Formalizing the Space Arms Race: US Acknowledgment of Space Weapons and Responses from China and Japan

Executive Summary

With the US Secretary of the Air Force officially acknowledging the possession of orbital space control weapons for the first time, the US space deterrence strategy has shifted from strategic ambiguity to public declaration. However, the concurrent downsizing of the organization dedicated to analyzing Chinese military capabilities suggests that this declaration may be the result of budget and personnel restructuring rather than sophisticated strategic communication. While China has reacted based on the logic of the security dilemma, it is simultaneously expanding its practical capabilities, such as launching the Diting-01 electronic reconnaissance satellite. Consequently, an inconsistent pattern where public declarations and capability building proceed separately is likely to persist for the time being. In this vacuum, Japan is advancing the establishment of its own AI satellite-based kill chain to the stage of institutionalization, demonstrating that the front line is expanding beyond the US-China bilateral dynamic into asymmetric self-reliance competition within alliance networks. Although South Korea is not a direct party, given the regulatory gaps in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the dual-use trend of civilian space infrastructure, it needs to prioritize accumulating space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, monitoring norm discussions, and putting information autonomy on the agenda within US-ROK space cooperation, rather than focusing on asset investment.

I. Issue Analysis

Issue Analysis: Formalizing the Space Arms Race

1. Background and Progress

On September 15, US Secretary of the Air Force Troy Meink officially acknowledged the possession of orbital space control weapons for the first time at the Air, Space & Cyber Conference in Maryland [3]. He stated, "Today, we remain ready to face evolving threats wherever they may be" [3]. He went on to explain, "This is why the United States has come to possess orbital space control weapons capable of defending the joint force from enemy attacks" [3]. This statement marks the first official confirmation of what had previously been an "open secret" in Washington [3].

This statement did not occur in isolation. Around the same time, the US Air Force decided to eliminate ten civilian research positions at the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI)—which has studied the aviation, space, and missile capabilities of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)—effective October 1 [15]. While the institute's director assessed this measure as virtually the end of the organization, the Air Force maintained that the mission itself would continue [15]. In effect, contradictory signals occurred simultaneously: the downsizing of the analytical infrastructure tracking China's space and missile capabilities, alongside the public disclosure of space weapons possession.

During this period, Japan has been accelerating the development of its independent space-based intelligence capabilities. The Ministry of Defense announced plans to introduce a new contracting system to support drone development by startups, with a public call for participating companies starting in October [16]. This can be seen as part of Japan's broader defense industry reorganization aimed at reducing its reliance on US intelligence and establishing an independent kill chain. Commenting on Japan's moves, China's state-run Global Times critically reported that Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi met with President Trump in New York on September 22 during the UN General Assembly, pleading "like a petitioner" for the United States to maintain its East Asian security commitment and support easing pressure on China [17].

2. Current Situation

On October 1, Google will embark on the first orbital test of its "Project Suncatcher." The schedule involves launching a satellite equipped with its self-designed AI chip, the Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), aboard SpaceX's Transporter-18 commercial launch [1][10][12]. Google CEO Sundar Pichai presented the question of "whether our TPU can survive and operate in space" as the core of the test [12]. Companies like SpaceX and Starcloud are also pursuing plans to deploy data centers in low Earth orbit (LEO), an attempt to bypass terrestrial power supply constraints and utilize the nearly continuous sunlight in orbit [10]. The Danish media outlet Berlingske evaluated this as Google triggering a "competition that until recently was considered pure science fiction" [7].

That same week, Isar Aerospace, a space startup based in Munich, Germany, successfully launched its proprietary launch vehicle, "Spectrum," from the Andøya Space Center in Norway. This was the first orbital rocket launch conducted from mainland Europe [6]. Historically, Europe has relied on Arianespace in French Guiana or SpaceX in the United States for its satellite launch needs. This launch is interpreted as a result of Europe extending its logic of self-reliance to the domain of space security amid the prolonged war in Ukraine and defense burden-sharing pressure from the Trump administration [6].

China is also expanding its orbital assets in parallel. On September 21, China launched nine satellites using the Lijian-1 Y18 rocket from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in Gansu Province. Among these, three Diting-01 satellites are commercial radio-tracking satellites, evaluated as China's first commercial electronic warfare satellites [13]. Malaysia's The Star reported this as a "quiet but decisive step forward in space-based electronic warfare" [13].

