Xi Jinping’s Visit to the United States and the Implications of the U.S.-China “Strategic Stability” Frame
Executive Summary
President Xi Jinping’s first visit to the United States in 11 years and Chinese state media’s framing of a “partnership” should be viewed as an extension of the rhetorical compromise reached at the May summit rather than a substantive signal of improving relations. President Trump’s agreement to the phrase “constructive strategic stability relationship” marks the first time the United States has accepted the definition of relations that Xi has pursued since 2012, but it has clear limitations as it does not entail substantive policy changes. While Beijing consumes this frame as a domestic diplomatic achievement, its modernization of nuclear forces and investment in supply chain self-reliance continue unabated, and the hardline stance toward China within the U.S. Congress and the Department of Defense remains unchanged. The substance of this visit is defined by an asymmetric structure in which Trump emphasizes achievements in trade balance while Xi highlights the stability of the relationship itself. The South Korean government and businesses must not misinterpret the friendly rhetoric between the leaders as a signal of easing structural competition, but instead adopt a dual-track approach that separately tracks the potential for practical relaxation regarding rare earths, tariffs, and export controls.
I. Issue Analysis
Issue Analysis: Xi Jinping’s Visit to the U.S. and the U.S.-China “Strategic Stability” Frame
1. Background and Progress
During the summit last May, Trump agreed to the phrase “constructive strategic stability relationship” proposed by Xi Jinping [3][2]. The Brookings Institution evaluated this as a “breakthrough” for Beijing. This is because it broke a long-standing deadlock in which Xi, since taking power in 2012, had repeatedly proposed definitions of the relationship—such as a “new type of major major power relations” and “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation”—only to be rejected by the United States every time [2]. An EAI report also evaluated the May agreement as an event that “rhetorically patched up a decade-long deadlock over the definition of U.S.-China relations,” while pointing out that “it has clear limitations in that it does not entail substantive policy changes” [3].
2. Current Situation
Just before the visit, the tone of Chinese state media consistently focused on “stability” and “cooperation.” The Global Times defined 2026 as a “big year” for U.S.-China relations in an editorial, stating, “Both China and the United States are great countries, and the peoples of both countries are great peoples” [4]. In a separate editorial, the same outlet presented cooperation in the spirit of “equality, respect, and mutual benefit” as a prerequisite for the visit, suggesting that doing so would allow them to find ways to address each other’s concerns [7]. Xinhua News Agency reported that the visit “will bring greater stability and predictability to U.S.-China relations and beyond amid growing global uncertainty” [12].
Upon his arrival in Washington, President Xi himself stated in a letter to the American people that “China and the United States should be partners, not rivals” [13][16]. Following his arrival at Joint Base Andrews, President Trump and First Lady Melania Trump personally greeted him, and an unusual level of protocol was displayed at the White House welcoming ceremony, which included flyovers by a B-2 bomber and an F-22 squadron [8]. Nikkei Asia reported on the difference in emphasis between the two sides, noting that while Xi stressed the “importance of cooperation and stability” in his opening remarks at the White House, President Trump highlighted their “historic relationship” and “tremendous strides in trade balance” [17].
Channel NewsAsia, affiliated with CSIS, reported expert forecasts that a “big deal” is unlikely to emerge from this visit, analyzing that what China seeks is not transactional results but “strategic stability” itself [19]. The South China Morning Post reported China’s announcement of harsh penalties for non-pharmaceutical fentanyl offenses ahead of the visit as a “gesture of goodwill.” The Chinese Ambassador to the United States remarked that the “giant ship” of bilateral relations would continue to “sail through the waves” along the track of “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation” [18].
