Analysis of the NATO Ankara Summit: European Defense Autonomy and the Ripple Effects on the ROK-US Alliance

Executive Summary

Executive Summary of the NATO Ankara Summit

○ Structural Europeanization of NATO — Irreversible Transition Underway - All 32 member states achieve 2% of GDP defense spending target; Europe covers most of the US reduction. - "A Stronger Europe in a Stronger NATO" slogan officially adopted, formalizing European strategic autonomy. - The US reduction in NATO roles is not a personal inclination of Trump but a structural and irreversible transition.

○ Trump's Transactional Alliance Realignment — Direct Spillover Effects for South Korea Foreseen - The logic of "spending the most money without receiving any benefits" is expected to apply to the ROK-US alliance beyond NATO. - The precedent of NATO burden-sharing is highly likely to be used as a benchmark for ROK-US defense cost-sharing negotiations. - If European burden reduction is successful, the US will inevitably accelerate the redeployment of forces to the Indo-Pacific and increase pressure on South Korea.

○ President Lee Jae-myung's Participation in IP4 — A Strategic Testbed for Balanced Diplomacy - This marks the first NATO participation under the new autonomous diplomacy stance, signaling the ROK's commitment to the ROK-US alliance to the international community. - The level of participation aims to simultaneously manage ROK-US relations and maintain room for ROK-China relations. - A key task is to pre-coordinate pending issues in the ROK-US alliance through opportunities for bilateral contact with Trump.

○ Overall Risk Rating: Medium-High — Base Scenario Applied (55%) - Short-term: The adoption of a declaration maintains superficial cohesion, but internal fissures remain unhealed. - Medium-term: The weakening of NATO-IP4 linkages risks the materialization of a vacuum in South Korea's multilateral security network. - Long-term: South Korea's self-defense capabilities must be strengthened in preparation for accelerated US force concentration in Asia.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

Analysis of the NATO Ankara Summit Situation

— Strengthening European Defense Responsibility and a Testbed for Trump's Alliance Disruptions

1. Issue Background and Progress

○ Historical Context of NATO Defense Spending Disputes - The goal of 2% of GDP for defense spending was first officially established at the 2014 Wales Summit [3]. - The argument of free-riding by European allies has been continuously raised since the first Trump administration. - Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 accelerated pressure for increased European defense spending. - At the 2025 Hague Summit, an agreement was reached to raise the target to 5% of GDP by 2035 [3].

○ Increased Pressure on NATO by the Second Trump Administration - Trump has continuously criticized US support for NATO as 'one-sided' [17]. - In May 2025, the US decided to reduce the scale of military force commitments in the NATO Force Model [20]. - Trump expressed strong dissatisfaction with European allies restricting the use of US bases in relation to the Iran conflict [17]. - Trump posted on Truth Social: "America spends the most money on NATO with no benefits" [15].

○ Background of the Ankara Summit - The summit was held in Türkiye for the first time in 21 years since the 2004 Istanbul Summit [8]. - The 36th NATO Summit was held in Ankara on July 7-8 [8]. - President Erdoğan is using this as an opportunity to showcase Türkiye's influence in a changing world order [8].

2. Current Situation (Latest Trends)

○ Achievement of Defense Spending Target — A Historic Milestone - For the first time, all 32 member states simultaneously achieved the defense spending target of 2% of GDP as of 2025 [3]. - Defense spending by European countries and Canada increased by $90 billion compared to the previous year [7]. - However, the target itself has been raised to 5%, highlighting challenges rather than a sense of accomplishment [3].

○ Substitution for US Gap in Europe — Largely Successful - NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Greenkewich stated: "European allies have covered most of the US reduction" [20]. - The remaining gap is concentrated in strategic bomber capabilities, where Europe lacks independent replacement capacity [14]. - Alternatives for the remaining gap, such as 'matching effects,' are under consideration [20].

