Global NK Commentary: China's New Strategic Evolution Towards the US in 2026 and the Korean Peninsula

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1. Changes in China's Perception of the International Order: Decline of American Hegemony and the US-led International Order

Since the second half of 2025, Chinese academia has been discussing the inevitable collapse of the existing international order led by the US since the post-war era and is already preparing for a new international order. China perceives the decline of American hegemony as the primary background that triggered the collapse of the existing international order. An analysis of US national power in terms of political influence, economic strength, military power, and technological level suggests that American hegemony is structurally weakening from within (Zuo Xiying 2025).

The second Trump administration seeks to delay the weakening of hegemony, caused by internal problems, through measures such as imposing tariffs and shifting more defense burdens and international responsibilities to allies and partner countries. This approach is being characterized as a shift from 'benevolent hegemony' to 'predatory hegemony' (Zuo Xiying 2025). Some in Chinese academia argue that while the Trump administration's 'predatory hegemony' actions might temporarily delay the weakening of American hegemony, they will ultimately not prevent its decline but rather accelerate it.

Consequently, it is analyzed that the global system is experiencing accelerating instability due to the decline of the existing order without the establishment of a new international order. The second Trump administration is undermining a significant portion of the US-led international order since the Cold War, and it is projected that even if a Democratic administration takes office after 2028, recovery will be difficult. Due to the Trump administration's isolationist and protectionist policies, major powers' trust in the Trump administration has significantly weakened, and it is highly probable that they will be less inclined to actively support and participate in a US-led international order as before.

In this era of transformation in the international order, occurring once in a century, the prevailing opinion is that China should formulate long-term strategic plans while strengthening its position as a nation that protects world peace, without directly confronting or competing with the US, except in safeguarding its core interests.

China believes that the rapid changes and increasing uncertainty in the international order, caused by America's 'America First' policy, present more opportunities than challenges. China anticipates that the US-led bloc expansion based on systems and values, and the 'new Cold War' confrontation that made things difficult for China during the Biden administration, will not be replicated. Instead, China sees emerging opportunities and space to expand its influence and role in the international community, thereby advancing its national interests. China is sending signals that it can seek practical compromises and policy coordination with the Trump administration in areas other than its core interests, such as the Taiwan issue.

However, China is also wary that despite the decline of American hegemony, the US still surpasses China in areas such as science and technology and military power, and harbors intentions to control China's development. China harbors concerns that the US may concentrate its strategic resources from global expansion to critical areas essential for maintaining hegemony and implement 'targeted containment' against major strategic competitors to overcome its declining hegemony. While the US National Security Strategy (NSS) report released in December 2025 might appear to adopt a more relaxed stance towards China compared to previous ones, China remains vigilant, believing that the US harbors an underlying intention to implement more precise, pragmatic, and sustained 'targeted containment' against China, its major strategic competitor (Wang Peng 2025).

Based on its changed perception of the international order, China's foreign policy in 2026 is evolving towards designing and creating scenarios for a multipolar order led by China through a unique Chinese approach to major power diplomacy that differentiates itself from that of the US. Therefore, rather than directly targeting the US and intensifying confrontation and competition, China aims to focus its diplomatic efforts on Europe, ASEAN, the Global South, and multilateralism to build a multipolar order led by China. Furthermore, it has strategically judged that avoiding direct conflict with the US through these indirect methods is an effective choice for containing and responding to the US in the long run.

2. Evolution of China's Perception and Strategy Regarding US-China Relations

The fact that China is actively discussing the decline of American hegemony is not unrelated to its increased confidence in its relationship with the US since the second half of 2025. When Trump's election victory in 2024 was confirmed, China harbored considerable concern and apprehension about the second term of the Trump administration, given its past experiences of rough clashes, such as trade friction during Trump's first term. In the first phone call with President-elect Trump in January 2025, President Xi Jinping, after offering congratulations, emphasized China's core interests and respect for its major concerns. He particularly requested cautious handling of the Taiwan issue, stating it is directly linked to China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2025a).

In the first half of 2025, the US imposed 'reciprocal tariffs' and strengthened export controls, leading to strong countermeasures from China, and the US-China relationship evolved into a confrontational pattern. However, after intense conflict and confrontation, both countries entered a new phase of seeking compromise more quickly than expected. US-China tariff negotiations were held five times starting in May, culminating in a summit meeting in Busan on October 30, 2025. The leaders of both countries agreed to a provisional suspension of tariffs and export controls and a one-year strategic truce.

