[Special Commentary on the US-Iran War] ④ The Iran War: The Rise of Space Intelligence Warfare and Military-Industrial Complex 2.0

Advanced Warfare vs. Cost-Effective Warfare

The Iran War showcased the cutting edge of 21st-century warfare without filters. In the early stages of the war, the United States concentrated on neutralizing Iran's air defense and naval capabilities by mobilizing advanced weaponry. Having achieved its initial military objectives, the U.S. assessed that Iran would find it difficult to blockade the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's high dependence on the Strait of Hormuz supported this assessment. The U.S. anticipated that the economic blow would be greater for Iran itself than for any other party, and that a blockade would, in fact, threaten the survival of the Iranian leadership.

It was impossible for Iran to counter the U.S.'s all-out offensive. However, Iran demonstrated a greater resilience than expected. Despite being at an absolute disadvantage in terms of economic power, Iran focused on striking U.S. strategic assets rather than engaging in large-scale airstrikes. Iran's alternative was an asymmetric strategy of selectively targeting high-value U.S. strategic assets. Over approximately 40 days following the start of the war, Iran launched about 6,400 missiles and drones. Although most were intercepted, some successfully penetrated air defenses and struck high-value radar facilities located in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. This demonstrated the effectiveness of Iran's asymmetric capabilities through missiles and drones.

Iran's strategy proved to be exceptionally cost-effective. The United States expended a significant portion of its weapons inventory to thwart Iran's attacks. The depletion rates for specific weapons reached 25% for JASSM, 32% for Tomahawk, and 61% for Patriot. The unit cost of these weapons ranges from $2.6 million to $3.9 million. In contrast, the drones used in these attacks cost only $20,000 to $50,000 per unit. Furthermore, in the first quarter of 2026 alone, the U.S. approved $45 billion in Foreign Military Sales (FMS). This was because Saudi Arabia and other nations, having depleted their weapon stocks due to Iranian attacks, requested $9 billion in arms sales from the U.S., including Patriot PAC-3. This is the outcome of an asymmetric strategy.

The Transparent Battlefield

A new point of attention in the Iran War is the close integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) with military operations. The Iran War is unique in three aspects. First, ISR was utilized extensively. ISR was employed in almost all U.S. operations, including intelligence gathering, B-2 airstrikes on nuclear facilities, neutralization of air defenses, and maritime blockade. As of February 28, 2026, the integrated commercial satellite constellation reduced the re-imaging cycle for Iran's nuclear and defense infrastructure to hourly intervals. This brought about a fundamental change in the relationship between the speed of conflict progression and the availability of imagery compared to any past operation. Consequently, within 96 hours of the operation's commencement, the U.S. executed various space-based operations, including GPS jamming, electronic warfare countermeasures, and expanded collection of commercial satellite imagery.

21st-century warfare is no longer carpet bombing warfare where ammunition was used without limit. Warfare begins with the collection of high-resolution, high-speed imagery of the adversary's key military facilities before direct engagement. The core of 21st-century advanced warfare lies in the rapid analysis of collected data through AI to determine strike priorities and execute precision strikes. It can be said that ISR capabilities against an adversary may even determine the outcome of a war before it begins. This is why 21st-century advanced warfare is referred to as a 'glass battlefield.' The integration of ISR-based advanced warfare is generally observed as an irreversible change.

Democratization and Commercialization of ISR

Second, the 'democratization of ISR' based in space has become a reality. It has been confirmed on the battlefield that ISR capabilities utilizing space assets are no longer the exclusive domain of superpowers like the United States. As demonstrated by Iran and Ukraine, ISR capabilities have become strategic assets that can be accessed relatively easily, even by non-superpowers. ISR capabilities play a crucial role in overcoming, to some extent, the disparity in conventional weaponry as well as advanced military capabilities.

Third, the democratization of ISR has been made possible by the active utilization of enhanced technologies from commercial satellite and service providers. Outer space is a complex domain where militarization and commercialization are progressing simultaneously. As vividly demonstrated by the case of SpaceX in the United States, the U.S. is making every effort to maintain its lead in the space industry and rapidly convert it into space military capabilities. This is no exception for ISR. Satellite service providers are moving away from their past business strategies of primarily targeting the niche market of commercial remote sensing with their high-resolution, high-speed imaging capabilities, and are pursuing a change by providing ISR-based data to belligerents.

