Analysis of China's Nuclear Triad Completion and Indo-Pacific A2/AD Strategy Trends

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

China is crossing the strategic threshold of completing its nuclear triad, following the July 2025 test launch of an SLBM from a nuclear-powered submarine towards the South Pacific, after its land-based ICBM tests in 2024. This is assessed as a consistent implementation of its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy aimed at neutralizing the US-led alliance network, alongside maritime pressure in the South China Sea, attempts to control sea lanes east of Taiwan, and joint exercises with Russia. The SLBM test, deliberately timed to coincide with the Australian Prime Minister's security treaty signing with Pacific island nations, serves a dual function: it is a geopolitical signal beyond a mere military technology demonstration, and a domestic political message to foster nationalistic cohesion amidst mounting internal pressures from economic slowdown and the real estate crisis. The most probable scenario (approximately 55%) is a continuation of 'managed tension,' characterized by China's sustained military assertiveness and the gradual strengthening of regional alliance networks. In this context, a simplistic approach focusing solely on deterrence enhancement or diplomatic engagement carries strategic risks. Therefore, regional actors, including South Korea, must adopt a dual-track strategy as their core response. This involves consolidating deterrence posture through multi-layered strengthening of alliance networks and the expansion of independent strategic assets, while simultaneously maintaining dialogue channels for military transparency and confidence-building measures, by leveraging the diplomatic space China itself defines as 'annual and legal exercises'.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

Analysis of China's Latest Military Strategy Trends and Indo-Pacific Military Activities — Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Progression of the Issue

China's military activities in the Indo-Pacific are entering a new phase. Following the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Pacific high seas in 2024, the first in decades, China further escalated regional tensions on July 6, 2025, by test-firing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from a nuclear-powered submarine towards the South Pacific [6]. This SLBM test, following land-based ICBM tests, demonstrates the operational capability of its sea-based nuclear forces and symbolizes China's strategic progress towards completing its nuclear triad [7].

This movement is not an isolated incident but an extension of China's ongoing military modernization strategy. China has intensified maritime pressure against the Philippines and Japan in the South China Sea, which is closely linked to its ultimate goal of unifying Taiwan [4]. Attempts to control maritime traffic in the waters east of Taiwan, the normalization of gray zone provocations, and this recent SLBM test launch should all be understood within a consistent strategic context [9].

2. Current Situation (Latest Trends)

The SLBM test launch conducted on July 6, 2025, was disclosed by Chinese state media, and the missile was confirmed to have landed in the international waters of the South Pacific [10]. According to Japanese media reports, the impact zone was outside Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) [19], though the United States reportedly tracked space debris trajectories from Japan to the central Pacific [11]. Notably, the missile was analyzed to have landed in waters near the EEZ of Tuvalu, an ally of Taiwan, further highlighting its character as a geopolitical message [11].

China maintains that this exercise is an annual drill compliant with international law, that relevant parties were notified in advance, and that it was not aimed at any specific country [13]. However, the timing of the test launch coinciding with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's visit to Fiji to sign a security and defense treaty cannot be dismissed as a mere coincidence [3][12]. Meanwhile, China and Russia showcased deepening military cooperation by conducting joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea, including submarine rescue drills [8].

In response to this pressure, Taiwan is scheduled to conduct its first-ever 'Joint Defense Mobilization Exercise' from July 13 to 17. This exercise simulates scenarios from detecting enemy troop departures to their entry into territorial waters and focuses on decentralizing command structures [5].

3. Key Actors and Their Positions/Interests

Chinadefines this SLBM test as an annual and legal exercise, countering that NATO and the US are exaggerating it to justify their involvement in the Asia-Pacific and promote bloc confrontation [13]. China's strategic objective is to enhance its nuclear deterrence against the United States by completing its nuclear triad, while simultaneously sowing doubt among regional allies about the credibility of US extended deterrence [7].

United Stateshas expressed strong concerns over the expansion of China's nuclear program and is responding by strengthening security cooperation with its allies [16]. However, recent signs of change in the US's strategic engagement in the region, such as the renaming of the US Indo-Pacific Command back to 'Pacific Command,' have raised fundamental questions among allies about their ability to deter China without US support [2].

Australia and New Zealandstrongly criticized this test launch for destabilizing regional security. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong publicly condemned China's actions as destabilizing regional security [10], and Australia is accelerating the signing of security treaties with Pacific island nations [3]. This reflects Australia's strategic intent to counter China's expanding influence in the Pacific region.

