Xi Jinping-Trump Washington Summit: Taiwan Arms Sales Conflict and Response Measures
Executive Summary
During the Washington summit on September 24, President Xi Jinping reportedly discussed the cessation of arms sales to Taiwan based on the 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communiqué. President Trump withheld approval of a $14 billion arms package, characterizing it not as a 'halt' but as a 'bargaining chip,' leaving room for interpretation. Beijing can promote this as a victory of principle domestically, while Washington can argue that it has not violated its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act since it is not a cancellation of approval. Given the pressure from hardliners in the Republican Party to submit the package and the trend of Taiwan increasing its independent defense budget, this interpretation is structurally unstable and likely to recur in future developments. South Korean companies need to review alternative procurement routes and track regulatory trends in response to the political uncertainties surrounding Taiwan's foundry supply chain and the expanding security-related items in the semiconductor and secondary battery sectors.
I. Issue Situation Analysis
Xi Jinping-Trump Washington Summit: The Tug-of-War Over Arms Sales to Taiwan
1. Background and Progress of the Issue
At the Trump-Xi summit held in Beijing last May, President Trump withheld approval for a new arms sales package worth $14 billion to Taiwan. He stated in a Fox News interview shortly after his visit to Beijing that "the decision will depend on China." This remark sparked significant backlash within Taiwan.
Last December, President Trump approved a package worth $11 billion, the largest ever. However, the subsequent $14 billion package has remained on hold since May. Hardliners in the U.S. Republican Party have been urging the submission of this package ahead of the summit, while the White House has shown signs of wanting to use it as a bargaining chip.
Beijing has treated this issue as a red line rather than a subject for negotiation. China has repeatedly demanded a halt to arms sales, defining the Taiwan issue as "the most sensitive and important diplomatic matter." Some sources warned that if new arms sales were actually carried out, Beijing might cancel the summit altogether.
2. Current Situation
As anticipated, President Xi was expected to pressure for a halt to arms sales based on the 1982 U.S.-China Joint Communiqué. Some sources mentioned the possibility that Xi might raise this issue during his visit to the National Archives.
According to a statement released by Xinhua after the summit, Xi urged the U.S. side to oppose "Taiwan independence." This announcement was made public before the White House's materials were released. In his public remarks, Xi also requested President Trump to be "cautious" regarding the Taiwan issue. The White House did not immediately release a separate official outcome document after the summit.
After the summit, President Trump described it as "a great meeting" and mentioned his "truly great friendship" with Xi. At the same time, he stated that he was still withholding final approval for the $14 billion arms package, referring to arms sales to Taiwan as a "very good bargaining chip" with China.
The Hankyoreh analyzed that the U.S. focused on securing visible economic achievements, such as expanding agricultural purchases, during this summit. In contrast, China prioritized preventing a rekindling of the trade war and maintaining "strategic stability." Channel News Asia evaluated the summit as having "low expectations compared to the grand ceremony," suggesting that symbolism overshadowed substantial outcomes.
3. Key Actors and Positions
China (Xi Jinping Administration): Defines the Taiwan issue as a core interest that cannot be negotiated. It frames U.S. arms sales as a violation of international agreements by invoking the legal basis of the 1982 Joint Communiqué. Explicitly demanded opposition to "Taiwan independence" in the summit announcement. At the same time, it referenced the Thucydides Trap, proposing mutual understanding to avoid military conflict between the U.S. and China. This is interpreted as a dual strategy to secure "strategic stability" in bilateral relations, separate from pressure on Taiwan.
United States (Trump Administration): Internally divided in its stance. President Trump treats the 1982 agreement as "a long time ago" and suggests flexibility in negotiations with China. He also remarked that a "war 9,500 miles away" is unnecessary. The Brookings Institution assessed this as "a major concession to China." However, administration officials argue that Trump's remarks do not signify a substantial change in Taiwan Strait policy, emphasizing that Trump has approved more arms sales to Taiwan than any previous president.
Republican Hardliners: Have been pressuring for the submission of the $14 billion package ahead of the summit. They have expressed concerns about the White House's approach of using the Taiwan issue as a bargaining chip.
