The Absence of U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Western Pacific and the Risks of China's Military Expansion: Situation Analysis and Response Measures

Executive Summary

The prolonged deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln due to the Iran war has exceeded 260 days, prompting the U.S. Navy to redeploy the USS George Washington from the Western Pacific to the Middle East. This has resulted in a complete absence of U.S. aircraft carriers in the Asian region. While this situation stems more from structural constraints related to the dual-theater operational limits of carrier forces rather than an intentional disregard for Asia by the Trump administration, it significantly increases the likelihood of China's expanded activities in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. In the absence of a publicized schedule for alternative force deployment by the U.S. Department of Defense, South Korea must move beyond a passive stance reliant on U.S. announcements and concurrently establish an independent monitoring system, diversify supply chains, and elevate the trilateral information-sharing channels among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. This incident is assessed not as an isolated event but as an initial case of a pattern that is likely to recur over the coming years in the context of U.S.-China maritime power competition.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

Analysis of the Absence of U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific

1. Background and Progress

The absence of U.S. aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific stems from the protraction of the Iran war. The Trump administration has maintained a long-term deployment of the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Middle East to respond to military confrontations with Iran. The deployment period of Lincoln has far exceeded the originally scheduled return in May[4]. This deployment has set a record of over 260 days of continuous maritime operations[13].

The issue lies with the condition of the Lincoln crew. Reports of deteriorating mental health and supply issues due to the long deployment have been frequently covered by local media[9][15]. In response, the U.S. Navy decided to deploy an alternative force. The USS George Washington, which was in the Western Pacific, was identified as the replacement[7].

After completing its port call in Da Nang, Vietnam, the George Washington passed through the Singapore Strait and the Malacca Strait. It then set a course towards the Indian Ocean[15]. This trajectory resulted in the complete withdrawal of U.S. aircraft carriers from the Western Pacific. The AP described this as "President Trump withdrew the last aircraft carrier from Asia while focusing on Iran and the Western Hemisphere"[7].

2. Current Situation

Local media perspectives are largely consistent. The Times of India reported this absence as "opening space for China to expand its influence"[1]. Mint similarly pointed out that the Iran war is excessively dispersing U.S. naval power[4]. The AP emphasized the coincidence of increasing aggressive signals from China and the aircraft carrier absence[7].

From the perspective of the U.S. Department of Defense, this redeployment is ostensibly a measure to address crew welfare issues. The Department has only reaffirmed the principle of replacing Lincoln with a "very similar vessel," without specifying the duration of the absence in the Western Pacific or the schedule for deploying alternative forces[11]. This is not unrelated to the political landscape in Washington. The Trump administration is in a position where it must concentrate resources on the political burdens of the Iran war and issues in the Western Hemisphere, such as the arrest of Venezuelan leader Maduro[5]. The Asia-Pacific theater has thus been relegated to a relatively lower priority.

The analysis by the East Asia Institute interprets this trend as a structural phase of U.S.-China maritime power competition. Historically, "when a maritime hegemon faces a maritime power competition from challengers, it has shown a tendency to redeploy naval forces that were stationed in surrounding areas while seeking new alliances or readjusting existing ones"[5]. The case of Britain in the late 19th century, which adjusted its naval forces in response to simultaneous naval power enhancements by the U.S., Germany, and Japan, is presented as a reference point[5]. The current situation, where the U.S. is concentrating resources in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere while accepting a temporary absence in the Western Pacific, aligns with this pattern.

3. Key Actor Analysis

U.S. Navy and Department of Defenseare limiting the superficial justification for this incident to crew welfare issues. The mental health crisis and supply shortages aboard Lincoln have acted as pressure factors from Congress and the media[9]. For the Department of Defense, maintaining a humanitarian replacement frame is politically advantageous compared to framing it as a strategic gap.

President Trumphas prioritized ending the Iran war and stabilizing the Middle East. Even after signing a memorandum of understanding with Iran in June, the ceasefire has remained precarious[6], leading to ongoing pressure to deploy military assets in the Middle East. Simultaneously, the focus on strengthening interventions in the Western Hemisphere, represented by the arrest of Maduro in Venezuela, is also influencing resource allocation[5].

Chinais interpreting this absence as a demonstration of the structural limitations of U.S. hegemony. Commentary from the East Asia Institute analyzes that "the Xi Jinping government in China views this war not merely as a regional conflict but as revealing the operational methods and limitations of U.S. hegemony, which will have significant repercussions for the transitional international order"[12]. China has publicly mentioned the decline of U.S. hegemony since the second half of 2025 while pursuing a dual strategy of seeking a practical coexistence relationship with the U.S.[12]. The expansion of military activities in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea is intertwined with this assessment of the situation.

