Analysis of Prospects for US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations and Middle East Regional Security Risks After Khamenei's Death

Executive Summary

Prospects for the End of the US-Iran War: Executive Summary

🔑 Key Conclusions and Implications

- Negotiation Phase Confirmed, but Structural Limitations Remain - "Positive progress" in indirect negotiations in Doha officially confirmed; temporary ceasefire based on the Islamabad MOU is being maintained. - However, the transitional leadership in Iran after Khamenei's death has not verified its negotiating authority, and internal power restructuring is incomplete, posing structural constraints on its ability to reach substantive agreements.

- Most Likely Scenario: Entrenchment of a Long-Term Stalemate (50-55% Probability) - High likelihood of intermittent clashes recurring due to unresolved core issues such as the nuclear program and inspection verification. - Structural breakthroughs in negotiations are unlikely until a new Supreme Leader is elected in Iran.

- Strait of Hormuz Expected to Take 6-18 Months for Full Stabilization Despite Temporary Resumption of Traffic - Risk premiums in the energy, shipping, and logistics sectors cannot be resolved in the short term. - Proactive measures are essential to prepare for continued volatility in global supply chains and energy costs.

- Corporate Strategy Direction: Immediate Implementation of a "Flexible Dual-Track Strategy" - Track 1 (Risk Mitigation): Prioritize reducing reliance on Middle Eastern energy, diversifying supply chains, and establishing financial hedging positions. - Track 2 (Opportunity Seizure): Concurrently prepare conditionally for entry into the Iranian reconstruction market while adhering to sanctions compliance.

- Crucial Monitoring Point: Future Negotiation Trends After Khamenei's Funeral (July 9) - The agenda and outcomes of the next negotiations hosted by Pakistan will be a turning point for the next 6-12 months. - The direction of the new Iranian leadership's composition (hardliners vs. pragmatists) is a key variable for the possibility of reaching an agreement.

Phase 1: Issue Situation Analysis

Prospects for the End of the US-Iran War: Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Progress of the Issue

- Outbreak of War: War began on February 28, 2025, with joint US-Israeli airstrikes ^[5][12]. - Khamenei's Assassination: Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei (86) was killed in airstrikes on his residence and office in central Tehran on the day the war began ^[6][7]. - Blockade of the Strait of Hormuz: Iran's blockade of the Strait during the war caused disruptions in global crude oil transport and shockwaves in the energy market ^[13]. - Islamabad Agreement: A preliminary agreement (MOU) to end the conflict was signed with Pakistan's mediation, laying the groundwork for a ceasefire ^[13][14]. - Lake Lucerne Summit: Further consultations were held in Switzerland to discuss the implementation of the Islamabad Agreement ^[8][17]. - Doha Indirect Negotiations: Indirect negotiations between the US and Iran were conducted with joint mediation by Qatar and Pakistan ^[1][2][3].

2. Current Situation (Latest Developments)

🔹 Diplomatic and Negotiation Trends

- The Doha indirect negotiations (as of July 2) have concluded, with an assessment of "positive progress," and efforts are underway to schedule the next round ^[1][2][8]. - The next round of negotiations is expected to be held as soon as possible after Khamenei's funeral (scheduled burial on July 9) ^[8][17]. - The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson officially confirmed "positive progress" regarding the Islamabad MOU ^[17]. - Pakistan is emerging as a potential host for the next US-Iran nuclear negotiations ^[1][2].

🔹 Military and Security Trends

- On June 28, Iran launched a third retaliatory airstrike, leading to mutual accusations of ceasefire violations by both sides ^[13]. - The US and Iran have agreed to halt further attacks and confirmed their intention to resume negotiations ^[14]. - Iranian military commanders have warned of "strong retaliation" if the US and Israel launch further attacks ^[4]. - The Israeli military maintains its policy of stationing forces in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza ^[15].

🔹 Strait of Hormuz Trends

- The Strait has been reopened under a temporary agreement, with confirmed resumption of tanker traffic by Saudi Aramco ^[15]. - Iran insists on adherence to shipping lanes designed by the country ^[15]. - Despite Iranian airstrikes, vessel traffic shows an upward trend ^[15].

🔹 Funeral-Related Trends

- Preparations are complete for a funeral ceremony involving millions at Tehran's Grand Mosalla ^[6][7][11]. - Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif will attend the funeral in person ^[16]. - Russia will send Dmitry Medvedev as its representative to the funeral ^[15]. - India will send an official delegation ^[15][16]. - Iran's chief negotiator, Ghalibaf, has urged large-scale public participation, indicating a political mobilization intent ^[9].

3. Key Actors, Positions, and Interests

🇺🇸 United States (Trump Administration)

- Position: Expresses willingness for continued diplomatic resolution and positively assesses progress in negotiations ^[1][2]. - Interests: - Securing the complete dismantlement or strict control of Iran's nuclear program. - Ensuring stability in the energy market through guaranteed free passage through the Strait of Hormuz. - Achieving political gains by bringing the Middle East conflict to an early end. - Strategy: Maintaining indirect negotiation channels and utilizing mediation channels of Qatar and Pakistan.

🇮🇷 Iran (Transitional Leadership)

- Stance: Participate in negotiations while simultaneously showcasing military retaliation capabilities^[4][9] - Interests: - Easing of economic sanctions through the release of frozen assets^[8] - Safeguarding nuclear sovereignty and maintaining negotiation leverage for the nuclear program - Need for internal cohesion amidst a power vacuum after Khamenei's death - Utilizing control over the Strait of Hormuz as a negotiation leverage - Internal Variables: Attention focused on whether Mojtaba Khamenei (Khamenei's son) will emerge as a successor^[14]

🇶🇦 Qatar

- Stance: Playing a key mediator role between the US and Iran^[1][2][3] - Interests: - Strengthening its status as a diplomatic hub in the Middle East - Protecting the environment for LNG exports through regional stability - Enhancing international standing by utilizing Doha as a negotiation platform

🇵🇰 Pakistan

- Stance: Led the Islamabad MOU, emerging as the host for future negotiations^[1][2][13] - Interests: - Maintaining a balanced relationship with both Iran and the US - Enhancing its international standing as a regional peace mediator - Building trust with Iran through the Prime Minister's direct attendance at the funeral^[16]

🇮🇱 Israel (Netanyahu Government)

- Stance: Maintaining presence in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza; seeking talks with Trump^[15] - Interests: - Demanding the complete dismantling of Iran's nuclear program - Ensuring Israeli security interests are reflected in any US-Iran agreement - Maintaining military superiority in occupied territories

4. Summary of Key Issues

① Iran's Nuclear Program Issue

- The greatest challengenot included in the interim agreement^[1][2] - US: Demands complete nuclear abandonment or a robust verification regime - Iran: Asserts nuclear sovereignty, unwilling to abandon the right to civilian nuclear use - Israel: Demands the complete elimination of Iran's nuclear capabilities, adding complexity to negotiations

