[EAI Online Seminar] After Trump Series 2. Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition

YouTube 링크 : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xU3cdaWzCOQ

The East Asia Institute(President Yul Sohn) and Brookings Institution jointly held the 2nd online seminar of the  series, titled "Prospects for U.S.-South Korea Cooperation in an Era of U.S.-China Strategic Competition". On Friday, November 13, panelists from EAI and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at Brookings discussed various issues including 1) How can the U.S. and South Korea more effectively coordinate on China? 2) What is the impact of U.S.-China strategic competition in various policy domains? 3) What is the agenda for U.S.-South Korea bilateral cooperation in ensuring a stable and inclusive regional order?

Program

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Keynote session

Session 1: Politics and security

Session 2: Economy, energy, and environment

※ Provided below are selected excerpts from panelists during the seminar.

Session 1: Politics and security

Protecting Regional Democracy through the ROK-US Alliance

Marc Kanpper: In 1990s, the ROK-US relations was very much about the Korean Peninsula and the constant threat from North Korea. However, the relationship has now expanded to encompass trade, investment, health and environment. Countries like South Korea, United States and Japan which share regional democracy and the value of human rights need to speak out against China regarding issues such as human rights, Xinjiang and Hong Kong.

South Korea’s Insufficient Contribution to Regional Security Cooperation amid US-China Competition

Lindsey W. Ford: While extensive cooperation has been pursued in the Indo-Pacific region, led by QUAD countries, South Korea has not actively participated in security cooperation at the regional level for a long time, only focusing on Korean Peninsula issues. It is natural for South Korea to prioritize its domestic security tasks including the North Korean nuclear threat, but considering South Korea’s status at the regional and global levels, as well as its expanding economic cooperation, its contribution to regional security cooperation is still insignificant. South Korea can more actively present a vision on regional peace and security based on Moon Jae-in government’s New Southern Policy; and may contribute more tosecurity cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region.

North Korea’s Denuclearization Issue: A Foothold for Cooperation or Another Obstacle for the Biden Administration?

Young-Sun Ha: Immediately after the Hanoi Summit, North Korea complained to the US about various obstacles to denuclearization, and conveyed its intention that only partial denuclearization is possible. In this state, South Korea and the US need to prepare for the complete denuclearization roadmap. For the new calculation for North Korea-US denuclearization talks, North Korea strongly insists on the three stages of denuclearization. The three-stage denuclearization strategy includes: 1) unilateral process of trust building, 2) a step by step simultaneous action for the exchange of the partial reduction of nuclear capabilities, excluding nuclear capabilities for minimum deterrence and the gradual lifting of sanctions and the beginning of the peace building on the peninsula, and 3) implementation of both complete denuclearization of North Korea including minimum deterrence and the complete security guarantee on the basis of abolishment, US hostile policy toward North Korea, including US forces in Korea and also nuclear strategic assets around the Korean Peninsula through nuclear arms control talks in the Asia Pacific.

Biden’s New America, and the Future of the ROK-US alliance

Sook Jong Lee: Based on the survey result from 2005 to 2020 conducted by the East Asia Institute on Korean Identity, Korean’s support for the Korea-US alliance has been strengthened since the mid-2000s. Over the past 15 years, support for the Korea-US alliance has increased by 17.6 percent, and the support base has been solid regardless of ideology and political orientation.

Session 2: Economy, Energy and Environment

Finding the Right Balance between National Security and Economic Interdependence

Yul Sohn: In contrast to the Unites States that can leverage its power to increase its strategic and economic counterbalance to China, South Korea is forced to play a more complex game. Given its deep yet asymmetric economic interdependence with China as well as demands for Chinese cooperation with regard to North Korean threats, South Korea needs to accommodate China while at the same time courting US engagement both economically and militarily. In that sense, two countries need strategic consultation and coordination over complex interdependence in the following three areas. 1) A recent development in weaponized trade and interdependence invoking national security boils down to the question of how we can restrain the abuse of a broader definition of security, namely over-securitization, and strike a right balance of national security and economic interdependence. South Korea underwent THAAD retaliation by China, US countervailing duties on steel and aluminum under Section 232, and Japan’s tightening of export controls over chemical components crucial to South Korea’s semiconductor industry. 2) Second question comes down to the China challenge, where the world is struggling to seek a collective approach against China’s disruptive mercantilist behaviors. 3) Last area of concern is the compelling need for a rules-based economic order in the region, which would restrain Chinese predation, America’s protectionism, increase middle power space, and sustain liberal norms.