Pacific Island Nationsstrongly protested that China's missile test violated the norms of the South Pacific, designated as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), sending a message to 'respect our seas' [14][20]. The 'Pacific Elders Voice,' a group of former Pacific leaders, warned that geopolitical competition threatens Pacific regionalism and the sovereignty of island nations [17][18].

Japan and the Philippinesare countries that China perceives as potential obstacles to Taiwan's unification, and they are subject to concentrated maritime pressure from China [4]. Both countries are strengthening security cooperation with the United States and support NATO's expanded engagement in the Asia-Pacific. However, China strongly opposes this, characterizing it as an attempt to undermine regional peace and stability [13].

IndiaPrime Minister Narendra Modi is actively strengthening Indo-Pacific partnerships, visiting Indonesia the day after China's missile test to sign a series of security, energy, and critical minerals agreements, including the sale of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles [15]. This is interpreted as India's move to expand its strategic influence by capitalizing on the uncertainty of US engagement in the region.

4. Summary of Key Issues

The first key issue in this situation is China's completion of its nuclear triad and the qualitative change in strategic deterrence. With the successful SLBM test following land-based ICBMs, China has more reliably demonstrated its capability to strike the US mainland, heralding a fundamental shift in the US-China nuclear balance [6][7].

The second issue is the political message conveyed by the timing and location of the test launch. The coincidence in timing with the Australia-Fiji security treaty signing and the impact zone near the EEZ of Taiwan's ally Tuvalu suggest that this test goes beyond a mere technical verification, conveying a clear strategic signal to regional actors [11][12].

The third issue is the credibility of US engagement in the region and the gap in allied deterrence posture. The US's strategic readjustment, exemplified by the renaming of the US Indo-Pacific Command, compels regional allies to recognize the necessity of developing independent deterrence capabilities [2]. This is creating structural pressure for regional countries, including South Korea, to consider increasing defense spending and deepening security cooperation [7].

The fourth issue is the erosion of the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone norm. The strong backlash from Pacific island nations, stemming from the fact that China's missile impact zone falls within the South Pacific NWFZ, is expected to pose a significant burden on China's Pacific diplomacy [20].

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

Analysis of China's Latest Military Strategy Trends and Indo-Pacific Military Activities — In-depth Issue Analysis

1. Analysis of Fundamental Causes of the Issue

While China's intensified military activities in the Indo-Pacific may appear as isolated exercises or provocations on the surface, they are rooted in complex and structural causes. The most critical driver is China's perceived strategic vulnerability, namely the gap in its sea-based nuclear deterrence compared to the superior US nuclear forces. China has long maintained a land-based ICBM-centric nuclear arsenal, but this inherently carries a structural weakness of being vulnerable to preemptive strikes. The SLBM test launch aims to address this vulnerability and secure a second-strike capability that can survive a US preemptive strike [7]. The completion of the nuclear triad is not merely a technological advancement but is directly linked to China's long-term national objective of reshaping the strategic balance with the United States.

A second fundamental cause is the escalating strategic urgency surrounding the Taiwan issue. China perceives the Philippines and Japan as potential obstacles to Taiwan's unification and has continuously intensified maritime pressure against these two nations in the South China Sea [4]. This is interpreted not merely as a territorial dispute but as an attempt to preemptively block pathways for the US-led alliance network to intervene in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Attempts to control maritime traffic east of Taiwan can also be understood in the same context [9], representing the practical implementation of the A2/AD strategy to deny US access during a conflict.

A third cause is the connection to China's domestic political context. The Xi Jinping leadership has centered its legitimacy on the narrative of the 'great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,' and a hardline military stance serves as a crucial tool to support this narrative. Amidst mounting internal pressures from economic slowdown and the real estate crisis, assertive external actions serve to rally nationalistic public opinion and bolster the Party's ruling legitimacy. Therefore, this SLBM test launch performs a dual function: an external deterrence signal and an internal cohesion message.

2. Structural Context

Security Context

From a security perspective, this incident is occurring within the macro-structural context of intensifying US-China strategic competition. While the US institutionalized its strategic presence in the region by establishing INDOPACOM in 2018, recent strategic adjustments, such as renaming it back to PACOM, are underway [2]. These US strategic realignments are creating uncertainty among regional allies regarding the credibility of US extended deterrence, and China is strategically exploiting this gap.

China's SLBM test signifies a fundamental shift in the nuclear deterrence structure, going beyond a mere technological demonstration. Submarine-based nuclear forces are extremely difficult to detect and preempt, thus their operational deployment dilutes US nuclear superiority and shifts the regional strategic balance in China's favor [7]. Furthermore, the joint naval exercises conducted by China and Russia in the Yellow Sea, including submarine rescue drills, suggest that military cooperation between the two countries is progressing beyond mere diplomatic gestures to the stage of sharing operational capabilities [8].