② Strait of Hormuz Navigation Regime

- While the interim agreement for reopening is being implemented, Iran continues to assert its right to unilaterally control navigation routes^[15] - Whether permanent freedom of navigation will be guaranteed is a key condition for a final agreement - Approximately 20% of global crude oil supply passes through → directly impacts the energy market

③ Release of Iran's Frozen Assets

- Emerged as a major agenda item in the Doha negotiations^[8] - Serves as an incentive for Iran's participation in negotiations and a prerequisite for easing economic sanctions - Potential for political backlash within the US

④ Iran's Internal Power Succession Issue

- The power vacuum after Khamenei's death increases uncertainty regarding the representativeness of the negotiating party - Competition between hardliners and pragmatists influences negotiation stances - Iran's strategic decisions may be delayed until power realignment is complete

⑤ Sustainability of the Ceasefire

- The fragility of the ceasefire was exposed by the recurrence of mutual airstrikes on June 28^[13][14] - The possibility of independent Israeli actions remains a variable in negotiations - The mutual accusations of "first violation" undermine the basis of trust

⑥ The Israeli Variable

- It is unclear whether Israeli security interests will be reflected in US-Iran negotiations - Netanyahu's pursuit of talks with Trump could influence the US stance in negotiations with Iran - Regional tensions persist due to the continued presence in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza^[15]

--- > Overall Assessment: With the historical turning point of Khamenei's death, US-Iran relations have entered a new phase. However, due to the complex interplay of variables such as the nuclear program, the Strait of Hormuz, and power succession, a considerable negotiation process is expected before a final agreement can be reached.

Phase 2: In-depth Issue Analysis

Prospects for Ending the US-Iran War: In-depth Issue Analysis

1. Analysis of the Root Causes of the Issue

🔹 Structural Origins of the Iran Nuclear Program Conflict

- The cascading effects of the JCPOA's collapse: The Trump administration's unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 → Iran's phased expansion of uranium enrichment → approach to nuclear criticality - Pursuit of Nuclear Deterrence: Iran perceives possessing nuclear capabilities as a strategic necessity for regime survival - Clash of Red Lines: Fundamental incompatibility between the US and Israel's principle of "never allowing a nuclear-armed Iran" and Iran's assertion of "sovereign rights" - Distrust in Verification Mechanisms: Collapse of mutual trust due to past instances of Iran evading or restricting IAEA inspections

🔹 Direct Triggering Factors for the Outbreak of War

- Reaching Nuclear Criticality: Iran's possession of highly enriched uranium (at 90% level) exceeds the critical threshold for nuclear weapon production - Prolonged Diplomatic Stalemate: Failure to reach substantial agreement despite multiple negotiation attempts → Choice of military option - Israel's Preemptive Strike Rationale: Defining a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, executing a preemptive strike in coordination with the United States^[12] - Direct Strike on Khamenei: Death of the Supreme Leader on the day of the outbreak of hostilities → Collapse of the highest level of Iran's command structure^[6][7]

🔹 Deep Dynamics of Regional Hegemonic Competition

- Shia Crescent vs. Sunni-Israeli Alliance: Structural backlash against Iran's expansion of regional influence (support for Hezbollah, Hamas, Houthis) - Energy Geopolitics: Strategic conflict between Iran and Western/Gulf states over control of the Strait of Hormuz^[13] - US Re-engagement in the Middle East: Transition from reduced Middle East engagement during the Biden administration to a more assertive stance under a potential second Trump term

2. Structural Context

🔹 Political Structure

- Power Vacuum within Iran - End of Khamenei's 37-year rule → Unprecedented situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Leader position^[12] - Coexistence of possibilities: succession by Mojtaba Khamenei (son) vs. transition to collective leadership guided by the Assembly of Experts - Hardline pragmatists, including Ghalibaf (Speaker of Parliament, chief negotiator), seize control of negotiations^[9] - Weak domestic legitimacy of the Iranian negotiation team → Structural limitations on the interim leadership's capacity for concessions - US Domestic Politics - Trump's pursuit of an early end to the Middle East conflict as a political legacy - Tensions between hardliners in Congress and proponents of a diplomatic resolution - The Israeli lobby and the Trump-Netanyahu relationship constrain the scope of negotiations^[14] - Pakistan's Political Positioning as a Mediator - Seeking to enhance international standing through a role as mediator within the Islamic world - Conducting complex balancing diplomacy to maintain relations with both Iran and the US^[13][14] - Prime Minister of Pakistan's direct attendance at Khamenei's funeral → Demonstrating trust with Iran^[16]

🔹 Economic Structure

- Energy Market Shock - Strait of Hormuz: A strategic chokepoint through which approximately 20% of global oil exports and 25% of LNG pass - Soaring global oil prices during the blockade → Acting as a pressure point on the world economy^[13] - Resumption of tanker traffic by Saudi Aramco and rebound in shipping volume following an interim agreement^[15] - Iranian Frozen Assets Issue - Assets worth tens of billions of dollars frozen due to US sanctions on Iran - Unfreezing of assets emerges as a key negotiation demand for Iran^[8] - The lifting of economic sanctions determines the structural incentives for the Iranian interim leadership to reach a settlement - Vulnerability of the Iranian Economy - The Iranian economy is in an extremely vulnerable state due to the prolonged war and sanctions - The interim leadership may be receptive to pressure for an early settlement to achieve economic recovery

🔹 Security Structure

- Asymmetric Military Power Dynamics - Overwhelming conventional military power of the US and Israel vs. Iran's asymmetric strategy (missiles, drones, proxy networks) - Iran's disadvantage in conventional total war → Utilization of asymmetric means such as retaliatory airstrikes and blockade of the strait^[13] - Structural Fragility of the Ceasefire - Iran's third retaliatory airstrike on June 28 → Mutual accusations of ceasefire violations^[13] - Warning of further attacks by Iranian military commanders → Possibility of independent actions by the military during the negotiation process^[4] - Continued regional tensions due to Israel's maintenance of forces in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza^[15] - Direction of the Nuclear Program - The extent of damage to nuclear facilities is unclear → Possibility of Iran retaining nuclear rebuilding capabilities - The main sticking point is the scope of civilian nuclear programs versus complete nuclear abandonment

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

🔹 Libya's Nuclear Abandonment Model (2003)

- Similarities - Gaddafi voluntarily abandoned WMD programs after secret negotiations with the US and UK - Agreement to dismantle nuclear and chemical weapons in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions and return to the international community - Military pressure (Iraq War) acted as a decisive catalyst for the agreement - Differences - Libya made the decision while the supreme leader was alive → Iran is in a state of leadership vacuum - Iran's nuclear technology level and program scale are incomparable to Libya's - The independent influence of Iran's hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is much stronger than in Libya