ROK-US Cooperation against the China Challenge

David Dollar: Chinese practices that deviate from international norms are spreading protectionism, weakening intellectual property rights, and providing generic tax breaks for R&D subsidies. In spite of all, decoupling the U.S. economy from the Chinese economy is not practical nor can it get popular support from Asian countries neighboring China, including South Korea, to which costs of decoupling could be directed. The US should rather make an attempt to address specific practices abovementioned, in coordination with allies and partners, instead of complete decoupling. South Korea plays a significant role in consistently conveying messages to the US that decoupling could bring about a considerable aftermath to its allies, and that larger trade agreements are necessary to set a good foundation for trade in the Asia-Pacific region.

Will the Biden Administration Rejoin TPP?

Yul Sohn: South Korea and the United States should be able to set an example of upholding a rules-based international order. In this regard, for the United States, rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a powerful signal of its return to global leadership, reassuring its commitment in the region to its allies and partners. This will prove more effective than unilateral actions for forging a preferable order that restrains China’s predatory behavior. A Biden administration will not prioritize reentering CPTPP, but it might converse to fix some CPTPP “problems” and rejoin if conditions are right. At the same time, South Korea will need to pursue a two-track approach: 1) building a domestic coalition that enables it to join the CPTPP membership, on one hand; and 2) recovering cooperative relationships with Japan in ways that coordinate efforts to reengage the United States to strengthen rules and norms on China, on the other.

Energy Cooperation May Be the Key to Thawing US-China Tensions

Samantha Gross: Whilst tensions between the US and China are sharply on the rise, especially in traditional areas of cooperation including economy and security, energy cooperation may be a good place to start the dialogue, since interests are so obviously aligned in this area-the liquified natural gas (LNG) sector. For the US, China and South Korea, respectively the world’s second and third largest importer of LNG, are a very attractive market. At the same time, the US’s LNG supply not only is affordable but also helps South Korea and China diversify its import sources, whose demand for LNG will be on the rise following their pledges to decrease the prevalence of coal.

Pledges on Carbon Neutrality Should Be Translated into Action

Jeffery Ball: The world is witnessing a race of pledges on de-carbonization or carbon neutrality, including President Moon Jae-in’s recent announcement to go carbon neutral by 2050 as well as pledges made by leaders of Japan, China, Europe and more. What really matters is to translate such pledges into action, and in order to operationalize such goals, geopolitical strategies need to be established and economic incentives should be provided. Many of the developed countries that announced to reduce their carbon consumption are indeed investing heavily in coal infrastructure businesses in developing countries like Vietnam. The pledges therefore should not only be limited to the domestic level, but also be expanded to the global level. Countries need to shift economic incentives so that various key players in the traditional energy sector including multinational corporations and international-development bank, can foresee profits from clean energy that are as alluring as those they have long have inked from dirty energy.

Speaker and Moderator Bios

■ YoungJa Bae is a Professor of the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy at Konkuk University. Dr. Bae received her PhD in political science at University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in the United States and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and vice chairman of the Korean Association of International Studies. She was a visiting scholar at National Taiwan University under Taiwan Fellowship. Her main research interests include international politics and S&T, science diplomacy, and international political economy. Her major papers include "Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment and National Security," "US-China competition and Science and Technology Innovation" and "S&T Diplomacy as Public Diplomacy: Theoretical Understanding".

■ Yul Sohn is the president of EAI and a professor at Yonsei University’s Graduate School of International Studies. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He previously served as the dean of Yonsei University GSIS, president of the Korean Association of International Studies, and president of the Korean Studies of Contemporary Japan. His research focuses on the Japanese and international political economy, East Asian regionalism, and public diplomacy. His recent publications include Japan and Asia's Contested Order (2018, with T.J. Pempel), and Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia (2016, with Jan Melissen).

■ Sook Jong Lee is a Professor of Public Administration at Sungkyunkwan University and Senior Fellow of the East Asia Institute. She has been directing the Asian Democracy Research Network since its formation in 2015, leading a network of about nineteen research organizations across Asia to promote democracy with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. Her recent publications include Transforming Global Governance with Middle Power Diplomacy: South Korea’s Role in the 21st Century (ed. 2016), and Keys to Successful Presidency in South Korea (ed. 2013 and 2016).

