The Houthis' Expanding Front: The Iran-Houthi Axis Targeting Saudi Arabia and Shaking Gulf Security
Executive Summary
Against the backdrop of the Israel-Iran war that began in February 2026, the Houthis—Iran's proxy—have escalated their attacks on Saudi Arabia, reshaping the Gulf security landscape. Starting with the landing of Iranian aircraft in Houthi-controlled territory in July, a series of events unfolded, including the declaration of a maritime blockade, attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, and strikes on western Saudi infrastructure and Riyadh. The September attack on King Khalid International Airport is evaluated as a symbolic event demonstrating the Iran-Houthi axis's capability to directly target the Saudi capital. Although Saudi Arabia signed the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement (MJDA) with Türkiye and Pakistan, its lack of efficacy became apparent within 48 hours of signing, leaving Riyadh to respond virtually alone. The South Korean government and businesses must treat the risks along the Red Sea–Bab el-Mandeb route as a constant. They should also monitor the diversification of energy procurement sources in response to repeated strikes on western Saudi infrastructure, alongside the potential restructuring of the defense and infrastructure markets. Rather than relying on logistics and procurement plans that assume the normalization of shipping routes, transitioning to a permanent operational framework that utilizes alternative routes, such as bypassing via the Cape of Good Hope, is a rational approach to risk management.
I. Issue Analysis
Saudi Arabia Faces Reignited Yemen Front Amid Intensifying Houthi Attacks: Escalating Threats to Gulf Security
1. Background and Progress
The starting point of the current crisis was when the Israel-Iran war, which broke out in February 2026, shook the overall Gulf security landscape [3][6]. The Houthis, who control most of Yemen's densely populated areas and the capital Sana'a, are Iran's proxy [1][4]. As the war involving Iran escalated, the Houthis resumed their attacks targeting Saudi Arabia.
The decisive turning point occurred in early July, when two Iranian aircraft landed in Houthi-controlled territory [2][11]. This triggered the largest military clashes between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis since the 2022 UN-brokered truce [2][11]. The Houthis declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia and claimed responsibility for attacks on three vessels in the Red Sea. Saudi airports and oil infrastructure also became targets [2][11]. In response, Yemeni government forces struck the runway at Sana'a Airport, and Riyadh retaliated with airstrikes on Houthi military and communication facilities along the Hodeidah coast [2].
The Saudi-led restructuring of the Yemeni government forces backfired, weakening internal cohesion. The vacuum created by the dismissal and expulsion of commanders belonging to the Southern Transitional Council (STC) created favorable conditions for the Houthis' advance along the western coast [9]. Following the battle over Sana'a Airport, frontline clashes continued to intensify [8]. The UN Special Envoy for Yemen warned that "the risk of a return to full-scale war is higher than at any point since the 2022 UN-brokered truce" [8].
2. Current Situation
In September, the frequency of attacks and the scope of targets expanded noticeably. On September 24, the Houthis launched missiles targeting the Red Sea port city of Yanbu and Taif. The Saudi-led coalition announced that it had intercepted six ballistic missiles [10][16]. Alerts were issued in major cities and Islamic holy sites, including Mecca, Jeddah, and Tabuk [10]. Coalition spokesperson Turki al-Malki stated, "We will respond decisively to the escalations and violations by the Houthi terrorist militia" [16].
The sight of black smoke billowing from the fuel depots at Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport is considered a symbolic moment of this current phase. Saudi Arabia stated that the Houthis had fired a ballistic missile toward the capital [15]. The Turkish media outlet Daily Sabah characterized the attack as a "strategic turning point in the Yemen conflict," assessing that the greater implication lies not in whether individual interceptions succeeded, but in the fact that Iran demonstrated its capability and willingness to directly target the Saudi capital [15].
Amid these developments, a meeting of the military leadership of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan was held in Riyadh on September 26 [1][14]. The meeting was attended by General Asim Munir, Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan; General Selçuk Bayraktaroğlu, Chief of the General Staff of Türkiye; and General Fayyadh bin Hamed Al-Ruwaili, Chief of the General Staff of Saudi Arabia [1]. According to statements from the Saudi Ministry of Defense and the Pakistani military, the three chiefs discussed measures to enhance intelligence sharing, military coordination, and capacity integration. They also condemned the Houthi attacks on Mecca and Saudi civilian and economic infrastructure [14]. This meeting was held within the framework of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement (MJDA) signed last month [1].