🔹 Post-War Iraq Management (2003~)

- Similarities - Removal of the existing regime's leadership through US-led military operations - Post-war power vacuum and internal factional conflicts increase negotiation complexity - Unilateral occupation without external mediation → Leading to long-term instability - Lessons Learned: Lack of a comprehensive political agreement after leadership removal leads to long-term chaos → Implies the importance of establishing a comprehensive framework in Iran's negotiations

🔹 North Korean Nuclear Six-Party Talks (2003~2009)

- Similarities - Multilateral negotiation framework surrounding nuclear program denuclearization - Attempted phased linkage of economic aid and sanctions relief with nuclear abandonment - Repetitive pattern of negotiation progress and provocations - Differences - North Korea ultimately refuses to abandon nuclear weapons → becomes a nuclear state - Iran has a relatively higher possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement due to leadership change and stronger economic pressure - Lessons Learned: The specificity of the verification mechanism and implementation roadmap determines the sustainability of the agreement.

🔹 JCPOA Negotiations (2013-2015)

- Similarities - Indirect negotiations between the US and Iran → transition to direct negotiations - Utilization of third-party mediation by Qatar, Europe, etc. - Exchange structure of phased sanctions relief and limitations on nuclear activities - Differences - The JCPOA is a limitation agreement predicated on the continued existence of Iran's nuclear program - The current negotiations involve a much broader agenda, including the end of the war and the complete dismantling of the nuclear program - The structure of the negotiating parties has fundamentally changed with the death of Khamenei^[6][7]

🔹 Paris Peace Accords for the Vietnam War (1973)

- Similarities - Reached agreement amidst military stalemate - Indirect negotiations conducted under third-party mediation (France) - Sporadic clashes continued even after the agreement was signed - Lessons Learned: An early declaration of cessation of hostilities without a comprehensive agreement carries the risk of renewed conflict → implies the necessity of a complete resolution of the nuclear issue in the Iran negotiations.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

🔹 Variable 1: Election of Iran's Next Supreme Leader and Power Realignment

- Importance: ★★★★★ (Highest) - The speed and outcome of the successor election will determine the structure of negotiation authority - If hardliners such as Mojtaba Khamenei come to power, difficulties in reaching a negotiated settlement are expected - If a transitional leadership system led by pragmatists and reformists is maintained, negotiation momentum may continue - The key will be whether negotiation-leading factions such as Ghalibaf secure internal legitimacy^[9]

🔹 Variable 2: Scope of Iran's Nuclear Program Negotiations and Verification Methods

- Importance: ★★★★★ (Highest) - Whether an agreement is reached on the scope of complete nuclear abandonment (CVID) vs. allowing a limited civilian nuclear program - Setting the intensity and scope of IAEA inspections and verification mechanisms - Choice between maintaining the US "maximum pressure" policy vs. linking it to phased sanctions relief^[1][2]

🔹 Variable 3: Control of the Strait of Hormuz and Maritime Security Guarantees

- Importance: ★★★★☆ (High) - Conflict between Iran's demand for mandatory adherence to "shipping routes designed by the country" and the principle of freedom of navigation^[15] - Whether the speed of releasing frozen assets is linked to the complete opening of the Strait - Possibility of the Iranian military (IRGC) resuming independent blockade of the Strait^[4]

🔹 Variable 4: Israel's Acceptance of Negotiations and the Trump-Netanyahu Relationship

- Importance: ★★★★☆ (High) - Netanyahu's pursuit of a meeting with Trump → possibility of Israel presenting conditions for accepting the negotiation outcome - Israel's continued presence in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza as a factor in ongoing regional tensions^[15] - Risk of independent military action resuming if an agreement unacceptable to Israel is reached.

🔹 Variable 5: Sustainability of Pakistan-Qatar Mediation Channels

- Importance: ★★★☆☆ (Medium) - Whether Pakistan secures the role of host for future negotiations^[1][2] - Internal coordination and trust maintenance within the joint mediation system of Qatar and Pakistan - The Prime Minister of Pakistan's attendance at the funeral contributed to building trust with Iran^[16]

🔹 Variable 6: Possibility of Independent Action by Iran's Military (IRGC)

- Importance: ★★★★☆ (High) - Conflict in policy between the negotiation team and the military → risk of renewed sporadic airstrikes^[13] - Case of the third retaliatory airstrike on June 28: confirmation of precedent for independent military action in negotiations^[13] - The level of control the transitional leadership has over the military will determine the stability of the ceasefire.

🔹 Variable 7: International Pressure and Support Structure

- Importance: ★★★☆☆ (Medium) - Level of support for Iran from Russia (Medvedev's attendance at funeral) and China^[15] - UN Security Council discussions and international community's support for negotiations^[15] - India's neutral participation could contribute to forming a multilateral pressure structure^[15][16]

> Overall Assessment: The negotiations for the cessation of the US-Iran war are proceeding amidst an unprecedented structural change following the death of Khamenei, and the handling of the nuclear program and the speed of resolving the internal power vacuum in Iran are expected to be the biggest variables determining the success or failure of the negotiations. Historical precedents offer lessons that while the possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement increases immediately after a leadership change, the sustainability of the agreement becomes fragile in the absence of a verification mechanism^[1][2][8].

3. Scenario Analysis

Prospects for US-Iran War Cessation: Scenario Analysis

1. Optimistic Scenario: Reaching a Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement and Complete Cessation of Hostilities

📊 Probability of Realization: 20-25%

🔹 Scenario Development

- Prerequisites - Agreement on a roadmap for the nuclear program in subsequent negotiations after Khamenei's funeral (July 9)^[8] - Iran's transitional leadership successfully persuades internal hardliners and makes substantial concessions - Pakistan-Qatar mediation channels contribute to the design of nuclear inspection and verification mechanisms^[1][2] - Trump provides preemptive incentives such as the release of Iranian frozen assets and sanctions relief.

