Strengthening European Self-Defense Capabilities and Discussions on Strategic Autonomy: Current Status Diagnosis and Responses from the South Korean Defense Industry

Summary

As the war in Ukraine prolongs and the Trump administration's alliance policy is adjusted, Europe is experiencing cracks in its trust in the American security umbrella. Poland has emerged as a leader in the rearmament discourse, with Foreign Minister Sikorski proposing a NATO-complementary 'European Legion.' However, due to the differing threat perceptions between France and Germany and the institutional coexistence of the EU and NATO, discussions on political integration are likely to remain at a declarative level. In contrast, individual industrial and technological projects, such as the development of interceptors by the Destinus consortium and the establishment of the HALO satellite network, have already secured concrete schedules and are underway. The basic scenario with a 55% probability depicts a situation where American pressure and European self-reliance occur concurrently amid friction, while the feasibility of a unified self-reliance path is limited to 20%. The South Korean government and defense companies should focus on an execution-oriented strategy that deepens existing procurement channels with Poland and enters as a subsystem supplier for projects like the Destinus consortium, rather than betting on the success or failure of political integration discourse. At the same time, it is necessary to continuously monitor the trend of strengthening dual-use technology export controls pointed out by SIPRI to manage technology transfer risks in advance.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

Expansion of Discussions on Strengthening European Self-Defense Capabilities and Strategic Autonomy: Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Progress

As the war in Ukraine enters its fifth year, Europe's security calculus has fundamentally changed. EAI currently defines Europe's situation as a "deadlock." The diagnosis is that peace negotiations are stagnant while Russia's ambitions for westward expansion continue [6]. This is compounded by the Trump administration's adjustment of its alliance policy. The United States is pressuring its allies to increase defense spending and burden-sharing under the banner of "America First 2.0" [2]. NATO is in a transitional phase from a U.S.-centric single-axis structure to a U.S.-European dual-axis structure [2].

In this process, Poland has emerged as a leading country in European rearmament. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Warsaw has devoted itself to military expansion [5]. Poland, being a NATO frontline state bordering Russia, is the country that most directly feels security threats. Against this backdrop, Poland's defense discourse tends to be ahead of other Western European countries.

2. Current Situation

Prime Minister Tusk declared at the Polish Armed Forces Day ceremony on August 15 that the Polish military would soon become "the largest in Europe" [5]. This statement is not merely domestic rhetoric; it is interpreted as a signal that Poland seeks to formalize its status change in military capability within NATO.

Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski took it a step further in an interview with the Greek media Kathimerini. He emphasized the need for a much deeper level of military integration in Europe [1]. The permanent "European Legion" proposed by Sikorski is designed not to replace NATO but to complement it [1]. He warned that Russia is already waging a "war" against European society through sabotage, misinformation, assassination attempts, and drone attacks [1]. The recipient of this statement is not only Europe. In a context where the U.S. administration has raised the issue of security free-riding in Europe, it can also be interpreted as a message to the U.S. that Europe intends to take responsibility for its own security [1].

Movements toward self-reliance are also materializing in the defense industry. The Destinus-led consortium, which includes MBDA, Safran, Airbus, and Thales, signed a letter of intent in Paris [9]. They aim to develop the first exo-atmospheric interceptor in Europe and plan to reach a binding agreement within three months and commence joint engineering work from August [9]. The backdrop for the formation of this consortium is the recognition that Europe lacks its own capabilities in this area amid increasing Russian ballistic missile production [9].

Multilateral cooperation has also advanced in the space domain. Eight NATO allies announced plans to establish the HALO (Hybrid Alliance Layered Operations in Space) satellite network during the NATO summit held in Ankara [12]. NATO Deputy Secretary General Shekherinska described this as "a new chapter in allied space operations" [12]. HALO is a multinational satellite constellation that supports multi-domain operations from communications to surveillance, focusing on the integration and interconnection of sovereign satellite assets held by each country [12].

3. Key Actors and Positions

Polandis effectively the leading country in this trend. Both the Tusk government and Foreign Minister Sikorski are pursuing a dual strategy of expanding military capabilities and promoting security integration at the European level simultaneously [5][1]. Poland's interests are clear: to establish an early architecture for European security independent of NATO's reliance on the U.S. and to secure a voice commensurate with Poland's military significance within that framework.

Germanyis in a relatively defensive position. The absence of civil defense infrastructure, such as bunkers, raises security concerns, indicating that Germany is lagging behind Poland and France in terms of actual preparedness in the rearmament discourse. The German industry is expanding its business scope into the defense sector, from automotive parts manufacturers to engineering firms [17]. This aligns with local assessments that defense demand is emerging as a new growth driver amid the stagnation of German manufacturing [17].

