["EAI Sounding Commentary"] Uncertainty in US-China Competition Caused by the COVID-19 Crisis, Where is Korea-China Relations Headed?

YouTube Link : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DTs8hJaGobA

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Editor's Note

The East Asia Institute (EAI) (President Son Yeol) is running the 'EAI Sounding Commentary' content to allow easier and more convenient access to expert commentary on major domestic and international issues. This 'EAI Sounding Commentary' introduces the commentary by Lee Dong-ryul, Director of EAI China Research Center and Professor at Dongduk Women's University, who analyzed China's foreign policy amidst the global crisis triggered by COVID-19. As developed countries, including the US and Europe, have failed in epidemic prevention and control amidst the global spread of COVID-19, China, which was at the center of domestic and international criticism due to controversies over initial concealment and inadequate response, is experiencing a rebound effect. China is accelerating its image improvement through active international support and public relations campaigns, and is actively utilizing the opportunities created by the global crisis caused by the pandemic to seek its relative rise. However, the author points out that while China may gain relative benefits, it still faces limitations in presenting new global standards and values and achieving independent growth. Furthermore, the author predicts that mutual distrust between the US and China will deepen due to the COVID-19 situation, leading to increased competition and conflict. However, it is predicted that both countries, due to domestic issues, will adopt a strategy of securing spheres of influence through 'proxy containment and competition' by emphasizing alliances and partnerships, rather than direct confrontation. In this context, South Korea faces pressure for a binary choice. The author argues that South Korea must strengthen its strategic flexibility in the current transitional international order to secure its independent strategic value and position.

EAI Sounding Commentary Script

Hello, this is the East Asia Institute (EAI). Following the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic, developed countries, which seemed unshakable, are struggling with epidemic prevention one after another. Meanwhile, there is a country showing a faster-than-expected recovery and seeking a rebound: China. In this 'EAI Sounding Commentary,' through the commentary by Lee Dong-ryul, Director of EAI China Research Center and Professor at Dongduk Women's University, who analyzed China amidst the global crisis, we will explore China's future foreign policy at the crossroads of crisis and opportunity due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and forecast South Korea's response. Let's begin!

As the US and Europe, among other developed countries, failed in epidemic prevention amidst the global spread of COVID-19, China is enjoying the effect of relative evaluation. The backlash against the Communist Party system, which began to emerge after controversies over initial concealment and inadequate response to the virus, seems to be transforming into internal cohesion, relative confidence, and support for the regime. With this positive momentum, China appears to be making a dramatic turnaround, seizing new opportunities for relative rise amidst the global crisis. China is focusing on improving its image by diluting the existing responsibility narrative for COVID-19 through fierce public relations campaigns in the international community and actively highlighting its contributions. It is also seeking to revitalize economic recovery by providing epidemic prevention supplies and medical support to key partner countries. While China is publicly offering cooperation and support to the world, the dispatch of important medical support teams is concentrated in pro-China countries and key Belt and Road Initiative partner countries, suggesting that it is pursuing complex strategic objectives, not only to improve its image through epidemic diplomacy but also to revitalize the Belt and Road Initiative.

In fact, China's use of the global crisis as an opportunity for leapfrogging is not unfamiliar to us. China has reached its current position by seizing opportunities for 'relative rise' during past major global crises. For example, China secured strategic time and space for its rise by capitalizing on US weakness during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, and the 2008 global financial crisis, and indeed achieved the effect of relative rise. The current situation with COVID-19, where China is actively engaged in international cooperation and support, also reveals its intention to transform the crisis caused by the pandemic into a fourth opportunity for relative rise. Having achieved relative rise by overcoming crises, China is now in a position to pursue independent rise by presenting differentiated global standards and values. However, China seems preoccupied with escaping the narrative of responsibility for the 'crisis originating from China.' Despite its unexpectedly rapid recovery, the Xi Jinping regime remains bogged down in domestic issues such as regime security and economic development, failing to lead international cooperation to overcome a crisis affecting all of humanity. China has not demonstrated the ability or willingness to present a vision acceptable to the international community and design a new international order. China still appears to have clear limitations in securing independent and absolute global leadership beyond relative rise.