- Negotiation Timeline - Mid-July: Draft agreement on uranium enrichment cap reached at the next negotiation hosted by Pakistan - August: Specifics of IAEA return inspection and verification system - September-October: Signing of a comprehensive peace agreement and declaration of a complete ceasefire - End of year: Full normalization of the Strait of Hormuz and phased lifting of sanctions on Iran

- Key Success Factors - Adoption of a pragmatic approach by Iran's new leadership - Convergence of interests between Trump's desire to build a "dealmaker" image and Iran's need for regime survival - Trump's suppression of Netanyahu's attempts to obstruct negotiations^[14] - Russia and China maintaining support or neutrality in negotiations

🔹 Global Economic and Industrial Impact

- Energy Market - Full normalization of the Strait of Hormuz → Potential drop in oil prices by $15-25 per barrel - Stabilization of global LNG supply → Downward stabilization of energy prices in Europe and Asia - Return of Iranian crude oil (approx. 3 million barrels per day) to the market → Emergence of oversupply concerns

- Financial and Capital Markets - Resolution of Middle East geopolitical risk premium → Upward pressure on global stock markets - Potential shift towards a weaker dollar, increased attractiveness of emerging market assets - Emergence of investment opportunities in infrastructure and construction related to Iran's reconstruction

- Impact by Industry - Oil Refining and Energy: Short-term pressure on profitability due to falling oil prices, expectations of medium-to-long-term demand recovery - Shipping and Logistics: Short-term deterioration in profitability due to sharp decline in insurance premiums and freight rates following normalization of the Strait of Hormuz - Defense Industry: Concerns about reduced orders due to easing tensions in the Middle East - Construction and Plant Engineering: Opportunities to participate in Iran's reconstruction projects, potential benefits for Korean and European companies

2. Base Scenario: Continuation of Partial Agreement and Entrenchment of Long-Term Negotiations

📊 Probability of Occurrence: 50-55%

🔹 Scenario Development

- Prerequisites - Maintenance of a temporary ceasefire based on the Islamabad MOU, but difficulties in reaching an agreement on nuclear issues^[13][14] - Continued constraints on negotiation authority during the internal power restructuring process of Iran's transitional leadership - Recurrence of intermittent clashes (e.g., retaliatory airstrikes of the type on June 28) as a factor delaying negotiations^[13] - Indirect negotiations through Doha and Pakistan channels continuing for several months to over a year

- Negotiation Timeline - Mid-July to August: Partial agreement on technical issues such as navigation rules for the Strait of Hormuz and release of frozen assets in the next round of negotiations - September-December: Stalemate due to failure to narrow the gap on core issues like uranium enrichment levels and inspection systems - First half of 2026: Attempt to reignite negotiation momentum after the election of Iran's new Supreme Leader - Continued structural impossibility of a comprehensive agreement until the completion of Iran's internal power restructuring

- Key Uncertainties - Tendency of Iran's new Supreme Leader (hardline vs. pragmatic): A decisive variable determining the direction of negotiations - Whether Israel will take further military action^[15] - US domestic political schedule (whether Trump will be a lame duck) - Whether Russia and China will continue to support Iran

🔹 Global Economic and Industrial Impact

- Energy Market - Prolonged volatility in the oil price range of $75-90 per barrel - Partial operation of the Strait of Hormuz → Continued surcharges on insurance premiums, sustained demand for alternative routes - Limited resumption of Iranian oil exports (utilizing indirect export routes via China)

- Financial and Capital Markets - Partial resolution of geopolitical risk premium → Continued market uncertainty - Increased volatility in Middle East-related assets, sustained preference for safe-haven assets - Mixed expectations for reconstruction investment in Iran and ongoing uncertainties

- Impact by Industry - Oil Refining and Energy: Unstable refining margins amidst oil price volatility, increased hedging costs - Shipping and Logistics: Sustained high freight rates due to continued demand for alternative routes around the Cape of Good Hope following normalization of the Strait of Hormuz - Defense Industry: Continued demand from Middle Eastern countries to enhance defense capabilities → Sustained strong order intake - Insurance: Prolonged surcharges on war risk insurance, expansion of the specialty insurance market - Semiconductors and IT: Strengthening of inventory stocking strategies due to persistent supply chain instability

3. Pessimistic Scenario: Collapse of Negotiations and Resumption of Full-Scale Conflict

📊 Probability of Occurrence: 20-25%

🔹 Scenario Development

- Prerequisites - Election of a hardline anti-US figure as Iran's new Supreme Leader → Declaration of refusal to negotiate - Israel's further military action completely triggers the collapse of the ceasefire agreement^[4][15] - Iran's declaration of re-blockading the Strait of Hormuz → Inevitable military response from the United States - Declaration of resumption of nuclear development utilizing Iran's remaining nuclear facility capabilities

- Collapse Triggers - Coup-like seizure of power by hardliners within Iran's IRGC - Further strikes by Israel on remaining Iranian nuclear facilities^[4] - Expansion of Iran's retaliatory attacks against Gulf states (Bahrain, UAE, etc.)^[15] - Resumption of proxy warfare by remaining Hezbollah and Houthi forces

- Path to Escalation - Complete re-blockading of the Strait of Hormuz → 30% of global crude oil supply cut off - Resumption of large-scale ballistic missile and drone attacks by Iran - US strikes on additional military targets within Iran - Increased support for Iran by Russia and China → Heightened risk of indirect conflict between the US and China

🔹 Global Economic and Industrial Impact

- Energy Market ← Most severely impacted area - Potential surge in oil prices to $130-160 per barrel (exceeding 2022 Russia-Ukraine war levels) - Global energy supply crisis → Inevitable release of strategic oil reserves by major countries - Soaring LNG prices → Recurrence of energy security crisis in Europe and Asia - Combined shock from complete cutoff of Iranian oil and production disruptions in Gulf states

- Financial and Capital Markets - Potential global stock market shock of 10-20% decline - Sharp surge in safe-haven assets such as the dollar, gold, and Swiss franc - Acceleration of capital outflow from emerging markets, increased risk for vulnerable countries facing foreign exchange crises - Resurgence of global inflation → Dilemma for major central banks' interest rate policies

- Impact by Industry - Oil & Energy: Short-term profit surge due to soaring oil prices, but concerns over demand destruction - Shipping & Logistics: Complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz would force a detour around the Cape of Good Hope, leading to record-high freight rates - Aviation: Expansion of Middle East airspace closures leads to a sharp increase in operating costs for Europe-Asia routes ^[15] - Automobiles & Manufacturing: Intensifying pressure on production costs due to soaring energy prices - Defense: Surge in defense demand from the US, Israel, and Gulf states, making it the biggest beneficiary - Food & Agriculture: Secondary shock to global food prices due to rising energy and logistics costs

4. Comprehensive Comparison of Global Economic and Industrial Impacts by Scenario

🔹 Scenario Matrix by Key Variables

🔹 Summary of Scenario Impacts by Industry

- Energy & Refining - Optimistic: Short-term profitability pressure due to falling oil prices; opportunity for re-entry into the Iranian market - Baseline: Prolonged volatility, increasing importance of hedging strategies - Pessimistic: Short-term profit surge due to soaring oil prices, coexisting with demand destruction risks

- Shipping & Logistics - Optimistic: Freight rate normalization, resolution of war risk insurance premiums - Baseline: Sustained demand for alternative routes, continued high freight rates - Pessimistic: Record-high freight rates, potential for uninsurable shipments

