NSPR1 North Korea's Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks: Assessment and Outlook

Overview



Since the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002, the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century has once again been held captive by the North Korean nuclear issue at a critical juncture in history. Despite the multilateral cooperation of China as mediator, South Korea as facilitator, and Japan and Russia as supporters, the principle of "Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID)" advocated by the United States and the principle of "freeze-for-aid" advocated by North Korea make it difficult to reach a basic agreement, casting doubt on the possibility of successful negotiations. In this situation, if the nuclear issue is not resolved quickly and the history of new civilizational standards is not actively addressed, the future of the Korean Peninsula's history in the 21st century is bleak.

Throughout the unfolding of the North Korean nuclear crisis, South Korea, as a party to the Six-Party Talks and a facilitator of North Korea-U.S. negotiations, has been deeply involved. However, in its desire for a resolution to the crisis, South Korea has erred by being captivated by idealistic thinking rather than pragmatic consideration of the parties' interests, failing to grasp the essence of the problem. This stems from an overemphasis on its own position, lacking thoroughness in considering interests. For South Korea to play a role in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, it must demonstrate a pragmatic approach by accurately assessing the interests of each party while clearly defining the scope and limitations of its own role.

Currently, North Korea proposes the cessation of the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea and a simultaneous, comprehensive package deal for a peaceful resolution as the solution to the nuclear issue. In response to the U.S. demand for CVID, North Korea demands complete, verifiable, and irreversible security assurances, including the verifiable withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, a peace treaty between North Korea and the U.S., and the normalization of relations. If the nuclear issue is not resolved through the Six-Party Talks, North Korea is considering strengthening its nuclear deterrence for a military solution. The two alternatives currently demanded by North Korea—the abandonment of the U.S. hostile policy and the continuous pursuit of nuclear deterrence—are both unlikely to be realized at this time and carry a high risk of bringing crisis to the Korean Peninsula.

The United States identifies the war on terror as the core of its national security strategy for the 21st century, pursuing the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of an anti-terrorism alliance. In this context, the U.S. has classified North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and is addressing the nuclear issue from the perspective of an anti-terrorism war against WMD proliferation, adhering to a hardline policy of negotiating only with a North Korea transformed into a normal state, not just a nuclear-free one. Against this backdrop, the U.S. has set complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) as the objective for resolving the Six-Party Talks, making North Korea's prior actions to guarantee this a prerequisite for the talks' success. The U.S. strategy appears to involve pursuing the Six-Party Talks while simultaneously preparing alternative measures based on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), including economic sanctions, regime change, and military sanctions.

Meanwhile, South Korea's three principles for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue—non-nuclearization of North Korea, peaceful resolution, and a leading role—are contradictory and thus face difficulties in simultaneous pursuit. South Korea's position differs from that of the U.S. and Japan, which are based on a dual approach of multilateral talks and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), particularly concerning pressure on North Korea. The three-stage proposal put forth by South Korea in the first and second rounds of the Six-Party Talks has limitations in bridging the gap between the U.S. principle of CVID and North Korea's principle of freeze. In this situation, South Korea appears to be focusing on process management—the progression of the Six-Party Talks—rather than the outcome of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

Considering long-term, mid-term, and short-term alternatives for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, in the long term, South Korea must devise a solution at a higher level—the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through international cooperation based on ethnic solidarity. The 21st-century resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue is not merely a problem for the Korean Peninsula but concerns the future of the Northeast Asian co-prosperity stage in the 21st century. A perspective that considers both the self-determination and survival rights of others and our own people is necessary. From a mid-term perspective, given the complexity of the North Korean nuclear issue itself, once the relevant parties reach a basic agreement, the current Six-Party Talks should be developed more comprehensively, actively utilizing bilateral and multilateral approaches depending on the issue. Conversely, the South Korean government must accurately assess the consequences should the Six-Party Talks fail, North Korea's and the U.S.'s strategies clash, coercive diplomacy lead to military conflict, and must make those catastrophic consequences clear to the parties of the Six-Party Talks.

For a short-term resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, new leadership within the North Korean leadership pursuing 21st-century methods is required. Based on new leadership, North Korea must practice the reaffirmation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and compliance with the norms of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The U.S. and other parties must promise multilateral legal, economic, and political guarantees to North Korea so that it can pursue a 21st-century solution. Meanwhile, the South Korean government must manage the negotiation process to ensure the continuation of the Six-Party Talks, while accurately assessing strategic changes between North Korea and the U.S. to establish realistic countermeasures. Currently, South Korea has obtained some response by proposing to the U.S. a change in the CVID terminology, considering North Korea's position, and by actively considering the three-stage plan previously proposed by South Korea. However, even if the U.S. considers changing the CVID terminology and reconsiders its existing position on denuclearization, it must be recognized that the U.S. position on WMD proliferation and the principles for handling the North Korean nuclear issue have not changed.

Author

Ha Young-sun, Professor of International Relations, College of Social Sciences, Seoul National University

Chun Jae-sung, Professor, Seoul National University