3. Key Actors and Positions
The Chinese Side (The Xi Jinping Government and State Media): As outlets representing the government's position, the Global Times and Xinhua News Agency are focusing on framing this visit as a restoration of “stability” and “predictability” [7][10][12]. This is interpreted as a defensive message from China to manage the downside risks of the relationship at the negotiating table amid ongoing U.S. pressure (tariffs, export controls, and the Taiwan issue). Brookings pointed out that Beijing is also taking care to avoid provoking Trump personally or putting him in an awkward position [2]. However, the EAI analysis noted that while Beijing consumes this frame as a domestic diplomatic achievement, it continues its efforts to reduce vulnerabilities to the United States, such as modernizing its nuclear forces and building self-reliant supply chains [3].
The U.S. Side (The Trump Administration): According to Nikkei Asia, President Trump put a “historic relationship” and “achievements in trade balance” at the forefront [17]. This differs in tone from the “stability” frame emphasized by China. Scepticism remains deeply rooted in some Washington policy circles and Congress, where the “constructive strategic stability” agreement is dismissed as “empty words” [3]. The Atlantic Council assessed that what the two countries have created over the past year is “not a genuine detente, but a temporary lull,” with both sides continuing to test each other’s red lines [11].
Third-Party Perspectives (Research Institutions and Media): The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reported that the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States has reignited debate among Chinese strategists over the decline of U.S. hegemony [5]. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) expected that highly sensitive issues, including the Taiwan issue, rare earths, fentanyl, and trade, would be on the table simultaneously during this summit [8]. The Hankyoreh defined this visit as an occasion where “strategic stability” will be put to a practical test, pointing out that the extension of the trade war truce, rare earths, and the Taiwan issue are the core agenda items [14].
4. Key Issues
The first issue is the gap between framing and substance. The key is whether the rhetorical agreement on “constructive strategic stability” leads to a substantive easing of structural conflict factors such as tariffs, export controls, and the Taiwan issue. The EAI analysis has already pointed out the limitation that this frame “does not entail substantive policy changes” [3].
The second issue is the narrative gap between the two sides. China highlights “stability and predictability,” while the United States emphasizes “achievements and transactions” [17]. This difference in framing leaves room for both sides to evaluate achievements by different standards during the future implementation of agreements.
The third issue is whether the military and technological competition will continue in parallel. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that China’s nuclear warhead stockpile will reach 1,000 by 2030 [3]. If the arms and technology competition between the two countries continues unabated even as detente rhetoric spreads, the sustainability of the “strategic stability” frame itself could be put to the test [11][3].
II. In-Depth Analysis
In-Depth Analysis: The Fundamental Structure and Historical Implications of the U.S.-China “Strategic Stability” Frame
1. Root Cause Analysis
Beijing’s repetition of the “partnership” frame is not a rhetorical preference; it is a defensive choice stemming from structural inferiority. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China’s nuclear warhead stockpile is projected to reach 1,000 by 2030 [3]. This indicates that the gap in nuclear capabilities with the United States remains wide. For Beijing, “stability” in relations is synonymous with buying time to lower the intensity of U.S. pressure on China.
Since taking power in 2012, Xi Jinping has constantly wrestled with the United States over the power to define their relationship. Neither a “new type of major power relations” nor “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation” gained the consent of successive U.S. administrations [2]. Trump’s agreement to the phrase “constructive strategic stability relationship” in May of this year is the first exception to this long-standing deadlock [3][2]. The Brookings Institution evaluated this as a substantive “breakthrough” for Beijing [2]. This accumulated frustration explains why Chinese state media reported the expression so extensively.
The U.S. motivation is different. As reported by Nikkei Asia, what Trump emphasized during the White House meeting was a “historic relationship” and “tremendous strides in trade balance” [17]. This differs in tone from Xi’s remarks, which stressed cooperation and stability. For Trump, the value of this visit lies not in the stability of the relationship itself, but in tangible transactional outcomes. This asymmetry is the root cause of the difference in framing between the two sides.