French defense companies(Safran, Airbus, Thales) and the startupDestinus, along with missile specialist MBDArepresent industrial interests. They are attempting to convert the gap in Europe's reliance on U.S. technology for intercontinental and strategic defense systems into commercial opportunities. The formation of this consortium demonstrates that European defense companies are operationalizing government-level self-reliance discourse into actual industrial projects.

The NATO Secretariatis positioning itself as a balancer in the transition process to a U.S.-Europe dual-axis structure. The announcement of the HALO project under NATO's name can be seen as an attempt to absorb the self-reliance efforts of individual European countries into the NATO framework. This is a strategy to manage the expansion of Europe's strategic autonomy so that it results in a reconfiguration within NATO rather than a departure from it.

The European Commissionis trying to simultaneously drive support for Ukraine and the development of the European defense industry through financial assistance. While planning to provide an additional 19.5 billion euros to Ukraine out of a 90 billion euro program for 2026-2027, a spokesperson for the European Commission acknowledged the uncertainty regarding the purchase of Patriot missiles. This exemplifies the gap between Europe's self-reliance intentions and its actual procurement capabilities.

4. Key Issues

The most fundamental issue is the relationship between NATO and the 'European Legion' concept. While Sikorski emphasizes a complementary relationship rather than competition, no specifics have been presented regarding who holds command structures and decision-making authority. The second issue is the supply chain of raw materials. Advanced defense systems such as space interceptors and satellite networks heavily depend on rare raw materials, and Europe's supply chain vulnerabilities are cited as structural constraints. The third issue is the export control of dual-use technologies. There are concerns about gaps in control systems as European countries mobilize civilian research and startup resources for military purposes. Finally, there is a gap between the pace of self-reliance and financial capacity. The disparity between countries rapidly increasing military spending, like Poland, and those lacking even basic civil defense infrastructure, like Germany, acts as a factor delaying the establishment of a unified defense system at the European level.

II. In-Depth Issue Analysis

Expanding Discussions on Strengthening Europe's Self-Defense Capabilities and Strategic Autonomy: In-Depth Issue Analysis

1. Fundamental Cause Analysis

The fundamental cause of the discussions on European rearmament lies in the structural erosion of trust in the United States as a security provider. Since the end of the Cold War, European countries have maintained defense spending at a low level relative to GDP. This has been predicated on the assumption that U.S. extended deterrence through NATO operates reliably. The Trump administration's "America First 2.0" has shaken this assumption. The U.S. Department of Defense has pressured allies to increase defense spending and power-sharing while simultaneously demanding increased production rates from its own defense industry. The incident involving the dismissal of the commander of the U.S. Army V Corps stationed in Europe illustrates the friction that has arisen during this recalibration process.

The remarks of Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski most directly reveal this fracture in trust. He stated that Russia is already waging a "war" against European society through sabotage, disinformation, assassination attempts, and drone attacks. This perception leads to the judgment that Europe can no longer rely solely on the American security umbrella. The 'European Legion' proposed by Sikorski is not intended to replace NATO but to complement it. However, the actual recipient of this statement is the United States. It sends a signal to the U.S. that Europe intends to take responsibility for its own security while also serving as insurance in case the U.S. withdraws from Europe.

Another fundamental cause is the pace of Russia's military rebuilding. The backdrop for European defense companies' initiatives to develop exo-atmospheric interceptors is the increase in Russian ballistic missile production. The recognition that Europe lacks its own interception capabilities in this area was a direct driving force behind the formation of the consortium. The combination of threat perception and the reality of the absence of specific weapon systems has transformed the self-reliance discourse from abstract rhetoric into industrial projects.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure

The discussions on European self-reliance unfold on the basis of asymmetric threat perceptions among countries. Poland is a NATO frontline state bordering Russia. The geopolitical position is the backdrop for Prime Minister Tusk's declaration that Poland will soon have "the largest army in Europe." The threat perception among Western European countries is lower than this. France has led the discourse on European sovereignty since President Macron's re-election, but this is closer to a principled orientation towards strategic independence from the U.S. Germany faces a much more practical security gap due to the absence of civil defense infrastructure such as bunkers. This temperature difference increases the coordination costs when integrated concepts like the 'European Legion' move to actual institutionalization.