China assesses that it has achieved remarkable results by responding firmly and resolutely to US tariff and export control measures in 2025, based on the experience accumulated since 2018 in responding to US pressure and its own growth in economic, technological, and military power. China emphasizes that it uniquely countered US trade pressure with retaliatory measures on par with the US, without making any compromises. It is even evaluated that China was able to control the Trump administration's offensive by retaliating with rare earth export controls in response to US export restrictions in September 2025.

China now believes that the US strategy of pressuring China has entered a phase of weakening. The view is also emerging that China is being used as a tool rather than a direct target in Trump's MAGA movement. China claims to now possess the experience, confidence, and strategy to respond to and manage US offensives. Moving a step further, opinions are being raised that China should take the lead in designing the future of US-China relations and its scenarios (Diao Daming 2025).

Since the Trump administration initiated the trade war against China in its first term in 2018, China has accumulated over eight years of experience and now considers itself capable of negotiating with the US on equal footing. Some interpretations even suggest that, similar to how 'mutually assured destruction' between nuclear powers deters nuclear use, the process of China's strong and effective countermeasures has created a situation of 'mutually assured disruption' (确保相互干扰), where both the US and China can severely disrupt each other's economies and supply chains. Based on this, China predicts that trade conflicts with the US will not excessively escalate in the future. China expects that while the pattern of counter-response and negotiation with the US may continue, the overall trend will move towards stabilization. China sees an increasing resilience in the US-China relationship, transitioning from confrontation and conflict to compromise.

Whether the Trump administration will indeed favor compromise over containment and pressure, as China expects and evaluates, remains uncertain. However, it is clear that optimistic arguments and discussions are actively emerging within China, displaying unusual confidence in its relationship with the US since the second half of 2025. How this change in China's perception and attitude will be reflected in actual policies and strategies requires closer observation through a series of processes, such as the consecutive summit meetings in 2026. Nevertheless, the message China appears to be conveying recently is clear. China is demonstrating its intention to move beyond a reactive and passive position in its relationship with the US and to proactively take steps from an equal footing to stably guide the relationship with the US.

3. Building a 'Stable Coexistence Relationship' through US-China Negotiation and Strategic Intentions

1) Possibility of Compromise and Deals Towards a 'Stable Coexistence Relationship' between the US and China

The increased confidence in US diplomacy within China is expanding into discussions about building a new paradigm for US-China relations. The attempt by leaders Xi Jinping and Trump at the Busan Summit in 2025 to seek compromise by restraining conflict and confrontation, albeit a temporary truce, and their promise of summit meetings through mutual visits in 2026, has created greater expectations for compromise between the US and China than ever before.

Subtle but significant changes are also detected in the keywords China has recently emphasized in its diplomatic engagements with the US. At summit meetings, China has consistently emphasized its core interests and red lines, showing no lack of vigilance and suspicion towards the US. For example, President Xi Jinping, in his virtual summit with President Biden in November 2021, mentioned red lines, stating, 'If separatist forces advocating for 'Taiwan independence' provoke and pressure us, or even cross the red line, we will be forced to take resolute action.'

In the summit meeting with President Biden in November 2023, President Xi Jinping consistently emphasized efforts to build stable, healthy, and sustainable US-China relations, while also stressing that China has interests to protect, principles to uphold, and bottom lines to observe. Furthermore, at the Lima Summit in November 2024, he explicitly emphasized that the Taiwan issue, democracy and human rights, institutions and systems, and the right to development are the four major red lines that China absolutely cannot tolerate (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2024).

However, since the latter half of 2025, while maintaining a strong principled stance on the Taiwan issue, China has been increasingly emphasizing stability, mutual benefit, and cooperation, sending more proactive messages of compromise rather than vigilance towards the US. For instance, at the meeting with President Trump in Busan on October 30, 2025, President Xi Jinping no longer mentioned red lines. At that time, he emphasized economic cooperation, stating that trade and economic cooperation should be a balancing force and driving force for US-China relations, not a source of obstacles or conflict. Both sides must consider the long-term benefits of cooperation and avoid falling into a cycle of mutual retaliation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2025b). In a phone call with President Trump on November 24, 2025, President Xi Jinping reiterated the importance of cooperation, stating that cooperation benefits both countries and confrontation harms both, a common sense repeatedly proven through practice, and that mutual achievement and common prosperity between the US and China are a feasible reality (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2025c).

The change in summit keywords aligns with the positive outlook and trends in US-China relations discussed by Chinese researchers earlier. While this internal shift in China may be the result of objective analysis and judgment, it more clearly confirms that China has a policy objective to actively engage in negotiations on equal footing with the US and thereby stabilize US-China relations.