2. Structural Context
Political Structure
Chinese state media reports cannot be separated from their purpose of domestic political consumption. The Global Times defined 2026 as a “big year” for U.S.-China relations and promoted President Xi’s visit as an event of “historic and landmark significance” [4][7][10]. Such expressions serve as a device to highlight the achievements of Xi’s diplomacy domestically. The EAI report points out that “Beijing consumes this frame as a domestic diplomatic achievement” [3].
The political structure on the U.S. side operates in the opposite direction. The Atlantic Council defines the bilateral relationship over the past year as “not a genuine detente, but a temporary stability,” analyzing that both sides have “continued to test each other’s red lines” [11]. Scepticism is deeply rooted in some Washington policy circles and Congress, where the agreement on “constructive strategic stability” is dismissed as “empty words” [3]. It remains uncertain whether Trump’s personal friendly gestures will soften the hardline stance toward China at the level of the State Department, the Department of Defense, and Congress.
Economic Structure
The Hankyoreh points to “the extension of the trade war truce, rare earths, and the Taiwan issue” as the substantive agenda of this visit [14]. Rare earths are one of the few cards where China holds substantial leverage. Channel NewsAsia reported expert forecasts that a “big deal” is unlikely to emerge from this visit, analyzing that what China seeks is not transactional results but “strategic stability” itself [19]. This can be read as an attempt by Beijing to redefine the playing field of the negotiating table within the framework of “stability,” at a time when economic interdependence has already been converted into a tool of security competition.
Security Structure
Apart from the rhetoric of stabilizing relations, capability competition is running in parallel. The EAI report points out that Beijing “continues to invest resources in reducing its vulnerability to the United States through the modernization of its nuclear forces and the establishment of self-reliant supply chains” [3]. Although military leadership channels in the Taiwan Strait and summit-level discussions on AI are mentioned as crisis management conduits, “without a structural resolution of the security dilemma, the coexistence of detente rhetoric and capability competition is highly likely to continue as the baseline trend for the time being” [3]. In other words, the agreement on the frame and the arms race are structured to proceed simultaneously on separate tracks.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparison of Similar Cases
The format of this state visit is frequently compared to Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States in 2011. An EAI commentary notes that the visit at the time “attracted the most global attention since Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States more than 30 years prior” [6]. Even after Hu’s visit, optimism and pessimism coexisted. While the joint statement projected that the two sides would “move toward a cooperative partnership,” skepticism was simultaneously raised that they would “repeat patterns of conflict and containment” [6]. The framing competition surrounding Xi’s current visit displays a similar dual structure.
The 2023 San Francisco APEC summit is also a reference precedent. The EAI report evaluated that the summit at the time “reached an agreement only on strengthening communication and building trust through the resumption of high-level military dialogue, without reaching a compromise” on the two core issues of “the Taiwan issue and economic matters related to advanced technology and export controls” [9]. In other words, it followed a pattern where core disagreements remained unresolved, and achievements were limited to restoring crisis management channels. It is suggested that a similar outcome may be repeated during this visit [19].
The term “strategic stability” itself is not new. A term that once referred to nuclear deterrence stability between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War has now been expansively applied as a comprehensive concept for managing relations across political, economic, and military spheres. The South China Morning Post reported that Chinese state media set these three words, “Constructive. Strategic. Stability.,” as the tone of the summit [15]. Given that the term originated in military tension management, this expanded application can be interpreted as Beijing’s intention to bind even political and economic conflicts within the framework of “manageable competition.”
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is whether the rhetorical agreement on the definition of relations will lead to actual policy changes. The EAI report points out that the May agreement “has clear limitations in that it does not entail substantive policy changes” [3]. Whether concrete measures, such as extending the trade truce or easing export controls on rare earths, follow this visit will serve as a touchstone to gauge the substance of the frame.
Policy divisions within Washington are also a variable. If the gap between Trump’s personal friendly gestures and the hardline stance of the Department of Defense and Congress toward China is not bridged, “constructive strategic stability” is highly likely to remain mere rhetoric between the leaders [3]. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace reports that a debate is underway among Chinese strategists regarding the decline of the United States [5]. Depending on how Beijing assesses U.S. power, the intensity of its approach toward the United States may also vary.