■ Wang Hwi Lee is a Professor of Political Science and Dean of the Division of International Studies at Ajou University, Suwon, South Korea, where he has taught international political economy since 2006. He is the author of “The Politics of Economic Reform in South Korea: Crony Capitalism after Ten Years”, “Pulling South Korea away from China’s Orbit: The Strategic Implications of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement” and “Crisis Management of the COVID-19 Pandemic in South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.” His research interests have been focused on issues of the political economy of economic policy and institutions in East Asian countries. Lee received his Ph.D. from London School of Economics and Political Science.

■ Chaesung Chun is the Chair of the National Security Research Center at the East Asia Institute, and a Professor of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University. Dr. Chun received his PhD in international relations at Northwestern University in the United States, and serves on the policy advisory committee to the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification. His main research interests include international political theory, the ROK-US alliance, and Korean Peninsular affairs. He is the co-author of The Korean War: Threat and Peace, and the author of a number of publications including Are Politics Moral and International Politics in East Asia: History and Theory.

■ Young-Sun Ha is chairman of the board of trustees of the East Asia Institute. He is also a professor emeritus at Seoul National University’s department of political science and international relations. Ha currently serves as a member of the senior advisory group for the Inter-Korean Summit Talks Preparation Committee. He also served as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Group, co-chairman of Korea-Japan Joint Research Project for New Era, president of the Korea Peace Studies Association, and research fellow at Princeton University’s Center for International Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His recent books and edited volumes include A New Perspective on the Diplomatic History of Korea, World Politics of Love: War and Peace, U.S.-China Competition in the Architecture of a Regional Order in the Asia-Pacific; Korean Peninsula Among Big Powers: 1972 vs. 2014, Complex World Politics: Strategies, Principles, and a New Order, The Future of North Korea 2032: The Strategy of Coevolution for the Advancement, The Emergence of Complex Alliances in the 21st Century, and A New Era of Complex Networks in Korea-Japan Relations. He received his BA and MA from Seoul National University and his PhD from the University of Washington.

■ Jeffrey Ball, a writer whose work focuses on energy and the environment, is scholar-in-residence at Stanford University’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance and a lecturer at Stanford Law School. He also is a nonresident senior fellow in the Brookings Institution's Energy Security and Climate Initiative. Ball’s writing has appeared in Fortune, Texas Monthly, Mother Jones, the New Republic, Foreign Affairs, Joule, The Atlantic, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times, among other publications. At the Stanford center, a joint initiative of Stanford’s law and business schools, Ball heads a project assessing the climate implications of infrastructure investment by major economies including China, the world’s largest carbon emitter, coal burner, and renewable-energy producer. Among Ball’s writing honors were two in 2019: He won a New York Press Club Award for Journalism and was named a finalist for a Gerald Loeb Award for Distinguished Business and Financial Journalism for “Lone Star Rising,” a 2018 long-form story he wrote in Fortune on how a renewed oil boom in West Texas’ Permian Basin, one of the world’s biggest oil-producing areas, is reshaping both the region and the global energy system. Ball was the primary author of a 2017 Stanford report that assessed countries’ comparative advantages in the globalizing clean-energy sector. That report, The New Solar System, was released in March 2017 and laid out a strategy to boost solar energy to a level that would contribute meaningfully to global carbon reductions. Ball came to Stanford in 2011 from The Wall Street Journal, where he was the paper’s environment editor and before that was a columnist and reporter focusing on energy and the environment. He graduated from Yale University, where he was editor-in-chief of the Yale Daily News. Follow him on Twitter at @jeff_ball.

■ David Dollar is a senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution and host of the Brookings trade podcast, Dollar&Sense. He is a leading expert on China's economy and U.S.-China economic relations. From 2009 to 2013, he was the U.S. Treasury’s economic and financial emissary to China, based in Beijing, facilitating the macroeconomic and financial policy dialogue between the United States and China. Prior to joining Treasury, Dollar worked 20 years for the World Bank, serving as country director for China and Mongolia, based in Beijing (2004-2009). His other World Bank assignments focused on Asian economies, including South Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Bangladesh, and India. Dollar also worked in the World Bank’s research department. His publications focus on economic reform in China, globalization, and economic growth. He also taught economics at University of California Los Angeles, during which time he spent a semester in Beijing at the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1986. He has a doctorate in economics from New York University and a bachelor's in Chinese history and language from Dartmouth College.

