China's Expanding Influence in Africa: Xi Jinping's Visit to Egypt and Deepening Technological and Military Cooperation
Executive Summary
President Xi Jinping's first visit to Egypt in a decade, coinciding with joint military exercises, Huawei's supply of AI chips, zero-tariff policies for 53 African nations, and cooperation on state-owned asset management with Tanzania, demonstrates that China has established a model for engaging Africa that integrates security, technology, finance, and institutional frameworks. Huawei's provision of AI chips for government data centers marks a shift from supplying telecommunications equipment to controlling the core computing resources of national infrastructure, a move Western media outlets interpret as the infiltration of security-sensitive infrastructure. The adoption of Chinese technology by local African companies is not an ideological alignment but a pragmatic choice based on cost-effectiveness; a dual-track approach of using Chinese models for high-frequency tasks and Western models for complex reasoning is becoming a market standard. For South Korea, a realistic strategy is to move beyond the framework of choosing between U.S. and Chinese camps and instead leverage its third-party position to offer multi-vendor integration services and specialize in niche sectors. However, in areas directly linked to national security, such as finance, telecommunications, and government data centers, a separate response is necessary, including supply chain diversification and the explicit inclusion of data security clauses in contracts. The potential spread of the Tanzania-style state-owned asset management model to other countries and the structural changes in African trade finance resulting from the expanded use of the yuan also warrant long-term monitoring.
I. Analysis of the Current Situation
Analysis of the Current Situation: Xi Jinping's Visit to Egypt and China's Expanding Influence in Africa
1. Background and Developments
President Xi Jinping's visit to Egypt is his first in a decade, since 2016 [1]. The visit is linked to his attendance at a regional summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan [4]. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the purpose of the visit is to "make a positive contribution to safeguarding regional peace and stability" [4]. A meeting with President el-Sisi is scheduled [4].
Relations between Egypt and China have expanded incrementally in the military and technology sectors in recent years. Joint China-Egypt military exercises began the weekend just before the visit [1], indicating that Xi's visit is not merely a diplomatic event but an extension of deepening military cooperation [1]. Coinciding with the visit, Huawei is pursuing a plan to supply more than 2,000 advanced AI chips to Egyptian government data centers [1]. This marks a transition for Huawei from a supplier of telecommunications equipment to a provider of AI computing resources for the country's core national infrastructure.
At the continental level, China's economic penetration is not limited to Egypt. On August 19, 2026, China's General Administration of Customs announced in a briefing for African journalists in Beijing that it would fully implement a zero-tariff policy for 53 African countries with which it has diplomatic relations [9]. Zhang Xiaohui, Director of the Department of International Cooperation at the General Administration of Customs, announced that the policy had resulted in 193.8 billion yuan worth of imports from Africa over a two-month period [9]. The easing of customs clearance and quarantine procedures is also being implemented concurrently [9]. In Tanzania, cooperation in the area of state-owned asset management is taking concrete shape. Tanzania's Office of the Treasury Registrar (OTR) is pursuing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with China's State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) and the China Enterprise Reform and Development Society (CERDS) [10][12]. OTR Registrar Nehemiah Mchechu stated that the MOU with SASAC aims to establish a framework for continuous technical exchange [12].
2. Current Situation
From the Egyptian perspective, the visit aligns with the Sisi regime's strategy of diversifying its foreign policy. Facing declining revenues from the Suez Canal and a foreign exchange crisis, Egypt has maintained a structure of reliance on both Gulf financing and Chinese capital. Al-Monitor reported on the visit within the frame of deepening military and technological ties, highlighting in particular the timing of Huawei's entry into the government data center market [1]. This shows that Western media outlets interpret Huawei's expansion in Africa not as a transfer of advanced technology but as the infiltration of security-sensitive infrastructure.
An EAI internal report has suggested that the pattern of adoption at the African corporate level is driven less by ideological choice and more by pragmatic calculation. Henry Mascot, CEO of the Nigerian insurtech company Curacel, stated, "For high-frequency tasks like coding, data extraction, classification, and customer service, Chinese models are comparable to Western ones in terms of cost-performance" [2]. However, he acknowledged that Western systems still hold an advantage in tasks requiring complex reasoning or high reliability [2]. According to a RAND Corporation study, the regions with the largest increases in the use of Chinese AI models were Russia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America [2]. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) assessed this trend as a divergence in the adoption of U.S. and Chinese models based on geopolitical and economic development stages [2].