The Other Side of the Iran War: China's ISR Support

The democratization of ISR is not solely achieved through Iran's direct expansion of accessibility. Behind Iran's asymmetric attacks, China's support is increasingly being revealed. From China's perspective, the Russia-Ukraine War provided an opportunity to indirectly gather information related to the war, particularly about U.S. advanced weapon capabilities such as Patriot missile systems and F-16 fighter jets.

For China, the U.S.-Iran War was a battlefield where it could directly acquire, and even test, information on the U.S.'s advanced warfare capabilities. In particular, this war presented a golden opportunity to obtain real-world battlefield intelligence on the U.S.'s detection-tracking-interception capabilities for missiles and drones. This is another reason for China's active engagement in cooperation with Iran. Based on satellite imagery and geospatial information provided by China, Iran was able to identify U.S. key assets relatively quickly and accurately, which was also used to prioritize targets. This information was the last resort for Iran, which was at an absolute disadvantage in military power, to sustain the war.

It has been revealed that the Chinese satellite imagery company MizarVision provided Iran with images analyzing U.S. military deployments before the war began. This company, formerly known as Meentropy Technology, is an open-source intelligence (OSINT) startup. Meentropy Technology analyzed data collected from commercial satellites to provide Iran with observational intelligence on U.S. military movements. The Trump administration imposed sanctions on three Chinese satellite companies, including Meentropy Technology, Earth Eye, and Chang Guang Satellite Technology, in May 2026.

While the U.S. government's sanctions were an expected measure, China's reaction, which had largely refrained from escalation, was somewhat surprising. Less than a month after the sanctions were announced, in June 2026, Chang Guang Satellite Technology released high-resolution satellite photos of the headquarters of Nvidia and Apple, symbols of the U.S. advanced industry. These photos were of such high resolution that they could capture not only the exteriors of Nvidia and Apple but also the status of construction sites. Given that Chang Guang Satellite Technology is assessed to be linked to the People's Liberation Army, there may be controversy regarding whether it is purely a civilian company. Considering that the Jilin-1 satellite, which took these photos, is itself a commercial remote sensing satellite constellation, China's intention to showcase its reconnaissance capabilities against key facilities of adversary nations by mobilizing commercial satellites of civilian satellite companies can be inferred.

This is not the first time Chinese satellite information has been used militarily. Starting with a Chinese company providing satellite imagery to the Russian mercenary group Wagner in the Russia-Ukraine War in November 2022, it has also been reported to have provided satellite information to the Houthi militia. After a satellite owned by Mino Technology, transferred to Russian ownership in 2024, was used to reconnoiter Ukraine, the UK sanctioned Mino Technology in February 2026, citing its destabilizing effect on Ukraine. As indirect military cooperation through satellite reconnaissance has sharply increased in recent years, China has come to be known by the nickname 'space mercenary'.

ISR Innovation

A similar phenomenon occurred in ISR. U.S. companies leading the commercial geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) market, such as Maxar Technologies and Planet Labs, began to be actively utilized by the U.S. government for battlefield observation. Maxar Technologies and Planet Labs play complementary roles in integrating ISR into military operations. While Maxar Technologies provides 90% of the GEOINT used by the U.S. government as foundational national security data, Planet Labs, operating hundreds of small satellites, images the entire Earth daily. By combining Maxar Technologies' high-resolution data with Planet Labs' global observation data, the U.S. government can drastically reduce the time required for collecting and analyzing military data, such as identifying military equipment, analyzing strike damage, and tracking troop movements. The U.S. demonstrated its ability to make the decision that Russia was increasing its military strength through Maxar Technologies' ISR data even before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War.

The Emergence of Military-Industrial Complex 2.0: 'Faster, Cheaper, More'

ISR innovation was further enhanced by the military integration of AI. In May 2021, the Israel-Hamas War became known as the world's first 'AI War' as Israel integrated AI into target identification and weapon system operation in its military operations. The background to Israel's ability to integrate AI technology into its military operations was the result of its efforts to pursue cooperation with private companies, including its own AI startups as well as U.S. big techs such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft.

