US-Iran Conflict Reignites: Implications of the Larak Island Airstrike and Retaliatory Strikes on Jordan and the UAE

Executive Summary

After the Islamabad Memorandum expired, Iran began to forcibly assert control over passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The United States responded on August 30 with a strike on missile launchers on Larak Island, and Iran immediately retaliated against US military bases in Jordan and the UAE, shattering a nearly month-long lull in hostilities. The US maintains its hardline stance despite physical constraints, with its THAAD and Patriot missile inventories diminished by at least 38% and up to 65%, respectively, making it difficult to predict the intensity of future escalation. Iran, for its part, continues to use the blockade of Hormuz as leverage and has reportedly considered striking US bases in Europe. While a stalemate characterized by low-intensity clashes is the most likely scenario, the possibility of a full-scale escalation cannot be ruled out. South Korean companies should avoid betting on a single scenario and instead adopt a low-cost, constant-readiness strategy that includes reviewing secondary sanctions, diversifying crude oil procurement routes, and establishing emergency response systems for personnel in the region.

I. Situational Analysis

US-Iran Conflict Reignites: The Larak Island Airstrike and Attacks on Jordan and the UAE

1. Background and Developments

The current crisis originated with the US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran on February 28, 2026 [2][4]. Although Supreme Leader Khamenei was killed in an Israeli airstrike, the Iranian regime itself did not collapse [2][4]. When the initial goal of regime change was not achieved after six months of military operations, the United States changed course [2]. On June 17, President Trump and the Tehran government signed the "Islamabad Memorandum" [2][6]. It stipulated an immediate and permanent cessation of military actions on all fronts [2][6].

The memorandum expired in July [2]. Iran then reverted to an offensive posture, forcibly asserting control over passage through the Strait of Hormuz [2]. Before the war, about one-fifth of the world's crude oil supply passed through the strait [6]. Since the war began, the strait has been effectively blockaded, and the United States has responded with a naval counter-blockade of Iranian ports [9]. Both sides had maintained conflicting positions regarding the opening and closing of the strait [6].

At this stage, the US military was facing the problem of dwindling interceptor missile inventories. THAAD inventories were assessed to have decreased by at least 38%, and Patriot inventories by up to 65% [4]. This physical constraint has been cited as a factor limiting the Trump administration's own ability to decide on escalation [4]. In late August, reports emerged that Iranian insiders had considered striking US military bases in Europe, including in Bulgaria and Cyprus [4]. This was interpreted as a form of leverage to press for the resumption of negotiations [4].

2. Current Situation

On Sunday, August 30, the US military struck two Iranian launch sites on Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz [8][15]. US Central Command (CENTCOM) described it as a "limited and precise" operation, stating that it targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) forces preparing to launch naval mines into the strait [15]. This was the first confirmed US attack on Iran since late July [8].

The IRGC immediately announced that it had carried out retaliatory strikes with ballistic missiles and drones on US military bases in Jordan and the UAE [1][5]. The Tehran Times reported that the IRGC characterized the action as a "decisive response to the violation of Iran's national sovereignty and territorial integrity" and warned of a "more destructive" response to any future attacks [1]. The Jordanian military stated that it had intercepted eight missiles fired toward its territory but did not specify the origin of the launch [5]. This exchange of fire was the first engagement to break the nearly month-long lull in hostilities [3][9].

In an interview with Fox News, President Trump signaled further retaliation, stating, "We will hit them hard" [3][10]. Global oil prices rose 3% immediately after news of the Iranian missile attack broke [10]. US Treasury Secretary Bessent announced that new secondary sanctions would be imposed weekly, suggesting that military responses and economic pressure are being pursued in parallel [8]. More than six months into the war, both sides remain deadlocked, with Iran continuing its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the US maintaining its naval blockade of Iranian ports [9].

3. Key Actors and Positions

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)The IRGC has framed the Larak Island airstrike as a violation of its territorial sovereignty and has officially characterized the strikes on bases in Jordan and the UAE as a "decisive response" [1]. It has repeatedly issued deterrent messages, vowing to respond more than proportionally to every attack [1]. However, the Iranian economy is simultaneously grappling with the pressure of secondary sanctions and its own losses from the strait blockade, creating a gap between its hardline rhetoric and its actual capacity for escalation.