- Defense Industry - Optimistic: Concerns over reduced orders, contraction of exports to the Middle East - Baseline: Orders maintained due to defense demand from Gulf states - Pessimistic: All-around surge in demand, making it the biggest beneficiary industry

- Finance & Insurance - Optimistic: Easing of risk premiums, resumption of Middle East investments - Baseline: Continued uncertainty premium, growth in specialized insurance - Pessimistic: Surge in war insurance payouts, concerns over systemic risk

- Construction & Plant Engineering - Optimistic: Maximized opportunities for participation in Iranian reconstruction projects - Baseline: Limited project opportunities, need for risk management - Pessimistic: Complete halt of Middle East projects, losses on existing projects

🔹 Specific Implications for Korean Companies

- Energy Import Dependence: Approximately 70% of crude oil imports transit through the Middle East; energy security directly impacted in the pessimistic scenario - Shipping & Shipbuilding: Directly exposed to freight rate volatility and changes in demand for specialized vessels (LNG carriers, tankers) - Construction & Plant Engineering: Rapid changes in the environment for securing Middle East projects; differentiated entry strategies by scenario are essential - Semiconductors & Batteries: Pressure on production costs due to rising energy prices; need to prepare for accelerated supply chain restructuring - Recommended Responses: - Short-term: Strengthen energy hedging, re-evaluate risks of Middle East projects - Medium-term: Continue pursuing supply chain diversification based on the baseline scenario - Long-term: Proactively develop strategies for re-entry into the Iranian market in preparation for the optimistic scenario

Phase 4: Analysis of Response Measures

Prospects for US-Iran Conflict Resolution: Analysis of Response Measures

1. Response Measures for the Optimistic Scenario

(Conclusion of Comprehensive Nuclear Agreement and Full Cessation of Hostilities / Realization Probability 20-25%)

🔹 Response Option 1: Preparation for Proactive Entry into the Iranian Reconstruction Market

- Response Option - Initiate preliminary feasibility studies for participation in Iran's infrastructure, plant, and energy reconstruction projects - Preemptively design local partnerships and joint venture (JV) structures - Establish phased market entry plans linked to the sanctions relief roadmap

- Advantages - First-mover advantage: Early entry 6-12 months ahead of competitors provides an advantage in securing key projects - Estimated reconstruction demand in Iran (energy, construction, infrastructure) amounts to tens of billions of dollars - Korean and European companies' technological capabilities and construction experience align with Iranian market demands

- Disadvantages - Risk of remaining sanctions: Preliminary contact before an agreement may violate US secondary sanctions - Uncertainty regarding the representativeness of contracting parties amidst incomplete internal power realignments in Iran - Risk of total loss of preliminary investment costs if the agreement collapses

- Feasibility and Risk Assessment - Feasibility: ★★★☆☆ (Medium) - Key Risk: Legal review required to determine potential violation of US Treasury OFAC sanctions - Mitigation: Utilize a conditional MOU structure for sanctions relief

- Priority Response Measures - ① Conduct preliminary sanctions risk assessment by the Legal and Compliance Team - ② Establish indirect network through local entities in arbitration countries such as Qatar and Pakistan - ③ Prepare to sign a Conditional MOU specifying conditions for sanctions relief

🔹 Response Option 2: Energy Portfolio Rebalancing

- Response Options - Strengthen hedging strategies to prepare for a crude oil price drop scenario (USD 15-25 per barrel) - Revise refining margin management system in anticipation of oversupply due to the re-supply of Iranian crude oil - Consider adjusting the proportion of renewable energy and LNG portfolios

- Advantages - Cost reduction effect in a falling oil price environment → Improvement in manufacturing and logistics cost structure - Structural benefits for Asian companies with high energy import dependency, such as South Korea and Japan - Opportunity to secure long-term supply contracts if Iranian LNG supply resumes

- Disadvantages - Increased hedging costs: Rise in derivative costs during periods of heightened oil price volatility - Difficulty in precise planning due to uncertainty in the timing and volume of Iranian crude oil re-supply - Potential for intensified margin pressure for refiners

- Feasibility and Risk Assessment - Feasibility: ★★★★☆ (High) - Key Risk: Loss on hedging positions if agreement is delayed - Mitigation: Set a cap on hedging costs by utilizing options contracts

- Priority Response Measures - ① Conduct profit and loss simulations for crude oil price scenarios every 3-6 months - ② Increase crude oil futures and options hedging ratio by 10-15 percentage points compared to the current level - ③ Conduct preliminary checks on refinery facility suitability in preparation for the potential import of Iranian crude oil

🔹 Response Option 3: Restructuring of Shipping and Logistics Networks

- Response Options - Develop plans to reduce operations on existing alternative routes in response to the full normalization of the Strait of Hormuz ^[1][2] - Prepare to renegotiate terms of long-term shipping contracts in anticipation of falling freight rates and insurance premiums - Establish a strategy for redeploying maritime hubs in the Middle East

- Advantages - Significant reduction in voyage distance and time compared to alternative routes upon normalization of the Strait of Hormuz - Reduced operating costs due to the elimination of war risk premiums - New business opportunities from the revitalization of logistics hubs in the Middle East region

- Disadvantages - Sunk costs from investments in alternative routes (ships, infrastructure) - Inevitable decline in short-term profitability for shipping companies due to falling freight rates - Continued uncertainty in navigation conditions if Iran persists in asserting control over maritime routes ^[15]

- Feasibility and Risk Assessment - Feasibility: ★★★★☆ (High) - Key Risk: Restricted navigation autonomy due to Iran's demand to comply with routes designed by Iran ^[15] - Mitigation: Maintain multiple routes and establish flexible navigation plans

- Priority Response Measures - ① Establish a monitoring system for the conditions and procedures for the resumption of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz - ② Negotiate early termination of charter contracts or redeployment of vessels dedicated to alternative routes - ③ Re-evaluate logistics capabilities at Middle Eastern hub ports (Dubai, Abu Dhabi)

2. Basic Scenario Response Measures

(Continued partial agreement / Entrenchment in long-term negotiations / Probability of occurrence: 50-55%)

🔹 Response Option 1: Supply Chain Redundancy and Risk Diversification

- Response Options - Maintain a system for parallel operation of alternative supply chain routes (Suez, Cape of Good Hope) to the Hormuz-dependent supply chain ^[13][14] - Accelerate diversification of raw material and energy procurement sources with high dependence on the Middle East - Increase strategic inventory and raise safety stock levels

- Advantages - Ensure supply chain continuity even in the event of intermittent conflict recurrence (Type of June 28 incident) ^[13] - Enable immediate response to the blockage of a specific route through the operation of multiple routes - Buffer effect against short-term supply shocks through inventory buildup

