although it is a very strong statement, the goal is not to overthrow China but to transform it into a great power that adheres more closely to international norms. Therefore, a discussion is needed on how to deal with China, as the strategy pursues both competition and cooperation. While we are currently discussing the need for firm containment because China is a revisionist power, there is a need for further discussion on what China actually thinks and how to set the parameters of US-China engagement.

Next, regarding the necessity of cooperation between South Korea and Japan, as mentioned earlier, there is no doubt that it is something that must be done. The peace strategy pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration between the two Koreas and the regional security issues occurring in the Indo-Pacific influence each other, but they are not the same problem. South Korea has its own issues of unification and peace, and therefore, it is a problem that must be pursued regardless of changes in the surrounding situation.

However, the method of resolving this is to stabilize the surrounding situation and promote cooperation between South Korea and Japan. Therefore, the issue is how to harmonize these two flows, and it is not a matter of choosing one over the other. In that sense, whether the United States can succeed in the future depends on the cooperation between its allies. As mentioned earlier, Campbell advocates for a "spoke-and-hub" system, where the United States is at the center, but cooperation among surrounding countries is crucial. Therefore, how the United States acts is important, but cooperation among the surrounding countries is very important, and in that sense, cooperation between South Korea and Japan is very important. Therefore, it is necessary to separate bilateral issues and inter-Korean issues.

It is necessary to conduct a more rigorous academic analysis of China and to engage in discussions regarding this matter.

This is to ensure that the issues do not arise again, particularly in the context of the wholesale market.

The stress and anger associated with this situation must be addressed, as it has implications for our community.

The situation regarding the Korean Peninsula remains complex, and we must consider various factors.

The significance of the current geopolitical climate cannot be overstated, especially in relation to the United States.

The implications of these developments for the future of international relations are profound.

The discussions surrounding these issues must be approached with caution and thorough analysis.

The importance of addressing these matters in a timely manner cannot be overlooked.

If it is acceptable, may I provide a response? I was unable to convey all my thoughts earlier due to time constraints.

Unfortunately, there are clear challenges regarding the relationship between South Korea and Japan.

It is crucial to recognize the ongoing threat posed by North Korea and to prepare accordingly.

I would like to highlight that there are differing opinions on this matter.

The discussions surrounding the future of our defense capabilities must be grounded in reality.

I hope that we can find a solution together. I believe that we need to be cautious and considerate.

Regarding Professor Kim's comment about whether South Korea's transition of wartime operational control is not only because of North Korea but also because of Japan, I have a somewhat different opinion on that.

Of course, generally speaking, as the issue of wartime operational control is pursued, South Korea naturally has to take on more responsibility for its own defense. Even in the current government's gradual assessment of the Northeast Asian security situation, while the primary mission of the ROK-US alliance and South Korea remains as a response to North Korea's military provocations, in the long term, one cannot help but consider how South Korea should cope with the unstable security environment in Northeast Asia. This is not necessarily aimed specifically at Japan; rather, I think it reflects a consideration of China and various other variables. In that context, as mentioned earlier, from the perspective that we need to have sufficient defense capabilities on our own terms, the defense structure that has been army-centric for addressing the North Korean threat inevitably requires expanding the air force and navy. Thus, naval power enhancement is being discussed.

I do not think that this means South Korea is creating something like an aircraft carrier by targeting Japan out of a belief that Japan poses a threat to South Korea. And personally, even though I have questioned the creation of light aircraft carriers, it is currently a subject of much controversy and considerable criticism. So, setting that issue aside for now, I do not believe the current administration envisions the transition of wartime operational control as a way to build military power targeting Japan as a military threat.

And I think there are various interpretations and opinions on this matter. The basis for my saying that South Korea's current Moon Jae-in administration's future development plans are linked to Japan is that during the severe tensions between Korea and Japan, it is a fact that the South Korean government at that time examined the introduction of core weapons systems. At that time, when Kim Hyun-chong, then Second Deputy Director, openly mentioned contents including a light aircraft carrier and even nuclear submarines, the context involved the Korea-Japan tensions under the GSOMIA issue, so I think that is a sufficiently reasonable suspicion. Furthermore, there is a need to strengthen the navy and air force, but actually, this discussion had already been concluded under the Lee Myung-bak administration.

I have heard that the conclusion was drawn that it is extremely difficult for us to possess a certain degree of force against neighboring countries with the navy and air force, so instead, we must possess at least a minimal deterrence utilizing missiles. Of course, there are also political judgments. For instance, the Minister of National Defense comes from a navy and air force background, so that influence is apparent. However, I believe there is a strategic environmental assessment different from before. The issue of intermediate-range missiles is also a very important problem, and I think significant progress has been made on this in the case of US Forces Korea.

Regarding the ATACMS deployed in the Camp Humphreys area, the US has already begun upgrading them, and by 2023, the range is expected to reach 800 km. If the range becomes 1,000 km, it would be able to cover from Pyeongtaek to the Chinese border, even reaching Beijing. Since this is an upgrade to existing equipment, South Korea cannot demand that it not be deployed. I think the US will proceed in such a manner. Even if the INF Treaty were terminated, the US could not deploy intermediate-range missiles in places like South Korea or Japan.

There was tremendous opposition back in the 1970s when the INF Treaty was created because of the MGM-29 missiles; thus, that possibility is unlikely, but I think there is a possibility of upgrading and modernizing existing weapons systems. Even so, rather than deploying new systems... [unintelligible content].

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The importance of maintaining a strong defense posture in light of regional threats cannot be overstated.

The need for strategic planning in response to evolving threats is paramount.

The discussions surrounding military capabilities must take into account the changing geopolitical landscape.

There are ongoing debates regarding the adequacy of our current military capabilities.

The implications of these developments for our national security strategy are significant.

The need for a comprehensive approach to defense planning is essential.

The importance of addressing these matters with a clear strategy cannot be overstated.

I hope that we can find a solution together. I believe that we need to be cautious and considerate.

The discussions surrounding these issues must be informed by historical context.

The ongoing developments in the region require our immediate attention and action.