Gaining the upper hand in US-China relations is also not easy. The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating changes in global supply chains and further eroding internationalism. Amidst this, US-China relations are also expected to see weakened economic interdependence and strengthened self-centeredness, leading to intensified competition and conflict rather than cooperation. Even amidst the global epidemic crisis, the two great powers, the US and China, are not seeking cooperation but are instead engaged in a fierce public relations battle over responsibility. In this process, the US's offensive regarding the vulnerability of the Communist Party system is a red line that China cannot accept. Through the exchange of accusations over COVID-19 responsibility, both the US and China have reaffirmed their fundamental differences in systems, races, and ideologies, and mutual distrust has expanded. Distrust and antipathy towards the US within China have reached their highest point in 41 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, and some assessments suggest that bilateral relations have reached their worst state.

Since political leaders in both the US and China find it difficult to yield or compromise for domestic political reasons, they will inevitably continue the fierce public relations battle. However, on the other hand, as both countries increasingly need to focus on domestic issues, it is also difficult to create situations of sharp confrontation. The Xi Jinping government, facing political and economic difficulties, must prioritize regime security, making it a rational choice to avoid further expanding the front of conflict with the US. China is already finding it difficult to fulfill the terms of the Phase 1 trade agreement with the US due to the COVID-19 crisis, and the US is likely to continue to exert pressure on China in other ways and in other areas using this as a pretext, placing China in a defensive position. What China fears most is the formation of an anti-China international coalition led by the US, which would then pressure and blockade China. The Trump administration, facing a presidential election, will not ease its 'blame China' offensive. However, since it is impossible to win the election solely by making China a scapegoat, it will not be easy to indefinitely escalate confrontation and conflict with China. Therefore, it is likely that the US and China will avoid direct confrontation as much as possible and engage in a diplomatic battle to secure spheres of influence through 'proxy containment and competition' by drawing in their respective allies and partners and putting them on the front lines. Competition to expand spheres of influence, particularly by emphasizing the Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) and the Belt and Road Initiative, is likely to involve both incentives and pressure to draw in intermediate countries in the region.

The repercussions of the sharp confrontation between the US and China during the COVID-19 phase on South Korea and the Korean Peninsula are likely to become more severe and unstable. The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented event and is highly fluid, making the post-COVID international order even more unpredictable. If the 'proxy containment and competition' between the US and China intensifies in the post-COVID-19 era, South Korea, due to its unique geopolitical location, will face pressure for an unwanted binary choice more than any other country. While it is true that South Korea currently has few alternatives other than strengthening strategic flexibility to maximize national interests, the reality is that there are not many options. Nevertheless, the effort to continuously seize new opportunities in the given situation is important. It is necessary to seize the transitional situation in the international community triggered by COVID-19 as a diplomatic golden time and strive to secure South Korea's independent strategic value and position amidst the great powers.

The period of weakened or absent great power leadership due to COVID-19 may be prolonged. In this case, the role of middle powers like South Korea, or alliances among middle powers, may relatively increase. South Korea needs to place more emphasis on forming alliances among middle powers and conduct diplomatic activities in preparation for the changing situation. In particular, South Korea has secured a unique asset through its response to COVID-19, a 'Korean-style' response that differs from developed countries, achieving epidemic prevention effectiveness while maintaining openness and transparency. By providing this experience asset in epidemic prevention to the international community, South Korea should gradually enhance its strategic value and status. Of course, overconfidence and arrogance regarding the currently popular 'Korean model' should be guarded against. South Korea needs to carefully explore its role in building cooperative mechanisms and joint solidarity in the international community, based on international attention. First, internally, it must accumulate the capacity to play a certain international role even in the post-epidemic era. Then, it is necessary to refine the 'Korean model' through a method where the private sector, particularly in healthcare and IT, takes the lead, with government support in an indirect manner. Through this, it is a time to gradually expand the scope of epidemic prevention cooperation, form an international cooperation system, and strive to enhance South Korea's independent strategic value and status.