Around the same time, Iraq tightened controls on flights originating from Iran under pressure from the United States, prompting an Iranian official to hint at retaliation [4]. The United Nations Security Council adopted a statement condemning the Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, which is viewed as a rare instance of the UN's highest body presenting a unified stance [17].
3. Key Actors and Interests
The Houthis (Ansar Allah), as Iran's proxy, are leveraging the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb chokepoints to pressure Saudi Arabia [3][6]. Their declaration of a maritime blockade alongside their advance along the western coast is interpreted as an attempt to translate military gains into political leverage [2][11]. Reports that approximately 100 US military advisors arrived in Riyadh the day after the fall of Al-Mukha suggest that the speed of the Houthi advance exceeded the expectations of regional actors [5].
Saudi Arabia is effectively left to respond on its own, caught between defense and deterrence. Critics point out that because the MJDA lacks an automatic intervention clause, Türkiye and Pakistan failed to provide any practical assistance even 48 hours after the attacks occurred [13]. Saudi Arabia is diversifying its security channels through indirect intelligence support from Israel and maritime cooperation with Egypt in the Red Sea [9]. Rather than a complete alignment with a specific bloc, this is evaluated as a transitional hedging strategy that allows multiple security providers to coexist [9].
Pakistan, as a signatory to the MJDA, is weighing its options between demands for direct intervention and the resulting diplomatic burden. Nikkei Asia pointed out that Islamabad's diplomatic assets accumulated in the Gulf region could be compromised depending on the level of its involvement [7]. The discussion of intelligence sharing and capacity integration during the September 26 meeting reflects Pakistan's cautious stance, prioritizing lower-level engagement over the deployment of actual troops [14].
Türkiye, similar to Pakistan, prioritizes symbolic solidarity while simultaneously eyeing opportunities for its defense and infrastructure companies to enter the Saudi market [9]. The editorial tone of Daily Sabah emphasizes a "shift toward a collective response," placing weight on justifying an expanded role for Türkiye [15].
The United States is refraining from direct intervention on the Yemen front even as it continues its war with Iran. While maintaining military pressure by operating KC-135 and KC-46 tankers and MQ-4C Triton reconnaissance drones near the Strait of Hormuz, President Trump reportedly rejected Iran's proposal for a seven-day ceasefire and its proposals regarding Hormuz [12]. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) assessed that Washington still lacks clear options six months after the outbreak of the war [13].
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is taking a different path from Riyadh. Rather than closely aligning with Saudi Arabia on the Yemen front, the UAE appears to be focusing on deepening the Abraham Accords [13].
Iran is employing a strategy of using the Houthis as a low-cost proxy leverage to maintain its bargaining power over the Strait of Hormuz [3][6][9]. Its hints at retaliation against Iraq's tightened controls on flights from Iran are interpreted as a signal that Tehran intends to maintain pressure across the wider Gulf region [4].
4. Key Issues
The first issue is the efficacy of the MJDA. The fact that practical assistance from Türkiye and Pakistan was delayed despite Houthi attacks occurring just 48 hours after the agreement was signed supports the assessment that the agreement was merely a symbolic signal lacking an automatic intervention clause [13]. The fact that the September 26 military leadership meeting remained at the level of intelligence sharing and capacity integration can be interpreted in the same context [14].
The second issue is whether the risks along the Red Sea–Bab el-Mandeb shipping routes will become entrenched. If the Houthis' control over the western coast and their declaration of a maritime blockade persist, there is a possibility that these risks will solidify into permanent hazards for the shipping routes, moving beyond one-off incidents [2][5][11].
The third issue is whether attacks will expand to eastern Saudi oil infrastructure. While targets have so far been concentrated in the western and central regions, including Yanbu, Taif, Mecca, and Riyadh [10][15][16], the potential path for attacks to spread to eastern facilities cannot be ruled out if the dual chokepoints of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are disrupted simultaneously.