■ Lindsey W. Ford is a David M. Rubenstein Fellow in the Foreign Policy program. She is also an adjunct lecturer at the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Her research focuses on U.S. defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific region, including U.S. security alliances, military posture, and regional security architecture. Ford is a frequent commentator on Asian security and defense issues and her analysis has been featured by outlets including the New York Times, the Wall St. Journal, the Financial Times, Politico, Foreign Policy, the Straits Times, CNN, MSNBC, and Bloomberg. She graduated with a master’s in public affairs and Asian studies from the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas-Austin, and a bachelor’s in vocal performance from Samford University. director for political-security affairs at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI). From 2009-15, She served in a variety of roles within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. She also served as the senior adviser to the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affair. She was also a leading architect of the Asia rebalance strategy work for the Department of Defense’s 2012 “Defense Strategic Guidance Review” and oversaw the development of the Department’s first “Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy” in 2015.

■ Samantha Gross is a fellow and director of the Energy Security and Climate Initiative. Her work is focused on the intersection of energy, environment, and policy, including climate policy and international cooperation, energy efficiency, unconventional oil and gas development, regional and global natural gas trade, and the energy-water nexus. She holds a Bachelor of Science in chemical engineering from the University of Illinois, a Master of Science in environmental engineering from Stanford, and a Master of Business Administration from the University of California at Berkeley. She has been a visiting fellow at the King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center, where she authored work on clean energy cooperation and on post-Paris climate policy. She was director of the Office of International Climate and Clean Energy at the U.S. Department of Energy. Prior to her time at the Department of Energy, Gross was director of integrated research at IHS CERA. She managed the IHS CERA Climate Change and Clean Energy forum and the IHS relationship with the World Economic Forum. She also authored numerous papers on energy and environment topics and was a frequent speaker on these topics.

■ Jung H. Pak is a senior fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies. She received her doctorate from Columbia University in U.S. history. Her research interests include the national security challenges facing the United States and East Asia, including North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities, the regime’s domestic and foreign policy calculus, internal stability, and inter-Korean ties. She is also focused on developing interdisciplinary forums to bolster regional dialogue on counterterrorism, nonproliferation, cybersecurity, and climate change. Her recent publications include Becoming Kim Jong Un: A Former CIA Officer’s Insights into North Korea’s Enigmatic Young Dictator.

■ Jonathan D. Pollack is a nonresident senior fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center and Center for East Asia Policy at the Brookings Institution. Between 2012 and 2014, he served as director of the John L. Thornton China Center. Prior to joining Brookings in 2010, he was professor of Asian and Pacific Studies and chairman of the Strategic Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. He previously worked at the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California, where he served in various senior research and management positions, including chairman of the political science department, corporate research manager for international policy and senior advisor for international policy. His recent publications include Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early 21st Century, Korea-The East Asian Pivot, Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspective on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the 21st Century. His principal research interests include Chinese national security strategy; U.S.-China relations; U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific; Korean politics and foreign policy; Asian international politics; and nuclear weapons and international security. He received his master's and doctorate in political science from the University of Michigan, and was a post-doctoral research fellow at Harvard University.

■ Mireya Solís is director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies, and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings. Prior to her arrival at Brookings, Solís was a tenured associate professor at American University’s School of International Service. Solís received a doctorate in government and a master's in East Asian studies from Harvard University, and a bachelor's in international relations from El Colegio de México. Solís is an expert on Japanese foreign economic policy, U.S.-Japan relations, international trade policy, and Asia-Pacific economic integration. Her publications include Banking on Multinationals: Public Credit and the Export of Japanese Sunset Industries, Cross-Regional Trade Agreements: Understanding Permeated Regionalism in East Asia (co-editor), Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim. Solís has offered expert commentary to The New York Times, Financial Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Politico, The New Yorker, Nikkei, Kyodo News, Asahi Shimbun, Jiji Press, Japan Times, NHK World, Bloomberg, CNN, and BBC, among others.