The coexistence of the EU and NATO as two institutional pillars also presents structural constraints. The European Commission plans to transfer an additional 19.5 billion euros to Ukraine this year out of a 90 billion euro support program for Ukraine in 2026-2027, but a spokesperson explained that it is uncertain whether this funding will enable Ukraine to purchase Patriot air defense missiles. The gap between financial allocation and weapon system procurement illustrates the delays experienced by European defense integration between political declarations and execution.

Economic and Industrial Structure

The European defense industry faces chronic constraints due to vulnerabilities in raw material supply chains. The Roland Berger report points out that securing key raw materials is essential for ensuring resilience in the aerospace and defense sectors. This constraint also applies to advanced interceptor development projects like the Destinus consortium. At the same time, SIPRI analyzes that European countries and the EU are expanding dual-use research by attracting civilian research resources from universities, research institutes, and spin-off companies as they accelerate rearmament and military modernization plans. In Germany, automotive parts manufacturers and engineering firms are transitioning their businesses to dual-use technologies such as drones and autonomous vehicles. While industrial base restructuring is underway, structural bottlenecks related to raw material procurement and export controls are unlikely to be resolved in the short term.

Security Structure

NATO is in a transitional phase from a U.S.-centric single-axis structure to a U.S.-Europe dual-axis structure. The establishment of the HALO satellite network is an example of this dual-axis structure extending into the space domain. This project, involving eight NATO allies, focuses on the integration and linkage of sovereign satellite assets held by each country. NATO Deputy Secretary General Shekherinska's description of this as "a new chapter in allied space operations" suggests an intention to highlight that space is no longer solely a U.S. domain. The SIPRI-hosted workshop on the space-nuclear nexus also addressed the implications of strategic uncertainty in space for European security. The trend of expanding the security structure from ground and maritime domains to space and cyber domains indicates that discussions on European self-reliance are moving beyond conventional military capability enhancement.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The concept of a European independent military force is not new. Since the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) concept in the 1950s due to the French National Assembly's rejection of ratification, discussions on a permanent integrated army at the European level have been raised multiple times without realization. The obstacles each time were similar to those today: resistance to sovereignty transfer by individual countries, issues regarding the relationship with NATO, and disagreements over financial burden-sharing. Sikorski's emphasis on the 'European Legion' concept as a complement rather than a replacement for NATO can also be seen as a learning effect from these past failures. It is designed to avoid triggering U.S. backlash and internal fractures among member states if it appears to be in competition with NATO.

The method of joint weapon system development through defense industry consortiums has already accumulated experience from multinational mergers such as Eurofighter and MBDA itself. The structure of the Destinus consortium, which draws in large companies led by startups, differs from past government-led joint development. The approach of having startups as focal points while involving established defense companies like Airbus, Thales, Safran, and MBDA is an extension of the recent trend where the drone and autonomous weapon startup ecosystem, which has emerged due to the war in Ukraine, combines with the traditional defense industry.

The decisive difference between current discussions on conventional defense in Europe and those during the Cold War is the nature of the threats. NATO's forward defense concept during the Cold War was designed based on the scenario of full armored warfare by the Warsaw Pact. The threats identified by Sikorski today are highly hybrid in nature, including sabotage, disinformation, assassination attempts, and drone attacks. The recognition that mere enhancement of conventional forces is insufficient for response is leading to investments across multiple domains, including space, satellites, and interceptors.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

The first variable is the level of U.S. security commitment fulfillment. Depending on whether the U.S. administration's pressure remains limited to demands for increased defense spending or leads to actual troop and asset redeployment, the pace of European self-reliance will vary. EAI analysis presents a 55% probability for the scenario where U.S. pressure and European self-reliance continue to occur in parallel amidst friction. This suggests that European self-reliance is likely to unfold as a process of adjustment within a dual-axis structure rather than a complete break with the U.S.

The second variable is whether the gap in threat perception between Poland and key Western European countries converges. Tusk and Sikorski's remarks are interpreted as Poland's attempt to seize leadership in European defense discourse. The extent to which Germany and France align with this trend will determine the feasibility of institutionalization concepts like the 'European Legion.'

The third variable is the degree of self-sufficiency in the defense supply chain. Unless the structural constraints of raw material procurement and dual-use technology export controls are resolved in the short term, projects like the Destinus consortium or HALO will take considerable time to transition from the planning announcement stage to actual deployment. The case of the Patriot missile, which illustrated the gap between funding allocation and actual procurement, suggests the practical weight of this variable.

From the perspective of the South Korean government and defense companies, it is essential to keep in mind that the combination of these three variables will alter the pathways for entering the European market. A dual-track strategy involving partnerships with Baltic startups, integration into subsystem supply chains, and participation in NATO 3.0 discussions remains valid in that it does not bet on specific scenarios.