Political Context

Politically, the expanded engagement of NATO in the Asia-Pacific presents a new variable that intensifies structural tensions. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, ahead of the Ankara summit, linked Euro-Atlantic security with Indo-Pacific issues, stating that 'NATO must not be naive about China' [13]. China strongly objects, arguing that NATO is exaggerating the China threat to justify its Asia-Pacific involvement and promote bloc confrontation [13]. This dynamic illustrates that Indo-Pacific security issues are no longer confined to regional states but are expanding into a global strategic competition front linked to the entire transatlantic alliance system.

India is also actively responding to this structural shift. Prime Minister Modi is rapidly expanding India's strategic presence across the Indo-Pacific, including selling BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to Indonesia and signing defense, energy, and critical minerals partnerships with Australia [15]. This signifies the emergence of a regional balancing force against China's growing influence.

Economic Structure

From an economic perspective, the structural pressure forcing Pacific island nations to make strategic choices between China and the West is intensifying. Australia's successive signing of security and defense treaties with Pacific island nations, including Fiji [3][12], is part of building a security network to counter China's expanding economic and diplomatic influence in the region. China's timing of its SLBM test launch to coincide with the Fijian visit of the Australian Prime Minister is interpreted as a direct warning message against the West's strengthening of its Pacific security network [3][12].

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

China's recent SLBM test launch is recorded as the second instance in decades of launching a ballistic missile in the international waters of the Pacific [16]. To understand this, it is necessary to refer to the historical precedents of the US-Soviet nuclear competition during the Cold War. The Soviet Union began to systematically build its submarine-based nuclear forces from the 1960s, challenging American nuclear superiority, which led to the formation of the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) system. The path China is currently treading is structurally similar to this, and in its pursuit of strategic balance with the United States through the completion of a nuclear triad, it parallels the Soviet Union's nuclear force modernization process during the Cold War [7].

The gray zone tactics in the South China Sea can also be understood through historical precedents. Since 2013, China has employed a fait accompli strategy by constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea, a method of gradually securing strategic interests without military conflict. The current intensification of maritime pressure against the Philippines and Japan [4] is an extension of this strategy, repeating a pattern of accumulating fait accompli in a gray zone where the opposing party has difficulty finding clear grounds for military response.

The reaction of the Pacific island nations is linked to the regional normative sensitivity towards a 'nuclear-free Pacific' that emerged after the US Bikini Atoll nuclear tests in 1946. Criticism has been raised that China has effectively violated the spirit of the Treaty of Rarotonga (1985), which established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific [20]. This is perceived not merely as a military concern but as a challenge to the regional normative order. This historical context provides the background for the strong backlash from Pacific island nations, who demand that China "respect our seas" in response to the missile tests [14].

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

The key variables that will determine the future development of this issue can be broadly categorized into four.

The first variable is the speed of China's nuclear triad completion and its level of operational deployment. If this SLBM test evolves beyond a technical milestone to the deployment of operational sea-based nuclear forces, the regional nuclear deterrence structure will inevitably be fundamentally reorganized [7]. This is a variable that directly impacts the nuclear posture reviews (NPR) and extended deterrence strategies of the United States and its allies.

The second variable is the consistency of the US Indo-Pacific strategy. As the United States undergoes strategic adjustments, such as renaming INDOPACOM to PACOM [2], the extent to which allies trust the US's commitment to extended deterrence becomes a key factor in determining the robustness of the regional deterrence posture. The greater the strategic uncertainty from the US, the higher the likelihood that China's gray zone tactics will be more effectively employed.

The third variable is the cohesion of the regional alliance network. Whether the security treaty signings between Australia and Pacific island nations [3][12], India's expansion of its Indo-Pacific partnerships [15], and the increased involvement of extra-regional powers like NATO in the Indo-Pacific [13] can translate into tangible deterrence is a crucial variable. The direction of the issue's development will largely depend on whether regional countries can overcome China's divisive strategies and establish a consistent response framework.

The fourth variable is the dynamics of China's domestic politics. The Xi Jinping leadership may further intensify its hardline foreign policy stance to manage economic pressures and internal dissent, which could lead to an increase in the frequency and intensity of military provocations. Conversely, if economic recovery and stabilization of foreign relations become priority tasks, there may be room for easing military tensions. The direction of China's domestic politics will act as a key lever in modulating the intensity of military activities in the Indo-Pacific.