United States (Trump Administration)The administration has described the Larak Island strike as a "limited and precise" response to Iran's preparations to lay naval mines, emphasizing it does not seek escalation, while simultaneously warning it "will hit them harder" in the event of further provocations [3][10][15]. This can be seen as a response that employs the dual tracks of military escalation and economic pressure, but one made from a position where the range of actual military options is narrowed by constraints on interceptor missile inventories [4]. The Treasury Department maintains its position of continuing economic pressure on Iran through secondary sanctions [8].

JordanJordan has taken a cautious stance, stating only that it intercepted eight missiles that entered its airspace without specifying their origin [5]. This is interpreted as a balancing act aimed at maintaining its pro-US alignment while avoiding being drawn into a direct confrontation with Iran.

UAEThe UAE was hit by this missile attack after having already completely suspended trade, commercial, and financial transactions with Iran [6]. This can be seen as the materialization of the warning from Iran's chief of staff of the armed forces that providing support and facilities to US forces would be considered an act of war [6]. As the UAE has expressed a willingness for dialogue and regional integration alongside its economic cutoff measures, it is likely to attempt to manage the level of pressure rather than pursue all-out confrontation following this strike [6].

4. Key Issues

First, it is unclear whether this engagement is a one-off retaliatory cycle or a signal of re-escalation. French media described the incident as the "first engagement in a month" [7], while Iranian state media warned of a "more destructive" response [1]. The actual level of the Trump administration's response will likely depend on Iran's reaction over the next few days.

Second, a key question is how the constraints on the US military's interceptor inventories will affect actual decisions on escalation [4]. Amid warnings from senior military officers that a prolonged war is eroding US defense capabilities [13], some interpret President Trump's bombing of Larak Island as a signal that he has "no intention of ending the war, no matter the cost" [13].

Third is the risk that Gulf allies could be drawn into the conflict as belligerents against their will. The very fact that both Jordan and the UAE were directly targeted in this attack has reaffirmed the structural vulnerability of regional countries that host US forces.

Fourth is the issue of the effectiveness of secondary sanctions. The US Treasury's policy of announcing new sanctions weekly [8] can be read as an attempt to compensate for limited military options with economic tools, but as long as China continues to import Iranian crude oil, the effectiveness of sanctions will remain structurally limited [2].

This phase of re-escalation shows that the US strategy toward Iran has not yet settled on a firm direction between military escalation and economic pressure. Whether Iran responds further and the actual scale of the Trump administration's strikes in the coming days will likely be a watershed moment determining the next phase of the situation.

II. In-Depth Analysis

US-Iran Conflict Reignites: The Larak Island Airstrike and Attacks on Jordan and the UAE

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The immediate trigger for this re-escalation was the Larak Island airstrike, but underlying it is the structural limitation that the Islamabad Memorandum was merely a temporary fix to prevent escalation from the outset. The memorandum stipulated an "immediate and permanent cessation of military actions on all fronts" [2][6], but it failed to resolve the core issue of passage rights through the Strait of Hormuz. After the memorandum expired, Iran shifted its course toward forcibly exercising control over the strait [2]. The United States perceived this as an unacceptable challenge.

CENTCOM defined the Larak Island strike as a "limited response to forces preparing to launch naval mines" [15]. This phrasing itself reveals the US dilemma. Washington needed to signal that it would not tolerate attempts to blockade the strait, even as it sought to avoid a full-scale war. For the IRGC, the opposite logic is at play. The Tehran Times characterized the airstrike as a "violation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity" [1]. For Iran, the Larak Island airstrike was not a bargaining chip but a violation of sovereignty itself.

A pattern is repeating in which both countries justify their actions as self-defense. Iran interprets its mine-laying as an exercise of control over the strait, while the US sees it as a violation of freedom of navigation. As long as this perception gap remains, localized clashes could recur at any time.

2. Structural Context

Security Structure: The US Military's Physical Constraints

What stands out in this phase of escalation is that the US capacity for escalation is not what it once was. After six months of attrition warfare, THAAD interceptor missile inventories are assessed to have decreased by at least 38%, and Patriot inventories by up to 65% [4]. This inventory depletion has acted as a structural constraint, narrowing the Trump administration's options [4]. In this context, the German newspaper Die Presse reported that senior US generals have warned that a prolonged war is undermining the superpower's defense capabilities [13]. The interpretation that President Trump's bombing of Larak Island reaffirmed his will "not to end the war, no matter the cost" also emerged from this same context [13].