It is a time when collective wisdom is more needed than ever to turn a crisis into an opportunity for leapfrogging. This was Yoon Jun-il of 'EAI Sounding Commentary.' ■

■ Author: Lee Dong-ryul_ Director of EAI China Research Center. Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies, served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, and is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Policy Advisory Committee. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and ethnic minority issues. His recent research includes "China's Strategy and Role in Korean Peninsula Denuclearization and Peace Process," "Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Discourse Since the 1990s," "Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative," "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," and "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-authored).

■ Managed and Edited by: Yoon Jun-il, EAI Researcher

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 203) I junilyoon@eai.or.kr

'EAI Sounding Commentary' is content designed to provide easier and more convenient access to in-depth analysis of major domestic and international issues by experts. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not related to EAI and are solely the views of the individual author.

Video Script

Hello, this is the East Asia Institute (EAI). Following the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic, developed countries, which seemed unshakable, are struggling with epidemic prevention one after another. Meanwhile, there is a country showing a faster-than-expected recovery and seeking a rebound: China. In this 'EAI Sounding Commentary,' through the commentary by Lee Dong-ryul, Director of EAI China Research Center and Professor at Dongduk Women's University, who analyzed China amidst the global crisis, we will explore China's future foreign policy at the crossroads of crisis and opportunity due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and forecast South Korea's response. Let's begin!

As the US and Europe, among other developed countries, failed in epidemic prevention amidst the global spread of COVID-19, China is enjoying the effect of relative evaluation. The backlash against the Communist Party system, which began to emerge after controversies over initial concealment and inadequate response to the virus, seems to be transforming into internal cohesion, relative confidence, and support for the regime. With this positive momentum, China appears to be making a dramatic turnaround, seizing new opportunities for relative rise amidst the global crisis.

China is focusing on improving its image by diluting the existing responsibility narrative for COVID-19 through fierce public relations campaigns in the international community and actively highlighting its contributions. It is also seeking to revitalize economic recovery by providing epidemic prevention supplies and medical support to key partner countries. While China is publicly offering cooperation and support to the world, the dispatch of important medical support teams is concentrated in pro-China countries and key Belt and Road Initiative partner countries, suggesting that it is pursuing complex strategic objectives, not only to improve its image through epidemic diplomacy but also to revitalize the Belt and Road Initiative. In fact, China's use of the global crisis as an opportunity for leapfrogging is not unfamiliar to us.

China has reached its current position by seizing opportunities for 'relative rise' during past major global crises. For example, China secured strategic time and space for its rise by capitalizing on US weakness during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, and the 2008 global financial crisis, and indeed achieved the effect of relative rise. The current situation with COVID-19, where China is actively engaged in international cooperation and support, also reveals its intention to transform the crisis caused by the pandemic into a fourth opportunity for relative rise.

Having achieved relative rise by overcoming crises, China is now in a position to pursue independent rise by presenting differentiated global standards and values. However, China seems preoccupied with escaping the narrative of responsibility for the 'crisis originating from China.' Despite its unexpectedly rapid recovery, the Xi Jinping regime remains bogged down in domestic issues such as regime security and economic development, failing to lead international cooperation to overcome a crisis affecting all of humanity. China has not demonstrated the ability or willingness to present a vision acceptable to the international community and design a new international order.

China still appears to have clear limitations in securing independent and absolute global leadership beyond relative rise. Gaining the upper hand in US-China relations is also not easy. The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating changes in global supply chains and further eroding internationalism. Amidst this, US-China relations are also expected to see weakened economic interdependence and strengthened self-centeredness, leading to intensified competition and conflict rather than cooperation. Even amidst the global epidemic crisis, the two great powers, the US and China, are not seeking cooperation but are instead engaged in a fierce public relations battle over responsibility.