○ Key Contents of the Summit Declaration (Pre-approved at Ambassadorial Level) - Reaffirmed the 'ironclad commitment' to collective defense under Article 5 [1][2]. - Designated Russia as a 'long-term threat' to Euro-Atlantic security [6]. - Pledged €70 billion in military aid to Ukraine for 2026, maintaining the same level in 2027 [1][12]. - Included a strong message towards Iran [6]. - Adopted the slogan "A Stronger Europe in a Stronger NATO" [10].

○ Defense Production Capacity — A New Bottleneck - Despite increased defense spending, the actual pace of weapons production is not keeping up with budget execution [7]. - Secretary General Stoltenberg stated: "Missiles and tanks cannot be stopped with dollars or euros" [7]. - Hundreds of billions of dollars in defense contracts are expected to be signed at the summit [4].

○ Indo-Pacific Agenda — Pushed to a Lower Priority - The Ukraine and Iran conflicts and defense spending issues dominated the agenda [5]. - Discussions on cooperation with Indo-Pacific partner countries (IP4) are expected to be relatively limited [5]. - Despite warnings from Secretary General Stoltenberg about the China-Russia linkage, the discussion's focus remains limited [5].

3. Key Actors and Positions/Interests

○ United States (Trump Administration) - Core Position: Criticizes the lack of reciprocity in NATO support, demands burden-sharing. - Interests: - Confirmation of European allies' commitment to achieving 5% defense spending [18]. - Securing European military cooperation related to the Iran conflict. - Maintaining a narrative of "America First" for domestic political purposes. - Actions: Reducing contributions to the NATO Force Model, continuing public criticism of the alliance [15][17].

○ European Allies (Germany, France, UK, etc.) - Core Position: Restoring trust through increased defense spending, minimizing friction with Trump. - Interests: - Securing the continuation of US security commitments. - The need for US participation to sustain support for Ukraine. - Simultaneously strengthening strategic autonomy and reducing dependence on the US. - Actions: Covering most of the US reduction, expanding defense contracts [4][14].

○ United Kingdom (Prime Minister Starmer) - Core Position: Emphasizing the maintenance of NATO cohesion, leading support for Ukraine. - Interests: Securing European security leadership post-Brexit. - Risks: Potential for public confrontation with Trump — concerns about exposing alliance fissures [11].

○ Türkiye (President Erdoğan) - Core Position: Assuming the role of mediator and facilitator as the host country. - Interests: - Enhancing strategic position within NATO - Maintaining balanced diplomacy with both Russia and the West - Asserting Turkey's influence in a changing world order [8]

○ NATO Secretary General (Mark Rutte) - Core Stance: Pragmatic mediation to maintain alliance cohesion - Actions: - Employing a strategy of actively praising European allies during Trump's visits [13] - Setting defense industry production capacity enhancement as a key agenda item [7][11] - Continuously warning of the threat posed by the China-Russia linkage

○ Ukraine - Interests: Securing a commitment of 70 billion euros in military aid and ensuring its continuity [1] - Risks: Exposure of the limitations of European support alone if U.S. willingness to provide support weakens

4. Summary of Key Issues

○ Issue 1: U.S. Commitment to NATO's Future - Discrepancy between Trump's public criticism and the reaffirmation of Article 5 in the declaration [1][17] - Credibility issues between rhetoric and actions (reduction of the Force Model) - Gap in core U.S. capabilities such as strategic bombers—Europe's inability to compensate independently [14]

○ Issue 2: Substantive Implementation of Defense Spending Targets - Achieving 2% is a historical milestone, but the target has already been raised to 5% [3] - Budget increase → Challenge of resolving defense industry production bottlenecks until actual force deployment [7] - Verification of the specificity and credibility of the roadmap for fulfilling Trump's demand for 5%

○ Issue 3: Sustainability of Support for Ukraine - Unclear U.S. participation and burden-sharing structure for the 70 billion euro commitment [12] - Issue of the binding nature of 'equivalent level' support after 2027 - Potential conflict between Trump's willingness to mediate negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and his support commitments