- Disadvantages - Constant increase in logistics and inventory costs due to maintaining redundant supply chains - Increased lead times due to longer transit times on alternative routes - Additional working capital required for strategic inventory buildup

- Feasibility and Risk Assessment - Feasibility: ★★★★★ (Very High) - Key Risk: Chronic increase in dual operation costs if long-term negotiations become entrenched - Mitigation: Adjust the redundancy ratio flexibly in accordance with the risk level

- Priority Response Measures - ① Immediately create a list of alternative sourcing locations for each Middle East-procured item - ② Increase safety stock levels by 30-50% compared to current levels - ③ Regularize quarterly supply chain risk stress tests

🔹 Response Option 2: Establish a phased decision-making system based on negotiation monitoring

- Response Option - Establish a geopolitical risk monitoring system to track the progress of negotiations through Qatar and Pakistan channels in real-time^[1][2][8] - Design an investment and procurement decision-making system based on triggers for each negotiation phase (technical agreement → nuclear agenda → comprehensive agreement) - Operate a tracking system for trends in Iran's internal power shifts (e.g., election of a new supreme leader)

- Advantages - Avoid extremes of over-investment and under-investment during periods of uncertainty - Enable rapid positional shifts relative to competitors upon detecting signals of negotiation progress - Minimize management judgment errors through data-driven decision-making

- Disadvantages - Requires investment of specialized personnel and costs for establishing and operating the monitoring system - Potential for misinterpretation of signals due to limited information accessibility in indirect negotiations - Rigidity of trigger-based decision-making may lead to reduced responsiveness to unforeseen events

- Feasibility and Risk Assessment - Feasibility: ★★★★☆ (High) - Key Risk: Misinterpretation of signals due to asymmetry of negotiation information - Mitigation Measures: Cross-validation of information from multiple channels (foreign media, think tanks, local networks)

- Priority Response Measures - ① Establish a dedicated Geopolitical Risk Monitoring Task Force or outsource to an external specialized agency - ② Develop pre-approved response manuals for each stage of negotiation progress - ③ Regularize monthly or more frequent briefings on Middle Eastern affairs for management

🔹 Response Option 3: Strengthen business networks in mediating countries (Pakistan, Qatar)

- Response Option - Secure indirect information channels related to Iran through local subsidiaries and partnerships in Pakistan and Qatar^[1][2][8] - Strengthen regional presence by participating in infrastructure and energy projects in both mediating countries - Utilize relationships with governments and corporations in mediating countries as a bridgehead for future entry into the Iranian market

- Advantages - Enhance accessibility to advance information on negotiation trends - Enable rapid market entry into Iran through mediating country partners upon market opening - Simultaneously secure business opportunities in the markets of Pakistan and Qatar themselves

- Disadvantages - Political volatility within mediating countries may affect partnership stability - Limitations in the accuracy and timeliness of information due to the indirect nature of the channels - Pakistan's economic instability poses a risk factor for local investment

- Feasibility and Risk Assessment - Feasibility: ★★★☆☆ (Medium) - Key Risk: Significant decrease in network value if mediating countries weaken their negotiation role - Mitigation Measures: Avoid reliance on a single mediating country; pursue parallel channels in Qatar and Pakistan

- Priority Response Measures - ① Conduct due diligence and contract review for local partners in Doha, Qatar, and Islamabad, Pakistan - ② Explore opportunities to participate in projects linked to the governments of mediating countries - ③ Expand networks of resident personnel or regional experts in mediating countries

3. Response Measures for Pessimistic Scenario

(Negotiation Failure / Resumption of Full-Scale Conflict | Probability of Occurrence: 20-25%)

🔹 Response Option 1: Prepare for Immediate Activation of Business Continuity Plan (BCP)

- Response Option - Pre-establish and conduct regular drills for emergency BCP scenarios by business segment for operations dependent on the Middle East - Prepare for immediate activation of evacuation plans for local personnel and emergency communication systems - Document procedures for transitioning to alternative procurement and production systems in the event of a full blockade of the Strait of Hormuz^[13]

- Advantages - Enable immediate response without decision-making delays in the event of a crisis - Minimize casualties and asset losses - Facilitate rapid normalization compared to competitors through pre-prepared BCP

- Disadvantages - Requires significant time and cost investment for BCP establishment and training - Excessive crisis preparedness may create unnecessary anxiety within the organization - Reduced effectiveness of the plan if the actual crisis differs from the scenario

- Feasibility and Risk Assessment - Feasibility: ★★★★★ (Very High) - Key Risk: Response vacuum in the event of a full-scale conflict resumption if BCP is inadequate - Mitigation Measures: Mandate BCP simulation drills and plan updates at least annually

- Priority Response Measures - ① Update Middle East business segment BCP and obtain management approval - ② Document criteria, procedures, and responsible parties for local personnel evacuation - ③ Establish a system capable of transitioning to alternative procurement within 72 hours of a Strait of Hormuz blockade

🔹 Response Option 2: Enhance financial risk hedging

- Response Option - Significantly expand commodity futures hedging ratios to prepare for scenarios of sharp oil price increases (an additional $30-50 per barrel) - Re-evaluate credit risk of Middle East-related assets and bonds, and reduce exposure - Immediately expand coverage of War Risk Insurance

- Advantages - Mitigate financial losses from sharp fluctuations in oil prices and exchange rates - Transfer asset loss risk through expanded insurance coverage - Capture investment opportunities during crisis periods by securing financial stability

- Disadvantages - Significantly increased hedging costs due to soaring war risk insurance premiums - Potential for counterparty risk in derivative transactions under extreme scenarios - Opportunity loss during normalization phase if hedging positions are excessive

- Feasibility and Risk Assessment - Feasibility: ★★★★☆ (High) - Key Risk: Difficulty in securing coverage due to sharp decline in liquidity of insurance/hedging markets - Mitigation Measure: Proactive establishment of hedging positions in the early stages of heightened tensions

- Priority Response Measures - ① Immediately increase oil and LNG futures hedging ratio by 20-30 percentage points compared to the current level - ② Review renewal of war risk insurance for assets with Middle East exposure - ③ Secure liquidity emergency credit line in advance

🔹 Response Option 3: Strategic Pivot to Alternative Markets and Suppliers

- Response Option - Rapidly shift energy and raw material procurement dependent on the Middle East to alternative sources in the Americas, Africa, and Central Asia - Accelerate diversification of business segments with high Middle East export share into Asian and European markets - Temporarily suspend new orders for Middle East projects and review force majeure clauses in existing contracts

- Advantages - Secure business stability through structural insulation from Middle East risks - Portfolio diversification effect through entry into alternative markets - Minimize contractual losses legally by utilizing force majeure clauses