3. Key Actors and Positions

The United States has shifted its stance toward a strategy of public deterrence. The US Space Force leadership argues that explicitly revealing the existence of orbital assets, rather than leaving them ambiguous, reduces enemy miscalculation and strengthens deterrence [3]. However, because this is accompanied by the downsizing of research personnel dedicated to analyzing the Chinese military, questions may be raised regarding the coherence between the public nature of the deterrence signal and intelligence analysis capabilities [15].

China responds using the logic of the security dilemma. Its position is that the US disclosure of its armament inevitably forces other countries to expand their own defensive armaments in response. At the same time, Beijing is sending messages warning against the expansion of US-Japan space cooperation, labeling Japan's AI satellite and space ambitions as a "serious threat" [9][17]. The Global Times criticized Japan for still harboring illusions even in the phase of seeking US-China strategic stability, expressing discomfort with the Takaichi government's moves to align closely with the United States [17].

Japan aims to reduce its reliance on US intelligence and establish an independent space-based kill chain. The Ministry of Defense's introduction of a contracting system to support startups is aimed at the rapid deployment of advanced technologies, including AI satellites, and can be read as an attempt to bypass the rigidity of the existing procurement system [16].

European countries, including Germany, are pursuing a path of self-reliance to break free from dependence on US launch vehicles. However, this structure—proceeding at the level of individual companies and nations rather than as integrated EU or NATO projects—is highly likely to persist for the time being [6].

While private big tech companies like Google are entering the orbital infrastructure competition out of industrial motivations to bypass power constraints—unrelated to military intent—the resulting orbital AI computing assets inevitably become dual-use assets with significant security implications [1][7].

4. Key Issues

First, it remains unclear whether making deterrence public actually helps prevent miscalculation or merely provides a pretext for an arms race. The fact that the US analytical infrastructure for Chinese military capabilities was downsized at the same time as its official acknowledgment leaves questions about the strategic consistency of this declaration [3][15].

Second, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty only bans the deployment of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); it does not regulate conventional counterspace weapons or electronic warfare satellites. Both China's Diting-01 electronic warfare satellites and the US space control weapons are being deployed within this institutional vacuum [3][13].

Third, the front line is expanding from a bilateral US-China dynamic to alliance and partner networks. Japan's attempts to build an independent kill chain and China's reaction to them, along with Europe's self-reliance path in launch vehicles, demonstrate that the space arms race is no longer an issue confined to the two superpowers [16][17][6].

Fourth, the rapid expansion of commercial space infrastructure is effectively broadening the scope of military targeting. Although Google's orbital AI data center is a civilian industrial project, it is establishing itself as a dual-use infrastructure that is difficult to separate from military assets deployed in the same orbital space [1][10].

II. In-Depth Analysis

In-Depth Analysis: The Structural Context of Formalizing the Space Arms Race

1. Root Cause: The Exhaustion of Deterrence Ambiguity

Fatigue with the deterrence strategy lies behind the United States' disclosure of its space control weapons. Previously, the US Space Force maintained "strategic ambiguity" by not disclosing the nature of its orbital assets. This ambiguity directly imported the logic commonly used in Cold War nuclear strategy: the assumption that the less an adversary knows about one's exact capabilities, the lower the likelihood of miscalculation. However, Secretary Meink's statement overturned this assumption [3]. Conversely, the US Space Force leadership presented the logic that "open communication strengthens deterrence and prevents enemy miscalculation" [3]. The shift from ambiguity to public declaration aligns with Washington's internal assessment that China's anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities have already crossed a critical threshold.

The fact that the US Air Force simultaneously eliminated civilian research positions at the China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI)—which has studied China's aviation, space, and missile capabilities—reveals another facet of this assessment [15]. The contradiction of reducing specialized analytical personnel on China while publicly broadcasting deterrence signals toward Beijing suggests that the policy-making structure based on China expertise established during the Biden administration is being systematically downsized under the Trump administration. In effect, while the means of deterrence were preemptively disclosed, the analytical capability regarding the adversary—which should underpin such disclosure—has actually been weakened.

China's logic of protest is a classic example of the security dilemma. The claim that the US disclosure of its armament inevitably forces other countries to arm themselves in response actually functions as rhetoric to justify the expansion of anti-satellite capabilities that China is already pursuing. The launch of China's first three commercial electronic reconnaissance satellites, Diting-01, reported by Malaysia's The Star, demonstrates that this rhetoric and action are proceeding in tandem [13]. These satellites, launched from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center on September 27, have the specific goal of acquiring electronic warfare capabilities, confirming that China is repeating its typical pattern of combining public criticism with practical capability enhancement.

