The Use of North Korean KN-23 Missiles in Russia's War Against Ukraine and South Korea's Response Directions

Executive Summary

The use of North Korean KN-23 series missiles was confirmed through multiple independent media reports during Russia's airstrikes on Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia on August 11. This incident indicates that the close ties between North Korea and Russia, which followed the 2023 Vostochny summit and the signing of a strategic partnership treaty, have entered the operational phase of real weapon systems. The deployment of Russian missile units in western Russia, independently confirmed by Ukraine's GUR and French intelligence agencies, is assessed as a credible structural change; however, the troop deployment estimates raised by President Zelensky, lacking evidence, require separate verification. Considering the Ukrainian government's practice of controlling the scope of battlefield information disclosure, South Korea needs a dual approach that separates the confirmed fact of missile use from unverified figures. The response directions can be summarized into three pillars: reassessment of the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture and KAMD, maintaining humanitarian and information-sharing engagement with Ukraine, and sustaining the line on lethal weapon support.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

Issue Situation Analysis: Confirmation of the Use of North Korean KN-23 Missiles in Russian Attacks on Ukraine

1. Background and Progress

The starting point of the military closeness between North Korea and Russia is the Vostochny summit in September 2023. This summit ended without a press conference or a joint statement. The fact that the venue was a spaceport foreshadowed the subsequent expansion of cooperation into the fields of space and military technology. In March 2024, Russia refused to extend the activities of the expert panel monitoring the implementation of UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. This effectively neutralized the existing sanctions monitoring system. In June of the same year, North Korea and Russia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty.

Following this treaty, reports of the operational deployment of North Korean weapons in Ukraine began to emerge repeatedly. The use of North Korean ballistic missiles was confirmed during the airstrikes on Radushne and Zaporizhzhia. Ukraine's GUR and French intelligence agencies independently detected the deployment of North Korean missile units in western Russia. This indicates that North Korea has entered a phase of direct involvement in the operational use of real weapon systems, beyond merely providing troops and supplies.

2. Current Situation

On the night of August 11, Russian forces simultaneously struck Kyiv and Zaporizhzhia using Iskander missiles, KN-23 series North Korean ballistic missiles, and Zircon cruise missiles. President Zelensky announced via social media that Zaporizhzhia was attacked by "North Korean ballistic missiles, Zircon missiles, and guided aerial bombs." Initial reports indicated 6 fatalities and 19 injuries; however, subsequent media reports varied, with fatalities reported between 7 and as high as 10. The discrepancy in casualty figures across different media outlets reflects the typical pattern of provisional adjustments in announcements by Ukrainian authorities, which does not undermine the credibility of the reports.

The Kyiv Independent noted that while the types of missiles used in this airstrike were disclosed, the exact number of launches was not made public. The same outlet reported that there has been domestic criticism regarding the recent cessation of the Ukrainian Air Force's publication of Russian ballistic missile launch figures. This suggests that the Ukrainian government is strategically adjusting the scope of information disclosure related to the battlefield, which should be considered when assessing the accuracy of future reports on the use of North Korean weapons.

3. Key Actors and Interests

Ukrainian Government and President Zelensky: Publicly raising the issue of the use of North Korean missiles serves two simultaneous purposes: one is to strengthen international pressure on Russia, and the other is to create a justification for additional support from the West, such as Patriot systems. However, the estimates of 30,000 to 50,000 additional North Korean troops raised by President Zelensky lack publicly available evidence and are based on a single source, necessitating verification given the upward adjustment of estimates within a month. This point should be evaluated separately from the independently confirmed fact of missile use.

Ukrainian Media (Kyiv Independent, NK News, etc.)Local Ukrainian media quickly relay government announcements but also exhibit critical tones regarding the reduction of information disclosure by their own air force, revealing a certain tension with the government. This indicates that Ukrainian media reporting is not merely a government spokesperson but also performs some degree of independent verification.