영상 스크립트

welcome everyone i am irea solis director of the center for east asia policy studies at the brookings institution welcome to today's webinar prospects for u.s south korea cooperation in the era of u.s china strategic competition we are delighted that this program is a collaboration with the east asia institute one that we started planning back in may of 2019 and has been very meaningful all panelists have drafted papers that will guide today's discussions and will be published soon by the east asia institute

the topic that gathers us today is of great consequence how will u.s china's strategic competition shape the region what are the best avenues for the united states and south korea to cooperate in meeting the china challenge in ensuring regional stability and prosperity what are the range of objectives trials and opportunities in energizing u.s south korea cooperation across different domains such as security trade and technology energy and environment we are honored to have deputy assistant secretary

for korea and japan mark napper deliver the keynote mark knapper needs no introduction but let me just highlight a few elements of his very distinguished career since august of 2018 mark napper has served as deputy assistant secretary for korea and japan and before that he served with distinction in the u.s embassy in south korea as charged affairs and deputy chief of mission deputy assistant secretary napper has twice worked in the democratic people's republic of korea as the state department representative to the spent

fuel team at the young beyond nuclear facility and as part of the advanced team for then secretary of state madeleine albright's trip to pyongyang mark knapper is a recipient of a number of awards from the u.s department of state including the secretary of state's distinguished service award the nation's highest diplomatic honor following deputy assistant secretary snapper's remarks we will take questions from the viewers you can submit questions by email to events brookings.edu or via twitter to at brookingsfp using the hashtag

usrok we'll also take questions during the panel discussion so please feel free to join this conversation and send you your questions we're very much looking forward to that and with that i would like to uh give the floor to deputy assistant secretary mark knapper yeah thank you so much uh you know i always get really embarrassed uh with these kind of full and and uh genuine introductions i almost wish as they say like if my my father were here he would have smiled uh my mother would have believed it but i i do really

appreciate that and thank you um and it's great to be here um uh i'm actually in seoul right now so it's i guess oddly appropriate that i should be speaking about these these issues while i'm here uh but i'm really grateful uh to maria and brookings and eai for for inviting me to speak today and so i guess i'll speak a little bit um you know the subject today is about the the u.s korea relationship and like how it how it works in the the context or against the background of of the china challenge and

you know i'm just thinking uh when i first came to korea when i first served in seoul in 1993 27 years ago uh the u.s korea alliance the u.s korea relationship was very much uh about uh the peninsula it was very limited to the peninsula it was very limited to uh the the the you know the constant threat from the north and it was uh it was a relationship that had very little to do in terms of trade very little to do in terms of investment or you know all these kind of other things that we take for granted today so

so we you know we we focused on on the threat from the north and and the security ties so let's let's fast forward so that was 93 and let's fast forward to now um you know the us korea relationship now is as broad and as deep as we could ever hope for an alliance relationship anywhere in the world i mean the u.s korea alliance um of course we still have our security ties but look i mean the uh trade ties uh you know korea is the 11th largest economy in the world uh korea is the sixth largest trading partner of the united states

korea is uh one of the fastest growing investors in the united states and you know in places in the south in the midwest places like georgia alabama if you look at hyundai motors for example is a huge investment in alabama sk huge investment in in georgia lotte big investment in louisiana samsung and and austin texas etc so my my point is i mean this is a relationship that has gone from just one that's limited to to the peninsula to one that is is global one that is building ties uh creating jobs

uh for you know good jobs for the american people and so uh we're very proud of this and and it goes beyond this it goes beyond trade and investment to science and technology and health cooperation health cooperation of course we talk about that we talk about covet of course this is something that uh you know we we wouldn't guess this a few years ago when uh for example ebola broke out in west africa 2014 united states sent doctors to west africa and we we asked for help who put their hands up korea

and korea put their hands up 2014 sent doctors to sierra leone uh 2015 we had the mayor's outbreak in in korea and the united states and korea together uh worked to to to deal with this outbreak uh and now together in covit copen19 the united states are working together again and this is just one example of the kind of work that our two countries are doing together we build uh muscle memory you know when you play golf you you hit the golf level it's like you you every time you hit the golf club you you build this ability to

work together and and this is something we in korea do together every day we've done it and now that we have this this this covet virus we're working together again and it's it's just a terrific example of the kind of work that the us and korea do together every day and um as we as we move forward i i think um something that i talk about i've talked about it here stuff in korea i mean uh we our values our shared values values about democracy values about religious freedom freedom of assembly freedom

