India-China Relations Rapprochement Attempts and India's Strategic Autonomy Dilemma: China's Strategic Direction Towards India and Constructive Response Measures

Executive Summary

Following the Galwan Valley clash in 2020, India-China relations have entered a dual phase of 'superficial thaw' and 'structural tension' since the latter half of 2024. Both nations remain in a stage of 'managed engagement,' pursuing outward normalization of relations without fundamental resolution of border disputes. China maintains a strategic intent to leverage India's strategic autonomy identity to detach India from the US-led containment network, while India consistently protests territorial sovereignty issues and participates in the Quad framework, refusing complete alignment with any bloc. China requires strategic patience to manage relations with India through gradual confidence-building and economic incentives, rather than coercion, predicated on a delicate diplomatic approach that does not provoke India's sense of sovereignty and strategic pride. Third-party actors, including South Korea, must recognize that the redefinition of India-China relations could lead to a structural realignment of the Asian regional order and explore flexible positioning strategies that redefine relations with India not as a dependent variable of US-China competition, but as an independent strategic asset.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

India-China Relations Rapprochement Attempts and India's Strategic Autonomy Dilemma

Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Course of the Issue

India-China relations cooled rapidly following the Galwan Valley clash in 2020. The bloody conflict along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas plunged bilateral relations into their worst state in decades, prompting India to implement comprehensive containment measures against China, including banning hundreds of Chinese apps and restricting investments from Chinese companies. During this period, India strengthened the Quad (Quad) framework with the United States, Japan, and Australia, emerging as a key pillar of the anti-China containment front [3][10].

However, subtle shifts in bilateral relations began to emerge in the latter half of 2024. Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, confirming their willingness to normalize relations, followed by an additional meeting in Tianjin. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has actively promoted these two summit meetings as a momentum for restoring relations, evaluating them as having "guided China-India relations back to the right track of improvement and development" [1]. This trend suggests that both countries are entering a phase of 'managed engagement,' pursuing outward normalization of relations without a complete resolution of border disputes.

2. Current Situation

The most recent diplomatic contact occurred on the sidelines of the ASEAN-related meetings in Manila, Philippines. Immediately after his meeting with Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized that "China and India are partners, not rivals, and opportunities for each other, not threats," urging the strengthening of bilateral relations, enhanced cooperation in multilateral forums, and expanded exchanges in various fields [1]. The Chinese side actively promoted this meeting as an extension of the relationship improvement trajectory set by the two leaders.

Almost concurrently, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri made an official visit to Beijing and met with Sun Haibin, Deputy Head of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee. Both sides discussed concrete measures to implement the relationship development direction set by the leaders of the two countries, with enhanced cooperation in various fields such as political dialogue, academic exchanges, think tank collaboration, and people-to-people exchanges on the agenda [12][14]. Foreign Secretary Misri, a former Indian Ambassador to China, is seen as a signal that the two countries are actively engaging their working-level channels, going beyond a mere diplomatic gesture.

However, the Indian government is publicly maintaining its vigilance towards China concurrently with these relationship improvement efforts. In its official response to the meeting minutes released by the Chinese side after the Jaishankar-Wang meeting, the Indian government reiterated its position that "India has never encroached upon China's sovereignty, but China is illegally occupying Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh" [7]. In particular, it emphasized that Minister Jaishankar directly stated to Wang Yi that "India is in a position to raise issues concerning sovereignty," implying that China's narrative distorts India's actual position [7].

Meanwhile, India simultaneously attended the Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting in Manila, reaffirming its commitment to a "free and open Indo-Pacific" with the United States, Japan, and Australia, and expressing support for ASEAN centrality [10]. This clearly demonstrates India's dual-track strategy of simultaneously pursuing engagement with and containment of China.

India's domestic public opinion is also complex. The Hindu, a leading English-language daily, published an editorial arguing "Do not bow to China, nor depend on the US," analyzing that the erratic policies of the Trump administration towards India—imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum, revoking preferential trade status (GSP), resuming relations with Pakistan, and tightening H-1B visa regulations—have spurred calls for a reassessment of China policy within India [4]. In particular, some segments of the Indian business community have criticized the hardline stance against China as excessively aligning with the US 'containment' strategy rather than serving India's national interests [4].

3. Key Actors and Their Positions and Interests

The Indian Government (Modi Administration)is currently engaged in the most complex strategic calculation. While the Modi government seeks to outwardly stabilize relations with China by leveraging the momentum from the Kazan and Tianjin summits, it simultaneously maintains an unwavering stance on territorial issues in Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir [7]. External Affairs Minister Jaishankar, as the executor of this dual strategy, performed a diplomatic tightrope walk in Manila, attending both a bilateral meeting with Wang Yi and the Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting within a single day [1][10]. The core interest of the Indian government is to restore economic relations without substantial concessions on border disputes and to maintain strategic autonomy, independent of either major power.