Taiwan (Tsai Ing-wen Administration): Officially reaffirmed its policy of maintaining "close contact" with the U.S. Concerns about delays in arms deliveries are spreading within Taiwan. Le Monde reported that Trump's remarks after the Beijing summit left a "bitter aftertaste" in Taiwanese public opinion. Taiwan has increased its defense budget by 16% for 2027, surpassing 1 trillion New Taiwan dollars for the first time. It also conducted practical checks on its blockade response system through joint military exercises.
4. Key Issues
The first issue is the differing interpretations surrounding the legal basis for the demand to halt arms sales. Beijing invokes the 1982 Joint Communiqué as a binding agreement. In contrast, the 'Six Assurances' announced concurrently during the Reagan administration specified that arms sales would be determined based on security needs without consultation with China. The conflict between these two documents represents a long-standing interpretive dispute between the U.S. and China.
The gap between President Trump's personal remarks and the official stance of the administration is also a point of contention. The president has repeatedly downplayed the current binding force of the 1982 agreement. However, the administration argues for policy continuity based on domestic legal obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. This gap complicates predictions regarding the actual approval of arms sales packages.
The approach of using arms sales as a bargaining chip is also controversial. President Trump publicly referred to it as a leverage point in negotiations with China. Critics argue that treating a matter with a red line character as a bargaining issue increases the risk of miscalculation. Many local media outlets have confirmed that the summit ended with symbolic stitching, leaving the structural conflict over the Taiwan issue unresolved.
II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue
Xi Jinping-Trump Washington Summit: In-Depth Analysis of the Taiwan Arms Sales Conflict
1. Analysis of Root Causes
After his visit to Beijing in May, President Trump stated in a Fox News interview that the approval of arms sales would be "determined by China." The Atlantic Council introduced this remark, stating that "the 1980s are a distant past," thereby undermining the binding force of the 1982 communiqué. The Brookings Institution points out that despite such remarks, the Trump administration has approved more arms sales to Taiwan than any previous administration. This indicates a gap between the language of principle and actual performance, creating an incentive structure for Beijing to repeat the same demands at every summit.
2. Structural Context
Political Structure: Domestic Political Constraints and Bipartisan Consensus
In the U.S., arms sales to Taiwan represent a point of conflict between executive discretion and congressional pressure. Republican hardliners have pressured for the submission of the $14 billion package ahead of the summit, indicating that internal mechanisms are at work to check the administration's conciliatory signals toward China. Conversely, the White House has shown signs of wanting to use this package as a bargaining chip. This creates a dynamic where the president's foreign negotiation discretion and congressional and military-industrial interests pull in different directions regarding the same issue.
From China's perspective, the Taiwan issue is directly linked to the legitimacy of the Xi Jinping regime. Domestically, the 'One China' principle is a political sanctuary that cannot be negotiated. The fact that Xinhua released the statement urging opposition to "Taiwan independence" before the White House's official announcement suggests that Beijing prioritized confirming its principled hardline stance to domestic public opinion and the party over normal diplomatic procedures.
Economic Structure: Linkage with Tariff Negotiations
During this summit, the U.S. emphasized securing visible economic achievements, such as expanding agricultural purchases. In contrast, China prioritized preventing a rekindling of the trade war and maintaining "strategic stability." The structure of discussing the postponement of arms sales in a package deal form with trade issues such as tariffs and rare earth elements is being repeated. EAI reports that "the extension of the trade truce in Busan is expected to be a key achievement, but it is highly likely that the postponement of arms sales to Taiwan and the restraint of technology sanctions will be exchanged as a price." This structure, where security issues are leveraged in trade negotiations, acts as a factor delaying the independent resolution of the Taiwan issue.
Security Structure: Conflict Between Red Lines and Bargaining Chips
For Beijing, the Taiwan issue is a red line, not a subject for negotiation. Meanwhile, some in Washington define it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with China. This fundamental difference in perception is a structural cause that recurs the same issues at every summit. Taiwan itself is also concerned about the possibility of being excluded from this structure. The Daily Maverick reported that Taiwan's statement about maintaining "close contact" with the U.S. regarding arms sales is underpinned by anxiety that the summit could conclude without Taiwan's involvement.