Similar trends are occurring in the Middle East. In Beijing, President Xi Jinping met with King Abdullah II of Jordan and proposed developing cooperation as an anchor for regional stability [14]. The Global Times reported on this meeting under the frame of "development cooperation as an anchor for regional stability," maintaining a narrative that defines China's engagement in the Middle East as that of a development partner rather than a security mediator [14]. The Iranian newspaper Tehran Times assessed that China has "evolved from an economy reliant on low-cost, high-volume exports into a complex actor combining industrial capacity, supply chain integration, emerging technologies, and a network of overseas investments" [13]. In 2025, China's merchandise exports amounted to approximately $3.77 trillion [13].
3. Key Actors and Positions
The Chinese Governmentis deploying a package to Africa and the Middle East that combines Huawei's exports of telecommunications and AI infrastructure, the expansion of yuan-based settlement, zero-tariff policies, and cooperation on state-owned asset management. This is an external extension of the "new quality productive forces" and the policy of technological self-reliance and self-strengthening presented at the 2024 Two Sessions [5]. Amid growing domestic pressure for self-sufficiency in semiconductors and AI, Huawei's expansion of its overseas data center supply also serves as a market acquisition strategy to bypass U.S. export controls on semiconductors to China.
The Egyptian Government, led by President el-Sisi, is simultaneously pursuing military and security cooperation and the expansion of digital infrastructure, following a policy of diversification aimed at reducing its dependence on Western aid and investment. The fact that joint military exercises were held just before the visit suggests that Egypt is positioning China not just as a trading partner but also as a security partner [1].
Individual African Governments and Companiesshow a clear tendency to treat China not as a side to choose in a bloc confrontation but as a subject of cost-performance calculations [2][7]. The Tanzanian government is pursuing cooperation with SASAC and CERDS for the practical purpose of strengthening the governance capacity of its state-owned enterprises [10][12]. A unified response framework at the African Union level is absent, and this pragmatic approach at the individual country and company level is expected to continue for the time being [2].
The United Statesis attempting to block allies' and partners' technological dependence on China through 'Pax Sillica'-style pressure to form blocs. However, in the African market, its engagement remains at the level of rhetoric about trust and partnership, while it scales back infrastructure investment to focus on itself and its allies [2]. This vacuum acts as a structural factor facilitating the market expansion of Chinese companies like Huawei and Alibaba [2].
4. Key Issues
The first issue is the security implications of Huawei supplying AI chips for Egyptian government data centers. If advanced AI chips are integrated into core government data processing infrastructure, going beyond telecommunications equipment, it could directly conflict with the U.S. export control regime on semiconductors to China [1]. This could become a new test case in the U.S.-China tech rivalry, with Egypt as the focal point.
The second issue is the pace at which military and economic cooperation are being combined. The concentration of joint military exercises, Xi Jinping's visit, and the pursuit of the Huawei contract within the same timeframe shows that China's approach to Egypt is shifting from cooperation in separate domains to a package-deal strategy [1][4].
The third issue is whether economic dependence on China will deepen at the continental level in Africa. As zero-tariff policies, the expansion of yuan settlement, and cooperation on state-owned asset management proceed simultaneously, the cumulative effect of individual countries' pragmatic choices could lead to structural dependence on Chinese standards and capital in certain sectors [9][10][12]. The absence of a coordinated response framework at the African Union level is a factor that structurally entrenches the limited bargaining power of individual nations [2].
II. Final Policy Recommendations
Final Policy Recommendations and Action Plan
1. Overall Assessment and Recommended Responses
President Xi Jinping's visit to Egypt should not be viewed as an isolated diplomatic event. Joint military exercises, Huawei's supply of AI chips, a continent-wide zero-tariff policy for Africa, and cooperation on state-owned asset management with Tanzania are all proceeding concurrently [1][9][10]. This signifies that China has established a model for engaging Africa that bundles security, technology, finance, and institutional frameworks into a single package. A project-by-project response will be insufficient to keep pace with China's expansion.
The logic of adoption in Africa is based on cost-performance calculations, not ideological alignment [2][7]. As the Curacel case illustrates, a dual-track approach—using Chinese technology for high-frequency, repetitive tasks and Western technology for complex reasoning—is becoming a market standard [2][7]. South Korean companies that approach this market with a presupposition of choosing between U.S. and Chinese camps will miss opportunities. A more realistic strategy for South Korea is to leverage its third-party position, independent of either camp, to offer multi-vendor integration services and specialize in niche sectors [2].
However, sectors with direct security implications, such as finance, telecommunications, and government data centers, require a different approach. Huawei's supply of AI chips for government data centers has already moved beyond providing telecommunications equipment to a stage of controlling the core computing resources of national infrastructure [1]. In this domain, supply chain diversification must be planned in advance. If the Tanzania-style model of cooperation on state-owned asset management spreads to other African countries, the possibility that the governance structures of state-owned enterprises themselves could be reshaped according to Chinese standards cannot be ruled out [10][12].