- Disadvantages - Potential for increased unit prices and quality gaps due to conversion to alternative suppliers - Time and cost required for re-entry into the Middle East market upon withdrawal - Possibility of disputes over the scope of application of force majeure clauses

- Feasibility and Risk Assessment - Feasibility: ★★★☆☆ (Medium) - Key Risk: Inability to fully substitute due to limited absorption capacity of alternative markets - Mitigation Measure: Adopt a gradual pivot strategy by expanding the proportion of alternatives in stages

- Priority Response Measures - ① Urgently investigate the volume and unit price of alternative sourcing available for each Middle East-dependent item - ② Immediately commence legal review of force majeure clauses in existing Middle East contracts - ③ Urgently consult with sales teams in Asia and Europe regarding the absorption capacity of Middle East volumes

4. Summary of Integrated Scenario Priority Response Measures

> Overall Recommendation: Based on the "Base Scenario," which currently has the highest probability of occurrence (50-55%), we recommend implementing supply chain redundancy and monitoring systems as the top priority, while adopting a "trigger-based dual-track strategy" that allows for rapid transition to the Optimistic Scenario response upon detection of negotiation progress. Considering the possibility of intermittent conflict recurrence ^[13][14], we emphasize maintaining BCP and financial hedging at all times as a safeguard against the pessimistic scenario.The dual-track strategy based on triggers, which prioritizes the establishment of supply chain redundancy and monitoring systems based on the basic scenario, while allowing for a rapid shift to the optimistic scenario response upon detecting signs of negotiation progress, is recommended. Considering the possibility of intermittent renewed hostilities ^[13][14], it is emphasized that BCP and financial hedging should be maintained at all times as a measure against the pessimistic scenario.based on the basic scenario, the establishment of supply chain redundancy and monitoring systems should be prioritized, and a trigger-based dual-track strategyis recommended, allowing for a rapid shift to the optimistic scenario response upon detecting signs of negotiation progress. Considering the possibility of intermittent renewed hostilities ^[13][14], it is emphasized that BCP and financial hedging should be maintained at all times as a measure against the pessimistic scenario.

Step 5: Final Recommended Response Measures

Prospects for the End of the US-Iran War: Comprehensive Recommended Response Measures and Implementation Plan

1. Comprehensive Judgment and Recommended Response Measures

🔹 Comprehensive Judgment of Current Situation

- Assessment of Negotiation Phase: Confirmation of "positive progress" in Doha indirect negotiations, but core issues such as the nuclear program remain unresolved ^[1][2][8] - Most Likely Scenario: Continued Partial Agreement and Stalemate in Long-Term Negotiations (Probability 50-55%) - Key Uncertainty Factors: - Unverified negotiation authority and internal cohesion of Iran's interim leadership ^[9] - Structural limitations on negotiations until the election of a new Supreme Leader in Iran ^[12] - Persistent variable of Israeli obstruction of negotiations ^[4][14] - Possibility of intermittent renewed clashes (repeating the June 28 incident) ^[13] - Strait of Hormuz: Reopened by interim agreement, but full stabilization expected to take 6-18 months ^[15]

🔹 Core Recommended Direction: "Flexible Dual-Track Strategy"

- Track 1 (Risk Defense): Prioritize hedging supply chain and energy cost risks in preparation for negotiation stalemate and renewed conflict - Track 2 (Opportunity Seizing): Simultaneously prepare for entry into the Iranian market, which can be activated immediately upon progress in negotiations - Core Principles: - Pre-set trigger points for each scenario to ensure immediate response to changes - Block legal risks by prioritizing compliance with sanctions - Enhance on-site information gathering through networks with mediating countries (Pakistan, Qatar)

2. Short/Medium/Long-Term Action Plan

📌 Short-Term Action Plan (0-3 months: July-September 2025)

① Risk Diagnosis and Exposure Assessment - Comprehensive survey of raw material and energy procurement via the Strait of Hormuz - Quantify dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil and LNG - Calculate increased logistics costs due to rising maritime insurance premiums - Full review of direct and indirect business exposure related to Iran - Conduct legal review for potential secondary sanctions violations - Reconfirm list of trading partners and collaborators linked to Iran

② Emergency Diversification of Energy and Raw Material Supply Chains - Initiate negotiations for alternative supply contracts to reduce Middle Eastern dependency - Explore securing supplies from US shale oil, North Sea, and West African sources - Mitigate price volatility by increasing the proportion of long-term supply contracts (LTC) - Increase strategic inventory levels (target 20-30% increase from current levels)

③ Establishment of Negotiation Monitoring System - Real-time tracking of negotiation trends following Khamenei's funeral (July 9) ^[8] - Monitor negotiation schedules and agendas hosted by Pakistan - Subscribe to and analyze official announcements from Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Designate a dedicated analysis team for trends in Iran's internal power reshuffling - Track trends among potential new Supreme Leader candidates (Mojtaba Khamenei vs. collective leadership) - Monitor changes in the political standing of negotiation leaders like Ghalibaf ^[9]

④ Establishment of Financial Hedging Positions - Adjust hedging ratios for derivatives (options, futures) against oil price volatility - Consider purchasing put options to hedge against potential oil price drops upon agreement conclusion - Maintain call option holdings to hedge against potential oil price surges upon negotiation failure - Review rebalancing of portfolios with Middle Eastern exposure

📌 Medium-Term Action Plan (3-12 months: October 2025 - June 2026)

① Preparations for Entry into the Iranian Market (Subject to Sanctions Compliance) - Develop phased market entry plans linked to sanctions relief roadmap - Phase 1: Explore channels for trading sanctioned exception items such as humanitarian goods and pharmaceuticals - Phase 2: Pre-contact potential JV partners in energy and infrastructure sectors upon partial sanctions relief - Phase 3: Bid for plant and construction projects upon comprehensive agreement - Establish indirect information gathering network through local subsidiaries in Pakistan and Qatar ^[1][2] - Utilize the strengthened Iran-Pakistan channel following the Pakistani Prime Minister's attendance at the funeral ^[16]

② Restructuring of Middle Eastern Business Portfolio - Re-evaluate risks of business operations in Israel, Lebanon, and Syria - Calculate risk of business suspension due to prolonged Israeli military presence in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza ^[15] - Clarify criteria for business withdrawal, reduction, or maintenance - Intensify focus on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) market - Identify opportunities for increased infrastructure investment in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar - Deepen partnerships with Gulf energy companies such as Saudi Aramco ^[15]

③ Structural Redesign of Supply Chains - Complete cost-time analysis of alternative routes bypassing the Strait of Hormuz and secure contracts for these routes - Explore possibilities of using the Cape of Good Hope route and overland pipelines in the UAE - Establish domestic stockpiling and alternative development roadmaps for key raw materials dependent on the Middle East