RussiaWhile deploying North Korean weapons in actual combat, Russia maintains an ambiguous stance by neither officially confirming nor denying this. This can be interpreted as a strategy to maximize the freedom of cooperation secured after the neutralization of the North Korean sanctions monitoring system.

North KoreaWithout receiving clear economic compensation for large-scale troop deployments and material support, North Korea is gaining political and military benefits through the accumulation of operational data and verification of precision-guided technology. Evidence of the practical enhancement of missile capabilities, such as improvements in impact error, has also been confirmed.

The West (United States, France, etc.)French intelligence agencies independently detected signs of the installation of launchers for North Korean missile units and provided cross-verification of the information confirmed by Ukraine's GUR. This demonstrates that Western intelligence agencies are not unilaterally accepting information from Ukraine but are operating their own verification systems.

4. Core Issues

The first issue is the credibility of reports from Ukrainian media. While casualty figures vary between 6 and 10 depending on the media and timing, the core fact of the use of KN-23 series missiles has been reported by multiple outlets of different nationalities, citing President Zelensky's announcements, and is consistent with independent confirmations from Ukraine's GUR and French intelligence agencies. Unlike troop deployment figures, the fact of missile use should be treated as a structurally established fact.

The second issue is the change in the Ukrainian government's information disclosure strategy. The recent pattern of disclosing missile types while keeping the number of launches undisclosed suggests a potential decrease in the specificity of future reports related to the use of North Korean weapons. This further emphasizes the need for independent verification by the South Korean government.

The third issue is the changing nature of military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. The transition from troop provision to the actual verification of weapon systems in combat represents a challenge that undermines the baseline for assessing the precision of North Korean missiles, which has been a premise of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, and should be treated as a separate issue from the controversy over troop deployment.

II. In-Depth Issue Analysis

In-Depth Issue Analysis: The Use of North Korean KN-23 Missiles in Russian Attacks on Ukraine

1. Fundamental Cause Analysis

The background of North Korea providing missiles to Russia and transferring operational data goes beyond mere support for a friendly nation. The greatest weakness of North Korea's missile industry is the lack of operational verification data. North Korea has been developing missiles since the Cold War but has had no opportunity to verify precision-guided performance in a real combat environment. The Ukrainian battlefield is the only testing ground that fills this gap.

EAI analysis clearly points this out. "North Korea is gaining political and military benefits in exchange for operational data and verification of precision-guided technology without receiving clear economic compensation for large-scale troop deployments and material support." In other words, from North Korea's perspective, this attack is an investment rather than a loss. The data on how each missile operates in real combat and where errors occur is information that cannot be obtained through its own test launches.

The incentives for Russia are also clear. The war in Ukraine has rapidly depleted Russia's stock of precision-guided munitions. The Atlantic Council reports that in July 2026, Russia launched 126 ballistic missiles, the highest monthly total since the beginning of the conflict. In a situation where it is difficult to cope with this level of consumption solely through domestic production, North Korean missiles serve as a practical means to fill the quantitative gap. The interests of North Korea and Russia are thus precisely aligned: North Korea wants data, and Russia wants quantity.

2. Structural Context

Political StructureThe institutional basis for the closeness between North Korea and Russia was established at the Vostochny summit in September 2023. The fact that this summit ended without a press conference or a joint statement was itself unusual. The fact that the venue was a spaceport signaled that subsequent cooperation would expand into military technology. Subsequently, in March 2024, Russia's refusal to extend the activities of the UN Security Council expert panel monitoring sanctions against North Korea effectively neutralized the sanctions monitoring system. The comprehensive strategic partnership treaty signed in June of the same year elevated the relationship between the two countries to an alliance level. This sequential progression of three stages—summit meeting, neutralization of sanctions monitoring, and treaty signing—demonstrates that North Korea-Russia cooperation is not an impulsive reaction but a planned institutionalization process.