of the press i mean these are things that are precious things are things that the u.s and the republic of korea and japan taiwan we all enjoy and frankly uh they're under threat they're under threat and to the extent that we and korea and japan can work together to defend these values i think really speaks uh to our three countries our four countries ability to to really uh defend the values that we have and so when the united states talks about uh the relationship between the u.s japan the north korea i think we

we really do mean it's it's not just about uh practical issues like like usomia for example but it's it's it's real issues involving the values that we share the practical sort of things that we all together have so um i really sincerely hope that when we do work together that we we think about this and i think this gets to the bigger issue of today's uh seminar of china and so when we talk about china uh the challenge of china i think it's all clear that you know we know that that japan and so in south korea have very complex

and nuanced relationships with with china we get it but at the same time i think we all should be able to stand up um and speak out uh when we see uh you know bad behavior from china and i think regardless the fact that that uh there are very important trading relationships and others we get it we're not asking south korea we're not asking japan to to cut off or contain china but at the same time i think the countries like south korea that have benefited from the international community uh speaking out on behalf of democracy i

think it's important that when it comes to uh speaking out about xinjiang taiwan hong kong i think we we we hope and expect that korea japan others will stand up and speak out on behalf of these things and so um i know that yeah later on i mean we're going to talk about china and the role of china and the role of our alliances in dealing with china but i really do think that it's responsibility of countries like the united states countries like south korea countries like japan to to accept the responsibility

of speaking out on behalf of democracy speaking out on behalf of freedom because if we don't who will and so it's our it's our job i think to do this and so we'll we'll continue to push on this we'll continue to press for uh us and our fellow democracies do this and so uh i'll certainly count on our friends in korea our friends in japan too to take up this this important task thank you sorry i've been in so many zoom calls you would imagine i got this down by now but obviously i still do not um i was just

saying uh thank you very much uh mark for those very insightful uh remarks i appreciate very much uh your comments about alliances that um have broadened now that you know with the trade integration investment and also uh that are based on shared values and that it's important at this moment in time to take a stand on very serious issues that uh emerge and to call out china where there's a need for that um i would like to then take the opportunity and ask you um a question or two just to remind our viewers that if you

have uh questions please send them to me via email events at brookings.edu or via twitter at brookingsfp using the hashtag usrok so let me then ask you the first question and really brings the china factor more front and center you know as u.s and china are now locked in strategic competition and a lot of these now plays out in the economic sphere there are concerns about a potential decoupling there are concerns about seeing a two separate digital ecosystems emerge and this is of course a concern for many countries but

especially those that have advanced high-tech sectors advanced manufacturing and certainly south korea is such a country given the lead that south korean companies play in semiconductor manufacturer for example so my question uh to you mark is in your view what is the best way to strike the balance between addressing those cyber security critical technology leakage concerns but not unwinding very robust links of economic interdependence that have generated a lot of innovation a lot of prosperity

and if i may add to that the state department a few months ago launched the clean network initiative with the idea to develop ties with trusted suppliers and not have the participation of chinese companies that represent a cyber security risk my question uh to you mark then is what has been the reaction in the region to this initiative especially from the rok but other countries as well okay uh thank you maria um no those are excellent questions excellent things to explore look i think when we talk about

as we talk about clean networks clean path we talk about 5g i mean these are all things that our government has been working very closely with governments in the region japan korea others taiwan southeast asia and really i mean the goal is to ensure that that our data that our citizens private information that our government's national security data is is protected are are protected and so uh i think it's um really imperative for all of us to to be able to work together to ensure that uh that whether it's

individuals privacy whether it's government uh secure information or are able to be protected and so i don't think it's it's asking too much for us to be able to work with governments in the region whether it's japan or korea other places taiwan southeast asia really to take a hard look at our networks and the networks that are you know providing the the back and forth for the information that makes our lives you know whether it's financial information or other information but um certainly i think it's it's it's safe

to say that uh this is something that when we talk about 5g when we talk about work we do around the world i mean there's no question that there are very nuanced relationships uh whether it's the united states korea japan and it's it's something that we have very very intense and close uh conversations with but um i think our ultimate goal and i think a goal that we share with our friends and our allies in places like japan and korea is that look ultimately we want to protect the data of our citizens we want to protect the

information of our governments and so i don't think it's too much to ask that we take a hard look at what we're doing and what are various i.t companies and what our various communication infrastructures are doing with potential potentially vulnerable companies or as we say uh you know vulnerable vendors like like like huawei like cte thank you uh thank you so much for that uh question and that's an issue that we expect we're going to discuss a greater length in the second panel of today's conference so you got us to a great