Indiaand other Asian allies are reporting this situation with a mix of concern. The Times of India has covered this issue significantly on two occasions, suggesting that India also perceives the expansion of China's military influence as linked to its own security[1][15].

4. Key Issues

The first issue is the duration of the absence. The U.S. Department of Defense has not clearly disclosed the schedule for replacement[11]. If the absence is short-lived, it may remain a symbolic issue. However, if the situation in the Middle East worsens further, the possibility of a prolonged absence in the Western Pacific cannot be ruled out.

The second issue is whether this incident is a one-time event or a signal of structural transition. The East Asia Institute presents a view that sees this as part of a long-term trend of U.S.-China maritime power competition[5]. According to this perspective, the redeployment of carriers is more a reflection of the structural constraints of the U.S. having to allocate resources across multiple fronts than a single variable like the Iran war.

The third issue is the response capacity of allies. The lack of a suitable entity to fill the deterrence gap in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea during the absence of U.S. carriers remains a practical problem. Military experts generally assess that the self-naval capabilities of regional allies such as Japan and Australia are insufficient to replace the deterrent signals of a carrier strike group.

The fourth issue is the level of China's response. How much China increases the intensity of military actions in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea during the absence will be a key observation point in the coming weeks. This will serve as a litmus test for gauging the Trump administration's re-prioritization of its Asia policy.

II. In-Depth Issue Analysis

Analysis of the Absence of U.S. Aircraft Carriers in the Pacific

1. Fundamental Cause Analysis

The superficial cause of this absence is simple. As the Iran war has prolonged beyond expectations, the U.S. Navy has lost the flexibility to operate its carrier forces. The deployment period of the USS Abraham Lincoln has surpassed 260 days[13]. This is an unusual figure in the context of U.S. Navy carrier deployment practices. Reports of deteriorating mental health and supply issues among the crew have been made public through local media[9][15]. The Department of Defense used this as a justification to deploy the George Washington as a replacement.

However, the fundamental cause is not the deployment period itself. It lies in the absolute quantity of carrier forces that the U.S. Navy possesses, which is insufficient to handle two theaters simultaneously. The U.S. Navy typically maintains 11 carriers, but considering maintenance and training cycles, only three or four carriers are actually deployable at any given time. The moment a decision is made to continuously deploy carriers in the Middle East, a power gap occurs in another theater. This incident is a case where this structural constraint has materialized in the specific theater of the Western Pacific[7].

The adjustment of policy priorities by the Trump administration is also a key aspect of the fundamental cause. The administration is concentrating resources on responding to the Iran war and issues in the Western Hemisphere, particularly the arrest of Maduro in Venezuela[5]. The Asia-Pacific has been relatively deprioritized. The AP summarized this as "President Trump focusing on Iran and the Western Hemisphere"[7]. This indicates a shift in the administration's regional strategic weight allocation beyond a temporary personnel deployment issue.

2. Structural Context

Military Structure: Limits of Dual Burden on Carrier Forces

The U.S. Navy's carrier forces were designed to counter the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. This system was not originally designed to sustain high-intensity operations in two major theaters simultaneously. As military tensions with Iran in the Middle East have prolonged, maintaining deterrence in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea simultaneously in the Western Pacific ultimately encounters limits of power circulation. This incident can be viewed as the first case where this structural limitation has surfaced.

Political Structure: Domestic Politics in Washington and Resource Allocation

The foreign policy of the Trump administration is driven by the urgent issue of the Iran war and the political priority of intervention in the Western Hemisphere[5]. The Asia-Pacific strategy is in a phase where it fails to secure concrete execution power due to being overshadowed by these two axes. EAI analysis has pointed out that since President Trump's first visit to Asia, "the economic aspects have been highlighted, while there has been no mention of future relations with China, the importance of alliances, or multilateral economic cooperation"[10]. The withdrawal of this carrier is a concrete manifestation of this strategic ambiguity in actual military asset deployment.

Economic Structure: Budget and Resource Pressures of the Iran War

The war with Iran is not merely a military operation but entails ongoing budget and personnel consumption. Tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz serve as both a bargaining chip and a burden for the Trump administration[3][6]. As long as carrier forces and budgets are continuously deployed in Middle Eastern operations, the structural possibility of a power gap in the Asia-Pacific will remain high.