○ Issue 4: Iran War and Alliance Fractures - Restrictions on European use of U.S. bases → Deepening Trump's distrust of the alliance [17] - Risk of the Iran issue overshadowing the Ukraine and defense spending agendas [9] - Potential for divergence on Middle East policy to spill over into damage to U.S.-European strategic trust

○ Issue 5: Indo-Pacific Linkage and the Role of IP4 - Indo-Pacific agenda relegated to a lower priority despite deepening China-Russia alliance [5] - Incomplete establishment of institutional status for IP4 (South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) participation - Narrowing space for discussions on Asian security linkages amidst a Europe-centric agenda

--- Analysis Date: Early July 2025 / Main Sources: Reuters, WSJ, DW, SCMP, Daily Sabah, Yonhap, etc.

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

In-depth Analysis of the NATO Ankara Summit

— Root Causes, Structural Context, Historical Precedents, Key Variables

1. Analysis of Root Causes

○ Redefinition of U.S. Strategic Interests — From 'Europe First' to 'America First'

- Post-Cold War U.S. commitment to European security was based on the clear strategic objective of containing the Soviet Union. - After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO's raison d'être became ambiguous, leading to latent 'free-rider' sentiments within the U.S. - Trump's second term explicitly prioritizes a new strategy focused on countering China and the Indo-Pacific. - A shift in perception viewing European defense not as a core U.S. national interest but as a 'service provided' [15][17]. - Restrictions on European use of U.S. bases during the Iran war → Reinforced perception of a lack of alliance reciprocity [17].

○ Structural Accumulation of Burden Imbalance within NATO

- Post-Cold War European nations enjoyed a 'peace dividend' — continuous reduction in defense spending. - Prior to 2014, only a few member states met the 2% GDP target. - The U.S. bears approximately 70% of NATO's total defense spending — solidifying structural asymmetry. - Contraction of Europe's defense industrial base leads to insufficient production capacity despite budget increases [7]. - While all 32 member states achieving 2% (by 2025) is historic, the target has already been raised to 5% [3].

○ Trump's Transactional View of Alliances — Ideological Root Cause

- Trump perceives alliances not as a public good for security but as a 'cost-benefit transaction'. - Statement "spending the most money for no benefit" negates the strategic value of alliances [15]. - Frames NATO not as a collective security system but as an 'insurance service provided by the U.S.'. - This reflects not just personal inclination but the resurgence of isolationist traditions within the U.S.

○ Russia's Invasion of Ukraine — Asymmetry in Threat Perception

- The 2022 invasion sharply increased threat perception in Europe, providing momentum for increased defense spending. - In contrast, the U.S. has a relatively lower sense of urgency regarding the threat due to geographical distance. - Europe views support for Ukraine as an investment in its own security, while the U.S. views it as a cost. - This asymmetry in threat perception is the fundamental cause of strategic goal misalignment within the alliance.

2. Structural Context

○ Political Structure

- U.S. Domestic Political Structure - Strengthening of isolationist forces within the Republican Party — providing a political base for Trump's skepticism towards NATO. - Continued pressure in Congress to cut NATO funding — linked to executive policy. - Incentive to strengthen the 'America First' foreign policy agenda ahead of the 2026 midterm elections.

- European Political Structure - Rise of right-wing populism in key countries like Germany, France, and the UK → domestic resistance to increased defense spending. - Potential public clashes between UK Prime Minister Starmer and Trump — signaling a rift in the special Anglo-American relationship [11]. - Emphasis on Erdoğan's role as mediator for Turkey — maintaining dialogue channels with both Russia and Ukraine [8]. - Orban's pro-Russian stance in Hungary — a factor in NATO's internal cohesion fractures.

- NATO Institutional Structure - Secretary General Rutte's 'praise diplomacy' — a strategy to maintain the alliance by appeasing Trump [13]. - Unanimity-based decision-making structure → potential for paralysis of the alliance due to a single member's veto power. - Finalization of declaration content through ambassador-level pre-agreement — enhancing the political performance aspect of the summit itself [1].