④ Laying the Groundwork for Relationship Building with Iran's New Leadership - Analyze policy directions following the formation of Iran's interim leadership and the election of a new Supreme Leader - The adoption of a pragmatic approach is a key variable for agreement conclusion and market opening - Continuous tracking of policy statements and actions by Ghalibaf, Iran's chief negotiator ^[9] - Establish indirect networks with the Iranian business community - Consider contacting networks of Iranian entrepreneurs based in Dubai and Istanbul

📌 Long-Term Action Plan (12+ months: Second half of 2026 onwards)

① Full Entry into Iran's Reconstruction Market Upon Conclusion of Comprehensive Agreement - Participate in bidding for large-scale projects in energy, infrastructure, and plant sectors - Pursue EPC contracts for the restoration of Iranian oil production facilities (targeting a return to approximately 3 million barrels per day) - Participate in infrastructure reconstruction projects in major cities such as Tehran and Isfahan - Utilize reconstruction funds and Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) financing structures - Pre-assess financing channels for Iranian reconstruction, including AIIB and IsDB

② Comprehensive Redesign of Middle Eastern Business Strategy - Reconfigure regional business portfolio to align with the post-conflict new order in the Middle East - Prepare for the need to readjust relations with Gulf countries upon Iran's return - Re-evaluate business opportunities based on progress in the normalization of Israel-Arab relations - Expand investment in Middle Eastern renewable energy in response to accelerated energy transition - Participate in renewable energy projects linked to Saudi Vision 2030 and UAE Net Zero 2050

③ Enhancement of Continuous Geopolitical Risk Management System - Internalize an early warning system for Middle Eastern geopolitical risks - KPI-ize indicators for monitoring nuclear deal implementation and establish a quarterly reporting system to the board - Regularly update emergency response manuals for each scenario (twice annually)

3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points

🔴 Immediate Response Trigger (Red Alert)

🟡 Strategic Shift Trigger (Yellow Alert)

🟢 Opportunity Seizing Trigger (Green Signal)

📊 Regular Monitoring Indicators (Monthly Review)

- Diplomacy and Negotiation Indicators - Frequency and agenda progress of US-Iran indirect negotiations ^[1][2][8] - Trends in official statements from Qatar and Pakistan's Ministries of Foreign Affairs ^[17] - Progress in the election of Iran's new Supreme Leader - Outcomes of Netanyahu-Trump meetings and changes in Israel's stance ^[14]

- Military and Security Indicators - Frequency and intensity of clashes between Iran, the US, and Israel ^[13] - Trends in statements and military exercises by Iran's IRGC ^[4] - Situation of Israeli military presence in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza ^[15]

- Economic and Energy Indicators - Daily vessel traffic and insurance premium levels in the Strait of Hormuz ^[15] - Dubai Crude oil price and Middle East geopolitical risk premium - Progress in negotiations for the release of frozen Iranian assets ^[8] - Global LNG spot prices and Asian premium levels

4. Summary Conclusion

🔹 Three Key Judgments

- ① Negotiations will continue, but agreement will be delayed: Negotiations will resume after Khamenei's funeral (July 9) ^[8], but substantive agreement on the nuclear issue will be structurally limited until the internal power reshuffle in Iran is complete ^[12] - ② Strait of Hormuz risk remains ongoing: Although reopened by an interim agreement, the possibility of intermittent renewed clashes persists ^[13][15], with full stabilization expected to take at least 6-18 months - ③ The nature of Iran's new leadership is the biggest variable: The choice between a pragmatic or hardline approach will be the key turning point determining whether negotiations conclude successfully.

🔹 Summary of Corporate Code of Conduct

- Immediate Actions: Review supply chain risks dependent on the Strait of Hormuz and readjust energy hedging positions - Preparations: Organize sanctions compliance system and conduct preliminary feasibility studies for entry into the Iranian market - Actions to Await: Execute direct investment after confirmation of the election of Iran's new Supreme Leader and agreement on IAEA return inspections - Actions to Avoid: Direct financial transactions with Iran before sanctions are lifted and excessive betting on the Iranian market before agreement confirmation

🔹 Final Recommendation

> "While maintaining defensive hedging as the baseline, a flexible dual-track strategy that simultaneously prepares to seize opportunities based on negotiation progress trigger points is the optimal response in the current uncertain environment."

- The current stance is neither a full withdrawal nor a full entry, but a "Prepared Standby" position is optimal - Monitor trends in Pakistan-Qatar mediation channels as key leading indicators to capture the timing for strategic shifts^[1][2][17] - Maintain dynamic portfolio adjustments based on changes in realization probability through quarterly scenario re-evaluations.

--- This report was prepared based on publicly available information as of early July 2025, and the scenario probabilities and response directions may change depending on internal power realignments in Iran and the progress of negotiations.

References

[1] [Kuwait Times] Next indirect US-Iran talks after Khamenei funeral: mediators

[2] [Channel News Asia] Next indirect US-Iran talks due after late supreme leader's funeral

[3] [Daily Sabah] US-Iran talks mark progress, to continue after Khamenei funeral

[4] [Arab News] Iran warns US, Israel against attacks ahead of funeral processions for Khamenei

[5] [Hürriyet Daily News] Iran readies funeral for former supreme leader Khamenei

[6] [Kuwait Times] Iran prepares for late supreme leader’s funeral

[7] [Le Monde] Iran prepares for late supreme leader's funeral

[8] [Daily Maverick] US, Iran talks conclude in Doha, focused on Strait of Hormuz

[9] [Republica (NP)] Iran chief negotiator calls to avenge Khamenei death with massive funeral turnout

[10] [Le Temps] En direct, Moyen-Orient – Le régime iranien appelle à une participation massive aux obsèques d'Ali Khamenei pour le «venger»

[11] [The Edge Malaysia] Iran prepares to bury slain supreme leader with week of mass mourning

[12] [DW (Deutsche Welle)] Iran turns Khamenei funeral into show of power

[13] [Hürriyet Daily News] Fragile Mideast ceasefire faces fresh test as US, Iran trade strikes

[14] [Hürriyet Daily News] US says Iran talks to continue, 'both sides' pausing strikes

[15] [Khaleej Times] LiveIranian attacks 'never random nor incidental': Bahrain at UNSC

[16] [Khaleej Times] Pakistan PM to attend funeral of Iran's former Supreme Leader

[17] [ANSA] Ambasciatore Usa all'Onu: 'L'Iran torni sulla via della pace, il mondo non è dalla sua parte'

[18] [Hürriyet Daily News] Mixed signals from US, Iran as region awaits deal to get back on track

[19] [Hasht-e Subh] Baqaei: Guests from 100 Countries Will Attend Ali Khamenei’s Funeral Ceremony

[20] [The National (UAE)] US and Iran conclude round of talks in Doha, focusing on Strait of Hormuz