The Iran War starkly demonstrated that intelligence fusion, combining human intelligence (HUMINT), ISR, and AI, has emerged as the dominant factor in warfare. The U.S.'s acquisition of formidable military capabilities was also the result of organically integrating the capabilities of emerging tech companies like Palantir. Palantir's 'Maven Smart System' drastically reduced the decision-making time from the creation of target lists to the determination of strike priorities by integrating large volumes of battlefield data collected from satellites and drones onto a single platform. As a result, it took only 24 hours to strike 1,000 targets within Iran during the execution of Operation Epic Fury.

Neo primes such as Palantir, SpaceX, and Anduril are harbingers of the transformation of the military-industrial complex. Having thoroughly experienced the effectiveness of Iran's cost-effective warfare, the Trump administration accelerated the reorganization of the traditional military-industrial complex centered around big primes. The big primes were preoccupied with replenishing depleted inventories, leading to President Trump's dissatisfaction. This created an opening for the neo primes. They championed a new defense paradigm symbolized by 'faster, cheaper, more,' and actively adopted innovative methods in weapons development. The core of this was the rapid conversion of commercial technologies into military applications. This marks the emergence of Military-Industrial Complex 2.0.

South Korea's Response

(1) Transition to a New Defense Paradigm

Nations that have witnessed the nature of advanced warfare are increasingly engaging in competition for the military integration of advanced technologies. This is particularly evident in Middle Eastern countries that have experienced war. Even Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, urged that 'AI must be conquered,' highlighting the critical importance of integrating advanced technologies militarily. The UAE's acquisition of a 30% stake in the Israeli AI drone detection company Thirdeye Systems through its state-owned defense company EDGE, and its joint venture with U.S. Anduril to co-produce AI-enhanced drones, is a prime example. Turkey, a strong player in drones, is also intensely focused on developing drones equipped with AI image processing software, centered around STM and Baykar Defense. As the competition for the integration of advanced technologies intensifies, South Korea needs to rapidly pursue a transition to a new defense paradigm. The core of this strategy is a dual approach that strengthens cooperation with leading neo primes while enhancing indigenous innovation capabilities in traditional defense.

(2) Preparing for the Militarization and Commercialization of ISR

The advantage, and also the disadvantage, of commercial applications is their high degree of sharing and accessibility. Commercial satellite imagery provided by private companies offers the advantage of sharing information within the government as well as with allies and partners, without revealing the source or collection methods. This facilitates military cooperation and, furthermore, joint operations with allies. On the other hand, ISR provided by private companies through paid services carries the critical risk of unlimited access. Accelerating this trend are platforms that enhance satellite imagery and analysis. SkyFi, which includes over 50 satellite service providers such as Vantor, Planet Labs, Satellogic, Umbra, and ICEYE, is a prime example. SkyFi does not own its own satellites but operates a platform that integrates the diverse services of satellite service providers. Users of this service can combine and use imagery and analysis from various companies as needed. This significantly enhances the convenience of satellite imagery services while also presenting side effects due to the dramatically increased accessibility. It is not impossible for hostile nations or non-governmental organizations like Iran to access this data. As the commercialization of space accelerates, there is a need to prepare for the new phenomenon of the militarization of ISR in the military domain.

(3) Establishing New Boundaries Between State and Private Sector

While the military utilization of ISR is indeed rapidly increasing, there are still barriers to overcome. Commercial imagery itself is not military intelligence. For satellite imagery to have military value, the ability to analyze it based on GEOINT and combine it with classified military information is essential. However, existing fragmented governance often hinders the collection, analysis, and utilization of new types of information. First, there are delays in the military adoption of commercial services. Furthermore, while there is general consensus on the need to actively integrate satellite information provided by private companies, delays often occur in establishing practical implementation plans.

To resolve these issues, fundamental efforts to redefine the boundaries between government and corporations must precede. As the utilization of commercial technologies or services expands, cases where the boundaries between public and private become blurred frequently occur. The fact that Maxar provides 90% of GEOINT to the U.S. military, as mentioned above, is a prime example of blurring the lines between government and corporations. This is because Maxar's facilities and equipment mobilized for ISR can be considered essential national infrastructure. To more actively utilize private commercial technologies and services, it is necessary to establish elastic yet clear boundaries between the state and these entities. ■

■ Seungjoo Lee_Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Chung-Ang University.

■ Responsible Editor: Lee Sangjun_EAI Research Fellow
Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 211) | leesj@eai.or.kr