start thank you for that and i want to shift gears a little bit and ask you another question because i think that you have really unique insight in into u.s relations with both south korea and japan now we know that this has been a bilateral relationship that recently has deteriorated there's been an increase in uh friction and um you know i think that ideally the goal of the united states has been to facilitate trilateral uh cooperation and when the u.s i'm sorry the rok japan relationships offers

obviously it's harder to accomplish that um in your mind um what can be done from the u.s point of view to try to improve uh u.s i'm sorry japan south korea relations so i get asked this question a lot and a couple years ago when people ask me sort of how much time i spend on japan how much time i spend on korea i would say yeah you know of course 50 50 right 50 on japan 50 in korea these days when people ask me that question i say well you know 20 percent korea 20 japan and 60 japan korea so i say that meaning

that um to the united states the japan korea relationship is is critical importance and when we say and we do say that we don't take sides we don't mediate we don't get in the middle we don't try to it arbitrate mean we don't care it doesn't mean we're not interested the japan korea japan south korea relationship is of critical importance to the united states because getting back to what i said before these are two democracies liberal transparent countries that that do the kind of work that we do in the united states if we

our three countries don't stand up for democracy if we don't stand up for freedom then who will and so we have to figure out a way to get along and and so the united states we don't presume to find a way to to get in the middle or to mediate this is up to japan and korea do um same time though it does not mean that we don't care it does not mean that we're not interested we are we do care we are interested and and very often we do things that aren't apparent to the press we do things that aren't apparent

to the public but nonetheless we are working very hard with our allies with our friends in tokyo and seoul to try and find a way to to move our three countries forward because we have to and we understand i mean history issues are sensitive um heaven knows in the united states you know we we have our own history issues and you know we we we deal with it every day and so it's not for us to presume to speak about uh history issues between japan and korea but at the same time i think it's fair to hope

that between south korea and japan that they can address these issues in a way that promotes reconciliation and promotes a path to a brighter future a path to a future that involves productive and constructive relations between not just seoul and tokyo but seoul tokyo washington among all of us because we have to i mean if you look at the region it's just you know our countries share these values and are you know we shared democracy and and freedom of of speech and religion and things that are under threat

these things under threat if we don't stand up for it who will and so we we really have to figure things out so that's why i hope uh going forward that we're going to figure these things out and we will find a way for our three countries to build a better a better relationship thank you mark for those comments and i have one final question for you um as i mentioned when i introduced you um you served with distinction in the u.s embassy in south korea at a time when there was a lot of tension in the peninsula

because of the provocations of the north korean regime if i remember correctly we used to refer to those days as the fire and fury days and after that there were a couple of meetings between president trump and kim jong-un so given all that you know about the evolution of u.s north korea relations can you talk about what the u.s and south korea can do at this moment in time in dealing with these uh threats coming from north korea well thanks for i mean you were you were you're right i mean that was uh

2017 was a really uh pretty stressful time for those of us who were who were living there we had uh the sixth nuclear test we had a couple of icbm launches and for sure it uh it was a time of great tension on the peninsula but you know i think u.s diplomacy in particular leader level diplomacy between you know president trump and kim jong-un helped to help to lower lower the tension and hopefully set the stage for for future progress um but you know obviously in the past you know few weeks months years there

hasn't been much and regardless though you know our message our public message and in private frankly is that the door to diplomacy remains open the door to finding way forward remains open and you know we firmly believe uh if you go back to the singapore statement from uh from 2017 the statement that between the united states and north korea about transforming the u.s north korea relationship between uh you know building a peace regime on the peninsula improving north-south relations uh bringing home the remains of american

soldiers i mean these these are commitments that we made with north korea between our two leaders and this is a you know a spirit that we we still hope to to to to implement and so and that where we are today i mean i can't speak about what's going to happen in a couple months but at this moment today we still sincerely hope to be able to implement and actualize the spirit of the singapore statement to the point where you know to to transform our relation to denuclearize to bring a better and brighter future to to the people of

north korea thank you so much mark again for joining us for starting us to a great uh discussion throughout the morning i think your last a set of remarks actually provide the perfect segue into panel one which will be moderated by my colleague jun pak the sk korea foundation chair in korea studies so i want to thank you again and then turn things over to john thank you so much