3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases
The August 17, 1982 Joint Communiqué itself was a product of crisis management. At that time, the Reagan administration promised that arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed past levels either qualitatively or quantitatively while adding a caveat through the 'Six Assurances' that this promise did not imply prior consultation with Beijing. As the Atlantic Council points out, these six assurances contain the principle that "the U.S. decides on arms sales based on security needs without consulting Beijing." Thus, the 1982 communiqué was a document that inherently contained the potential for conflicting interpretations from the outset. Xi's invocation of it now is akin to resurrecting contradictions that were stitched up over 40 years ago.
The trends following the first Trump administration also provide a reference point. According to EAI analysis, "high-level official visits to Taiwan, which were previously considered red lines, have been carried out." The current phase of postponing arms sales is situated on a trajectory where the boundaries of strategic ambiguity have gradually eroded. However, this time it is in the reverse direction. The Trump administration sent conciliatory signals by withholding sales approval, which marks a departure from the previous trend of 'erosion of ambiguity'.
A comparison with the 2023 San Francisco APEC summit is also valid. EAI evaluated that "the 2023 San Francisco APEC summit was characterized by an event aimed at stitching up relations that had been strained by the balloon incident, which is different from the current summit." The Washington summit is not a restoration of relations after a crisis but rather an event that continues on the same continuum as the prior diplomatic engagement in May. This indicates a phase of regularized competition rather than crisis management.
4. Key Variables Shaping the Issue's Development
The first variable is the actual submission timing of the $14 billion package. CFR cited some observers who mentioned the possibility that this package may not be submitted until next year. At the same time, Beijing continues to increase military exercises around Taiwan, indicating that the postponement of approval does not necessarily mean a reduction in tensions.
The second variable is the direction in which the gap between President Trump's remarks and actual administrative actions converges. He reiterated after the summit that arms sales are a "very good bargaining chip," suggesting that the postponement is tactical rather than a principled concession. The timing of the resumption of arms sales is likely to be influenced by the progress of tariff and rare earth negotiations.
The third variable is Taiwan's own response. Taiwan has increased its defense budget by 16% for 2027, surpassing 1 trillion New Taiwan dollars for the first time. This signals a commitment to continue strengthening its independent defense capabilities, regardless of Washington's postponement decision. Taiwan's continued mention of maintaining "close contact" with the U.S. is interpreted as an effort to secure independent channels in anticipation of potential exclusion from the normal diplomatic track.
The fourth variable is the gap between the announcements from Xinhua and the White House. The manner in which China distributed a statement explicitly opposing "Taiwan independence" before the White House's announcement suggests that Beijing may continue to interpret the outcomes of summits in its favor through public relations strategies. The speed and clarity with which the White House responds with a separate outcome document will be crucial in reducing interpretive gaps surrounding the 'content of agreements' between the two sides.
III. Final Recommended Response Measures
Xi Jinping-Trump Washington Summit: Comprehensive Assessment and Response Measures
1. Comprehensive Assessment
This summit did not resolve the Taiwan issue; it merely managed it. President Xi pressured for a halt to arms sales by invoking the 1982 Joint Communiqué. President Trump responded by continuing to withhold approval for the $14 billion package. However, he characterized this not as a 'halt' but as a 'bargaining chip.' This difference in expression defines the nature of this summit. Beijing can promote the postponement as a victory of principle domestically. Washington can argue that it has not canceled approval, thus not violating its obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. Both sides have achieved an ambiguous stitch-up that allows them to avoid admitting defeat domestically.
This stitch-up is structurally unstable. Republican hardliners have already pressured for the submission of the package. Taiwan perceives the delay in approval itself as a security vacuum. The fact that Xinhua released a statement urging opposition to "Taiwan independence" before the White House announcement indicates that Beijing intends to imprint this postponement as a principled achievement domestically. As long as these two interpretations coexist, the likelihood of the same conflict recurring in the next phase is high. EAI has previously characterized this structure as an "extension of managed competition." The results of this summit reaffirm that diagnosis.
The implications for South Korean companies and the government are twofold. One is the political uncertainty of the Taiwan foundry supply chain. The other is the trend of increasing difficulty in separating security-related issues from commercial areas in the semiconductor and secondary battery sectors. Both aspects must start from the premise that this postponement is a temporary measure.