The fourth issue is which axis Saudi Arabia's diversification of security partners will eventually converge toward. The key to gauging the future direction of regional alignment is whether the current configuration—where indirect cooperation with Israel and Egypt, nominal agreements with Türkiye and Pakistan, and limited US involvement coexist—will resolve into the dominance of a specific axis or become institutionalized as a multipolar security supply system [9].
II. In-Depth Analysis
Saudi Arabia Faces Reignited Yemen Front Amid Intensifying Houthi Attacks: Escalating Threats to Gulf Security
1. Root Cause Analysis
Viewing the current crisis merely as a localized resurgence of the Yemeni civil war misses the core issue. The root cause lies in the fact that the Israel-Iran war, which began in February 2026, has reshaped the Gulf security landscape itself [3][6]. Facing direct strikes on its homeland and its nuclear and missile programs, Iran lacks the capacity to confront the United States and Israel with its conventional forces. Instead, it has opted for a strategy of simultaneously disrupting two chokepoints—the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—through the Houthis, a low-cost proxy [3][9]. The early July incident, in which two Iranian aircraft landed in Houthi-controlled territory, was a signal that this proxy war framework had transitioned into the execution phase [2][11].
From the Houthis' perspective, this escalation is not merely the execution of Iranian directives. The command vacuum created during the dismissal and expulsion of STC commanders within the Yemeni government forces provided a golden opportunity for the Houthis to advance militarily along the western coast [9]. This created a paradox where the Saudi-led restructuring of the government forces actually weakened their defensive capabilities. The Houthis are maximizing their bargaining power by translating this military advantage into declarations of a maritime blockade and attacks on Saudi cities and infrastructure [2][11].
2. Structural Context
Politically, this crisis coincides with a phase where Saudi Arabia's hedging strategy toward the United States has hit its limits. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has sought an independent path while relying on the United States for security. However, the Trump administration's refusal to directly intervene in the escalating conflict with Iran exposed the gaps in this hedging strategy [9]. Saudi Arabia is currently diversifying its security channels through indirect intelligence support from Israel, maritime cooperation with Egypt in the Red Sea, and the MJDA with Türkiye and Pakistan [9]. This should be viewed not as a victory for a specific bloc, but as a transitional multipolar structure in which multiple security providers coexist [9].
Economically, as areas dense with oil infrastructure such as Yanbu and Taif have become repeated targets, the supply stability of the world's largest crude oil exporter is being put to the test [10][16]. The strike on the fuel depots at King Khalid International Airport is interpreted less as a matter of physical damage and more as a signal that the Iran-Houthi axis has acquired the capability and willingness to directly target the Saudi capital [15]. In terms of the security architecture, this crisis exposed the fact that the MJDA was merely a symbolic agreement lacking an automatic intervention clause. Although the Houthis struck Saudi Arabia just 48 hours after the agreement was signed, Pakistan and Türkiye did not immediately provide military assistance [13]. Pakistan is concerned that intervention could deplete Islamabad's diplomatic assets in the region [7]. Consequently, despite the agreement, Saudi Arabia is effectively left to respond on its own.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Analysis
A comparison with the Saudi-led coalition's intervention in Yemen from 2015 to 2022 clearly highlights how the nature of the current phase has changed. The 2015 intervention was a war in which Saudi Arabia acted as an offensive actor seeking to suppress the Houthis. In contrast, in the current phase, Saudi Arabia has been pushed into a defensive posture. The fact that approximately 100 US military advisors were dispatched to Riyadh following the fall of Al-Mukha as the Houthis advanced along the western coast symbolically demonstrates this reversal of power [5].
A comparison with the 2022 UN-brokered truce is also instructive. That truce was established when both Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were exhausted by a military war of attrition. This time, the fundamental driver is different, as Iran has reactivated the Houthis to preserve its own war-fighting capabilities. This structural difference explains why the UN Special Envoy for Yemen warned that "the risk of a return to full-scale war is higher than at any point since the 2022 truce" [8].