Military Technology StructureThe KN-23 confirmed in this attack is not a one-time support item. The EAI report analyzes that North Korea is pushing for the deployment of a dedicated missile unit with 6 launchers and 120 missiles in Voronezh Oblast, Russia. This shows that North Korea has entered the operational phase of real weapon systems, beyond merely providing troops and supplies. The independent confirmation of this deployment by Ukraine's GUR and French intelligence agencies indicates that this should be viewed as a structurally verified change rather than a claim from a single source.

Economic StructureRussia's production capacity for precision-guided munitions faces significant limitations due to supply constraints on components caused by Western sanctions and the loss of skilled personnel. In this situation, North Korea's missile supply is not irreplaceable, but the cost of substitution is very high. The fact that North Korea is obtaining technological data rather than traditional compensation such as cash or food through this cooperation suggests that this collaboration is part of a long-term military enhancement project rather than a short-term transaction.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

This is not the first time North Korean weapons have been deployed in actual combat overseas. Previous EAI analyses have pointed out that the use of North Korean F-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) was revealed during Hamas's surprise attack on Israel in 2023. At that time, a pattern was confirmed where North Korean weapons and tactics were verified in actual combat through specific conflict parties. However, the current KN-23 case differs in nature from previous cases. RPGs or conventional shells are closer to generic consumables, while the KN-23 is a short-range ballistic missile system that North Korea has developed as a core strategic asset. The repeated use of this weapon in combat indicates that North Korea is taking considerable risks to secure operational data for its core military capabilities.

There are also differences compared to the proxy war dynamics of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States have previously verified their weapon systems through allied nations in conflicts such as the Vietnam War and the Afghan War. However, in those cases, the weapon-providing countries were superpowers, and the beneficiary countries were the ones engaged in combat. In this case, the opposite is true: a relatively technologically weaker North Korea is providing weapons, while the military power Russia is consuming them in actual combat and returning data. This structure, where a small country utilizes the battlefield of a great power as a testing ground for its own weapons, can be seen as a relatively new pattern emerging in 21st-century proxy wars.

The similarities in design between the Iskander missile system and the KN-23 should also be noted. Since its early development, the KN-23 has been consistently linked to the Iskander-M system. The circumstances of the simultaneous deployment of Iskander and KN-23 in this attack suggest that the two systems are being operated complementarily against similar targets. This supports the possibility that Russia is integrating and operating North Korean missiles as an extension of its existing systems, beyond mere quantity support.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

The first variable is whether the sanctions monitoring system will be restored.As long as the UN expert panel's functions, which were neutralized by Russia's refusal in March 2024, are not restored, there will effectively be no official channels for the international community to verify the transfer of North Korean weapons to Russia. This means that even if similar cases recur in the future, the international response will inevitably rely on the independent information of individual governments.

The second variable is the scale of Western support for Ukraine's air defense assets.The recent domestic criticism regarding the Ukrainian Air Force's cessation of publishing Russian ballistic missile launch figures indicates that the Ukrainian government is in a dilemma over how much to expose the vulnerability of its air defense capabilities. The decision on whether to provide additional support for interception systems such as Patriots will directly impact the frequency and success rate of North Korean missiles' operational deployment in the future.

The third variable is the quality of data that North Korea secures and the speed at which it is relayed back to the Korean Peninsula.EAI analysis points out that there are indications that impact errors have improved to around 1 meter. If this precision improvement continues, it will lead to a need to reassess the baseline for evaluating North Korean missile performance, which has been a premise of South Korea's deterrence posture.

The fourth variable is the potential for institutional rollback of North Korea-Russia cooperation.The two measures of signing a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty and deploying missile units have already been executed, making it difficult to expect a return to the status quo in the short term. Whether this cooperation will be reduced due to changes in Russia's battlefield situation, such as the initiation of ceasefire negotiations, or maintained as a separate military-technical cooperation channel will be a key turning point for the future security environment on the Korean Peninsula.