Moreover, China is expressing its willingness to proactively propose scenarios and design the future direction of bilateral relations, rather than being passive and reactive. In his speech at the annual seminar on 'International Situation and Chinese Diplomacy' in December 2025, Foreign Minister Wang Yi suggested the need for a new paradigm in relations with the US (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2025d). Specifically, he stated, 'We will create a new paradigm of mutually beneficial interaction between the US and China. And we will promote the development of sound, stable, and sustainable US-China relations,' thereby presenting the direction for the new US-China relations envisioned by China.

In the future, China envisions a situation where competition proceeds with each side pursuing its own strategy based on equal capabilities, and accordingly, the two countries will adjust the intensity of confrontation and competition and move towards peaceful coexistence by accommodating mutual strategic changes (Da Wei, 2025). For example, US-China relations are seen as having transformed into a relationship between two nationalistic great powers for the first time in history. Trump's 'Make America Great Again' and Xi Jinping's 'Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation' both put forth nationalistic goals, which are not necessarily conflicting, and it is argued that the US and China can at least avoid hindering each other. With multiple US-China summit meetings expected in 2026, including Trump's visit to China in April, the APEC summit in November, and the G20 summit in December, China believes it must use these opportunities to seek reasonable coexistence plans that are appropriate for the new era.

Specific proposals for building a stable bilateral relationship that meets the realistic needs of both countries are also being discussed. For instance, Professor Wu Xinbo of Fudan University (Wu Xinbo 2026) proposes a 'Grand Bargain' between the US and China. Wu suggests that since a grand bargain is difficult, it should begin with negotiations in relatively easily agreed-upon areas such as trade and economy to build mutual trust, and then, based on this trust, gradually expand negotiations to more complex regional security issues and global topics.

For example, China proposes a deal where it increases imports from the US, such as soybeans, and investment in US manufacturing, while the US eases export controls and reduces regulations on Chinese private enterprises. In the science and technology sector, China suggests a deal where the US eases restrictions on technology import and export to China, and China correspondingly restrains its export limitations on rare earths and critical minerals. Furthermore, using agreements in trade and economics as a stepping stone, it proposes advancing to discussions for risk management in more complex geopolitical competitions, such as on the Korean Peninsula, in the South China Sea, and regarding Taiwan. Particularly, the Taiwan issue is presented as the most critical challenge that will determine the future of US-China relations; to prevent escalation of conflict, the US should urge restraint on Taiwan and exert influence to prevent overt 'independence' actions, while China should show goodwill by reducing military activities around Taiwan.

In the global arena, it is considered necessary to have consultations to clarify each side's role in the international order. China must clarify that it is not aiming to completely overthrow the existing US-led order, but rather to enhance the efficiency of some multilateral organizations and strengthen the representation of non-Western countries while maintaining overall stability, thereby gaining practical trust from the US and the international community.

Professor Wang Jis (Wang Jisi, 2026) proposes the need for mutual exchange of 'strategic clarity where the US abandons attempts to subvert China's system, and China does not challenge US global leadership.' Professor Wang also suggests that instead of striving to 'improve' US-China relations, the goal should be pragmatic 'coexistence' where red lines are clarified, and each side pursues its own interests within those boundaries. In summary, a review of the discussions within China, including the proposals by Foreign Minister Wang Yi, indicates that China aims to establish a stable coexistence model through practical-level deals and negotiations on mutual interests from an equal footing in its relationship with the US, amidst the transformation of the international order once in a century.

2) China's Strategic Intentions and Challenges

China's new proposals are largely intended to capture and proactively leverage President Trump's pursuit of 'America First' and his transactional instincts. Nevertheless, significant constraints and limitations exist for actual compromises or deals to materialize. First, given the nature of its political system, China assumes the possibility of a grand bargain led by Presidents Xi and Trump. However, although President Trump is exceptionally autocratic and transactional for a US president, unlike the Chinese system, the US presidency has a fixed term and checks on power, limiting his ability to unilaterally push through deals. Even if a deal between Xi and Trump is reached, it may not guarantee the long-term stability of US-China relations.

Second, in any deal, trust is as important as the equitable exchange of benefits. However, the majority of mainstream politicians and high-level decision-makers in the US still harbor strong distrust towards deals and negotiations with China. Therefore, it is highly suspected that recent discussions within China about negotiations and deals are merely proposals to 'buy time' to lay the foundation for China's modernization roadmap set for 2035. The US, fundamentally distrustful of the Chinese government and its strategic intentions, is likely to oppose deals like a 'grand bargain.'