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plan
Short-Term (3–6 months)At the government level, the priority is to confirm the details of the Egypt-China joint statement and military cooperation agreements to be announced following Xi's visit [1][4]. It is necessary to track whether Huawei's contract to supply AI chips to Egyptian government data centers is signed and to determine its scale [1]. At the corporate level, a survey of the local AI infrastructure vendor landscape should be conducted for South Korean companies operating in Africa, and case studies of sectors where the dual-track adoption of Chinese and Western models has occurred should be compiled [2][7]. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy should identify the list of 53 countries and the specific items covered by the zero-tariff policy to assess any relative disadvantages for South Korean exporters [9].
Medium-Term (6 months–2 years)It is necessary to monitor which state-owned enterprises the Tanzania state-owned asset management MOU is actually applied to and whether similar models are spreading to other African countries [10][12]. As South Korean public institutions and state-owned enterprises may find themselves competing with the Chinese SASAC model when cooperating with African state-owned enterprises, the development of a Korean-style state-owned enterprise governance support program should be considered. At the private sector level, companies in security-related sectors (e.g., financial payment networks, telecommunications infrastructure) should establish the practice of explicitly including data security clauses in contracts when dealing with African partners who rely on Chinese equipment and solutions.
Long-Term (2+ years)If the expansion of yuan-based settlement substantially alters the structure of African trade finance, South Korean companies will need to reconsider their payment methods for trade with Africa. To prepare for the possibility of progress in discussions on unified technology standards at the African Union (AU) level, it would be advantageous for the South Korean government to establish permanent channels for digital cooperation with the AU. However, if the current absence of a unified AU response framework persists, bilateral cooperation with individual countries will remain the more effective approach [2].
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is whether the contract for Huawei to supply AI chips to Egyptian government data centers is actually signed and its scale [1]. If the contract is confirmed and supply begins, it should be interpreted as a signal that Huawei has transitioned from a telecommunications equipment provider to a supplier of core national computing infrastructure.
The second indicator is whether the China-Egypt military exercises become regular events [1]. If they transition from a one-off exercise to an annual one, it should be seen as a signal of Egypt's partial disengagement from the U.S.-led security partnership.
The third indicator is the pace at which the zero-tariff policy is expanded to more countries and products [9]. Whether the initial volume of 193.8 billion yuan over two months is sustained or increased will be a benchmark for the policy's durability [9].
The fourth indicator is the spread of the Tanzanian SASAC-OTR model to other countries [10][12]. If similar MOUs on state-owned asset management are signed in major African countries like Kenya and Nigeria, it would signify that China has entered a phase of attempting to standardize the governance of African state-owned enterprises.
The fifth indicator is whether African companies maintain the dual-track structure for AI model adoption [2][7]. An increase in cases where Chinese models replace Western ones even in the domain of complex reasoning could be judged as a turning point where the superiority of Western technology in the African AI market is being challenged.
4. Summary and Conclusion
Xi Jinping's visit to Egypt should be read as part of a complex package involving simultaneous cooperation in military, technological, financial, and institutional domains [1][9][10]. The technology choices of local African companies are based on pragmatic cost-performance calculations, not on bloc politics [2][7]. South Korea should leverage this pragmatic space by pursuing multi-vendor and niche strategies, while pre-emptively designing supply chain diversification for security-linked infrastructure sectors [2]. Establishing a system to continuously monitor three key triggers—Huawei's entry into government data centers, the regularization of military exercises, and the spread of the state-owned asset management model—is the most effective response at present [1][10][12].
References
[1] [Al-Monitor] China's Xi to visit Egypt for first time in decade as military, Huawei ties grow
[3] [CSIS - Reconnecting Asia] Mapping China’s Digital Silk Road
[4] [Hürriyet Daily News] China's Xi to visit Kyrgyzstan, Egypt from Sunday
[6] [Jane's (Janes)] WebinarFrom Investment to Influence: China's Expanding Reach in Latin America
[7] [South China Morning Post] he African firms adopting Chinese AI as US-China rivalry intensifies
[9] [Guinée News] China-Africa: 193.8 billion yuan of African imports in two months of zero tariffs
[10] [The Citizen (TZ)] Tanzania, China deepen state asset management ties through new MoUs
[11] [South China Morning Post] Asia is reaching for the open road that Chinese AI offers
[12] [Daily News (TZ)] OTR, China agencies deepen state asset cooperation
[13] [Tehran Times] China’s economic soft power in the age of connectivity
[16] [Les Dépêches de Brazzaville] Currency: The yuan establishes itself in Africa
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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