2. Structural Context: Three Layers of Shifting Power Structures

This issue occurred at the intersection of three layers of structural shifts.

The first is the military realignment of the US-China strategic competition. The US disclosure of space weapons is an extension of its deterrence posture in the Taiwan Strait and the Western Pacific. Given that orbital assets, unlike ground forces, are not fixed to a specific region, this is a signal that affects the entire Indo-Pacific deterrence framework. The Global Times' depiction of Prime Minister Takaichi's US visit as a "petitioner-like" move shows that China views the strengthening of US-Japan security cooperation as part of a single trend linked to the US disclosure of space deterrence [17].

The second is the pressure for autonomy within alliance networks. Although the Japanese Ministry of Defense's implementation of a new contracting system to support startups starting in October appears to be limited to drone development, its context is aligned with a broader reorganization of the defense industry aimed at reducing reliance on US intelligence [16]. The successful launch of "Spectrum" by Germany's Isar Aerospace is the European version of the same pressure. Europe has historically relied on Arianespace or SpaceX for satellite launches, but the prolonged war in Ukraine and defense burden-sharing pressure from the Trump administration have driven Europe to extend its logic of self-reliance into the space domain [6]. Although occurring in different regions, the movements of Japan and Germany share a common structural cause: a response to the declining credibility of the US security commitment.

Third is the penetration of private capital into military and security spaces. Google's orbital AI data center plan originated from a purely industrial motivation to bypass terrestrial power constraints [10][12]. However, the moment a satellite carrying TPUs enters orbit, this infrastructure is transformed into a dual-use asset that could become a military target. The fact that SpaceX and Starcloud are pursuing similar concepts indicates that this is not an isolated case unique to Google, but rather a shift in direction for the entire commercial space industry [10]. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty only prohibits nuclear weapons and WMDs, leaving conventional counterspace weapons and the military utilization of civilian infrastructure outside its regulatory scope. As this institutional vacuum combines with the entry of private capital into space, a structure is being created where military and industrial assets are simultaneously concentrated in a norm-free space.

3. Historical Precedents: Similarities with the Dismantling of Nuclear Deterrence Ambiguity

This disclosure decision structurally resembles the debates in the 1960s over the disclosure of US nuclear force deployments. At the time, without a precise understanding of Soviet capabilities, the United States underwent internal debates regarding the extent to which it should disclose information about its own nuclear forces. The logic that disclosure reduces miscalculation coexisted with the argument that disclosure would instead stimulate the adversary's counter-armament. The proposition presented by Secretary Meink that "open communication strengthens deterrence" directly inherits the former position in this debate [3].

China's logic of response is also a historical repetition. The narrative of the security dilemma put forward by the Soviet Union upon the announcement of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983—namely, that one side's strengthening of defensive and offensive capabilities inevitably forces the other to build up its own defensive armaments—shares almost the exact same structure as the current rhetoric of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and state-run media. However, a key difference from that era is the increased number of actors. While the Cold War arms race was a bilateral US-Soviet dynamic, today's space arms race is a multilateral, multi-layered structure: it involves the US-China-Russia triad, supplemented by the independent capability building of allies like Japan and Germany, and further joined by private corporations like Google.

Europe's pursuit of space sovereignty also overlaps with the logic behind France's establishment of its independent nuclear force (*force de frappe*) during the De Gaulle era in the 1960s. The pattern where the assessment that the US security commitment cannot be fully trusted leads to the building of independent capabilities remains the same now as it was then. The only difference is that the target this time is space infrastructure—launch vehicles and satellites—rather than nuclear forces.

4. Key Variables

The variables shaping future developments can be boiled down to three.

First is the speed of China's practical response. As demonstrated by the launch of the Diting-01 satellites, China is steadily expanding its electronic warfare and anti-satellite capabilities, separate from its rhetorical protests [13]. Whether this pace accelerates under the stimulus of the US public declaration or proceeds gradually according to existing plans will determine the intensity of the future arms race.

Second is whether the development of autonomous capabilities by allies will complement or fracture the US-led order. While Japan's establishment of an independent kill chain and Europe's self-reliance in launch vehicles are currently described as "complementary self-reliance" vis-à-vis the United States, if this is scaled down, it has the potential to weaken the United States' control over its alliances.

Third is the pace of military involvement of commercial space infrastructure. If Google's orbital AI data center actually enters the commercialization phase, it will transcend mere industrial competition to become an asset that could be included in the counterspace targeting lists of various nations. In this case, the regulatory gap in the Outer Space Treaty could transform from a simple institutional flaw into a real risk of conflict.