In this process, the US's offensive regarding the vulnerability of the Communist Party system is a red line that China cannot accept. Through the exchange of accusations over COVID-19 responsibility, both the US and China have reaffirmed their fundamental differences in systems, races, and ideologies, and mutual distrust has expanded. Distrust and antipathy towards the US within China have reached their highest point in 41 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations, and some assessments suggest that bilateral relations have reached their worst state. Since political leaders in both the US and China find it difficult to yield or compromise for domestic political reasons, they will inevitably continue the fierce public relations battle.

However, on the other hand, as both countries increasingly need to focus on domestic issues, it is also difficult to create situations of sharp confrontation. The Xi Jinping government, facing political and economic difficulties, must prioritize regime security, making it a rational choice to avoid further expanding the front of conflict with the US. China is already finding it difficult to fulfill the terms of the Phase 1 trade agreement with the US due to the COVID-19 crisis, and the US is likely to continue to exert pressure on China in other ways and in other areas using this as a pretext, placing China in a defensive position.

What China fears most is the formation of an anti-China international coalition led by the US, which would then pressure and blockade China. The Trump administration, facing a presidential election, will not ease its 'blame China' offensive. However, since it is impossible to win the election solely by making China a scapegoat, it will not be easy to indefinitely escalate confrontation and conflict with China. Therefore, it is likely that the US and China will avoid direct confrontation as much as possible and engage in a diplomatic battle to secure spheres of influence through 'proxy containment and competition' by drawing in their respective allies and partners and putting them on the front lines.

Competition to expand spheres of influence, particularly by emphasizing the Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) and the Belt and Road Initiative, is likely to involve both incentives and pressure to draw in intermediate countries in the region. The repercussions of the sharp confrontation between the US and China during the COVID-19 phase on South Korea and the Korean Peninsula are likely to become more severe and unstable. The COVID-19 pandemic is an unprecedented event and is highly fluid, making the post-COVID international order even more unpredictable. If the 'proxy containment and competition' between the US and China intensifies in the post-COVID-19 era, South Korea, due to its unique geopolitical location, will face pressure for an unwanted binary choice more than any other country.

While it is true that South Korea currently has few alternatives other than strengthening strategic flexibility to maximize national interests, the reality is that there are not many options. Nevertheless, the effort to continuously seize new opportunities in the given situation is important. It is necessary to seize the transitional situation in the international community triggered by COVID-19 as a diplomatic golden time and strive to secure South Korea's independent strategic value and position amidst the great powers. The period of weakened or absent great power leadership due to COVID-19 may be prolonged.

In this case, the role of middle powers like South Korea, or alliances among middle powers, may relatively increase. South Korea needs to place more emphasis on forming alliances among middle powers and conduct diplomatic activities in preparation for the changing situation. In particular, South Korea has secured a unique asset through its response to COVID-19, a 'Korean-style' response that differs from developed countries, achieving epidemic prevention effectiveness while maintaining openness and transparency. By providing this experience asset in epidemic prevention to the international community, South Korea should gradually enhance its strategic value and status.

Of course, overconfidence and arrogance regarding the currently popular 'Korean model' should be guarded against. South Korea needs to carefully explore its role in building cooperative mechanisms and joint solidarity in the international community, based on international attention. First, internally, it must accumulate the capacity to play a certain international role even in the post-epidemic era. Then, it is necessary to refine the 'Korean model' through a method where the private sector, particularly in healthcare and IT, takes the lead, with government support in an indirect manner.

Through this, it is a time to gradually expand the scope of epidemic prevention cooperation, form an international cooperation system, and strive to enhance South Korea's independent strategic value and status. It is a time when collective wisdom is more needed than ever to turn a crisis into an opportunity for leapfrogging. This was Yoon Jun-il of 'EAI Sounding Commentary.'