Alliance Structure: Trust Issues in the Indo-Pacific Alliance Network

This absence is directly linked to trust issues regarding U.S. security commitments among allies. As discussed at the EAI-Brookings Conference, "the possibility of a retreat from the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and the responses of allies" has already been a core agenda in regional security discourse since the first term of Trump[8]. This incident can be seen as the first concrete case where these concerns have been manifested in actual military asset deployment.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

EAI analysis interprets this incident as a typical phase of power redistribution for maritime hegemons. "Historically, maritime hegemons have shown a tendency to seek new alliances or readjust existing ones while redeploying naval forces stationed in surrounding areas when faced with maritime power competition from challengers"[5].

The case of Britain in the late 19th century serves as a representative reference. When the naval power enhancements of three challengers— the U.S., Germany, and Japan—occurred simultaneously, Britain began to accept U.S. claims to hegemony in the Western Hemisphere during the 1895 Venezuela crisis[5]. Simultaneously, in 1902, it signed the First Anglo-Japanese Alliance to redistribute naval burdens in Asia to Japan[5]. Through this adjustment, Britain was able to concentrate resources on homeland defense and countering the emerging German Navy in Europe. Relations with France also transitioned from tension prior to the 1898 Fashoda Crisis to an alliance through the 1904 Entente Cordiale[5].

Applying this historical pattern to the present, the current situation where the U.S. is strengthening its dominance in the Western Hemisphere through actions such as the arrest of Maduro in Venezuela[5], continuously deploying carrier forces in the Middle East, and accepting a temporary absence in the Asia-Pacific overlaps with this historical context. However, there is a decisive difference. In the 19th century, Britain was able to share the burden of naval power in Asia with a reliable regional partner, Japan. Currently, the naval capabilities of allies that the U.S. can rely on to fill the absence in the Western Pacific, particularly the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force or the Royal Australian Navy, do not reach the regional status of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the early 20th century. This asymmetry adds weight to the security implications of this absence.

Another reference case is the repeated delays in aircraft carrier maintenance that the U.S. Navy experienced in the early 2020s. At that time, the number of carriers available for actual deployment was fewer than planned, raising concerns about power gaps in both the Middle East and Asia. However, this incident differs in that it involves intentional resource redistribution due to actual war operations rather than maintenance delays. While the humanitarian justification of crew welfare is at the surface[9][15], it should be viewed as a reflection of the administration's reallocation of priorities across theaters.

4. Key Variables in the Development of the Issue

Variable 1: Duration and Intensity of the Iran War

The duration and intensity of military tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will determine the length of the absence in the Western Pacific. The Atlantic Council analysis points out that Iran is exhausting its leverage in the Strait of Hormuz[3]. If this assessment is correct, the U.S. may soon have the opportunity to alleviate its military burden in the Middle East and redirect resources to the Asia-Pacific. Conversely, if the ceasefire with Iran fails to hold and escalates again as per CFR analysis[6], the absence in the Western Pacific is likely to be prolonged.

Variable 2: China's Utilization of the Absence and Response Level

How China conducts military activities in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea during this absence will be the second key variable. The AP has already pointed out that "China is increasing aggressive signals"[7]. Depending on whether China limits itself to symbolic displays of force or moves toward substantial changes in the status quo, the speed and intensity of U.S. responses will inevitably vary. However, China will also calculate that excessive provocations could backfire and hasten the reintegration of U.S. forces into the Asia-Pacific. A separate analysis by EAI indicates that while China recognizes the limitations of U.S. hegemony, it has begun to propose building a stable coexistence relationship through "pragmatic transactions and negotiations"[12]. This suggests that China may approach this absence in a gradual and calculated manner rather than recklessly.

Variable 3: Whether Regional Allies Can Compensate for Deterrence

The extent to which regional allies such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines can supplement their own maritime surveillance and deterrence activities during this absence is also an important variable. Depending on how allies respond, the security ramifications of the absence could either be mitigated or amplified.

Variable 4: Uncertainty of the Timing for Deploying Alternative Forces

The Department of Defense has only stated the principle of replacing Lincoln with a "very similar vessel," without specifically disclosing the schedule for returning to the Western Pacific[11]. This uncertainty itself is a variable. If the return timeline is clearly presented early, allies' concerns may remain manageable. Conversely, if uncertainty prolongs, this could lead to a recalculation of allies' trust in U.S. security commitments beyond a mere temporary absence.