The fact that compromise and deal proposals are being actively advanced by both the Chinese government and academia is indicative of an intention to stabilize relations with the Trump administration. However, considering the high probability that compromises may not proceed as China expects, it is plausible that other strategic considerations and intentions lie behind China's negotiation proposals.

First, it is possible that behind China's proposal for coexistence with the US lies an intention to buy time by temporarily alleviating US pressure and controls, and by resolving the instability and uncertainty of the Trump administration's tenure. China believes that a temporary compromise with the US might be a viable option for President Trump, who is facing political difficulties due to issues such as the excessive crackdown on immigrants ahead of the midterm elections. From President Trump's perspective, China's proposals such as purchasing US agricultural products like soybeans and energy (LNG), cooperating on blocking fentanyl precursors, increasing direct investment in US manufacturing, and lifting rare earth export controls could be worth considering for a deal.

From China's perspective, 2026 marks the first year of the '15th Five-Year Plan,' a period when it must concentrate on domestic development more than ever. The stable launch and success of the 15th Five-Year Plan are critical variables for stabilizing the Xi Jinping regime and for Xi Jinping's long-term rule. Therefore, the Xi Jinping government faces the critical task of minimizing confrontation and conflict with the Trump administration and breaking through US trade and technology controls to focus on economic structural reform, revitalization, and technological self-reliance. Thus, China may be considering a fallback option of achieving at least a small deal in trade and economic areas to extend the temporary truce, even if a grand bargain with the US is not possible.

Second, while China is proposing stable coexistence to the US, it is possible that this proposal is also directed at other countries in the international community, excluding the US. In other words, it may be an attempt to secure global leadership by actively projecting diplomatic rhetoric of China's stability, certainty, and responsibility into the diplomatic space created by the Trump administration's isolationism and 'America First' policy. Indeed, China is actively approaching US allies and partners, as well as countries in the Global South, who are weary of the US administration's coercive and unpredictable policy actions, by highlighting policy continuity and predictability.

In this regard, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in his December 2025 speech, unusually emphasized China's five major roles in the international community. Specifically, he asserted that China serves as an 'anchor of stability' in turbulent world affairs, a 'backbone' in new surrounding environments, a 'compass' for the changing international order, an 'engine of growth' driving global economic development, and a 'ballast stone' in international moral crises. China seeks to secure global leadership by actively expanding its role in the international community during this transitional period of the international order, starkly contrasting with the Trump administration's isolationism. While continuously proposing stable coexistence to the US, China is simultaneously pursuing a broad-ranging, multi-faceted diplomacy to actively seize the opportunity presented by the decline of US hegemony and strengthen China's international influence and leadership. In fact, China is leading reforms in global governance to strengthen the multipolar order and is reinforcing practical cooperation and solidarity with countries in Europe, the Middle East, ASEAN, and the Global South.

4. Changes in China's US Strategy and Their Impact and Implications for Korean Peninsula Policy

China is actively expressing its intention to pioneer a new horizon of major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, targeting 2026. The reason China is newly emphasizing major power diplomacy is that the initiation of the 15th Five-Year Plan and the securing of a stable coexistence relationship with the US are, in fact, the most crucial diplomatic tasks for 2026. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the 15th Five-Year Plan and US diplomacy are closely intertwined. Securing stable coexistence in US-China relations is a key variable for the success of the 15th Five-Year Plan, and the success of the 15th Five-Year Plan can serve as an important foundation for securing China's leadership in its diplomacy with the US.

Building a community of shared future with neighboring countries is included in the seven major diplomatic tasks for 2026 proposed by Foreign Minister Wang Yi. However, neighboring diplomacy is also a background and dependent variable for the achievement of the 15th Five-Year Plan and US diplomacy. The Korean Peninsula is a strategically very important target for China's neighboring diplomacy. However, the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula is highly fluid, influenced by China's development strategy and its diplomacy with the US.

The recent occurrence of two consecutive inter-Korean summit meetings within a two-month period, which is highly unusual, confirms that both governments share a strong will to restore relations. However, it is undeniable that complex external variables, such as Sino-Japanese conflict, South Korea-Japan summit, potential US-China and North Korea-US summits, have played a role in the unusually swift arrangement of the summits at the beginning of the year. While the instability and uncertainty of the international situation, including US-China relations, can serve as an opportunity for the restoration of South Korea-China relations, conversely, it could also lead to the worst-case scenario, as seen in the THAAD conflict in 2016.