○ Economic Structure

- Economic Burden of Increased Defense Spending - In the context of fiscal deficits in major European countries, the 5% GDP target conflicts with social welfare budgets. - Germany's discussion of amending the constitutional debt brake (Schuldenbremse) — structural change to enable increased defense spending. - Potential for increased defense spending to lead to inflationary pressures and rising interest rates.

- Bottlenecks in Defense Industry Structure - Decades of contraction in Europe's defense industrial base → budget execution speed > production capacity [7]. - Independent production of highly strategic assets like strategic bombers is impossible in the short term [14]. - U.S. defense companies are the biggest beneficiaries of increased NATO demand — motivating Trump's emphasis on defense contracts [4]. - Scheduled defense contracts worth tens of billions of dollars → using economic interests to foster alliance cohesion [4].

- Financial Structure of Ukraine Support - Commitment of 70 billion euros in military aid by 2026 — primarily from Europe and Canada, excluding the U.S. [1][12]. - Reduced direct U.S. support for Ukraine → solidification of a structure that shifts the financial burden to Europe. - Long-term support sustainability depends on budget approvals by the parliaments of individual European countries, thus inherently uncertain.

○ Security Structure

- Issue of NATO Force Model Gaps - Reduction in the U.S. NATO Force Model commitment (May 2025) → Europe to cover most of it [14][20]. - Remaining gaps in strategic bomber capabilities — a core strategic asset directly linked to nuclear deterrence [14]. - While conventional capabilities in Europe have improved, reliance on the U.S. for nuclear deterrence remains absolute.

- Vulnerabilities in the Extended Deterrence Structure - Uncertainty of Trump's NATO Pledge → Concerns over Undermining Credibility of Article 5 - Discussion of Independent European Nuclear Deterrence Emerges — Consideration of Expanding French Nuclear Umbrella - Russia's Designation of 'Long-Term Threat' [6] — Recognition of Structural Hostility Rather Than Short-Term Crisis

- Indo-Pacific Linkage Structure - China's Support for Russia → Increased Need for NATO to Counter China - However, Ukraine/Iran Crises Push Indo-Pacific Agenda Down Priority List [5] - Concerns over Reduced Cooperation Agenda with IP4 (South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) [5]

3. Comparative Analysis of Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

○ The 1956 Suez Crisis — A Precedent of US Alliance Departure

- The US opposed the UK and French military intervention in Egypt, forcing their withdrawal through pressure on allies - The first explicit instance of the US prioritizing its own interests over alliance cohesion - Comparison with the Present: Trump's pressure on NATO is a repetition of the pattern of the US using alliances instrumentally - Difference: Suez aimed to strengthen discipline within the alliance, whereas the current situation questions the value of the alliance itself

○ De Gaulle's 1966 Withdrawal from NATO's Military Structure — Pursuit of Autonomy within the Alliance

- France withdrew from the US-led NATO military command structure — Development of independent nuclear deterrence - An attempt to secure military independence while maintaining political participation in the alliance - Comparison with the Present: The discussion of 'strategic autonomy' in Europe is a modern rendition of Gaullism - Difference: 1966 involved the withdrawal of a single nation, whereas the current situation involves the pursuit of collective autonomy by Europe as a whole

○ The 1970s Nixon Doctrine — Shifting Defense Responsibilities to Allies

- Following the lessons of the Vietnam War, the principle was declared that allies should bear responsibility for their conventional defense - The US nuclear umbrella would be maintained, but conventional force support would be reduced - Comparison with the Present: Trump's reduction of the NATO Force Model is the European application of the Nixon Doctrine - Similarities: Pressure on allies to increase defense spending + Reduction of direct US involvement - Differences: The Nixon Doctrine presupposed the maintenance of alliances, while Trump questions the value of the alliance itself