Another point of reference is the 2019 drone attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities. Although Iran was suspected of being behind those attacks as well, the United States refrained from direct military intervention. Similarly, in the current crisis, President Trump has rejected Iran's seven-day ceasefire proposal while remaining cautious about direct intervention to defend Saudi Arabia [12]. Washington's pattern of limiting its response to a show of force—deploying KC-135 and KC-46 tankers and MQ-4C Triton reconnaissance drones near the Strait of Hormuz—closely mirrors the 2019 precedent [12].
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is the level of commitment among Iranian hardliners to escalate the conflict. The fact that an Iranian official hinted at retaliation against Iraq's tightened controls on flights from Iran [4] shows that Tehran has incentives to expand this proxy war across the entire region. The extent to which Iran maintains its control over and support for the Houthis will determine whether targets expand to eastern Saudi infrastructure.
The second variable is the efficacy of the MJDA. Whether Türkiye and Pakistan, as signatories to the agreement, will move beyond intelligence sharing and military coordination to actually deploy forces is currently being tested [14]. A key point of observation over the coming weeks is whether the agenda discussed at the September 26 meeting of the three nations' military leadership in Riyadh will translate from nominal condemnation into concrete defense commitments [1][14].
The third variable is the threshold for US intervention. Although the UN Security Council condemned the Houthi attacks with a rare, unified voice [17], this did not translate into practical military action. As long as the Trump administration maintains its policy of avoiding direct conflict with Iran, Saudi Arabia will have no choice but to continue relying on indirect security cooperation with Israel and Egypt [9].
Unless the collapse of the western coast defense line caused by the STC command vacuum is reversed, the Houthis' military advantage will continue to serve as persistent leverage even in future negotiations [9].
III. Recommended Policy Responses
Saudi Arabia Faces Reignited Yemen Front Amid Intensifying Houthi Attacks: Comprehensive Response Measures
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Policy Recommendations
This crisis must be assessed as a structural phase rather than a short-term clash. As long as the Iran-Israel war remains unresolved, there are strong incentives for proxy pressure through the Houthis to persist [3][9]. The MJDA exposed its lack of efficacy within 48 hours of signing [13]. Pakistan and Türkiye are highly likely to limit their cooperation to intelligence sharing and capacity integration rather than actual military intervention [14][7]. Consequently, Saudi Arabia is expected to maintain a virtually solo response posture for the foreseeable future.
The first assessment for the South Korean government and businesses is that shipping route risks have become a constant. The dangers along the Red Sea–Bab el-Mandeb route must be factored in not as a temporary variable, but as a cost factor that will persist for at least the next six months [9]. The second assessment is the urgency of diversifying energy procurement sources. Since western Saudi infrastructure in areas like Yanbu and Taif is being repeatedly targeted, the possibility of attacks spreading to eastern infrastructure cannot be ruled out [10][16]. The third assessment is the restructuring of the Saudi defense and infrastructure markets driven by the multipolarization of security providers. There is a high probability that the involvement of Turkish, Pakistani, and Chinese operators will increase [9].
The recommended response is to simultaneously pursue shipping route alternatives, procurement diversification, and monitoring of the agreement's efficacy. Logistics plans that assume the normalization of shipping routes should be avoided. Instead, transitioning to a permanent operational framework that bypasses via the Cape of Good Hope is a more rational approach to risk management [9].
2. Short/Medium/Long-Term Action Plans
Short-Term (1–3 Months)
South Korean shipping companies and cargo owners must re-evaluate their use of the Red Sea route on an individual voyage basis. Port call schedules for western ports such as Yanbu and Jeddah need to be flexibly adjusted in response to the frequency of attacks [10][16]. South Korean companies operating in eastern Saudi Arabia should re-examine their emergency evacuation and communication protocols through local partners. As demonstrated by the strike on King Khalid International Airport, Riyadh can no longer be considered a safe zone [15].
Energy-importing companies should reconfirm the terms of execution for procurement contracts of Saudi crude oil and petroleum products. In particular, they should prioritize securing alternative shipping locations for volumes transiting through western ports.
Medium-term (3–12 months)
The phase of verifying the effectiveness of the Mecca Defense Pact must be tracked separately. Whether Pakistan and Turkiye provide actual air defense and interception assets to Saudi Arabia, rather than just sharing intelligence, is a key indicator [14]. In this phase, South Korean companies that have entered the Saudi defense procurement market need to track the rise of Turkish and Pakistani competitors on an individual project basis [9].