The two summit meetings confirmed the will to restore relations, but at the same time, it was reconfirmed that a strategic divergence of expectations and demands still exists between the two countries. The North Korean and US factors, which have been the biggest variables and obstacles in the 34-year history of South Korea-China relations, have once again surfaced as differing demands from both countries at a crucial juncture for restoring relations. While South Korea is focusing its summit agenda on the North Korean issue and the Korean Peninsula, China confirmed its expectation of South Korea's strategic choices regarding US-China strategic competition and the Taiwan issue.

Furthermore, China is proposing deals and negotiations for coexistence with the US, albeit possibly temporary. In Professor Wu's proposed 'grand bargain,' the issue of the Korean Peninsula is also presented as a subsequent issue requiring bilateral negotiation. Professor Wu suggests transitioning from deterrence policy to a management approach of the situation through a peace mechanism jointly guaranteed by the US and China, such as resuming the Four-Party Talks. The current situation, where neither the US nor China prioritizes the North Korean nuclear issue and both actively avoid mentioning denuclearization, suggests that there is a possibility that the US and China might, for the sake of a temporary truce, expend the Korean Peninsula issue as a bargaining chip without consulting South Korea, even if it is merely an academic proposal.

The Lee Jae-myung administration is pursuing the seemingly conflicting diplomatic objectives of modernizing the ROK-US alliance and fully restoring ROK-China relations under the banner of pragmatic diplomacy. Simultaneously, given South Korea's stance of never accepting North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, it must monitor and prepare for North Korea-US dialogue, but it also needs to prepare for the possibility of a swift compromise between the US and China. The pragmatic diplomacy of the Lee Jae-myung administration may face a critical test in 2026. ROK-US, ROK-China, US-China, and North Korea-US relations are intricately interconnected and influence each other, leading to unpredictable situations where South Korea risks being marginalized or sacrificed. Strategic contemplation and preparation are more crucial than ever to address this complex equation and consider various scenarios.

First, regarding ROK-China relations, while restoring relations is important, it is crucial to quickly restore strategic dialogues at various levels that have been suspended, to prepare for unpredictable changes and secure close communication channels between the two countries. South Korea and China must maintain continuous strategic dialogue to achieve a clearer and more objective understanding of each other's maximum expectations and minimum red lines. Through this, the priority for restoring relations is to prevent and manage a sudden deterioration of the situation on the Korean Peninsula caused by the complex challenges of external variables.

References

Wang Peng. 2025. 'US Latest National Security Strategy Report Highlights 'Pragmatic Containment' Towards China.' October 12. Xi Jinping Diplomacy Thought and China's Diplomacy in the New Era Website. https://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-12/10/content_118220692.shtml

Da Wei. 2025. 'US-China Relations: Resilience and New Dynamics Amidst Turbulent Storms.' World Affairs, December 26. https://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-12/26/content_118247640.shtml

Diao Daming. 2025. 'Let's Hold the 'Script' for Shaping US-China Relations and the International Order in Our Own Hands.' World Affairs, 08-29. https://cn.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2025-08/29/content_118048563.shtml

Zuo Xiying. 2025. 'The Trump Administration and the Formation of America's Predatory Hegemony.' World Economy and Politics, Issue 12.

Professor Wang Jisi in conversation with former US Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg (January 15, 2026). https://m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_32441494

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2025a. 'Xi Jinping Holds Phone Conversation with US President-elect Trump.' 01-17. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202501/t20250117_11538132.shtml

وزارة خارجية جمهورية الصين الشعب. 2025b. “شي جين بينغ يلتقي بالرئيس الأمريكي ترامب في بوسان.” 30-10.https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202510/t20251030_11743847.shtml

وزارة خارجية جمهورية الصين الشعب. 2025c. “شي جين بينغ يجري مكالمة هاتفية مع الرئيس الأمريكي ترامب.” 24-11.https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202511/t20251124_11759124.shtml

وزارة خارجية جمهورية الصين الشعب. 2025d. وانغ يي يحضر ندوة حول الوضع الدولي والدبلوماسية الصينية لعام 2025 ويلقي كلمة رئيسية.” 30-12.https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjbzhd/202512/t20251230_11790364.shtml

وزارة خارجية جمهورية الصين الشعب. 2024. “شي جين بينغ يلتقي بالرئيس الأمريكي بايدن في ليما.” 17-11.https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202412/t20241218_11497766.shtml

وو شينبو. 2026. "الحالة الكبرى للصفقة بين أمريكا والصين."الشؤون الخارجية. يناير/فبراير

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