The Taiwan issue remains the most volatile variable. It is one of the core agenda items identified by The Hankyoreh [14], and the CFR also lists it as one of the top ten issues to watch during this summit [8]. Apart from the agreement on “stability” at the framing level, military signaling in the Taiwan Strait is highly likely to be the first case testing the sustainability of this agreement.
The pace of Beijing’s resource allocation for nuclear capabilities and supply chain self-reliance is also an important variable to observe [3]. If capability competition continues even while the rhetoric of stabilizing relations persists, the achievements of this visit will remain symbolic, leaving the substantive security dilemma intact.
III. Recommended Policy Responses
Comprehensive Policy Recommendations and Action Plan
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Policy Responses
Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States and the “partnership” framing by the Global Times and Xinhua News Agency are the results of a rhetorical compromise rather than signals of improving relations. Trump’s agreement to the phrase “constructive strategic stability relationship” at the May summit marks the first time the United States has accepted the framework for defining relations that Xi has pursued since 2012 [2][3]. It has already been pointed out that this expression does not entail substantive policy changes [3]. While Beijing consumes this frame domestically, its modernization of nuclear forces and investment in supply chain self-reliance continue unabated [3]. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that China’s nuclear warhead stockpile will reach 1,000 by 2030 [3]. Scepticism within some Washington policy circles and Congress also remains deeply rooted [3].
It is also clear that the interests of the United States and China are fundamentally different. During the White House meeting, Trump emphasized a “historic relationship” and “tremendous strides in trade balance” [17]. Xi emphasized cooperation and stability [17]. Channel NewsAsia projected that a “big deal” is unlikely to emerge from this visit, analyzing that what China wants is not transactional results but “strategic stability” itself [19]. This asymmetric structure is highly likely to recur in the future.
The implications for the South Korean government and businesses are twofold. First, friendly rhetoric between the leaders must not be misinterpreted as a signal of easing structural competition between the United States and China. Second, despite this, the possibility of a practical relaxation phase opening up—such as the easing of tariffs and export controls or adjustments in rare earth supplies—cannot be ruled out. A dual-track approach that tracks these two tracks separately is required [3].
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-Term (1–3 Months)
It is necessary to directly verify the wording of the follow-up joint statement and working-level agreements after the visit. The key is how the term “strategic stability” connects to specific provisions regarding trade, export controls, and the Taiwan issue. In particular, rare earth supplies, regulations on fentanyl precursors, and whether tariff suspensions are extended will directly affect the supply chain strategies of South Korean semiconductor, battery, and automotive industries toward China and the United States [14][18]. As pointed out by The Hankyoreh, the substantive agenda of this visit consists of “the extension of the trade war truce, rare earths, and the Taiwan issue” [14]. The priority is to individually verify whether agreements have been reached on these three pillars and their respective implementation deadlines.
At the same time, the reactions of the U.S. Congress and the Department of Defense must be monitored separately. Under the assumption that Trump’s personal friendly gestures are highly unlikely to shift the hardline stance toward China across the entire administration or Congress, the direction of ongoing export controls and investment screening measures against China must be tracked independently of the summit’s outcomes [3][11].
Medium-Term (6 Months–1 Year)
Since the Global Times defined 2026 as a “big year” for U.S.-China relations [4], the schedules for subsequent high-level dialogues and summit-level contacts planned during this period must be identified preemptively. As the Atlantic Council points out, the current U.S.-China relationship is “not a genuine detente, but a temporary stability,” and a phase in which both sides continue to test each other’s red lines is highly likely to persist [11]. If individual conflict issues recur in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, or the semiconductor export control domain during this period, the effectiveness of the “strategic stability” frame will be put to the test.