The potential formalization of Israel-Saudi security alignment should also be managed as a separate scenario. Because this could trigger political backlash within the Islamic world, it has the potential to impact Saudi domestic public opinion and GCC regional relations [9].
Long-term (12 months or more)
Supply chains must be redesigned under the assumption that the dual chokepoints of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb become permanent. This represents a structural transformation of the procurement and logistics strategy in the Gulf region itself, rather than a mere response to a specific event. Diversifying procurement sources, including eastern Saudi infrastructure, is a key pillar of this long-term transition [9].
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is the geographical spread of Houthi attacks. To date, targets have been concentrated in western and central cities such as Yanbu, Taif, Riyadh, and Mecca [10][15][16]. If attacks spread to eastern oil-producing regions like Dammam and Jubail, this should be viewed as a trigger for a structural recalculation of the risk premium.
The second indicator is whether the parties to the Mecca Defense Pact actually deploy military assets. The key is whether Pakistani air defense assets or Turkish drone forces are deployed on Saudi territory, going beyond mere intelligence sharing [14][7]. If confirmed, this can be interpreted as a signal that the pact is transitioning from symbolic to substantive.
The third indicator is the closeness of command and control between Iran and the Houthis. Circumstances of the IRGC supervising operations on Yemen's western coast have already been reported [5]. If this supervision is formalized or Iranian regular military assets are directly observed, the situation must be redefined as a phase directly linked to a war on the Iranian mainland, moving beyond a localized war in Yemen.
The fourth indicator is changes in the level of US involvement. Following the fall of Al-Makha, the dispatch of around 100 US military advisors to Riyadh has already been confirmed [5]. If this scale is expanded or direct US interception assets are deployed to Saudi Arabia, this would be a trigger signaling a policy shift in Washington.
The fifth indicator is the restriction of Iranian flights from Iraq and Iran's retaliatory measures against it [4]. If this axis intensifies, additional disruptions could occur in air and maritime logistics across the Gulf.
4. Summary and Conclusion
The Saudi-Houthi conflict is not a recurrence of the Yemeni civil war, but a derivative phase of the Iran-Israel war shaking the overall Gulf security architecture [3][6][9]. The Mecca Defense Pact remains a symbolic agreement to date, and Saudi Arabia is responding virtually alone [13]. South Korean companies should incorporate the Red Sea shipping route risk as a constant rather than a temporary variable, and gradually implement the diversification of procurement sources to eastern Saudi Arabia. At the same time, they need to establish a dual monitoring system that tracks the transition of the Mecca Pact's effectiveness, the closeness of Iran-Houthi command and control, and changes in the level of US involvement as separate triggers.
References
[2] [Sana'a Center] The Yemen Review Quarterly: April-June 2026
[4] [Channel News Asia] Allies unite behind Saudi Arabia as more Iranian flights restricted
[7] [Nikkei Asia] Houthi threat tests Pakistan's Mecca defense pact commitment
[8] [Sana'a Center] Yemen’s Return to War: What is the Endgame? Reactions from Sana’a Center Experts
[11] [Sana'a Center] Saudi-led Restructuring Tests Southern Military Loyalties
[14] [Al-Monitor] Pakistani, Saudi, Turkish chiefs discuss closer military ties
[15] [Daily Sabah] Strategic shift in Yemen conflict: Toward collective response
[16] [Kuwait Times] Saudi Arabia issues warning for Makkah, repels Houthi attack
[17] [Al-Monitor] UN Security Council condemns Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia
[18] [Bangkok Post] Security Council condemns Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia
[20] [Business Times (SG)] Saudi coalition says it intercepts Houthi missiles, drones
[21] [Al-Monitor] UN Security Council condemns Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia
[23] [Al-Monitor] Rubio meets Saudi FM as fight against Yemen's Houthis intensifies
[24] [Gulf Daily News] Saudi-led coalition intercepts six Houthi ballistic missiles
[25] [BBC News] Watch: BBC reports from the front-line of an escalating war in Yemen
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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