○ Reagan's 1980s Defense Spending Pressure — A Successful Precedent

- Reagan strongly urged European allies to increase defense spending — Persuaded them by citing the Soviet threat - This ultimately led to increased European defense spending and strengthened NATO cohesion - Comparison with the Present: Aspects where Trump's pressure led to increased European defense spending (all reaching 2% by 2025) [3] - Difference: Reagan shared a common goal in the Soviet threat, whereas Trump lacks a shared perception of common threats

○ The 2003 Iraq War — A Precedent of NATO Division

- France and Germany opposed the US invasion of Iraq → Division between 'Old Europe' and 'New Europe' - Defense Secretary Rumsfeld's 'Old Europe' remark — Public rift within the alliance - Comparison with the Present: Restrictions on US military base usage in Europe related to the Iran conflict [17] — Similar pattern of division - Similarities: European allies' non-participation in US-led military actions → Strong US dissatisfaction - Differences: In 2003, the US bypassed NATO; currently, Trump is pressuring NATO itself

○ The 2014 Wales Summit — Institutionalization of the 2% GDP Target

- Following Russia's annexation of Crimea, an official target for increased defense spending was set - Only a few countries met the target at the time — All countries met it 11 years later [3] - Comparison with the Present: Meeting the target has become not a sign of alliance cohesion but a starting point for new pressure (5% target) - A pattern of meeting a target and immediately raising it has become entrenched

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

○ [Variable 1] The Level of Trump's Summit Remarks — The Most Immediate Variable

- If Trump publicly denies NATO commitments at the summit, it will critically damage alliance credibility - The reality of a public clash with UK Prime Minister Starmer [11] — A signal of a rift in the special US-UK relationship - Refusal or reservation of signature on the declaration would be an unprecedented event in NATO history - Trump's psychological need for 'praise' is the key factor determining the level of his remarks [13]

○ [Variable 2] Solutions for Strategic Bomber Gaps — The Core of Nuclear Deterrence

- Whether Europe can secure alternative capabilities to fill the strategic bomber gap [14][20] - The possibility of integrating French nuclear forces into NATO — The biggest strategic shift since De Gaulle - If the gap is not resolved, the possibility of Russian miscalculation increases → Weakened deterrence

○ [Variable 3] Progress in Ukraine Peace Negotiations — A Test of Alliance Cohesion

- Internal divisions if Trump-led Ukraine negotiations conflict with NATO's support commitments - The 70 billion Euro pledge [1][12] requires parliamentary approval in each country for actual implementation — A political variable - Increased pressure for further European support versus fatigue if the situation in Ukraine worsens

○ [Variable 4] Speed of European Defense Industry Production Capacity Expansion — Mid-Term Key Variable

- The time lag problem in translating budget increases into actual force deployment [7] - The speed of expansion of defense industry production lines in Europe — Whether visible results can be achieved within 2-5 years - If reliance on US defense companies deepens, Trump's economic leverage will increase

○ [Variable 5] Turkey's Role as Mediator — A Geopolitical Wildcard

- Erdogan maintaining dialogue channels with both Russia and Ukraine [8] — Independent actions within NATO - Turkey's possession of the S-400 and economic cooperation with Russia — Factors weakening NATO cohesion - An attempt to enhance Turkey's status by hosting the summit — Aiming to increase negotiation power within the alliance

○ [Variable 6] The Level of China's Support for Russia — Variable Determining NATO's Strategic Direction

- If China expands its military and economic support for Russia, the issue of NATO countering China will emerge - Strategic choice between strengthening IP4 cooperation vs. focusing on the European crisis [5] - The China variable increases the necessity for cooperation with NATO for Indo-Pacific partners like South Korea

> Overall Assessment: The Ankara Summit carries the character of a historical inflection point where NATO transitions from a 'US-led collective security system' to a 'Europe-led autonomous defense system.' Trump's pressure is paradoxically acting as a catalyst accelerating Europe's defense self-reliance, but structural limitations, such as reliance on the US for core strategic assets like strategic bombers and nuclear deterrence, remain insurmountable in the short term.