2. Short-term, Medium-term, and Long-term Action Plans
Short-term (1-3 months)
The official outcome documents from the White House and the State Department should be compared with the Xinhua announcement. Differences in the timing and wording of the announcements have already emerged during this summit. These differences will sow the seeds of interpretive disputes in future implementation phases. The actual submission status and timing of the $14 billion package should be tracked alongside trends in the U.S. Congress. The extent to which pressure from Republican hardliners shakes the postponement stance will be the first test.
Separate channels should be maintained with Taiwan's supply chain partners. Taiwan's defense budget has been increased by 16% for 2027, surpassing 1 trillion New Taiwan dollars for the first time. This indicates that Taiwan is strengthening its independent defense posture regardless of Washington's postponement decision. The impact of this trend on the stability of the semiconductor supply chain should be monitored separately.
Medium-term (3-12 months)
Regulatory measures by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the FCC regarding technology controls on China should be tracked separately from the normal diplomatic track. EAI has projected that this dual structure will continue "separate from the symbolic agreements of the normal diplomatic track." The postponement of arms sales during the summit does not imply a relaxation of technology controls. Internal standards should be established to distinguish between security-related items and purely commercial items in the semiconductor and secondary battery sectors.
Alternative procurement routes should be preemptively reviewed for items with high dependence on Taiwan's foundry. If the postponement is reversed in the next phase, the possibility of heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait cannot be ruled out.
Long-term (1 year or more)
The likelihood of the U.S. and China permanently stitching up the Taiwan issue is low. The legal hierarchy issue between the 1982 Joint Communiqué and the Taiwan Relations Act has not been resolved for over 40 years. As long as this structure remains, similar conflicts are expected to recur at every summit. Rather than betting on specific scenarios, South Korea should operate a supply chain diversification roadmap under the premise that Taiwan risk is a constant variable.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
Primary Indicator: The actual submission status and timing of the $14 billion arms package. President Trump has still left it in a "pending" state. If signals indicating imminent submission are detected, the level of Beijing's backlash should be reassessed immediately.
Secondary Indicator: Trends in legislative and budget pressures from hardliners in the U.S. Congress. If executive discretion and congressional pressure collide again, the postponement agreement itself may be shaken early.
Tertiary Indicator: The speed of Taiwan's defense budget execution and the frequency of response training such as joint military exercises. If Taiwan accelerates its independent defense capabilities, this signals growing internal distrust regarding Washington's postponement decision.
Trigger Point: If Beijing promotes this postponement as a "victory of principle" more vigorously than expected, there is a risk that the next attempt to approve arms sales could be blocked early. Conversely, if the U.S. Congress pushes forward with the package submission, there is also a possibility that Beijing will reconsider the overall outcomes of the summit. A system for regularly checking signals between these two extremes is necessary.
4. Summary Conclusion
This summit did not resolve the conflict over arms sales to Taiwan; it merely postponed it. President Trump withheld approval while leaving it as a "bargaining chip." President Xi secured the opportunity to promote his principled demands domestically. This asymmetrical stitch-up carries potential conflict elements that may recur in the next phase. South Korean companies and the government should not interpret this postponement as a signal of permanent stability. A system for continuously managing Taiwan supply chain risks and U.S.-China technology control measures separately from the normal diplomatic track is necessary.
References
[5] [Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)] Ten Issues to Watch at the Trump-Xi Summit in Washington
[7] [Daily Maverick] Taiwan to maintain ‘close contact’ with US on arms sales
[8] [Brookings Institution] Why Beijing isn’t taking the bait with Trump
[10] [Le Monde] Before Xi Jinping's US visit, Taiwan worries about postponed arms deliveries
[13] [Cyprus Mail] Trump-Xi summit in Washington begins with great fanfare but low expectations
[14] [El Economista (MX)] Xi Jinping pide a Trump
[15] [The Guardian] At Trump meeting, Xi Jinping lays out terms to avoid US-China military conflict
[16] [The Globe and Mail] Trump rolls out the red carpet for China’s Xi as both sides seek stability
[22] [United Daily News] 川習會開始 川普與習近平發言聚焦貿易、合作與AI
[24] [Business Times (SG)] Xi rolls into Trump summit with China’s trade engine roaring
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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