For South Korean businesses, there is a need to establish a system to review the list of export control items to China and whether the conditions for U.S. tariff suspensions are renewed on a semi-annual basis. This is because a time lag often occurs between the rhetoric of the leaders and the enforcement of regulations by working-level agencies.
Long-Term (1 Year or More)
Structural variables such as the nuclear balance, competition in AI and semiconductor technology, and supply chain restructuring are issues that will persist regardless of the summit’s framing. As the EAI analysis suggests, “without a structural resolution of the security dilemma, the coexistence of detente rhetoric and capability competition is highly likely to continue as the baseline trend for the time being” [3]. South Korea must establish a permanent dual-risk management system for both the United States and China based on this coexisting structure. It is rational to exclude any scenario that assumes the competitive structure itself will be resolved by a single summit or statement.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
Indicators that can be interpreted as positive signals - The joint statement following the visit to the US explicitly specifies the extension period for tariff suspensions and the specific items covered. - Measures to ease export controls on rare earths are formalized through executive orders or Department of Commerce notices. - Evidence confirms that the regular communication channel between the military leadership of the United States and China is actually operational.
Trigger points requiring caution - The US Congress passes sanctions bills against China independently of the summit agreement. This would signal a reaffirmation of the existing assessment that the executive branch's conciliatory gestures are decoupled from the legislative branch's hardline stance[3][11]. - Military tensions recur near the Taiwan Strait. This would serve as the first test of whether the 'strategic stability' framework actually functions as a crisis management tool. - Export controls on semiconductors and AI are not eased after the summit but are instead expanded. This would serve as an indicator of the gap between the 'partnership' rhetoric and actual technological competition. - Evidence emerges that the pace of China's nuclear modernization exceeds the US Department of Defense's estimates. This would provide evidence of the deepening dual structure of parallel rhetoric on relationship stability and capability competition[3].
4. Summary and Conclusion
The 'partnership' framework emphasized by the Global Times and Xinhua News Agency is a partial outcome of the negotiations on defining the bilateral relationship that Xi Jinping has pursued for over a decade[2][3]. This is qualitatively different from the Trump camp's emphasis on trade achievements and transactional progress[17]. At present, there is no evidence that this agreement on the framework eases structural competition between the United States and China, particularly in nuclear capabilities, technology, and supply chains[3]. The South Korean government and businesses must track the rhetorical stability between the leaders and the continuation of regulations and competition at the working level on separate tracks. A monitoring system is required to track the specific clauses of the follow-up agreement from the US visit in the short term, while simultaneously monitoring independent moves by the US Congress and Department of Defense alongside indicators of nuclear and technological competition in the medium to long term.
References
[2] [Brookings Institution] Why Beijing isn’t taking the bait with Trump
[4] [环球时报 (Global Times)] China and the US should be partners, not rivals: Global Times editorial
[5] [Carnegie Endowment] American Power: A View from China
[8] [Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)] Ten Issues to Watch at the Trump-Xi Summit in Washington
[12] [环球时报 (Global Times)] Xi's upcoming US visit to chart course for bilateral ties
[13] [Última Hora (PY)] Presidente Xi dice que China y EEUU deben ser “socios más que rivales”
[16] [A Semana] Xi Jinping diz que China e EUA devem ser “parceiros, e não rivais”
[17] [Nikkei Asia] Xi urges limits on US-China rivalry, calls for stable ties
[18] [South China Morning Post] Behind closed doors, Xi urges Trump to prevent AI ‘misuse and abuse’
[20] [Kuwait Times] Trump rolls out red carpet for Xi as leaders eye stability despite strains
[21] [The Irish Times] China’s Xi tells Trump: ‘Let’s not wrestle’ during White House summit
[22] [The Globe and Mail] Trump rolls out the red carpet for China’s Xi as both sides seek stability
[23] [Financial Times] Xi says US and China must ‘coexist in peace’ in historic White House visit
[24] [环球时报 (Global Times)] Xi leaves for state visit to the US as China-US summit under spotlight
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
How can I help you?