The Chinese Government (Xi Jinping Regime)is employing a more proactive courtship strategy in this attempt to redefine relations. Wang Yi's statement, "partners, not rivals," reflects China's strategic intent to detach India from the US-led China containment alliance [1]. China seeks to redefine the framework of bilateral relations as 'cooperation between two emerging powers,' thereby weakening the cohesion of the Quad and strengthening China's position within the Global South. The involvement of the International Liaison Department of the CPC in the meeting with Foreign Secretary Misri suggests an intention to elevate bilateral relations beyond mere diplomatic channels to a strategic level at the party-to-party level, characteristic of the party-state system [14].

Indian Business and Economic Actorsare the domestic actors most vocal in advocating for the normalization of relations with China. Recognizing that restrictions on Chinese capital and technology impose tangible costs on India's manufacturing sector and startup ecosystem, they are urging a relaxation of the hardline stance against China [4]. However, The Hindu critically analyzes that these business demands are based on the argument that "India's confrontational approach has excessively aligned with the US containment agenda rather than serving India's national interests," expressing caution that economic logic alone should not replace strategic judgment [4].

Indian Strategic Community and Mediaare leading the discourse on strategic autonomy. According to analyses by the East Asia Institute (EAI), India is seeking to establish its position as a "true third pole" by simultaneously pursuing FTA and security agreements with the EU, participating in the Quad, and resuming engagement with China [2][5]. This is an extension of India's 'strategic ambiguity' policy, which rejects alignment with any single bloc and aims to maximize strategic leverage through multiple partnerships.

4. Summary of Key Issues

The key issues highlighted in this attempt at redefining India-China relations can be summarized into three main points.

First, the disconnect between the unresolved territorial issues and the normalization of relations is a significant issue. Pursuing normalization of relations while China continues its effective occupation of territories in Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir poses considerable domestic political challenges for India. The Indian government's public reiteration of its protest against China's illegal occupation of territory immediately after the Jaishankar-Wang meeting is intended to clarify to the domestic public that relationship improvement does not imply concessions on territorial issues [7].

Second, the dilemma between strategic autonomy and bloc pressure is evident. While India functions as a key partner in the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy through its participation in the Quad, it seeks to secure an independent diplomatic space, free from alignment with any bloc, by resuming relations with China [2][5][10]. However, the unpredictable policies of the Trump administration towards India are disrupting this balance, and the risks of excessive dependence on the US are being publicly debated within India [4].

Third, the question of sincerity in China's engagement strategy remains a critical point. There are divided opinions within the Indian strategic community regarding whether China's proposed "partnership" discourse is a tactical approach to decouple India from the anti-China containment alliance or reflects a genuine intent for relationship normalization [1][4]. The core debate revolves around whether relationship improvement without fundamental resolution of border disputes can bring strategic benefits to India or will contribute to China's regional hegemony.

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

India-China Relations Rapprochement Attempts and India's Strategic Autonomy Dilemma

In-depth Issue Analysis: Analysis of Root Causes, Structural Context, and Historical Precedents

1. Analysis of the Root Causes of the Issue

The current tensions and rapprochement attempts in India-China relations are not merely diplomatic friction but a structural product of the clash between the shared geographical destiny and competitive national identities of these two civilizational states. The root causes can be understood at three levels.

The first level is the historical sin of unresolved border disputes. India and China have been engaged in territorial disputes for decades along the approximately 3,488 km Line of Actual Control (LAC), and the bloody clash in the Galwan Valley in 2020 clearly demonstrated that this latent conflict can erupt at any time. The Indian government's reiteration, even after the Jaishankar-Wang meeting, that "China is illegally occupying Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh" [7] serves as evidence that diplomatic relationship improvement is proceeding on a separate track from the substantive resolution of territorial issues. In other words, the current attempt at normalization is not about eliminating the root cause of the conflict, but rather a 'superficial thaw' that proceeds while sealing it.

The second level is the structural competition for hegemony in Asia. As China expands its influence into the Indian Ocean and South Asia through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India perceives this as a direct encroachment on its strategic backyard. In particular, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which India claims as its territory, posing a direct threat to India's security interests. Within this structural competition, China's repeated rhetoric of "partners, not rivals" [1] can be interpreted as a diplomatic intention to alleviate India's strategic vigilance and detach India from the US-led containment network.

The third level is the paradoxical coexistence of economic interdependence and strategic competition. India has a high degree of dependence on Chinese products, and is deeply integrated into Chinese supply chains, particularly in key industrial sectors such as pharmaceutical raw materials, electronic components, and solar panels. The criticism from some segments of the Indian business community that "India's confrontational approach towards China has excessively aligned with the US containment strategy rather than serving India's national interests" [4] reflects this economic reality. Ultimately, India is caught in a structural dilemma where it must contain China strategically while being unable to completely sever economic cooperation with China.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure

India's policy towards China is inextricably linked to the domestic political dynamics of the Modi government. Following the Galwan clash in 2020, as anti-China sentiment surged within India, the Modi government has leveraged a hardline stance against China as a domestic political asset. However, at the same time, the Modi government has adhered to the traditional Indian foreign policy principle of 'Strategic Autonomy,' refusing complete alignment with any major power bloc. The strong adherence of major Indian media outlets to the narrative of "Do not bow to China, nor depend on the US" [4] reflects this political sentiment.