It is paradoxical that the United States resumed airstrikes despite these constraints. It amounts to sending a signal of escalation at a time when interceptor assets are scarce. This suggests that political necessity—the judgment that the strait blockade could not be ignored—took precedence over military capacity.

Economic Structure: Parallel Sanctions and Blockades

US Treasury Secretary Bessent announced that new secondary sanctions would be imposed weekly [8]. This shows that military strikes and economic pressure are not separate but are being operated as a single system of coercion. At the same time, a stalemate has persisted for over six months, with Iran maintaining its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the US maintaining its counter-blockade of Iranian ports [9]. This structure of blockade-counter-blockade is entrenching a situation where neither side can force the other to submit, leading only to a war of attrition.

Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz was a conduit for about one-fifth of the world's crude oil supply [6]. The significance of this figure goes beyond mere statistics. It means that the longer the conflict over the strait continues, the more structural instability in the oil market becomes a constant. Indeed, when news of this latest exchange broke, global oil prices rose by 3% [10]. The market appears to have already entered a phase where it prices in the recurrence of such localized conflicts as a repeating risk.

Political Structure: The Risk of Entangling Regional States

The very fact that Jordan and the UAE host US military bases is a structural factor that draws these countries into the conflict as parties. The Jordanian military stated it intercepted eight missiles fired toward its territory but did not specify their origin [5]. This ambiguous stance shows that Jordan is in a dual position, needing to maintain its alliance with the US while avoiding a direct confrontation with Iran. The UAE faces a similar dilemma. It is understood to be pursuing a balancing strategy of completely suspending trade and financial transactions with Iran while also reaffirming its willingness for dialogue and regional integration [6]. This suggests that Gulf states are exposed to the structural risk of being drawn into the conflict as belligerents, regardless of their own intentions.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The current incident follows a pattern that has repeated over the past six months of the war. At the war's outset on February 28, the US and Israel aimed for a short, decisive intervention, but the actual course of the war deviated significantly from this plan [4]. Despite the symbolic blow of Supreme Leader Khamenei's death, the Iranian regime did not collapse, and Iran immediately launched a counterattack [4]. The recent Larak Island airstrike and the retaliatory attacks on Jordan and the UAE repeat this same pattern. This means it is not the first time a cycle of a US precision strike leading to an immediate and broad Iranian retaliation has occurred.

The signing and subsequent breakdown of the Islamabad Memorandum can also be seen as part of this repeating pattern. A lull of about a month followed the signing of the memorandum on June 17 [2][6], but the current re-escalation has revealed this was a temporary pause rather than a resolution of fundamental issues. Reports in late August that Iranian insiders had considered striking US bases in Europe, including in Bulgaria and Cyprus [4], were a precedent that foreshadowed how leverage for negotiations could translate into actual action. In this context, the recent attacks on Jordan and the UAE can be seen as a case that reaffirms Iran's pattern of actually targeting US assets in the region.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the status of the US military's interceptor asset inventory. The rate of depletion of THAAD and Patriot inventories could substantially constrain the scope and intensity of any further retaliation by the Trump administration [4]. If inventories fall below a critical threshold, the focus may shift from military escalation toward strengthening defensive postures and increasing economic pressure.

The second variable is the effectiveness of secondary sanctions. The sustainability of the US pressure strategy will likely depend on whether the weekly sanctions announced by Treasury Secretary Bessent [8] actually damage the Iranian economy or are rendered ineffective by sanctioned countries' evasive transactions.

The third variable is a potential shift in the stance of regional allies like Jordan and the UAE. If these countries continue to host US bases, they must accept the risk of becoming repeated targets for Iran. If this burden exceeds a critical point, the possibility of fractures in the regional alliance structure itself cannot be ruled out.

The fourth variable is the gap between President Trump's rhetoric and his actual actions. It is currently difficult to determine whether his warning to "hit them hard" [3][10] will lead to large-scale military action or, as before, be limited to restricted strikes. The level of the US response will likely be determined on a case-by-case basis at the intersection of military capacity and political judgment, an issue that can only be assessed by observing developments over the next few weeks.