Political calculations are also at play on the Chinese side. The Xi Jinping leadership considers it strategically crucial to decouple India from the Western bloc amidst increasing US pressure on China. Wang Yi's emphasis at his meeting with Jaishankar that "the two leaders' meetings in Kazan and Tianjin have guided China-India relations back to the right track" [1] is a typical pattern of Chinese diplomacy that uses the authority of the top leader as a basis for normalizing relations.

Economic Structure

Economically, India-China relations exhibit a structure of asymmetrical interdependence. India's trade deficit with China has accumulated over years, directly conflicting with the national goal of fostering India's manufacturing sector. India's strengthening of the 'Make in India' policy and its continued restrictions on Chinese investment are responses to this structural economic imbalance. However, paradoxically, India also faces the practical constraint of needing Chinese technology and capital for the advancement of its manufacturing sector.

Meanwhile, India is fully embarking on economic diversification by concluding FTAs and security agreements with the EU. These agreements aim to respond to the external shock of tariff pressure from the Trump administration while simultaneously reducing dependence on China and strengthening ties with Western economic blocs, pursuing a dual effect[2][5]. This demonstrates that India is actively employing a 'hedging' strategy in the economic sphere to diversify its reliance on specific great powers in order to secure economic autonomy.

Security Structure

In terms of security, India is deepening security cooperation with the United States, Japan, and Australia through the Quad framework, while maintaining a dual stance by refusing to elevate it to a formal military alliance. At the ASEAN meeting in Manila, India, along with its Quad partners, reaffirmed its support for a "free and open Indo-Pacific" and "ASEAN centrality"[10]. This clearly shows that while India is seeking to improve relations with China, it is not choosing to withdraw from the security network that checks China.

As such, India's security strategy is operated through a 'dual-track' structure that simultaneously pursues improved relations with China and participation in the security network that checks China. This is an implementation of strategic autonomy, but also a product of structural constraints that prevent a complete shift in either direction.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparison of Similar Cases

Historical precedents provide an important analytical framework for understanding the current phase of India-China relations. The most direct precedent is the process of restoring relations after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. After the war, relations between the two countries were severed for decades, and normalization began with the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988. At that time, the border issue remained unresolved, and economic and diplomatic relations were restored first within the framework of 'peaceful management.' The current attempt to redefine relations can be seen as a repetition of this pattern, implying that both countries share historical experiences of managing relations without resolving the border issue.

As a similar case, the process of restoring China-Australia relations is also worth noting. Sino-Australian relations, which reached their worst state in 2020-2021, have been gradually restored since 2022[13]. However, Australia has pursued a dual strategy of simultaneously restoring economic relations with China while maintaining the US-led AUKUS security cooperation framework. India's current actions are similar, unfolding in a way that manages bilateral relations with China while maintaining participation in the Quad.

Furthermore, the 'managed competition' pattern that repeatedly appears in US-China relations also warrants attention. The US and China have managed their relationship by setting guardrails to prevent strategic competition from escalating into overt confrontation[15]. The current phase of India-China relations is similarly converging towards a state of 'managed tension,' rather than complete cooperation or full confrontation.

However, the decisive difference that distinguishes India-China relations from US-China or China-Australia relations is that the two countries share a direct border, and the unresolved territorial dispute carries the constant physical risk of escalating into armed conflict. This is also the structural reason why India cannot afford to lower its military vigilance, even while maintaining the appearance of improved relations.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

The key variables that will determine the future development of India-China relations can be condensed into four main points.

First, changes in the military situation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). No matter how much diplomatic relations improve, any new conflict along the LAC could instantly nullify all diplomatic achievements. The Indian government's public reaffirmation of its protest against the illegal occupation of territory[7] concurrently with discussions on improving relations demonstrates that India itself recognizes the importance of this variable.

Second, the direction of the Trump administration's policy toward India. Amidst the complex pressures from the Trump administration, such as imposing tariffs on Indian steel and aluminum, revoking preferential trade status, and strengthening relations with Pakistan[4], the greater the skepticism about India's dependence on the US, the greater the incentive to improve relations with China. Paradoxically, this means that the US policy toward India is acting as a key variable in India-China relations.

Third, changes in India's domestic political landscape. Given that the Modi government has leveraged its tough stance on China as a domestic political asset, the speed and scope of improving relations will be constrained by the extent to which domestic public opinion is receptive. The strong calls from major Indian media outlets for maintaining strategic autonomy[4] reflect these domestic political constraints.

Fourth, the sincerity of China's strategic intentions toward India. Whether China will use the improvement of relations as an opportunity to build a genuine partnership or as a tactical means to detach India from the US-led anti-China network will determine the sustainability of the relationship. The agenda items discussed during the visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Misri to China, such as expanding political, academic, and people-to-people exchanges[12][14], and whether they can lead to substantive outcomes, will be a test case for gauging this variable.